Vir inligting oor die ANC as ‘n gewelddadige, terroristiese instansie is daar geen beter of meer gesaghebbende bron nie as Anthea Jeffery se People’s War: New light on the struggle for South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2014, 676p; Kindle $9,19). Dit blyk dat by verre die grootste lewensverlies onder swartes was. Die bloed wat gevloei het, was nie soseer om Suid-Afrika van apartheid (dus die blanke bewind) te bevry nie, maar by uitstek om te verseker dat die ANC so oorheersend moontlik die politieke mag bekom. Wat die ANC voorhou as ‘n bevrydingstryd was uiteindelik primêr ‘n politieke magstryd, veral gemik teen sy hoofopposisie, die Inkatha Vryheidsparty (IVP). Dat die ANC hierdie “People’s War” in 1990/94 gestook het, blyk uit die volgende: “After the 1994 election there was a dramatic decline in political violence” (James Myburgh, bron hier onder, Kindle 365).
Vir inligting oor die ANC se politieke grondslag is daar onlangs ‘n onontbeerlike boek gepubliseer: James Myburgh se The last Jacobins of Africa: The ANC and the making of modern South Africa (Politicsweb Publishing, 2020, 262p; Kindle $11,49). Dit is die onderwerp van hierdie rubriek. Maar ek moet noem dat dit vir my uiters moeilik was om Myburgh se teks in woorde te klee omdat die onderwerpe so ineengestrengel is. Soos gebruiklik vul ek die teks aan met my eie menings. Myburgh het die aanlyn koerant Politicsweb in 2007 gestig (Kindle 231), met as leuse: “Fair, but fearless” (3). Wat daarin aangebied word, is meer konserwatief as waaraan die linkse Daily Maverick hom skuldig maak. Die teks van die boek is gebaseer op Myburgh se navorsing en sy doktorale proefskrif wat in 2007 goedgekeur is: The African National Congress under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1997-2002) (184).
Mbeki se presidentskap strek amptelik van 1999 tot 2008, maar hy het eintlik van die begin af grootliks die rigting bepaal wat die ANC-regime ingeslaan het; dus ook tydens die presidentskap van Nelson Mandela (1994-1999). Mandela was in baie opsigte hoogs onprakties en gewoon onbekwaam om ‘n staatshoof te wees. Mbeki het namens Mandela politieke leiding aan die ANC-regime gegee en bv as voorsitter by kabinetsvergaderings opgetree. “It is difficult to discern any coherent philosophy within the speeches of President Mandela, the product, as they were, of many hands and minds” (1652). Mandela is veral gebruik om die openbare beeld van die ANC (en homself) plaaslik en in die buiteland te bevorder en om blanke Suid-Afrikaners, veral die Afrikaners, oor die swart magsoorname te paai deur mooi broodjies te bak. Patti Waldmeir skryf (naïewelik) in 1998 (toe Mandela die liefling van die wêreld was): “Mandela made non-racialism the new civil religion of South Africa. He spoke of giving nervous minorities a ‘silver bridge to cross’ to the new South Africa … The politics of reconciliation reigned supreme in those early days” (365). Onnodig om te sê: Die silwer is lankal gesteel en daarna die handevatbrug.
Naspers/Media24 het reeds in 2004 ‘n ooreenkoms met Myburgh vir die publikasie van sy proefskrif aangegaan (195). Die voltooide teks vir die boek is in 2007 aan die uitgewery besorg. Een van die anonieme beoordelaars van die manuskrip het geskryf: “It would raise hackles in the ANC” (225). Uiteindelik is besluit “the book was too controversial to publish” (237). Met ander woorde, Naspers begeer skoothondjiestatus en wil dus nie die ANC aanstoot gee nie. In hoe ‘n mate Naspers sedert 1994 ideologies ontaard het, blyk uit die onlangse publikasie deur Tafelberg-uitgewery van Patric Tariq Mellet, ‘n ANC/MK/SAPK-lid, se boek, The lie of 1652 (Praag 10.10.2020). Naspers se huidige beleid, wat by al sy inligtingsmedia, bv koerante en tydskrifte, waarneembaar is, is: Die ANC moenie aanstoot gegee word nie. Maar die plaaslike blankes, veral die Afrikaners, kan maar grondig met ‘n prulboek soos dié van Mellet beledig word.
Die feit dat Myburgh se boek ‘n teks uit 2007 is, het my aanvanklik laat twyfel of dit die moeite werd sou wees om die e-boek te koop. Nadat ek die boek gelees het, het ek tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat dit noodsaaklike leesstof is vir enigeen wat die werklike aard van die ANC wil verstaan. In sy 2020-voorwoord skryf Myburgh: “If you wish to understand the origins of South Africa’s current predicament, one needs to study the beginnings of the evils we witness today” (266). Baie van die inligting wat hy verskaf, het nie (duidelik) uit koerantberigte geblyk nie. Myburgh verhelder die historiese, wesenlik kommunistiese, grondslae van die ANC. Die val van die Berlynse Muur in 1989 het veroorsaak dat baie van die lande wat deel van die Sowjetunie was, nie-kommunisties geword het. Die ironie is dat hierdie selfde gebeurtenis, wat FW de Klerk genoop het om onderhandelinge te begin en mandaatloos die mag aan die swartes oor te gee, tot ‘n wesenlik kommunistiese bewind in Suid-Afrika gelei het. Suid-Afrika is steeds uit pas met die wêreld; steeds nie ‘n normale samelewing nie. Ons beleef die hoogbloei van rassediskriminasie terwyl dit taboe in die res van die wêreld is.
