Etiket: Edmund Burke

Leon Lemmer: Peter Hitchens oor die ontaarding van die Britte

Christopher Hitchens (1949-2011) was ‘n radikale, konfronterende, marxistiese joernalis wat baie polemieke met sy omtrede uitlatings ontketen het. Saam met Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett en Sam Harris was hy een van die grondleggers van die militante Nuwe Ateïsme. In sy latere lewe is Hitchens daarvan beskuldig dat hy polities (meer) regsgesind geword het, bv vanweë sy renons in Bill Clinton en sy veroordeling van NAVO se militêre inmenging in Bosnië.

Vandag skryf ek egter oor Christopher se minder bekende broer, Peter Hitchens (gebore in 1951), ook ‘n Britse joernalis, wat in sy prille jeug ‘n aanhanger van Leon Trotskie (1879-1940) se marxisme was. Hy verwys na homself as “a former Bolshevik” (bron hier onder, Kindle 4904). Peter het polities van verlinks tot regs gevorder, van sosialisme, via die Britse Arbeidersparty tot lid van die Konserwatiewe Party (1997-2003); ‘n party wat hom mettertyd ook nie meer aangestaan het nie. Deesdae beskou hy Edmund Burke (1729-1797 – Praag 2.05.2020) as sy mentor. Hitchens wil nie polities byderwets wees nie. Hy is ten gunste van die doodstraf en gekant teen homoseksualiteit asook die dekriminalisering van dwelmgebruik, bv dagga. “Legalization … lead[s] to social acceptance” (3820). Hy het geen simpatie met mense wat deur eie toedoen aan longkanker (weens die rookgewoonte) en vigs (weens homoseksuele gedrag) ly nie. Tydens Suid-Afrika se 1994-oorgang/ondergang was hy in Suid-Afrika. Hy het tot die juiste gevolgtrekking gekom, naamlik dat Nelson Mandela nie ‘n heilige is nie. Verder het hy die Wikipedia korrek as ‘n linkse naslaanbron geïdentifiseer.

Soms dryf Hitchens sy konserwatisme dalk te ver. Hy is bv gekant teen die “valsheid” van Britse Somertyd. Hy verkies Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) dwarsdeur die jaar. Hy verset hom selfs teen die metrisering van mate en gewigte. “My instincts … revolt against the shiny, efficient, ugly and stone-cold metric system” (4797). “English measures … pounds and ounces, inches and feet, chains and furlongs … were destroyed with slow subtlety and cunning, and resistance is left to a few eccentrics, such as me, fuming hopelessly against a loss nobody else can see” (4803). “[English] measurements … were based on the individual. A pound was what could be held in the hand. A pint was what a grown man might reasonably drink to quench his thirst. An inch was the top joint of a thumb, a foot was, well, a foot, and a yard was a pace. A fathom of water was deep enough to close over a man’s head. They worked outwards from the human. Metric measurements, by contrast, were based on a (mistaken) calculation of the Earth’s circumference” (4839).

Ek bespreek vandag die volgende boek van Peter Hitchens: The abolition of Britain: From Winston Churchill to Theresa May (London: Bloomsbury, 1999/2018, 368p; Amazon Kindle $21,23). Die hooftitel van die boek word in die 2018-voorwoord soos volg verduidelik: “The abolition of a great and famous nation is now virtually complete. This book, originally [1999] intended as a warning in letters of fire, might now at least serve as a headstone” (116). Die newetitel wek verkeerdelik die indruk dat hierdie boek onlangs geskryf is. Al die hoofstukke is reeds in 1999 vir die eerste keer gepubliseer. Slegs die voor- en nawoord is later bygevoeg. Nogtans toon die teks uitstekende insig in die diepgaande veranderinge wat sedert die dood van Winston Churchill (1874-1965) in die Britse omstandighede en geestesklimaat ingetree het. “The death of Churchill, an unchallengeable father figure, was a final farewell to a reassuring past” (182).

“My argument is that we chose the wrong future in the second half of the twentieth century” (101). Hy noem dit ‘n kulturele revolusie (162). “We have gravely devalued knowledge and academic qualifications, made many thoughts almost unthinkable, sundered many of the invisible bonds which once held our society together, and inflicted upon our country a permanent and irreversible change in morals, values, customs, taboos, language, humour, art and even eating habits” (167). In Suid-Afrika het dit veel erger daaraan toe gegaan. In 1994 het ons ‘n politieke revolusie beleef, waarna ‘n kulturele revolusie ingetree het waarin ‘n grootliks vreemde swart kultuur die twee tradisioneel leidende blanke kulture/lewenswyses verdring het. Hitchens noem Brittanje “a wholly foreign country” (187). Uit die oogpunt van die blankes geld dit in veel groter mate vir Suid-Afrika.

Volgens die outeur het die Britte in 1965 nog rede gehad om hulleself as die voortreflikste mense op aarde te beskou en kon hulle met reg trots op en patrioties jeens hulle land wees. Hy verwys na “a society that was profoundly civilized, gentle and humane” (707). Hy meen dat die Britse samelewing sedertdien feitlik onherkenbaar ontaard het. Dit herinner aan die ingrypende verskille wat daar tussen die ou en die nuwe Suid-Afrika bestaan, wat onder meer die entoesiasme vir en die tradisionele patriotisme van Afrikaners vir hulle geboorteland weggekalwe het. Daar kan egter kwalik van Afrikaners verwag word om die tradisionele Britte as verhewe organismes te beskou, gedagtig aan onder meer die Anglo-Boereoorlog. Tog is daar vir die plaaslike blankes min troos in die volgende reeds aangehaalde woorde: “The abolition of a great and famous nation is now virtually complete” (116). Brittanje is nog ‘n blanke Westerse land wat weens bv selfaangedoende, ingevoerde multikulturaliteit besig is om onder te gaan.

In Suid-Afrika ken baie jongmense van die huidige geslag nie die land se geskiedenis nie. Dit is veral te wyte aan die propaganda van die ANC-regime, bv in skoolgeskiedenisboeke, en die uitlatings van ANC-nalopers in die massa-inligtingsmedia. In Brittanje het iets soortgelyks gebeur. Hitchens verwys na “a generation to whom the past was not just a foreign country, but a place of mystery which was easier to mock than understand” (146). By hedendaagse Britte, soos by Amerikaners, is daar die neiging om onpatrioties te wees, om ‘n negatiewe siening van hulle land en hulle geskiedenis te hê. “The ideas of the past were invariably wrong, that putting the clock back was a sin, while progress and change were both inevitable and right” (616). Hitchens verwys na “the ‘anti-establishment’ tendencies in politics, academe, broadcasting and the press” (458). “Patriotism, monarchy and Englishness in general [became] unfashionable and – worst of all – comical” (600). “In 1965, even the radicals were loyal patriots” (474).

Daar word plek-plek na Suid-Afrika verwys:

  • “The old struggle between Afrikaner and British settlers in South Africa had ended in the triumph of the National Party, the building of grand apartheid and the founding of a Boer republic outside the Commonwealth” (637).
  • Die Britse openbare mening is “unshakeable in its certainty that personal righteousness is reserved for those who share its views about South Africa” (151), naamlik dat die swart politieke bewind reg en goed is en die blanke bewind van weleer, by name apartheid, verkeerd en sleg was.
  • Voorgeskrewe skooldrag word in progressiewe geledere geassosieer met “repressive and reactionary forms of government such as apartheid South Africa and Augusto Pinochet’s Chile” (1119).
  • “Opposition to apartheid or General Pinochet are valued more highly than personal adherance to the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount. An adulterer with the correct view on Nelson Mandela is perferable to a Mother Teresa who fails to critize the currently unfashionable regimes of the world” (4446).
  • Vir ‘n politieke aktivis soos Desmond Tutu gaan dit om die hiermaals en nie om die hiernamaals nie. Hy probeer om ‘n (swart) hemel op aarde te skep. Hitchens noem dit sosiale teologie “in which Christian charity to your neighbour was expressed through political action at home and abroad, rather than in your own conduct. This was especially attractive to the British because the Church’s old missionary links with the former colonies now gave it a potent voice in places such as South Africa, where it was to play an often creditable role in resisting the stupidities of Grand Apartheid” (1658).
  • Die hedendaagse afkeer van Standaardafrikaans kan ingevolge kulturele marxisme verduidelik word. Ordentlike, suiwer Afrikaans herinner aan ‘n glorieryke verlede wat deur ANC-kamerade weggewens word. “The glories of the language were offensive to the modernizers because they reminded them of what they owed to the past, because they reinforced the bonds of tradition, but above all because they constantly reminded them of a view of religion which was not theirs. It did not offer salvation through the Overseas Development Agency, the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Amnesty International and the Social Security budget. It offered it in an entirely non-political way, through the faith and deeds of the individual” (1871).

Hitchens kan nie (heeltemal) vrede met die nuwe elektroniese kultuur maak nie. Hy noem dit “post-literate” omdat die inligting eerder deur piktogramme, dus deur beelde/illustrasies, as deur teks oorgedra word (223). “Early television was nothing like the modern force which has now displaced all other forms of culture and entertainment. Its effect on the imagination has been the motor of the new morality and the new conformism” (234, ook 468). “The BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] functions as a sort of priesthood of the politically permissible, awarding airtime and favour to those it likes, and silence, bad camera angles or mockery to those it dislikes” (4952). “[Television] encourage[s] only one set of ideas about what was good” (447). “It made each one of us more like the other, it narrowed the gaps between us and made us simultaneouly less alone and more conformist. We have all noticed the way in which mass culture has flattened out accents and made us dress and even walk in standardized fashions” (238).