Volgens die HAT beteken jakobyn “vurige voorstander van die Franse Revolusie.” In die Collins World Encyclopedia (2003) word die term Jacobin, wat in die boektitel voorkom, soos volg verduidelik: “member of an extreme republican club of the French Revolution … they proclaimed the French republic, had the king executed, and overthrew the moderate Girondins … they began the Reign of Terror [October 1793 to July 1794], led by Robespierre [1758-1794]. After his execution … the club was abandoned and the name ‘Jacobin’ passed into general use for any left-wing extremist” (p 476). Toegepas op Suid-Afrika kan gesê word dat ons in 1990/94 ‘n revolusie beleef het, dat die ANC die nie-kommunistiese NP-regering omver gewerp het, dat die ANC eerder ‘n klub vir sy elite-lede as ‘n politieke party is, dat voortgesette geweld en terreur ‘n wesenskenmerk van die nuwe Suid-Afrika is en dat die ANC ongetwyfeld ‘n uiters linkse instansie is. Let ook daarop dat in die jakobyn-konteks hier bo van ‘n republiek gepraat word en nie van demokrasie nie.
In die voorwoord noem Myburgh dat hy sedert 1997 politieke navorsing doen; aanvanklik vir die Demokratiese Alliansie (18) en van 2001 af as student aan die St Antony’s College in Oxford (65). In die boek maak hy in ruime mate van amptelike, interne dokumente van die ANC gebruik. Hy vestig telkens die aandag op die verskil tussen wat die ANC amptelik intern aan sy lede meedeel en wat openbaar gemaak word. Dit kom neer op doelbewuste misleiding van die publiek oor die ANC se beleid en motiewe (6171). “The assurances and concessions made in each stage were never meant to provide a permanent obstacle to the attainment of those longer-term goals” (82). Ek onthou dat Mbeki vroeg in die ANC-bewind gesê het dat die ANC hom nie gebonde voel aan die ooreenkomste wat daar met die NP-regering aangegaan is nie omdat die ANC toe nog nie in beheer van die land was nie. Myburgh beaam dit (1983).
Reeds in 1997 het die ANC op sy hoofdoel besluit, naamlik “the enforcement of ‘demographic representivity’ across all spheres and levels of endeavour” (36). Jare later het FW de Klerk begin neul dat die ANC-beleid nie die letter en veral gees weerspieël waarop die NP (naïewelik) met die ANC ooreengekom het nie. Myburgh skryf: “This was a plan for mechanistically replacing white with black domination, or ‘African hegemony’ as the ANC described it. Enforcing such outcomes would also clearly require unending racial discrimination against the country’s racial minorities” (36). “The ANC was very careful to ensure that the constitution enshrined neither the ‘irrelevance of clour’ nor ‘individual merit as the criterion of privilege’ for this, it was felt, would entrench the advantages of the white minority in perpetuity” (6214).
Wat die ANC bedryf, kan onmoontlik ‘n liberale demokrasie wees. “Liberal democracy is based upon the careful counterbalancing of the principle of majority rule, with minority rights” (3217). “Once political office was secured the ANC turned … to reshaping the state so that it too came to embody the will of the black majority” (3246). “The role of the ANC was to exercise power on the behalf of the black majority” (3270).
Die ANC het hierdie beleid in Mandela se dienstermyn as president (1994-1999) aanvaar. Enersyds dui dit op die absolute valsheid van Mandela se bewering dat hy teen swart heerskappy gekant was. Andersyds belig dit die algehele mislukking van De Klerk se beloofde magsdeling, wat in verswelgende meerderheidsregering getransformeer is. Die ANC het beweer dat sy bevrydingstryd teen rassediskriminasie gemik was; dat dit die groot euwel in die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing was waaraan hy ‘n einde wou maak. In werklikheid sit die ANC (verskerpte) rassediskriminasie voort, myns insiens ter groter benadeling van die land as ooit tevore, met die swartes wat buitensporig daarby baat terwyl die belange van veral die blankes uitermate benadeel word. Die doelbewuste ontheemding van die blankes het veral duidelik geword toe Mbeki met die verkondiging van sy swart Afrikaan-nasionalisme, die Afrika-renaissance genoem, begin het (77).