“This regimentation has also affected our thinking, and our ability to choose. In a society of stable values and unchanging tradition, this would not be specially important, and the cinema had far less impact on 1930s Britain than television was to have fifty or sixty years later. The effect of television, especially colour television, on a society whose values were all open to question and whose morals were dissolving was explosive, and continues to be” (243). “Television robs adults of one of their most important tasks, as passers-on of culture to the young” (2116). Gelykmaking, eendersverklaring en internasionalisering kan die taak van regerings vergemaklik maar het ‘n vernietigende uitwerking op bv individualiteit, kreatiwiteit en eiesoortige kultuur. NP van Wyk Louw het reeds in 1936 geskryf: “Ons tyd wil net van gelykheid en gelykmaak weet; die natuur ken net ongelykheid en streng rangordening” (Berigte te velde, Kaapstad: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1959, p 17). Plaaslik is dieselfde neiging as in Brittanje waarneembaar: “The increasingly blatant use of soap operas as cultural propaganda” (Hitchens 48). Sepies en baie ander televisieprogramme is as’t ware ‘n siekte wat nie net bedags nie maar veral saans kulturele verwoesting saai.

Amerika was die eintlike wenner in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. Amerika het die leidende land geword. “By 1941 we were a defeated nation” (285). “When American servicemen began arriving in Britain in 1942, much of the United Kingdom fell under a bizarre and unique form of military occupation” (4140). “They spoke the same language but brought with them a completely different culture, different morals, different habits of courtship and even different tastes in food and drink, music and entertainment” (4145). “The total number of Americans in the UK at this time [1944] was more than 1.6 million, mostly active young men, at a time when Britain’s active young men were mainly away from home” (4171). Hitchens bied die volgende as ‘n kompliment aan: “A rather touching and honourable refusal by Britons to countenance the US Army’s colour bar” (4192).

Die Amerikaanse besetting van Brittanje het tot lank ná die oorlog voortgeduur. Hierdie situasie “undermined and belittled Britain’s image of herself, and the British people’s view of themselves” (270). Amerikaanse kultuur het die Britte grondig beïnvloed, nie net vanweë die baie Amerikaanse soldate wat daar gestasioneer was nie, maar ook vanweë Amerikaanse rolprente en televisie. Daar was gevolglik “the increasing use of American terms in language” (280), asook die groeiende invloed van Amerikaanse populêre musiek, bv rock (295). Hitchens verwys na moderne populêre musiek “with its strangely bisexual appeal and its carnal beat” as “part war-dance, part fertility ritual” (2121). Wat die tradisionele Britse kultuur ook ontwrig het, is “America’s supposed ‘classlessness’, actually a fiction, [which] mocked our minutely graded caste system” (290).

Hitchens maak gewag van “the huge scale of the war effort and the breath and depth of the destruction it had caused not just to the physical fabric of the country but to its social fabric. Few now recall that the immediate postwar years were a time when many were alarmed by a rapid increase in crime, an atmosphere of purposeless rebellion among the young and a great deal of family breakdown because of the number of marriages which failed to survive the long partings of war” (680). “The Americanization of our sex lives was probably more important than all these put together. American attitudes towards divorce and adultery, the collapse of American puritanism … under the blows of Kinsey and the contraceptive pill, fanned out across the country like an infectious disease” (290). “As late as 1965, the child of divorced parents was an exception at any school, illegitimate children were a shameful rarity, homosexual acts were illegal, and contraception and abortion were taboo subjects in most homes” (572). Hierby kom nog “the arrival of North American feminism” (306).

Van die veranderings in die Britse leefwyse wat Hitchens opgemerk het, is die agteruitgang van die gehalte van standaard- of tradisionele Engels [Estuary English (358)], bv weens Amerikaanse invloed. “Estuary English – the universal classless patios of southern England” (3363). Daar is deesdae baie meer misdaad (566), bv inbrake (561), as voorheen en daar lê vullis in die strate (363), onder meer weens die multikulturele gedaanteverwisseling wat veral die stede ondergaan het. Maar sulke negatiewe verskynsels word deur linksgesindes goedgepraat. Daar is “a crude moral justification for crime, seen by many modern thieves as a form of taxation levied upon the greedy by the rest” (2381). In Suid-Afrika maak die ANC-regime die nieblankes wys dat die blankes hulle grond gesteel het en dat die blankes hulle besittings bekom het deur nieblankes uit te buit, bv deur hulle te min vir hulle arbeid te vergoed. Dit kan ten minste deels verduidelik waarom misdaad, bv onwettige grondbesetting en diefstal, op so ‘n buitensporige skaal in Suid-Afrika gepleeg word.

“In 1965 … eating in the street, except for a holiday ice cream or a homebound parcel of fish and chips, was practically unknown, and drinking in the street quite unthinkable for most people” (512). Die gedrag van mense het verander; eintlik versleg (479). Daar is al beweer dat die hedendaagse Britse kultuur gekenmerk word aan “lager, football and bodily functions” (611). Hoflikheid en goeie maniere het skaarser geword (479). Goeie smaak het agteruitgegaan (368). Mense voel minder veilig as voorheen, veral snags (389). In 1965 was Brittanje baie meer verenig as tans (432), met baie inwoners in Wallis en veral Skotland wat deesdae van Engeland wil wegbreek. “Northern Ierland … was the only place on British territory where British patriotism took the form of nationalism” (4615). Daardie nasionalisme is uit nood gebore – die gevaar vir Protestantse Britte van vereniging met en oorheersing deur die Rooms-Katolieke Iere van die Ierse Republiek. By die Britte in Noord-Ierland is daar deesdae egter al hoe groter onsekerheid of hulle in die toekoms deel van die Ierse Republiek of van Engeland gaan wees. Voorheen was daar nasionale solidariteit in Brittanje maar sedert 1965 het gebeure dit weggekalwe (653).

“A nation is the sum of its memories, and when those memories are allowed to die, it is less a nation. However, when a people cease to believe their national myths, and cease to know or respect their history, it does not follow that they become blandly smiling internationalists” (756). Die ANC-regime beywer hom vir die herskrywing van Suid-Afrika se geskiedenis, sodat die swartes beter en die blankes, veral die Afrikaners, slegter voorgestel word. Plekname word verander en standbeelde vernietig of verwyder ten einde die Afrikanerdom se trotse verlede te misken. Gebeure soos die Groot Trek en die Slag van Bloedrivier word as mites afgemaak. Dit alles word gedoen om die Afrikaners as etniese nasie, as volk, te probeer vernietig. Afrikanisme en globalisme word as plaasvervangers vir Afrikanernasionalisme aan ons opgedring. Regeringsleiers soos Donald Trump en Boris Johnson verset hulle teen globalisme. Hulle ondersteun onderskeidelik Amerikaanse en Britse nasionalisme, maar word om veral hierdie rede in die massa-inligtingsmedia verguis. As eilande is Brittanje, volgens Hitchens, “uniquely suited to be a nation-state” (809); des te meer sedert sy onttrekking aan die Europese Unie.

Ons het pas die onverkwiklike ondervinding gehad dat Jeremy Vearey (Praag 26.05.2018), ‘n opgeleide ANC-terroris, oud-Robbeneilander, nie-taalkundige en nie-letterkundige, klaarblyklik weens politieke redes deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns gevra is om vanjaar, vyftig jaar ná sy dood, die NP van Wyk Louw-gedenklesing te lewer. ‘n Soortgelyke vergryp is die jaarlikse Neville Alexander-lesing wat deur die Afrikaanse Taalmuseum en -monument aangebied word ter huldiging van nog ‘n oud-Robbeneilander. Hitchens vestig die aandag op ‘n soortgelyke polities byderwetse skuif: om die blanke Florence Nightingale (1820-1910), tradisioneel dié heldin in die verpleegkunde, met ‘n swart rolmodel, die Jamaikaan Mary Seacole (1805-1881), te vervang (910). Albei het gedurende die Krim-oorlog (1853-1856) gewonde soldate verpleeg. Dit herinner aan die vervanging van ons volksplanter van weleer, Jan van Riebeeck, met ‘n nuwe vader van die (swart) Suid-Afrikaanse nasie, die geweldenaar Nelson Mandela. Sedert 1994 is daar in ANC-geledere selfs meer as een moeder vir hierdie nasie ontdek.

Volgens Hitchens is die Britse neo-marxiste “drearily left-wing, and focussed upon suffering and deprivation rather than upon achievement or heroism. They are also notably more forgiving of the misdeeds of communist totalitarianism than of fascist totalitarianism” (938). Weens die gebrek aan positiewe prestasie deur ANC-kamerade word negatiewe gebeure, soos ongehoorsaamheid en geweldpleging, sedert 1994 in Suid-Afrika tydens openbare vakansiedae in herinnering geroep. Dit dui op geestelike en morele bankrotskap.

In Suid-Afrika is skoolonderrig vir die verskillende kultuur- en etniese groepe, elk met sy eie leerplanne, sedert 1994 deur gemeenskaplike leerplanne, primêr afgestem op die swart meerderheid, vervang. In Brittanje is die tradisioneel monokulturele skoolonderrig tot multikulturele opvoeding omvorm. Hitchens noem dit “yet another excuse to denigrate the nation-state, apologize for the Empire and abolish the lore of the British tribe” (998). Terselfdertyd was daar, soos in Suid-Afrika, ‘n ernstige verlaging in akademiese standaarde – “standards always are out of date” (2272) – en die vernietiging van die tradisionele geskiedenisleerplan (1003). In Suid-Afrika verkondig die ANC-regime openlik dat ons geskiedenis volgens die voorkeure van ANC-kamerade herskryf word. Daar is blanke historici wat hartlik aan hierdie projek saamwerk. “In an incredibly short time, we have been turned into a nation without heroes, without pride in our past or knowledge of either our past triumphs or our past follies and disasters” (1007).