Nog ‘n skandalige beleid is daarna begin: “In 1997 and 1998, the ANC implemented a policy of cadre deployment whereby party loyalists would be ushered into all centres of power in society” (42). Byvoorbeeld, die ANC “largely dismantled the ‘merit-system’ in civil service appointments in favour of a patronage-based one” (82; ook 2266). Ook dít het tydens die Mandela-bewind ‘n aanvang geneem terwyl daar dikwels voorgegee word dat dinge nie te sleg tydens die Mandela/Mbeki-era (1994-2008) gegaan het nie; dat agteruitgang eers met Jacob Zuma se presidentskap (2009-2018) begin het. Die destruktiewe gevolge van kaderontplooiing het met verloop van tyd al hoe duideliker geword.
Tans veroorsaak kroniese ondoeltreffendheid en toksiese korrupsie/steelsug dat die land ‘n mislukte staat op die rand van algehele ineenstorting is. In die land se geskiedenis was daar nog nooit so ‘n groot konsentrasie van immoreles in hoë poste soos tans nie. Desnieteenstaande gee die ANC-regime graag voor dat hy moreel die hoë grond beklee. Tussen die ANC se nasionale konferensies is die mag in die hande van ‘n klein groepie ANC-kornuite gekonsentreer, naamlik die ongeveer honderd lede van die nasionale uitvoerende komitee, wat kwartaalliks vergader, en die ses lede van die dagbestuur of nasionale werkskomitee wat al om die ander week byeenkom (3537).
Die ANC gee voor dat Suid-Afrika se geskiedenis eintlik eers in 1994 begin het. Hy het natuurlik goeie rede om ‘n sluier te probeer trek oor die afmetings wat sy onbeskaafde vernietigingswerk en terrorisme van 1961 af tot vóór die algemene verkiesing in 1994 aangeneem het. Die blanke politieke bewind van 1652 tot 1910 word as kolonialisme afgemaak en sedert Uniewording in 1910 as “colonialism of a special type” (94). In hierdie opsig, soos in so baie ander opsigte, was (die swartes in) die ANC afhanklik van die (ideologiese) leiding wat daar van (die blankes in) die Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party (SAKP) uitgegaan het. “By the end of the 1980s the ANC was dominated by the SACP” (563).
In 1962 het die SAKP op daardie “special type”-formulering besluit, asook op die “National Democratic Revolution” (NDR) (94). Met die NDR is daar sedert 1994 stadig maar seker vordering gemaak. Dit is iets waarop John Kane-Berman die aandag gevestig het (Praag 23.06.2017), moontlik vanweë beïnvloeding deur Myburgh se manuskrip (249). Min ander kommentators is bedag op die deurlopende vordering wat die ANC met sy NDR maak. Dit is ‘n voortgesette swart Afrikaan-revolusie waarin blankes per definisie al hoe minder en uiteindelik geen lewensruimte gegun sal word nie. Die jongste NDR-skuif is die onteiening sonder vergoeding van blankes se eiendom. Maar die ANC het reeds in 1988 hierop besluit (1019). “The 1994 election was a ‘breakthrough’ not a ‘settlement'” (6237). Met die eerste revolusie in 1994 het die ANC/SAKP sy voet in die deur gekry deur die regering oor te neem. Die tweede revolusie beoog die omverwerping van die kapitalistiese stelsel met sosialisme (976). Die term “sosialisme” word as ‘n eufemisme vir kommunisme gebruik. Maar dit word nie openlik erken nie. Skynheiligheidshalwe “the ANC should not publicly tie itself to Marxism-Leninism” (983).
In 1994 het die ANC homself bedrieglik voorgedoen as “a non-racial liberal democracy” (281). Al drie begrippe wek ‘n gunstige indruk, maar al drie aansprake is vals. Volgens Mbeki “true ‘democracy’ lay not in the right of the electorate to freely choose (and change) their government, but in the ability of the national liberation movement to recognise and pursue their real and ultimate will” (3924). “Only the ANC leadership recognised, and could pursue, the real interests of the nation” (3938). Dit is kom neer op paternalisme en staatkundige sabotasie. Die kiesers bepaal nie die ANC se beleid nie. Die ANC besluit watter beleid die (ongesofistikeerde, ongeletterde, oningeligte) kiesers nodig het.
Die ANC-regime in Suid-Afrika sou glo duidelik verskil van die swart regerings in die res van Afrika. Nadat die ANC sy mag gevestig het, was daar egter “a drift towards one-party dominance, centralised control and racially driven politics” (289). Die verraad wat in 1990/94 gepleeg is, het al hoe duideliker geword, met as gevolg: “The permanent exclusion of the white minority from any share of political power” (320); dus presies die teenoorgestelde van wat De Klerk vóór die 1992-referendum aan die blanke kiesers belowe het.
“The NP leadership had achieved very little, in constitutional terms, from the negotiations (indeed, probably less than Ian Smith had in Rhodesia, from a greatly weaker position, in 1980)” (416). In die geval van Rhodesië is ooreengekom dat 20 blankes sewe jaar lank sitting in die Zimbabwiese parlement van 120 lede sou hê. In Suid-Afrika se geval hoef daar nie ‘n enkele blanke parlementslid te wees nie. Ian Smith (1919-2007) haal Cicero aan: “A nation can survive its fools … but it cannot survive treason from within” (The great betrayal, London: Blake Publishing, 1997, p 320). Alex Henshaw skryf: “There is no dishonour in a lost cause – the shame is with those who betrayed you” (327).
Die reaksie van die meeste plaaslike blankes op hierdie verraad was egter teleurstellend. Myburgh skryf: “There had been very little opposition by whites either to the loss of statutory privileges – most of which had been removed by the previous [NP] government – or to the redistribution of government expenditure” (2526). “After the 1994 election there was a widespread acceptance of, or resignation to the new political order by white South Africans … Afrikaner nationalism, which had shaped the course of South African politics for forty years, ceased to be a powerful political force” (406). “According to Patti Waldmeir, the ANC were expecting far greater resistance and were surprised by the rapidity with which Afrikaners made peace with the new order” (1929).
Myburgh verwys ook na “the rapidity with which Afrikaner power had collapsed” (422). Enersyds kan dit dui op die doeltreffendheid van die pro-ANC-propaganda van die Nasperskoerante, Engelse koerante en die SABC. Andersyds toon dit dat apartheid oordrewe anti-swart voorgestel word. Wat in Suid-Afrika ná 1994 gebeur het, is verder soortgelyk aan wat ná 1980 in Zimbabwe plaasgevind het: “A long line of opportunists attempting to climb on the bandwagon” (Smith, 359). (Die ooreenkomste is so groot dat ek ‘n plan behoort te maak om oor Smith se boek te skryf.)
Myburgh skryf: “Within the South African context, the implementation of Afrikaner hegemony after 1948 provoked vehement opposition … The concentration of power by the ANC, however, provoked only pinpricks of dissent” (3674). Die Afrikanerdom en Afrikaans het onmeetbaar by nasionalisme gebaat. Ons heil en die heil van Afrikaans hang van die herlewing van Afrikanernasionalisme af, in direkte opposisie teen swart of Afrikaan-nasionalisme en verengelsing. Myns insiens behoort Afrikaans die enigste amptelike taal in Suid-Afrika te wees. Oor die ANC se aanhang van swart nasionalisme behoort daar geen twyfel te wees nie. Tydens die Rivonia-verhoor in 1964 het Mandela gesê: “The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African nationalism” (584).
Sedert 1994 word daar grootliks volgens ras in Suid-Afrika gestem (296). Waarmee ons opgeskeep sit, is ‘n skyndemokrasie. “As James Madison [1751-1836] argued, a shifting majority, and the concomitant possibility of being displaced in power, was a crucial inducement to restraint for the ruling party” (428). In Suid-Afrika is daar die skandalige “majoritarian nature of the final constitution; the consentration of power at the centre; the growing weakness of parliament’s ability to place any check on the executive; the blurring of the lines between party and state; and, the increasing tendency of the ANC to dismiss the legitimacy of opposition” (445). “From its own standpoint there is nothing undemocratic in the party’s enjoying a monopoly of power within the state” (680). Nog erger: “There is no sphere of collective endeavour regarded as falling outside of the realm of politics – and which should not have to submit to the goals of the national democratic revolution” (3307).
Ons sit met “’totalitarian democracy’, but what this book will call Jacobin democracy” (691). “Jacobin democracy … was based upon the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics … It widens the scope of politics to embrace the whole of human existence” (698). Hiervolgens val niks buite die ANC se bevoegdheid vir inmenging nie. Daar is ‘n verskil tussen ‘n “congress”, soos die ANC, en ‘n “party” – “the former being more radical and confrontational than the latter. While the party recognised the legitimacy of other political groupings, the congress claimed to represent ‘all the people’; to embody the national will” (667); dus “the democratic will of the people as a whole and particularly its black majority” (900). Maar met “the people” word meesal eksklusief die swartes bedoel. “The ANC regarded itself as synonymous with ‘the people'” (3280).
Die ideologiese leiding wat die ANC van die SAKP ontvang, is deur veral Jode geformuleer. ‘n MK-lid, Michael Harmel, het in 1950 vorendag gekom met die karakterisering van blank Suid-Afrika as “colonialism of a special type” (773). Volgens Mbeki “the relationship between ‘the white rulers of South Africa and the non-white masses is essentially imperialistic. In a word: there are two nations in South Africa … White South Africa is a semi-independent imperialist state. Black South Africa is its colony'” (782).
In 1954 skryf Harmel: “The economic content of national liberation in South Africa must centre on the redivision of the land and the nationalisation of the principle means of production” (791). “Very soon after, the Freedom Charter, drawn up in 1955 and adopted by the ANC as its official programme the following year, gave voice to such demands. It called for the land to be ‘re-divided amongst those who work it’; the ‘national wealth’ of the country to be ‘restored to the people’; and, for the ‘mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry’ to be transferred to ‘the ownership of the people as a whole'” (799). Hierna is die SAKP se The road to South African freedom (1962) hoofsaaklik deur Harmel geformuleer. Onder meer word Vladimir Lenin se standpunt onderskryf: “That what the white minority had attained had been entirely at the expense of the black majority” (854).