Plaaslik was daar al uitsprake van die nuwe bewindhebbers dat dinge soos meriete en standaarde Westerse uitvindings is wat maar agterweë kon gebly het. Jonathan Jansen het hom by uitstek smalend oor akademiese standaarde uitgelaat, heel moontlik omdat hy, sonder om dit te erken, besef dat akademiese standaarde in die skole en aan die universiteite in die ou Suid-Afrika veel hoër was as wat hulle in die nuwe Suid-Afrika is. Hitchens skryf: “The great universities of Oxford and Cambridge are still being attacked by ministers for trying to maintain some standards” (48). Later skryf hy van “a general lowering of Oxbridge standards” (1134). Dit is die Britse weergawe van die ANC se: “pass one, pass all.” Dit is ‘n tragedie as geestelike vervlakking twee van die oudste en akademies-wetenskaplik mees gerespekteerde universiteite in die wêreld aangetas het. Albei het in die 13de eeu ontstaan..

Hitchens noem die hedendaagse marxiste “cultural revolutionaries”: “They believe, in most cases with some passion, that education should be used to eradicate privilege and élitism, to spread the gospel of the new society in which everyone (and everything) is equal” (1015) – dus “the ‘democratic’ or levelled society” (1042). Mededinging word ontmoedig. As sommige skoliere akademies beter as ander presteer, word die (natuurlike) ongelykheid by skoliere sigbaar. As ‘n skolier druip, tas dit sy menswaardigheid aan, wat taboe in hedendaagse verligte samelewings is. Meriete is tot ‘n onding verklaar omdat dit ‘n hiërargie daarstel. “Melanie Phillips [Praag 18.08.2018] has condemned the ‘all must have prizes’ ethos of the modern system” (1108). Die gesag van onderwysers word deur ‘n verbod op (lyf)straf ondermyn. Dit skep ‘n situasie in die klaskamer waarin leer weens gebrekkige dissipline bemoeilik word. In baie gevalle leer skoliere deesdae op skool minder as voorheen. Om hierdie feit te kamoefleer, verkies die ANC-regime dat daar van leerders pleks van skoliere gepraat word. Die marxistiese obsessie met verandering (pleks van verbetering) is die rede waarom sulke disfunksionele verskynsels hulle opwagting maak (1064). Sodanige transformasie word deur sommige sielkundiges goedgepraat; “those stand-by experts who can always be counted on to decry common sense, defy public opinion and loathe hallowed tradition” (1166).

Een van die hoofoogmerke van kulturele marxisme is om die tradisionele gesin te vernietig. “The greatest fortress of human liberty, proof against all earthly powers, is the family [“huisgesin”]. In its small private space, it can defy the will of authority and the might of wealth. It is without doubt the most effective means of passing lore, culture, manners and traditions down through the generations. Its loyalties are stronger than those of the state, more powerful even than patriotism. All serious tyrannies have sought to undermine or infiltrate it, socialist tyrannies most of all” (2837). “There are many explanations for authority’s mistrust of the family. The main one must be that it cannot control what goes on there, what ideas are taught, what wealth stored up, what loyalties fostered” (2853). Weens sy magsbeheptheid sou die ANC-regime te graag iedere gesin na sy beeld wou afrikaniseer en aan die ANC gedienstig maak. Huwelike, dus histories normale gesinsvorming, word nie deur die ANC-regime bepleit nie. Die huwelik is al beskryf as “an unromantic compromise between sensuality and drudgery” (3070). Die huwelik is in baie gevalle nie hemel op aarde nie maar kultureel nogtans meesal ‘n beter, bv meer stabiele, situasie as heteroseksuele saambly of ‘n selfdegeslagverbintenis.

In Suid-Afrika kom enkelouergesinne algemeen voor, veral by die swartes. Trekarbeid, dus die blankes, is dikwels die skuld hiervoor gegee. Eintlik is ‘n gebrek aan seksuele dissipline, oftewel permissiwiteit – “moral poverty” (2635) – ‘n meer geldige rede. Die eksponensiële toename in buite-egtelike kinders kan ook toegeskryf word aan die (oor)gewilligheid van die ANC-regime om ongehude moeders met staatstoelaes te vergoed. Dit geskied sonder dat enige teenprestasie vereis word. Daar is ook nie ‘n maksimum perk vir sulke kinders nie. In die nuwe Brittanje is daar al hoe meer buite-egtelike kinders. “Roughly 44% of children in Britain are now born to mothers who are not married” (63). “The new cruelty, which leaves hundreds of thousands of children without a proper family, is imposed through many acts of generosity by the state and the taxpayers, and through the broad-minded tolerance of individuals and opinion-formers” (2428). “It is certain that crime is higher among the children of broken homes than among those from stable families” (4354). Wat nodig is, is “a sensible compromise between stern duty and individual kindness” (2433).

“Illegitimacy – the very thing marriage is supposed to prevent – has become so common as to be the norm. Shame and stigma, which once both defended respectable marriage and heaped misery on the poor bastard and his wretched mother, have disappeared. Instead, there is the slower, vaguer, more indirect misery of a society where fewer and fewer children have two parents, and where more and more women are married to the State” (2444). Maar dit is juis hierdie toenemende getal afhanklikes van staatstoelaes wat aan die ANC-regime ‘n substansiële steunbasis verseker. Terselfdertyd veroorsaak kinders uit enkelouergesinne dikwels dat misdaad floreer.

“The cultural revolutionaries have understood that a nation’s literature is one of the ways, perhaps the most important way, in which values are transmitted unchanged from generation to generation. They understand that Shakespeare’s Englishness is not an accident, and that Shakespeare and Englishness have helped to form each other” (2722). “This literature is also dominated by men” (2727). Wat ‘n marxis soos Terry Eagleton (gebore in 1943) hieromtrent doen, is “to try to rebuild Shakespeare as some sort of Marxist critic of the social order” (2738). “The desire for a national culture is seen as damagingly conservative, often ‘racist’ and almost inevitably unsympathetic to the rights of women” (2772). “Something called ‘the cult of the apron’ is constantly attacked” (2801). Die nuwe vooroordeel (2812) is dat vroue net sulke bekwame skeppers van letterkunde, asook ander literatuur, bv nie-fiksie, en ander kuns as mans is. Pas is daar ‘n bohaai in die plaaslike pers opgeskop omdat blankes oor die toekenning van literatuurpryse besluit het. Volgens die polities byderwetse narratief moet enersyds sowel mans as vroue en andersyds sowel blankes as nieblankes by enige openbare geleentheid, bv besluitneming, betrek word. Die ANC-regime verlang voorts dat swartes substansieel in die meerderheid moet wees en vroue in dieselfde mate as mans betrek moet word. Dit gaan nie om meriete, bv kennis en kundigheid, nie. Dit gaan om ras en geslag.

In hoofstuk 15, onder die opskrif, “Is Britain civilized?” word die linkse politikus, Roy Jenkins (1920-2003), uitgesonder as die hoofaanstigter van die Britse kulturele revolusie. “He should see it as his task to revolutionize all our habits” (3939). Volgens Jenkins: “It is about the need to make this country a more civilized place in which to live” (3949). Hy het bv die doodstraf en sensuur veroordeel, maar hom ten gunste van die openbare aanvaarding van aborsie, homoseksualiteit en dobbel uitgespreek. Jenkins het “a new era of loving the sinner” ingelui (4070). Die gevolg was: “The laws have grown more permissive and society more violent, selfish and chaotic” (4075). Jenkins was “the Europhile of Europhiles” (3994). Hy het geen gevaar vir die Britse kultuur weens massa-immigrasie voorsien nie. Hy het verkies om Brittanje voor te hou as deurgaans moreel voorbeeldig, naamlik as “the traditional refuge op the oppressed” (3978).

Wat ek uiters eienaardig vind, is dat Hitchens, anders as baie ander waarnemers, nie die verwording van Brittanje primêr aan die massa kultureel vreemde inkommers toeskryf nie. In sy 2018-nawoord is daar net ‘n enkele opmerking hieroor, wat eintlik geen verduideliking verskaf nie: “Immigration itself, which I deliberately did not include in my 1999 book [why not?], has beyond doubt transformed many towns and urban areas beyond recognition, far beyond what had happened in the forty years of immigration before 1997” (4753). “The UK welcomed an estimated net 1.5 million immigrants in the decade to 2008. Part by accident, part by design, the Government had created its longed-for immigration boom” (4770).

Die skuld hiervoor word by uitstek aan Tony Blair (Britse eerste minister, 1997-2007) toegeskryf. “The Blair government was not like any previous governments. It had a declared cultural purpose” (4871). “The truth, that New Labour was a sophisticated version of Eurocommunism, hugely socially radical, deeply hostile to the nation-state and monoculture and coldly dismissive of Church and Crown, can be observed in its actions by those who understand these things” (4899). Blair het erken “that he had himself been a Trotskyist” (4899). “Labour supporters … felt that mass immigration had changed their lives for the worst without their permission. It was this, above all, that turned a strong anti-EU minority into a decisive majority” (4776) in 2016.

Hitchens se betoog is soms wydlopig. Hy is geneig om in sypaaie af te dwaal. Die volgende kan as ‘n samevatting van sy konserwatiewe stellinginname beskou word: “The pattern in all these events is the same: Behaviour which was once deviant is made to seem mainstream, or al least acceptable, and those who are unhappy about it are portrayed as narrow-minded, old-fashioned, prejudiced and wrong. The effect of this implicit propaganda upon public opinion has been enormous, causing many people to be ashamed of views they had held since their childhood and had thought until recently were normal” (3439). Veertig jaar gelede was daar onder blanke Suid-Afrikaners ‘n oorweldigende mate van eenstemmigheid dat een mens, een stem rampspoedige gevolge sou hê, ‘n swart meerderheidsregering die land in sy swernoot sou stuur, gedwonge rasse-integrasie absoluut verwerplik is, ens. Deesdae word diegene wat steeds sulke menings huldig as verkramp en rassisties uitgekryt. Die ergste is blankes, insluitende oud-Broederbonders, wat deesdae valslik voorgee dat hulle eintlik reeds hulle hele lewe lank nalopers van die ANC is.

“How do you tell that a country has died? I would say that the moment comes when its people no longer even know that they have lost their culture and their history” (4730). Die Afrikanerdom is darem nog nie daar nie, maar is fluks op pad daarheen. Binne enkele geslagte kan sowel ons voortreflike Afrikanerkultuur as ons roemryke geskiedenis in die vergetelheid verborge wees. NP van Wyk Louw het in 1936 oor “ware volkskuns” geskryf: “Die beste daarvan sal alleen vergeet word wanneer die geaardheid en omstandighede van ‘n groep so verander dat hy homself nie meer daarin herken nie” (17)

Leon Lemmer: Konserwatisme: ‘n bekoorlike verlore saak

Richard West (1930-2015) was ‘n konserwatiewe Britse joernalis wat in talle lande gewerk het; ook in Suid-Afrika. Hy is onder meer die outeur van boeke soos The white tribes of Africa (1965), The white tribes revisted (1978) en The diamonds and the necklace: A South African journey (1989). Hy het twee seuns gehad wat hulle albei in die joernalistiek begeef het, Patrick (gebore in 1974) en Ed (gebore in 1978). Patrick is die outeur van onder meer The poverty of multiculturalism (2005). Van Ed is daar boeke soos die volgende gepubliseer: The diversity illusion: What we got wrong about immigration and how to set it right (2013, 288p; Amazon Kindle $9,19) en Small men at the wrong side of history: The decline, fall and unlikely return of conservatism (London: Constable, 2020, 432p; Amazon Kindle $11,94). Ek skryf vandag oor laasgenoemde boek. Wat duidelik is, is dat Richard se twee seuns sy konserwatisme voortsit. Die hooftitel van die 2020-boek is ontleen aan Barack Obama se karakterisering van Al Kaïda (Kindle 278). Ed West het ‘n omvattende, gesaghebbende en buitengewoon interessante boek geskryf. Oor sy belesenheid en sy myns insiens meesal gesonde insig behoort daar geen twyfel te wees nie.

Enersyds is daar die linkses (bv liberales, sosialiste, progressiewes, verligtes) en andersyds die regses (bv behoudendes, konserwatiewes, tradisioneles, verkramptes). Die verdeling links/regs kom uit die eerste ná-revolusionêre parlement in Frankryk (1789). “At the National Convention in Paris it became custom that the king’s supporters sat on his right and his opponents on the left, after which the divide between tradition and radicalism would always be defined along those lines” (950). Daar is die wydaanvaarde waarneming dat namate mense ouer word, hulle meer tot konserwatisme neig. Die outeur het desnieteenstaande tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat daardie era aan die verbygaan is, dat konserwatisme “a charming lost cause” geword het (3571); dat linksheid toenemend verswelgende afmetings aanneem.

“Conservative parties could still win elections, but conservatism was an endangered creed, as much in demographic decline as the Christianity from which it once emerged, and the degree to which it had become hated by anyone born after 1970 was intense and perhaps irreversible” (74). “On almost any non-economic issue most of my friends hitting forty were more progressive than in their early twenties; they might resent paying more tax and even dislike trade unions, but that didn’t make them conservative” (85). Die verwysing na “non-economic issues” is belangrik. In die plaaslike hoofstroom-inligtingsmedia is daar die neiging om die ANC-regime (later uitgesonderd Jacob Zuma) hemelhoog te prys. Daar is egter een area wat nie met dieselfde gemak wanvoorgestel kan word nie: die finansieel-ekonomiese sektor. Rommelstatus is ‘n werklikheid wat nie moeiteloos vir leuens en gunstige polities byderwetse retoriek vatbaar is nie.

West noem dat vroue meer linksgesind as mans geword het (145), onder meer omdat meer vroue as mans deesdae aan oorverligte tersiêre onderrig blootgestel word. Linkses het egter meesal ‘n konserwatiewe leefstyl (196). Daar is geen moontlikheid dat mense soos Willie Esterhuyse en Leon Wessels hulle in ‘n swart woongebied sou vestig nie. Wat ook duidelik geword het, is dat die feministe op die rug van die geweldpleging van die Amerikaanse swart burgerregtebewegings sukses behaal het. Op hulle beurt het die LGBT’s die suksesvolheid van die swartes en feministe misbruik om plek in die son en buite die kas te verwerf. Dit is die regses wat sedertdien al hoe meer in die kas gedruk word (242).

“Since the 1960s the West has gone through the biggest cultural shift in half a millennium” (254). Dit is globaliserende linksheid wat kultureel-geestelike dood en verwoesting saai, bv “supporting the EU means being part of the global community of liberals” (6070). “The Left has also developed a moral monopoly, so that those outside of the faith are under an unspoken obligation to prove their moral worth before their views can be considered” (196), bv “taking in more refugees [is] a quintessential moralised high-status cause” (219). “There is active competition to come up with ever wilder radical ideas, a trend that has sped up with the ‘Great Awokening’ of the 2010s, the acceleration of identity politics brought about by competing victimhood narratives on social media” (208). “Awoke” beteken “awake to social justice issues” (5634). “The Great Awokening almost certainly represented an authoritarian turn by the Left, ‘a spreading social, cultural, and ideological conformism … this relentless drive for conformism, which constantly works to extinguish the illiberal'” (5709). “Identiy politics” verwys dikwels na die belange van minderheidsgroepe, maar ook “European Right-wingers refer to themselves as ‘identitarian’ to suggest they don’t believe their homeland belongs to everyone” (5924).

“Left-liberalism has become the prestige faith with a moral monopoly” (231). “Religion simply becomes replaced by ideology” (3747). “A new faith arose, progressivism as Christianity 2.0, with ‘privilege’ a form of original sin and vulnerable groups the new sacred” (3903). Daar is nog ‘n groot verskuiwing wat in sowel die Britse as die Amerikaanse politiek plaasgevind het: “It is the upper class who are moving Left, and the working-class pushing to the Right” (4299). In Suid-Afrika is dit die armer blankes wat die ANC-regime se rassistiese beleid aan hulle bas voel; nie soseer die welgesteldes nie omdat hulle (in ‘n mate) hulle apartheid kan koop.

Die fiktiewe karakter, Bridget Jones, het van die Britse Arbeidersparty gesê: “Labour stands for sharing, kindness, gays, single mothers and Nelson Mandela” (242). Dit is die eerste verwysing in die boek, maar nie die laaste nie, na Suid-Afrika. Oor sy pa, Richard, skryf Ed: “By the time I was around he was deeply pessimistic and cynical, and seriously out of step with the prevailing mood over South Africa. Although he respected and admired Nelson Mandela, he thought the ANC a venal and extreme organisation that would eventually make the country even worse off than it was under apartheid (which he nonetheless thought morally indefensible)” (300). In die 1980’s “the anti-apartheid movement was ultra-fashionable, topping the charts and filling stadiums” (311).

“Look at the line-up of people who represent liberalism in the modern imagination: Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, JFK[ennedy] … Tony Blair and Barack Obama. Contrast with what people picture when they think of the Right: Richard Nixon looking sweaty and suspicious, racist 1970s comedians, South African security forces gripping their salivating Alsatians, semi-literate rednecks shouting at black people … And last but not least Donald Trump, a man who seems to possess the unique gift of having no redeeming human qualities whatsoever. Oh, and Nazis obviously” (430).

West het geen hoë dunk van Trump nie. Hy skryf selfs van “this awful man” (5787). “Trump seemed to be almost a caricature of Left-wing ideas about conservatives, brash, callous, casually racist, abusive towards women and absurdly rich thanks to his background” (5779). Ja, sy pa se geld het Donald aanvanklik gehelp, maar dit was hy wat op ‘n kundige manier sy jeugdige welgesteldheid in buitengewoon groot rykdom omskep het. West borduur voort oor Trump: “A three-times married serial adulterer and sexual predator who had probably broken at least eight commandments regularly” (5801). Nietemin, in konserwatiewe geledere word Trump se politieke oriëntasie waardeer. Hy het aan baie blanke Amerikaners hulle selfrespek teruggegee.

Die Nazi’s en die Twee Wêreldoorloë word dikwels as die slegte nalatenskap van die blankedom voorgestel. “The evocation of the Nazi crimes rubs a collective scar in Western societies” (1512). “The Nazi atrocities were also tied up in the collective imagination with the other great racial dramas, the US civil rights movement and apartheid South Africa … Having listened to my father and read his Spectator articles I obviously digested his pessimism about ANC rule” (1523).

Ek het die werke oor fascisme deur Benito Mussolini en Adolf Hitler gelees en kon daarin geen duidelike ideologie vind nie. West bevestig dit: “Fascism had few real intellectual thoughts behind it … Fascism … had no central texts or ideas” (1622). Mussolini was aanvanklik ‘n sosialis en dus linksgesind. “The Polish-Israeli scholar Zeev Sternhell [born in 1935] argued in The birth of fascist ideology [1989, 348p; Amazon Kindle $45,94] that fascism was a revolutionary movement, emerging from the radical left but ‘which became fused with blood and soil nationalism'” (1633).

Maurice Barrès [1862-1923] “coined the term déraciné, ‘deracinated’ [“ontras(sing)”], to denote someone who had lost contact with their ancestors” (1633) – ‘n verskynsel wat in die nuwe Suid-Afrika wydverspreid onder verloopte Afrikaners voorkom. “[The] state-worship aspect of fascism has given many conservatives the comforting idea that the philosophy was ‘Left-wing’, because true Right-wingers believe in a small state. In his entertaining book Liberal fascism (2008 [492p; Amazon Kindle $16,75]), Jonah Goldberg made a spirited attempt to show the extent to which Italian fascism and German national socialism had some common roots with the Left” (1633).