Mandela het in 1994 beweer: “It is the labour of black workers that has built the cities, roads and factories” (1108). Mbeki het in 1979 die swartes as “the producers of wealth” gedefinieer (1039). “It followed that the ANC-SACP were entitled to return this wealth to ‘the people’ through the expropriation of white-owned property” (1048). Eie prestasie deur blankes word sonder meer ontken. “The material wellbeing of the white minority and its political, social and economic privileges were rooted in its racial domination over, and exploitation of, the African majority and Coloured and Indian minorities” (927). Soos Lenin wil die SAKP “a dictatorship of the people” daarstel (874). “This democratic state … would suppress the former ruling classes and set about effecting a transformation of society” (884).
Sedert 1969 onderskryf die ANC die SAKP se “programme of Africanisation in the state, economy, and educational system – which would, necessarily, require extensive racial discrimination against the white minority. At the same time then as demanding ‘equal opportunities for all’ the SACP [and ANC] insisted that in order to correct ‘the legacy of colonialism, priority must be given to the training of African and non-white specialists in every field'” (909). Die inherente rassisme van die ANC, soos blyk uit die absolute voorkeur wat aan die belange van swartes gegee word, is deur die Joodse kommunis, Ben Turok, beaam: “The movement must be … led by black leaders … it is an essential requirement if the movement is to maintain its credibility with the mass of the people” (948). Dus, die ANC is rassisties omdat sy ondersteuners rassisties is. Dit is waarom ANC-gesinde kiesers ingevolge ras stem. Maar dit is die ANC wat eens valslik beweer het dat hy ‘n Grondwet beoog waarin “racism … shall be outlawed” (1268). Die ANC se riglyne vir ‘n Grondwet “remained overwhelmingly Jacobin. Political rights and freedoms were conditional on support for the ANC’s goals” (1268). Tony Leon het voorspel: “Reverse discrimination will be accorded constitutional preference over other, perhaps more fundamental, rights” (1289).
“The ANC Policy guidelines of 1992 stated that, ‘Management in both the public and private sectors will have to be de-racialised so that rapidly and progressively it comes to reflect the skills of the entire population'” (1304). Met die oog hierop word “racial preferences in appointments and promotions” vereis (1304). “De-racialise” noodsaak dus die uiterste rassisme. “The term ‘de-racialise’ was now used instead of ‘Africanise’, ‘non-racialism’ instead of ‘revolutionary nationalism'” (1723). “‘Africanising’ … was hardly reconcilable with the values of non-racialism. The Oxford English Dictionary defines non-racial as ‘Not involving race, racial factors, or racial discrimination’; and non-racialism as ‘The principle or practice of not discriminating on the basis of race’; while to Africanise is ‘To give an African character to; to make African; to subject to the influence or domination of Black Africans'” (1739). Waarmee die ANC besig is, is “the re-racialisation of society” (3347).
“Affirmative action would be so powerful as to override all personal rights and freedoms as well as to supercede the specific provisions of the property clauses” (1324). As dit hoe is, beweer die ANC egter dat daar nie rassediskriminasie in die toepassing van regstellende aksie sal wees nie. “This will not be done at the expense of others, nor lead to a lowering of standards” (1594). “Affirmative action would be used not to discriminate, but simply to ensure that ‘those who were disadvantaged by apartheid in the past’ had an opportunity to catch up” (1604).
Kort voor die 1994-verkiesing het Mandela ‘n beroep op die blankes gedoen om nie die land te verlaat nie (1585). Enkele jare later het Mbeki gesê die blankes wat wil emigreer, kan dit gerus maar doen. Die aanslag van die ANC was nie net teen apartheid gemik nie, maar ingevolge die leerstelling van “uitsonderlike soort kolonialisme” teen al die blanke inwoners. “It proceeded though to negate the contribution of white South Africans to the building of the economy, state, and society … Whites had not achieved or contributed anything other than at the expense, or through the exploitation, of the black population … The roots of the ‘historic injustice’ reached back all the way to the first white settlement in 1652” (1759). In 1995 “Mbeki stated that among the great ‘distinguishing features’ of this history were: ‘the genocidal destruction of the Khoisan, the importation of slaves from the East, the massive land dispossession of the indigenous majority'” (1766).
Die ANC het daarop aangedring dat die finale grondwet ná die 1994-verkiesing deur die gekose grondwetlike vergadering opgestel moet word (1837). Die armsalige NP-onderhandelaars het hiertoe ingestem. Dit het meegebring dat die bepaling in die tussentydse 1993-Grondwet dat Afrikaans se status nie aangetas mag word nie, uit die 1996-Grondwet gelaat is. Die kommunistiese Jood, Joe Slovo, wat tydens die oorgangstyd in groot mate die strategie van die ANC bepaal het, het na afloop van die grondwetlike onderhandelinge gesê: “We got pretty much what we wanted … Eveything in the interim constitution can be rewritten by the democratically elected representatives of the people” (1844).