West skryf: “I could never muster any sympathy for people who committed violence” (2066). Hy verwys ook na “the violence of ANC-run South Africa” (3217). Tog is dit moeilik om die volgende paragraaf met die res van sy boek te versoen. “The Tories made no effort to ensure that history was kind to them, as Churchill put it, by ensuring that they wrote it. The real great figure of the era, the one who captured the public imagination, was not in Downing Street but rotting in a jail cell some 11 000 miles away. And today Nelson Mandela is the one with a statue in Parliament Square, while a similar proposal for one of Margaret Thatcher can’t be built because it would be vandalised” (1401). Dat ‘n terroris uit ‘n ander land met ‘n standbeeld vereer word, wat volgens die populêre siening nie geskend sal word nie, toon hoe verwerplik hedendaagse waardes geword het.

Mandela het in die tronk gefloreer. Hy is jare lank op staatskoste gehuisves, gevoed en geklee. Hy het hom selfs aangematig om ‘n langbroek pleks van ‘n kortbroek te eis. Hy het 95 jaar oud geword. In seker geen tronk elders in Afrika sou hy 27 jaar so geil oorleef het nie. Anders as wat meesal beweer word, was die “apartheidsregime” in baie opsigte (te) mensliewend. Dink ook aan hoe die NP-regering toegelaat het dat sommige kerke en moskees vestings van terrorisme geword het omdat hy nie die (skyn)heiligheid van daardie inrigtings wou aantas nie.

Met verwysing na 1994 toe Tony Blair die leier van die opposisie in die Britse parlement geword het, skryf West op ‘n nogal eienaardige manier: “While Blair shone, we appeared like the brooding, bull-faced Afrikaans [Afrikaner] watching the smiling black people’s dignified walk to the polling booth, cast as baddies in a morality play in which we would obviously end up the losers” (2677). “Blair hugely increased immigration and actively liked the idea of cultural diversity” (2797).

West is op stewiger grond as hy skryf: “I often see people on Facebook posting an inspirational Nelson Mandela quote: ‘Overcoming poverty is not a task of charity, it is an act of justice. Like Slavery and Apartheid, poverty is not natural. It is man-made and it can be overcome and eradicated by the actions of human beings.’ Which is pretty much the stupidest thing ever said by anyone – poverty is the most natural thing in the world, and until the nineteenth century the vast majority of people lived in it” (2968). In die 21ste eeu moet on(der)ontwikkeldes/agtergeblewenes (hulle is nie agtergesteldes nie) dus liewer hulle armoede as selfaangedoen aanvaar as om dit aan slawerny en apartheid, dus blankes, toe te dig. Waarmee Mandela hier besig was, was om skuldgevoelens by blankes te probeer wek ten einde geld ten bate van swartes uit hulle te pers.

“Right-wing … is an irredeemably tarnished identity, which is hardly surprising when two generations of educated people have largely been raised in environments where they have encountered few conservatives … From before their political awakening most middle-class people are given the message by the education system, the broadcast media and the wider political culture that to be Left-wing is to be generous, tolerant and forward-looking, and so to be Right-wing is to be selfish, uncaring and bigoted” (453). “Progressive television and cinema … are the prevailing cultural noises” (475). In die woorde van Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): Die massa-inligtingsmedia strooi (“sprinkle”) hulle idees uit op die mense (653).

Oor ‘n ander filosoof, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), skryf West: “To conservatives his idea of ‘the noble savage’, primitive man living in peaceful abundance, makes Rousseau the godfather of all bad ideas” (653). Op sy onoorspronklike manier vertel Mandela dieselfde leuen: “The African people lived in relative peace until the coming of the abelungu, the white people” (Long walk to freedom, London: Abacus1995, p 27). Rousseau is ‘n held in linkse geledere. “Rousseau was perhaps the most influential thinker of his and our time, doing more than any other to popularise the idea that people are inherently good. Christian theology holds that we are all born with original sin, tarnished and imperfect from birth. Rousseau’s great idea was to see human behaviour as formed by social conditions, so that our wickedness comes not from within but the society we are raised in” (West 668).

Ooreenkomstig Rousseau se idees is die plaaslike vertolking dat wat ook al sleg by swartes mag wees, aan apartheid toegeskryf kan word. Dit is dus die blankes, veral die Afrikaners, wat sedert 1994 as oorvloediglik sleg voorgestel word terwyl al wat ‘n swarte is skynbaar inherent goed is. “Rousseau was … spectacularly wrong, perhaps the most wrong man who ever lived” (726). Wat ‘n mens is, word bv nie net deur sosiale omstandighede bepaal nie, maar ook geneties, dus deur oorerwing (kyk hier onder). Die armoede onder swartes in Suid-Afrika word deesdae graag maar verkeerdelik aan apartheid toegeskryf. Edmund Burke (1729-1797) was van mening: “Poverty always exists … it is the essential human condition, not a departure from it” (950).

Die leuse van die Franse Revolusie (1789), “vryheid, gelykheid en broederskap,” is in groot mate aan Rousseau ontleen. Al drie daardie begrippe is dermate oordrewe vertolk dat hulle uiters skadelike gevolge gehad het. “Real human freedom is limited by our own moral weaknesses and poor decision-making, and by the cues we pick up from society. We are morally imperfect, and out of ‘the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing could be ever made’, as Immanuel Kant [1724-1804] said” (1195). Geen wonder nie dat Burke baie skepties oor die Franse Revolusie was (Praag 2.05.2020). Die Franse agitator, François-Noël Babeuf (1760-1797), “concluded that ‘perfect equality’ and ‘common happiness’ could only be achieved by suppression of private property” (1051) – ‘n vroeë wegbereider van die ANC se beleid van onteiening sonder vergoeding.

Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), ‘n ondersteuner van die Franse monargie asook sosiale hiërargie, vind daarenteen aansluiting by Burke met bv die opmerking: “Custom is the mother of legitimacy” (1156), waarmee die wettigheid van die ANC se beleid van onteiening sonder vergoeding teengespreek word. “Custom serve as a check on anarchy and the lust for power” (1169). Neem veral kennis van De Maistre se boek, Considerations on France (1797, 180p; Amazon Kindle $27,60). “He blamed intellectuals for inciting the violence, just as later there was widespread hostility to American liberals in the 1960s as crime and public disorder shot up” (1535).

In Suid-Afrika het skynintellektuele nie net ANC-terroriste in hulle kwaad gesterk nie. Hulle probeer steeds om die ANC-regime so goed moontlik voor te stel. Sulke Afrikaanssprekendes distansieer hulle deesdae van (die geskiedenis van) die Afrikanerdom. Tradisies en gebruike is (dikwels) sinvol omdat hulle die toets van die tyd deurstaan het. Soos ‘n Duise regsgeleerde, Justus Möser (1720-1794), dit gestel het: “After all, our forefathers were no fools either” (1156). Dit is waarom ons nie moet toelaat dat ANC-kamerade en hulle meelopers hedendaagse Afrikaners of ons voorgeslag verguis nie.

Ek vind die oorsprong van die benamings Whigs en Tories interessant. “Both names were originally insults, whiggamore being a (Presbyterian) Scottish cattle rustler and toraidhe a (Catholic) Irish highwayman, and these two groups much later evolved into the Liberal and Conservative parties (although the latter contained the more conservative Whigs, also). They represented cultural divisions, too, Tories being attached to established religion, the monarchy, tradition and a more pessimistic view of human nature. Whigs were more likely to be merchants than landed aristocracy, had the overwhelming support of Dissenters – Protestants too radical for the Church of England – and tended to believe in progress, so that the ‘Whig theory of history’ came to be one in which things slowly but steadily go from bad to good” (867).

“The Tories had first been referred to as the Conservative Party by John Wilson Croker in 1830 and they came to be officially known as such under Robert Peel [prime minister 1834-1835 and 1841-1846], who wished to allow in more moderates, uniting the middle class and old landowners” (1323). Die Konserwatiewe Party of Tories se siening kan soos volg opgesom word: “Humans are flawed, fallible creatures; reason is powerful, but prone to error; and tradition and prejudice are often good guides to social policy” (1119). “Conservatism is parochial, and drawn to attachments that are local and national rather than global” (1681). Die ANC-regime, daarenteen, verkies inklusiwiteit, bv wat betref swart Afrika en (liberaal-sosialistiese) globalisme.

Konserwatisme is nie ortodoks nie. Burke het dit reeds duidelik gestel: “A society without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation” (1119). Maar dit moet nie gaan om verandering ter wille van verandering soos by die ANC-regime nie; eerder om verandering ter onmiskenbare verbetering. Daar moet nie onnodig of oorhaastig gekrap word aan wat doeltreffend funksioneer nie. Soos die Britse filosoof, Roger Scruton (1944-2020), dit gestel het: “Conservatism is the politics of delay” (1169). CS Lewis (1898-1963) het die frase “chronological snobbery” gebruik: “the idea that previous ages were always more backward simply because of the date. Conservatives are more likely to see history in terms of cycles” (3864). In die konteks van Suid-Afrika is die volgende van belang: “Conservatives also see themselves as the conservers of civilisation against barbarism – which is after all the most ‘orthodox’ state of all” (1119).

Die benaming konserwatisme is in 1818 die eerste keer in ‘n Franse tydskrif gebruik. “It stated that it ‘upholds religion, the King, liberty, the Charter and respectable people’ … But from the start the philosophy varied across different countries. Liberalism is by definition universal, since it seeks to guide society under a set of principles, and so it tends to be quite alike around the world, while conservatism varies more from culture to culture, since it seeks to defend specific traditions” (1085). “Right-wing activists tend to stay in their own lanes and not work together, share notes, or reach out to one another’s followers” (3836).

“America, it was said, lacked a ‘conservative’ movement in the European sense, its Right-wing philosophy largely descending from the English Whig tradition, since Toryism was all but dead there and there was no established Church or landed aristocracy to defend … In England conservatism – and the party that came to represent it – was strongly associated with Anglicanism” (1094). “It was once famously said that the Church of England was ‘the Tory party at prayer'” (1106; ook 3616). In die retoriek van die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek is daar skynbaar geen oorspronklikheid nie. Die NG Kerk is male sonder tal daarvan beskuldig dat hy, toe hy apartheid ondersteun het, “die Nasionale Party in gebed” was.

“[There] are things such as ‘good manners, charity, duty and decency’ which are not the concern of the law” (1220). Maar dit beteken nie dat ons verplig moet voel om iedere modestroming na te volg nie, bv. die hedendaagse manie dat vreemdelingehaat/xenofobie uit die bose is. “Haat” is hier in baie gevalle sterk oordrewe. Dit gaan meesal bloot daarom dat inkommers onwelkom is; dat ‘n land sonder hulle beter daaraan toe sou wees. “Humans, conservatives believe, are prone to tribalism and nepotism. We prefer what is familiar to the distant, we favour family members to stangers and, to a lesser extent, compatriots over foreigners. And we are more concerned about friends and relations than ‘humanity’ in the abstract – and there’s nothing wrong with that” (1220).

In sy boek, Liberty, equality and fraternity (1873, 370p; Amazon Kindle $3,44), het ‘n Britse regsgeleerde, James Fitzjames Stephen (1829-1894), bedenkinge oor elkeen van die drie hoofidees van die Franse Revolusie uitgespreek. Hy was veral krities oor John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) se On liberty (1859, 120p; Amazon Kindle $0). “[Stephen] rejected the radical idea of a ‘brotherhood of man’, stating that: ‘It is not love that one wants from the great mass of mankind, but respect and justice … Humanity is only I writ large, and love for Humanity generally means zeal for MY notions as to what men should be and how they should live'” (1220).

In die tweede helfte van die 20ste eeu het die lewensomstandighede, bv veiligheid, van blankes drasties versleg; nie net in Suid-Afrika nie, maar ook in die Weste. “There was the underlying fear of barbarism at the door, an idea that forms a central part of conservative psychology. And yet it was not a totally irrational fear – crime had hugely increased from the 1960s to the 1980s. Britain’s crime rise was nothing like the rapid explosion of violence in America from the 1960s … The British have a sort of psychological awareness of the 1960s America as being the era of civil rights and freedom, yet this social change went hand in hand with an enormous rise in murder in urban America, unprecedented anywhere in modern times” (1451). In Suid-Afrika het ons eie Mandela op 16 Desember 1961 met sy terrorisme begin. Die toename in misdaad en geweld in Suid-Afrika, Brittanje en Amerika hou (onder meer direk) met swart aktivisme verband.

In Brittanje was daar “increased homelessness, and the growth of sink estates [“krotlandgoedere”] … fear tends to push people to the Right” (1462). “The housing lists had been literally that, a queue, in which people waited their turn, with good behaviour and reputation as bonus. It changed to one of ‘need’, which put more needy people such as single mothers or immigrants – as well as people with various pathologies – ahead of locals who had queued, and who often had deep roots in the area … Financial rewards for poor life choices can encourage more people to make them … As far back as the 1770s there were debates about the social sanctions against illegitimacy, with German social theorist Justus Möser arguing they were necessary because there needed to be incentives to marry” (1462).

In Suid-Afrika is daar eintlik nie sprake dat blankes by regeringsbehuising baat nie. Dit gaan om behuising vir swartes, waarvoor die blankes moet help opdok. Geboortebeperking word nie deur politici aangemoedig nie omdat dit glo teen (tradisionele) swart kultuur indruis. Die subsidiëring van ongehude moeders – “welfare queens as Americans called them” (2821) – word ‘n al hoe groter en toenemend onvolhoubare finansiële en maatskaplike las. Die ANC-regime misbruik selfs die huidige grieppandemie om van staatstoelaes ‘n al hoe swaarder meulsteen om die land se nek te maak. Die ANC se jongste skuif is om rassisme te verdoesel deur na die swart bevoordeeldes as die “kwesbares” te verwys.

West skryf: “Central to conservatism is the idea that radical change is almost always bad” (1246). Die Britse filosoof, Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990), “wrote that conservatism was ‘to prefer the familiar to the unkown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the suffient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss'” (1246, 6142). Volgens West “conservatives also believe in ‘epistemological modesty’, that there are limits to human knowledge, especially in politics, as human society is too complex for any one person or group to understand” (1270).

“Back in 1794 the romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, along with another wordsmith, Robert Southey, came up with the brilliant idea of an egalitarian community in which all ruled equally. They settled on the name ‘Partisocracy’, from the Greek for ‘equal government for all'” (1562). Die aartsfeminis, Amanda Gouws, wat wens dat bykans die helfte van die mensdom, die bose mans, liewer moet verdwyn, bied ‘n kursus aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch aan wat Susterkunde genoem kan word, met Ousiekunde as subdissipline. Vir Gouws se hartsbegeerte kan die benaming Broekiekrasie (“Pantycracy”) gebruik word. “Egalitarian utopias overlook people’s natural instinct to better themselves, while twentieth-century sexual utopias ignored the failures, disappointments and injustices that characterise human relationships” (1574).

Die goeie ou dae word gekenmerk deur die salige verskynsel dat elkeen sy (tradisionele) plek geken het. “The notion that everyone has their place … can arguably provide a coherent structure that makes the world seem less chaotic” (2001). Pleks van die bestaan van realistiese hiërargieë te erken, word eerder gelykheid en eendersheid gepredik. “With identity politics becoming so dominant some conservatives have accused the Left of being almost proprietorial about minorities, and holding non-whites to lower standards, called ‘the soft bigotry of low expectations'”(2015). Dit is presies wat aan bv die Universiteit Stellenbosch gebeur. Vir toelating tot mediese studie word laer akademiese prestasie van nieblanke as van blanke kandidate verwag. Daar is boonop ‘n kwotastelsel waarvolgens verseker word dat daar op ‘n rassistiese grondslag nog erger teen blanke kandidate gediskrimineer word (kyk op die internet).

Dit is veral die Italiaanse marxis, Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), se idees wat as “kulturele marxisme” bekend staan (2178). Ná die ontbinding van die Sowjetunie in 1991 het marxiste hulle aktivisme van staatkundige na kulturele ondermyning, met die oog op uiteindelike oorwinning, verskuif. “Cultural Marxism … views history as a question of power and privilege. What people mean by ‘cultural Marxism’ might be simplistically surmised as opposition to tradition and hierarchy; radical gender politics; the Marxist theory of race in which whites are the bourgeoisie and non-whites the proletariat; intolerance towards non-orthodox thinkers; the necessity of changing the language;* and the ideas that criminals are victims of society, marriage is oppressive and exploitative, and nations are artificial, imagined communities. It’s roughly synonymous with progressive politics, then, perhaps just a slightly crankier way of saying ‘progressivism'” (2178). “Progressivism … holds that everyone is essentially good” (2225) – insluitende misdadigers en gewelddenaars soos terroriste. Dit is waarom gevangenes in die nuwe Suid-Afrika stemreg het. “It is forbidden to forbid” (2249). Die resultaat is chaos en anargie, wat revolusie tot gevolg kan hê.

[* Dink aan al die geykte woorde met groot seggingskrag wat nie meer in die nuwe Suid-Afrika gebruik mag word nie. Ter sake is ook die Afrikaanse Taalraad (ATR) en Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging (ATKV) se ywer om Standaardafrikaans te herstandaardiseer en Afrikaans met onnodige Engelse woorde te besoedel deur Kaaps as die toekoms van Afrikaans te propageer.]

Oor politieke byderwetsheid/korrektheid (PC) skryf West: “PC could be called ‘political politeness’, since in the popular imagination it is associated with euphemisms about race, sexuality, disability or other perceived disadvantages, and as a consequence ‘politically incorrect’ has come to mean the same as rudeness. Except that wasn’t really the purpose of political correctness in policing the language. The aim in many cases was not to pressure opponents into being polite, but to stop them expressing their ideas altogether. PC, for want of a better expression, describes a set of acceptable beliefs, outside which it is not permitted to step [ie the Overton window] … Newspapers probably made it easier for PC’s real purpose – of censoring and controlling – to go unchallenged” (2453).

In die praktyk is daar talle voorbeelde van “[PC] gone mad … If you’re conservative it’s mad to start with … like the one about ‘Baa baa black sheep’ being removed for being insuffiently racially sensitive” (2441). Breinspoeling begin in die kleuterskool: “To my surprise they did actually sing ‘Baa baa woolly lamb’ there, rather than ‘Baa baa black sheep’, something I previously assumed was a tabloid myth” (4173). “At our local children’s library the entire front desk area was made up of hagiographies of Barack Obama and Nelson Mandela” (4375). “If you’re a conservative, then once you become a parent, you’re faced with the prospect of raising your children in a culture that is filled with simplistic, untrue messages about the world … Kid’s books and television give an interesting insight into where prevailing beliefs come from, regularly hammering home the message that borders are bad, stereotypes are wrong,* mankind is a menace to the planet and girls ought to be masculine … We are all basically good and others are just like us” (4385). “[They] make lovely neighbours and don’t in any way steal everything … Children’s books are culture war meme processors” (4396); “meme-processing propaganda” (4421). Ek onthou hoe ‘n plaaslike uitgewer ná ons “bevryding” in 1994 hiet en gebied het dat daar in iedere kinderboek minstens een swart karakter móét wees. “And books seem nothing like as obviously indoctrinating as films or TV” (4421).

[* “The … idea of stereotype accuracy, once assumed by the psychology profession to be largely wrong, has in recent years been shown to be resilient and accurate” (6021).]

Dit gaan eintlik om die gewilde standpunt dat ons almal “ideologically correct”, dus polities linksgesind, moet wees (2476). “One interpretation of PC is that it is the ‘paradox of tolerance’, promoting tolerance of historically disadvantaged or persecuted groups to such an extreme that it becomes itself another form of intolerance” (2538). In die HAT word ‘n groot aantal woorde as “rassisties” geëtiketteer, maar die verligte samestellers het dit darem nog nie met die volgende woorde gedoen nie: swartgallig, swartlys, swartmark, swartryp, swartskaap, swartsmeer. “One way a political group can come to dominate the culture is by dominating the language, creating neologisms that imply acceptance of their worldview and making other terms unfashionable or unsayable” (2573).