‘n Meer verdoemende getuigskrif vir die NP-onderhandelaars is kwalik denkbaar. Hulle het hulle deur kommuniste aan die neus laat lei. “The National Party had promised white South Africans power-sharing in the 1992 referendum, and the ANC allowed the NP to believe that this system could be enshrined in the final constitution” (1852). “The ANC ensured however that such half-promises were not, in any way, constitutionally binding” (1861). In 1992 het die ANC besluit ‘n regering van nasionale eenheid sal slegs aanvaarbaar wees “if it does not delay or obstruct the process of orderly transition to majority rule and … the parties that have lost the elections will not be able to paralyse the functioning of government” (1861).
Die Grondwet het Mandela in staat gestel om die lede van die Konstitusionele Hof te benoem. “There was not a single person on the court who could be described as unsympathetic to the ANC” (1881). Tydens die NP-regering het dosente in die regte deurlopend kapsie gemaak teen apartheid en omtrent alles wat die regering gedoen het. Doeltreffende polisie-optrede om wet en orde te handhaaf, is verdag gemaak deur te beweer dat die land ‘n polisiestaat is. Sedert 1994 het al hierdie grootbekke stil geword. Die verpolitisering van die regstelsel word nie gekritiseer nie. “The English newspapers and universities no longer took an oppositional stance to government” (2436) – eintlik ook nie die gedrukte Afrikaanse koerante nie.
Voorheen is ‘n LLB-graad vir aanstelling as regter vereis. “The constitution … set out no minimum qualifications for appointment at any level of the judiciary, requiring only that they be ‘appropriately qualified'” (2956). ‘n Diploma in die regte is dus voldoende en afdoende praktykondervinding word nie vereis nie (2962). In 1999 was daar 1 550 blanke advokate in Suid-Afrika en 300 nieblanke advokate (2962). Die Regterlike Dienskommissie/Judicial Services Commission (JSC), met Dullah Omar as justisieminister (1994-1999), dus toe Mandela die president was, het toegegee aan die eis “that race become the overriding criterion in the appointmemt and promotion of judges” (3036).
“Race, therefore, becomes the main criterion, with government secure in the knowledge that most blacks aspiring to be judges are party supporters … They could be expected to ally themselves with the racial goals of the movement … The ‘ultimate objective’ was ‘that the judiciary reaches a stage when it is able to reflect the demographics of South Africa” (3055). “Overall 89 per cent of new judges appointed to the bench between 1994 and June 2004 would be black, Coloured or Indian” (3065). “It signalled the subservience of that body [JSC] to the racial agenda of the ruling party … The ANC had an in-built majority in the JSC … Furthermore … ‘it is common currency in legal circles that a de facto [ANC] caucus exists and operates in the commission'” (3044). Maar regsgeleerdes, feitlik sonder uitsondering, leef kritiekloos saam met hierdie ernstige wantoestand.
Daar is geen duidelike onderskeid meer tussen die wetgewende en regterlike gesag nie. “The Constitutional Court … was packed with lawyers who shared the movement’s [ANC’s] worldview” (3389). Vandaar ‘ n hofuitspraak soos dié oor die taalbeleid van Free State University. “By 2004 … at least seven of the 11 judges had been ANC members before their appointment to the bench … All five of the non-black judges on the court had an ANC background” (3389). Johann van der Westhuizen was deel hiervan (2004-2016). Wat hy ook al skryf, maak nie saak hoe vergesog of dwars nie, word in Media24 se koerante gepubliseer. “The Constitutional Court … saw its central role not as the protection of racial or political minorities, but ensuring that government held to the substantive provisions of the Constitution (designed to uplift the historically deprived majority)” (3395).
“The promise made by Mandela in 1994 that South Africa was now ‘one nation’ was displaced by the ‘two nations’ thesis. In a speech in May 1998, Mbeki described South Africa as [a] ‘country of two nations’ – the origins of which lay in ‘the arrival of European colonists in our country, almost 350 years ago” (3148). Teen 1998 was die ANC se versoeningsbeleid vergete en het sy beleid al hoe meer radikaal geword. “A ‘normal’ or ‘non-racial’ society was defined as one where every state and social institution – at every level – reflected the current demographic composition of the country as a whole” (2821). Toe is 75% swart verteenwoordiging vereis. Deesdae, weens die hoë geboortesyfer onder swartes en die invloei van (onwettige) inkommers, het daardie syfers 80%+ geword.
“In order to advance the movement [ANC] towards these goals discrimination was encouraged. And, in order to set, and monitor, the attainment of these racial targets, race classification was reintroduced according to the old apartheid designations. As Mbeki later stated, the goal of the ANC was to ‘ensure that all levels of our society reflect the racial and gender composition of South Africa’. Equality of opportunity, or treatment, which prohibited differentiation between black and white would allow these racial disparities to endure” (2821). Die rassediskriminasie teen blankes “would continue until this ‘racist legacy of inequality’, manifested in ‘white over-representation’ across society, had been completely eliminated” (2828). Waarop dit neerkom, is dat, as dit van die ANC afhang, hierdie rassediskriminasie teen veral die blankes tot in die oneindige voortgesit sal word.