“Harvard’s Richard Herrnstein was called a racist for arguing, in 1971, that, because intelligence is partly inherited, then the tendency of clever people to marry other clever people will lead to stratification. He wasn’t even talking about race, but he received death threats and his lecture halls were filled with chanting mobs. Herrnstein and another academic, Arthur Jensen, were forced not just to cancel lectures but also to hire guards, because of their IQ research. Then there was EO Wilson, whose Sociobiology (1975 [2nd ed, 720p; Amazon Kindle $45,94]) concluded that some universal human attributes, including our moral sense, may be shaped by natural selection. The aim of the book was to explain human behaviour, such as violence and altruism, through evolution, yet a widely circulated article by a group of academics accused him of promoting theories that ‘led to the establishment of gas chambers in Nazi Germany'” (2512).

“Gramsci’s great theory was that of hegemony, ideological domination that extends beyond politics and into culture, which is far more important” (2166). Daar word dikwels na blanke oorheersing/hegemonie verwys in lande waar die blanke meerderheid in beheer is. In die nuwe Suid-Afrika word daar graag van “demokrasie” gepraat asof dit verkwikkende saligheid oor die land gebring het. In werklikheid het ons te make met swart oorheersing/hegemonie in die ergste graad, maar dit word (feitlik) nooit met hierdie benamings geëtiketteer nie. Die politiek en blanke/Westerse kultuur word op ongekende skaal deur marxisme gerysmier. Dit is bv waarom ‘n nuwe maar valse geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika toenemend ontplooi en Afrikaans so min moontlik ruimte gegun word. “The past … becomes another front in the culture war” (2955).

“Pretty much every aspect of human culture and the variation between us has a large genetic factor that makes equality of outcome impossible … Among the top-ten replicated findings from behavioural genetics are that ‘all psychological traits show significant and substantial genetic influence’ and ‘the heritability of intelligence increases throughout development'” (5974). “Even criminality has a genetic component … [and] all the variation in personality traits is about 50 per cent genetic … Even our political beliefs are to some extent hereditary” (5988). “Right-wing authoritarianism ‘in particular shows high levels of heritability'” (6005).

Linkses hou daarvan om wat ‘n mens (veral geestelik) is aan omgewingsfaktore toe te skryf. Dit baan dan die weg om vir bv apartheid die skuld te gee vir nie-prestasie en die armoede en ellende wat daaruit volg. Gelyke geleenthede sou na bewering na gelyke uitkomste lei. In die praktyk gebeur dit nie omdat genetiese oorerwing buite rekening gelaat is. “The vast area of twin studies has shown the variation in human intelligence to be around 50 per cent heritable, as are the five major personality traits [neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, conscientionsness]. As for sex, there are vast amounts of evidence showing that average differences in temperament between men and women across cultures are the product of biology” (2388). Dit is dus ‘n dwaalleer om te beweer dat elkeen die vryheid het om self tussen manwees, vrouwees en bv transwees te kies.

Regerings openbaar dikwels heeltemal skeefgetrekte voorkeure. Die ANC-regime gee blatant voorkeur aan die belange van swartes en vroue in sy “nie-rassige en nie-seksistiese” nuwe Suid-Afrika. In Brittanje word voorkeur aan welsynsdienste gegee. “Britain is not a state so much as a hospital service with a TV station attached” (3359). Robert Conquest (1917-2015) het tereg opgemerk: “Any organisation not explicitly right-wing sooner or later becomes left-wing” (3371) – wie nie vir ons is nie, is teen ons. Dit verduidelik waarom daar feitlik geen regse instansies in Suid-Afrika oorgebly het nie. Amnestie Internasionaal was aanvanklik ‘n instansie wat geweier het om gewelddenaars te ondersteun. “In 1964 they refused to take up the cause of Nelson Mandela” (3419). Sedertdien het daar ‘n radikale verandering ingetree. “Recently the group has campaigned for members of al-Qaida, which is not exactly a non-violent organisation” (3419). “Violence is more likely to be forgiven if it’s done by the right people” (4016), bv deur ANC-kamerade.

Ons lewe in ‘n tyd wat deur dubbele standaarde gekenmerk word. “The inauguration of Barack Obama in 2009 was followed by eight years without a single joke on any BBC comedy show about the president of the United States” (4521). Ons word gereeld vergas op Donald Trump se oranje hare en Boris Johnson se hooimied, maar opmerkings oor Obama se hare was in die praktyk eintlik verbode. Die Amerikaners mag feitlik nie eens hardop gewonder het oor wat van Obama se geboortesertifikaat geword het nie.

By ‘n vorige geleentheid het ek ‘n uitdrukking aan Winston Churchill toegeskryf, terwyl die oorsprong daarvan nie so seker is nie. “If you are a conservative you have no heart and if you are a socialist you have no brain.” Hierdie uitdrukking “has been attributed to Victor Hugo, Bejamin Disraeli, George Bernard Shaw, George Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and Bob Dylan. The truism was probably first written down by nineteenth-century French political theorist Anselme Batbie, but he in turn attributed it to Edmund Burke” (4670).

Leon Lemmer: Terrorisme en revolusie

‘n Kwarteeu het verloop sedert die gebeure van 1990/94. Dit het duidelik geword dat daar nie politieke magsdeling plaasgevind het soos valslik aan die blanke kiesers belowe is nie, maar magsoorgawe aan die swart meerderheid. Daar is nie evolusionêre voortsetting van die geskiedenis soos wat dit van 1652 tot 1989 was nie. Die ramp wat die land in 1994 getref het, was ‘n revolusie; dus, ‘n absolute breuk met die geskiedenis. Dit is waarom die ANC/SAKP-regime voorgee dat die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika eintlik in 1994 begin. Dit is ook die grondslag vir die veronderstelling dat alles wat tydens die blanke politieke bewind was, sleg is. Dit is waarom daar van ons donker verlede gepraat word asof dit evangelie is. Dit is waarom naïewe linksgesinde blankes hulle deur ANC/SAKP-propaganda laat wysmaak dat hulle verskoning vir ons beweerde slegte verlede moet vra.

Het die era van lig werklik in 1994 aangebreek? Nee, die versugting moet eerder wees: “Hoe groot is die donkerheid nie” (Matteus 6:23). ‘n Ander mite is dat hierdie oorgang na “demokrasie” vreedsaam plaasgevind het. Sedert 1910 was 1990/94 die gewelddadigste in die land se geskiedenis.

Die voorafgaande verduidelik waarom daar in hierdie rubriek aandag aan twee verskynsels, terrorisme en revolusie, geskenk word. Plaaslik het terrorisme tot die 1994-revolusie en ook tot “demokrasie” (‘n eufemisme vir swart oorheersing) gelei. Die gebeure was wesenlik ‘n gewelddadige revolusie waarin die wit baas deur die swart baas vervang is. Hierdie revolusie het onder die leiding van Nelson Mandela plaasgevind, vandaar die groot waardering wat hom veral ná die suksesvolle revolusie te beurt geval het; ook in die geledere van polities verligte blankes. Vervolgens bespreek ek eers terrorisme en daarna die revolusie wat daarop gevolg het. Hou deurgaans die ANC (waarby die UDF en SAKP ingesluit is) as dié toonbeeld van ‘n terreurinstansie, asook Mandela as dié toonbeeld van ‘n terroris, in gedagte.

Terrorisme

Terrorisme: “skrikaanjaging/intimidasie deur dade van geweld; gesamentlike dade deur terroriste gepleeg” (HAT). Terrorism: “The use of violence, or the threat of violence, to frighten people in order to achieve a political, social, or religious goal” (Oxford English Dicionary). Geweld en dreigemente dat tot geweldpleging oorgegaan sal word as daar nie aan eise toegegee word nie, is dié kern van terrorisme. Albei strategieë was kenmerkend van die ANC tydens die 1990/94- onderhandelinge; so ook buitensporige geweld vóór 1990. Dat die ANC ‘n terroriste-organisasie was, kan nie betwyfel word nie. Die ANC se geweld asook afdreigings daarmee het in 1990/94 onder die leiding van Mandela plaasgevind. Mandela was ongetwyfeld ‘n terroris, al het hy besluit dat hy eerder ‘n “vryheidsvegter” genoem moet word. Daarna het al wat ‘n sikofant is Mandela as ‘n vryheidsvegter by uitnemendheid beskou. Sowel Mandela as die ANC het nooit die kern van hulle bedrywighede, naamlik geweld, afgesweer nie. Dit is in ooreenstemming met die wens van die berugte swartmagaktivis, Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), wat geweld as “inherently empowering” beskou het; selfs as “a cleansing force” (Townshend, bron hier onder, p 13).

In Amerika is die amptelike definisie van terrorisme: “The calculated use or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies,” en in Brittanje: “The use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological course of action, of serious violence against any person or property” (Charles Townshend, Terrorism: A very short introduction, Oxford University Press, 2002, p 3). Oor Amerika: “Many of the legislative enactments followed federal law by defining ‘act of terrorism’ as a violent felony intended either to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence or effect governmental policy or conduct'” (Albert Borowitz, bron hier onder, Kindle 204). Sunil Khilnani skryf: “‘Terrorism is a distinctive form of modern political agency, intended to threaten the ability of the state to ensure the security of its members’ – and thus its claim to legitimacy” (Townshend 5). Die ANC het op hierdie manier uiters voortydig erkenning as die “enigste ware verteenwoordigers van die land se inwoners” verwerf, bv by die Verenigde Nasies. Geen wonder nie dat daar beswaardheid is oor “the failure of the international community to fully recognize terrorism as criminal behaviour” (127).