Soos in die geval van ‘n broer wat in die tronk is, word daar nie gepraat oor die blatante rassediskriminasie wat universiteite deesdae pleeg nie. Die blankes word grootliks van die gesogste beroepe uitgesluit. In 1998 het die minister van gesondheid aangekondig “that medical schools would be obliged to implement a quota system to ensure demographic representivity in their 1999 intake of first year medical students. According to the Director General of Health, funding to medical schools would be proportional to the number of black medical students enrolled” (2828). Gaan gerus die keuringsbeleid van Stellenbosch University se mediese fakulteit op die internet na.
Die ANC-regime het die vuil gewoonte om die plaaslike universiteite in alle opsigte tot onderdanigheid te dwing deur te dreig om hulle owerheidsfinansiering af te skaal of te beëindig. Van die universiteite se kant is daar hartlike samewerking met die ANC-regime. Daar is geen sprake van verset en aandrang op universitêre outonomie nie. In die advertensies om poste word openlik gesê dat by aanstellings voorkeur gegee sal word aan diegene in die aangewese groepe (2858), dus dat sover moontlik teen die blankes, veral mans, gediskrimineer sal word.
“Although the ANC’s own policies had resultated in a decline in the quality of school education, it remained insistent that universities – like all other institutions in society – conform to the ‘demographics’ of society. The National Plan on Higher Education (2001) stated that ensuring that the ‘student and staff profiles progressively reflect the demographic realities of South African society’ – in both admissions and graduations – remained strategic objectives of government. It warned that if institutions did not put in place ‘equity targets’ to address black under-representation ‘or put in place clear strategies for achieving them, the Minister will have no hesitation in introducing quotas in the future'” (4220).
“Conformity to the goal of ‘demographic representivity’ – particularly for the more prestigious degrees – required the lowering of minimum requirements for entry and the racial exclusion of many white and Indian students who were ‘overrepresented’ among the top achievers” (4304). Volgens ANC-beleid moet die aanwesigheid van swartes in sport ook demografies verteenwoordigend wees. “For two to three years, let’s not mind losing international competitions” (4381). Dit is dieselfde ANC/UDF wat vóór 1994 verkondig het dat politiek uit sport geweer moet word.
Myburgh beweer: “Having given up power, there was no discernible decline in their [the white’s] fortunes. This powerlessness made their continued prosperity less, rather than more, tolerable for the ANC” (4405). Baie blankes lê besondere kundigheid en vindingrykheid aan die dag. Maar die blatante rassediskriminasie van die afgelope kwarteeu het groot smart in baie blanke huise veroorsaak. Wanneer ek die ná-1994-verskynsel van blanke bedelaars op die strate sien, wonder ek hoe die NP-onderhandelaars, in hulle weelderige huise, dit met hulle gewetes versoen – veronderstellend dat hulle gewetes het.
In 1998 ‘n ANC “document rejected the notion that the state should be a ‘neutral, non-partisan entity’ and endorsed the idea that instead it should be ‘an instrument’ in the hands of the liberation movement … and used to pursue the interests of the racial majority” (3065). Dit is duidelik dat die ANC-regime sy magsposisie sover moontlik misbruik om die blankes se belange soveel moontlik te benadeel. “The apartheid state has to be destroyed in a process of fundamental transformation” (3074). Met die oog hierop is ‘n National Deployment Committee in 1998 daargestel (3090). Om die funksionering van hierdie komitee aan te help word lyste bygehou “of key positions as well as the cadres available to fill them … The ANC needed to conduct a ‘skills audit of all our cadreship'” (3108).
As geswore Afrikanis, wat ‘n sterk anti-blanke gesindheid insluit, was Mbeki oorsensitief vir enige tekortkominge van of kritiek op swartes. In hierdie verband skryf Thomas Hodgkin: “African nasionalists have been compelled to develop their own counter-attack; to answer the myth of African barbarism and backwardness with the counter-myth of African civilisation and achievement. This answer took such forms as glorifying those African leaders who had resisted the colonial intruders and emphasising the better qualities of pre-colonial African society” (3973). By gebrek aan ‘n ander substansiële voorbeeld van ‘n vroeë beskawing in Afrika word dan na antieke Egipte verwys, wat bitter min indien enigiets met swart Afrika te make het. Mandela het ook hierdie laai in sy outobiografie uitgehaal. Hy is ook ‘n toonbeeld van verset teen die blanke bewind en word gevolglik sedert 1994 heeltemal oordrewe gehuldig. Die probleem is dat Mandela se roem berus op wat hy vernietig het; nie op wat hy tot stand gebring het nie.
Met oordrewe retoriek het Mbeki beweer: “We the Africans, who led the ancient world in science, technology, intellectual activity and the arts, have stood by as the rest of the world moved forward while we regressed towards becoming a historical curiosity. Whereas as a continent we gave birth to all humanity, we are today seen as the least advanced of all human societies anywhere in the world. For a millennium, including the passing century, we have failed to destroy the insulting and criminal prejudice which has described the black human complexion as the very representation of everything that is sub-human within the human race” (4548). Die 21ste eeu sou glo “the African Century” wees (4563). Tot dusver is bitter min hiervan waarneembaar.
Myburgh skryf: “In order to fully answer the myth of African inferiority, African nationalism had to find an explanation for the disparity of achievement between Europe (and her descendants) and black Africa which lent this myth its apparent plausibility. It was in this context that the idea that Europe, and her descendants in Africa, had attained their advantages through the exploitation of black Africans had such resonance” (3996). “It ascribed the present advantages of the white group to the enslavement, dispossession, and exploitation of the black majority” (4058). Afrika-nasionaliste verkies om te glo dat Afrika, vóór die koms van die blankes, ‘n paradys was. Hulle bly hunker om daarheen terug te keer, “to be ‘reborn’ to her glorious past” (4483). “The idea of rebirth was intrinsic … to African nationalist thought” (4003). Vandaar Mbeki se gewaande Afrika-renaissance, waarvan eintlik niks tereg gekom het nie en waarvan ons ook nie eens meer hoor nie. “The end of white rule in Africa had not brought the long promised, and long delayed, continental rebirth” (4738). Sonder ekonomiese voorspoed is herlewing nie moontlik nie. Voorspoed is onmoontlik as die staatskas leeg gesteel word. “Ultimately genuine equality and true recognition could only be built upon real achievement” (4752).
Voordat in die laaste twee hoofstukke, 7 en 8, by Mbeki se berugte MIV/vigsbeleid uitgekom word, verskaf Myburgh die volgende opsomming. “The ANC needed to mobilise against the white minority after the transfer of power in order to hold ‘the [black] nation’ together … Mbeki … was driven by a passionate desire to prove that black Africans could govern successfully, and democratically, and manage a sophisticated and modern economy. Yet the policies of centralisation and deployment employed to hasten the attainment of that goal resulted in institutional decay and a drift towards authoritarianism. There was, from the beginning, a refusal to acknowledge the trade-offs that would have to be made between ‘affirmatief action’ and efficiency, Africanisation and non-racialism … When the predictable consequences of these policies became self-evident, the only way to maintain the purity and infallibility of the ANC’s ultimate purposes was to conjure up the ‘demon’ of white racism” (4765).
Ek skryf nie in besonderhede oor Mbeki se MIV/vigs-debakel nie omdat dit van min aktuele belang is. “HIV/Aids did not fit easily into the African nationalist paradigm, which saw all the woes of the black majority as a product of colonialism and apartheid” (4786). “Aids may confirm Western racial prejudices about black Africans … The idea that Aids had originated in Africa [is] a ‘calculated racial insult'” (4798); “[ie] the thesis about the alleged original transmission of HIV ‘from animals to humans'” (6123). Die hoë voorkoms van vigs onder swartes kan die indruk wek of versterk dat swartes seksueel ooraktief of losbandig is. Mbeki het ‘n renons in enige kritiek op swartes. Hy wou nie erken dat MIV (mensimmuniteitsgebreksvirus) vigs veroorsaak nie. Hy het die oorsaak eerder in sosio-ekonomiese status gesoek (5640), bv in “poverty, malnutrition, poor sanitation and parasitic diseases” (5633).
Hiermee het Mbeki vigslyers vrygeskel van verantwoordelikheid en die geleentheid geskep om die skuld eerder op die blankes te pak. “The idea that immune deficiency was caused mainly by poverty fitted into the old anti-colonial paradigm of the liberation movement, since poverty was a ‘legacy of apartheid and colonialism'” (6137). Op hierdie manier Mbeki “defended the dignity of the black majority, absolved the ANC of moral responsibility, and placed the blame for the epidemic back onto the ‘legacy of the past'” (6310). “Taken together, Mbeki argued, … scientific claims confirmed the racial stereotypes he believed white people held about blacks” (6130). Chris McGreal het gesê: “Mbeki is obsessed by race” (5927).
Rusty Bernstein (1926-2002), ‘n Joodse kommunis, was die hoofskrywer van die Vryheidsmanifes van 1955, wat die grondslag van die ANC se beleid is. Ben Turok (1927-2019) het die ekonomiese beleid vervat in die manifes geformuleer. Hierna het nog Joodse kommuniste, soos Michael Harmel (1915-1974) en Joe Slowo (1926-1995), die beleid verder bepaal. Mbeki, self voorheen ‘n SAKP-lid, was sedert 1994 die hooftoepasser van hierdie beleid, wat tot op hede, wat die hoofoogmerke betref, dieselfde gebly het. Die nuwe Suid-Afrika kon dit kwalik slegter getref het as met ‘n regime soos die openlik rassistiese, ondoeltreffende en immorele ANC.
Die ANC se oogmerk is “to transform South Africa ‘from a European outpost in Africa into an African country, with a predominantly African cultural character, and showing a face to the world that is nationally representative of its peoples'” (2876). Dit word normalisering genoem (2882). Ek is ‘n Europeër of Westerling in Afrika. Dit is vir my mooi as iets opgebou en bewaar word. Dit is vir my weersinwekkend as wat onder die leiding van blankes oor eeue daargestel is, afgebreek en vernietig word. Dit is wat die ANC doen.