“Terrorism is the recourse of those too weak to oppose states openly” (7). Mandela het bv telkens beweer dat hy geen ander opsie as geweld gehad het nie. Hierdie argument word sonder meer deur Mandela se volgelinge en simpatiseerders herhaal. Daarmee word die feit geïgnoreer dat baie van die dood en verwoesting wat deur die ANC aangerig is, veral in 1990/94, nie teen die NP-regering gemik was nie, maar teen die Inkatha Vryheidsparty (IVP); dus om politieke mag vir die ANC te bekom en wat so onbeperk moontlik moet wees, verkieslik ‘n tweederde meerderheid tydens die algemene verkiesing in 1994. ANC-kornuite vertel graag van die vryheid wat hulle met bloed verwerf het, maar hulle versuim om te noem dat dit weens die ANC se magshonger hoofsaaklik swart bloed van nie-ANC-aanhangers is wat ANC-terroriste laat vloei het. “The essence of terrorism is the use of violence by the armed against the unarmed” (8).

Wat ook geïgnoreer word, is dat baie swartes buite die ANC teen die gebruik van geweld vir politieke doeleindes gekant was. “The weak may adopt a strategy of resistance which does not require terror” (7). Maar die ANC het nie-ANC-gesindes met geweld en dreigemente van geweld probeer verplig om hulle by die ANC te skaar. Dít is kenmerkend van ‘n egte terreurorganisasie: “targeting ‘the silent’ – those who had precisely avoided political commitment of any kind” (43). Mandela het leiding met die vergoeiliking en vertroeteling van geweld in die ANC gegee deur die stigting van Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), die gewapende vleuel van die ANC, wat op 16 Desember 1961 met sy terrorisme begin het. Deesdae verwag die ANC met sy valse waardes dat 16 Desember as Versoeningsdag gevier moet word.

“The essence of terrorism … is surely the negation of combat. Its targets are attacked in a way that inhibits (or better prohibits) self-defence … in the indiscriminate bombing of a street market, a store, or a bar, we see a deliberate flouting of the international law of war, and a refusal to accept as binding the prevailing moral distinctions – between belligerents and neutrals, combatants and noncombatants, legitimate and illegitimate targets” (7). Volgens die ANC “there are no innocents” (60) in nie-ANC-geledere. Indien dit nie steeds die geval is nie, wás die ANC ‘n verderflike organisasie, met Mandela aan die begin (1961-1962) en later (1990/94) aan die spits van die geweld/terrorisme. Daar is gepoog om so skouspelagtig moontlik onbeskaaf te wees, bv met halssnoermoorde, om die ANC se gesag af te dwing. ‘n Amerikaanse regter het tereg terrorisme beskryf as “a clear and present danger to the very existence of civilisation itself” (33). “Without some sense of disturbance, of abnormality if not enormity, attention would not be seized” (8).

“Fear may drive people to comply” (9); vrees nie net by nie-ANC-gesinde swartes nie, maar ook by die armsalige FW de Klerk en sy armsalige onderhandelaars. De Kerk het nooit gevolg gegee aan die Amerikaanse departement van buitelandse sake se beleid nie: “Make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals” (130). “Although the 20th century produced plenty of successful ‘wars of national liberation’, often with a significant terrorist dimension, none succeeded by terrorism alone” (25). In Algerië het die FLN-terroriste Charles de Gaulle se hartlike samewerking vir ‘n oorwinning/revolusie nodig gehad. In Suid-Afrika was dit De Klerk wat gesorg het dat die ANC-terroriste seëvier. In Algerië terrorisme “was integral to the revolution” (94) – so ook in Suid-Afrika.

“Terrorists … are mostly unamenable to limited concessions: it is by setting absolute, non-negotiable demands, as much as by using violence, that they opt out of the political process” (26). De Klerk het hom op ‘n uiters dwase en kortsigtige manier probeer distansieer van die sekuriteitsmaatreëls van sy voorgangers, John Vorster en PW Botha, wat terrorisme kragdadig bestry het. Op aandrang van die ANC het De Klerk talle sekuriteitsmaatreëls afgeskaf, waarmee hy hom toenemend blootgestel het aan afdreiging met geweld deur die bose ANC. De Klerk het nooit ‘n elementêre les geleer wat steeds suksesvol deur bv Israel toegepas word nie: “The reaction of a state should [at least] be in proportion to the wound inflicted on it [by terrorism]” (117)

“The support-building function of terrorism encompassed two distinct aims: first, securing obedience or compliance … and, second, bidding for sympathy and ideological or moral endorsement” (12). Met albei was die ANC suksesvol. Die massa-inligtingsmedia plaaslik en in die buiteland, asook bv religieuse instansies, het die ANC se terrorisme vergoeilik en gesteun, gevolg deur die regerings van talle lande. “Publicity is the ‘oxygen’ of terrorism” (136). Volgens Yonah Alexander “terrorists make ‘a conscious and deliberate effort to manipulate the media’ and that ‘by provinding extensive coverage of incidents the media give the impression that they sympathise with the terrorist cause'” (136). Die ANC het steeds die SABC en Naspers/Media24 in die holte van sy hand. Dit hinder my dat Afrikaners veral in hierdie grendeltyd daagliks aan die pro-ANC-propaganda van hierdie twee instansies blootgestel is, terwyl baie van hierdie kykers, luisteraars en lesers nie die vermoë het om sinvol teen breinspoeling weerstand te bied nie.

Die aartslinkse Doris Lessing (1919-2013), wat lank in Rhodesië gewoon het (1925-1949), het simpatie met terroriste gehad. In haar roman, The good terrorist (1984), laat sy ‘n terroris sê: “We are going to pull everything down. All of it” (20). Dit is ook wat die ANC telkens belowe het: dat sy terroriste enigiets, indien nodig alles, wat in Suid-Afrika opgebou is, sal vernietig ten einde die politieke mag te bekom. Dit het van 1994 af die ANC-regime se heropbou- en ontwikkelingsprogram (“Reconstruction and Development Programme”) genoodsaak. Townshend vestig die aandag op die geykte skynheiligheid of dubbele standaarde van terreur-instansies, wat ook dikwels in ANC-uitlatings na vore gekom het: “That the violence of their protests was puny in comparison with the ‘violence inherent in the system'” (23). Willie Esterhuyse verwys graag na die “sistemiese geweld” van apartheid, maar hy verkies om soveel moontlik oor die inherente gewelddadigheid van die terroristiese ANC te swyg.

Selfverheerlikende terrorisme

“The terrorist is noble, terrible, irresistibly fascinating, for he combines in himself the two sublimities of human grandeur: the martyr and the hero” (Serge Stepniak-Kravchinski, Underground Russia, 1883, aangehaal in Townshend, p 31). Hiervan is Mandela by uitstek ‘n toonbeeld: eers ‘n martelaar-gevangene, “onskuldig” in die tronk (1962-1990), toe ‘n hergeaktiveerde terroris (1990-1994) en daarna ‘n ná-revolusionêre held. Van veral fanatieke Moslem-terroriste word gesê: “The terrorist is not just prepared to get killed, but wants to get killed” (119). Ek dink Mandela was te lafhartig vir selfdoodterrorisme, al het hy in 1964 in die Rivonia-verhoor vol propagandistiese bravade verklaar dat hy bereid was om vir sy ideale en die bevordering daarvan met terroristiese bedrywighede te sterf.

Mandela se misplaaste roem is gegrond op die gewaande”moral superiority of the individual guerrilla, produced by the fact that he is ‘defending a just cause, the cause of the people'” (63). In werklikheid het dit nog nooit vir Mandela en die ANC om die heil van “the people”, in die sin van die Suid-Afrikaanse bevolking in sy geheel, gegaan nie. Dit gaan spesifiek om die onregverdigbare bevoordeling van swartes, by uitstek diegene in die voorste gestoeltes van die ANC, en die buitensporige benadeling van blankes. “The framework for much modern terrorist action is ethnic or nationalist” (74). “Terrorism may play a leading part in the attempt to preserve or ‘reawaken’ the national spirit” (76). Vandaar die groot aanhang wat die swartbewussynspropaganda van bv Fanon en Steve Biko in ANC-geledere geniet.

Van Albert Borowitz (gebore in 1930) is die volgende boek gepubliseer: Terrorism for self-glorification: The Herostratos syndrome (Kent State University Press, 2005, 192p; Amazon Kindle $25,09). Die naam Herostratos is vanweë ‘n enkele daad bekend. Hy het in 356 vC die Artemis-tempel (Artemisium) in Efese aan die weskus van Klein-Asië (by Selçuk in Turkye) afgebrand. Hierdie marmertempel was een van die Sewe Wêreldwonders in die antieke tyd. Herostratos het die hout van die tempeldak aan die brand gesteek (Kindle 329) met ‘n enkele doel voor oë: sodat hy vir altyd en wêreldwyd bekend kan wees. Dit is ‘n voorbeeld van “the morbid quest for eternal fame through crimes of violence” (93), oftewel “the morbid passion for infamy” (235). Borowitz wys op “the paradox that negative fame often outlasts glory achieved by merit” (692). “They seek fame and generally attain honor from that from which it were more fitting that they suffer disgrace and punishment” (723). “It is said of Herostratos … that he was ‘more desirous of a widespread reputation than of a good one” (770). Ná die brand is die marmerpilare van die tempel verkoop (378). Die vernietiging van die Artemisium was dus volkome.

Ydelheid het ongetwyfeld ‘n rol gespeel. Mense wat aan die Herostratos-sindroom ly, is nie in staat om op ‘n positiewe manier te presteer en op ‘n prysenswaardige manier bekend te word nie. Hulle is gedoem om eerder berug as beroemd te wees. Herostratos het ‘n metoniem geword vir iemand wat ‘n misdaad pleeg ten einde bekend te word. Hy het ‘n duur prys vir sy misdaad betaal: “He was apprehended, tortured, and executed” (93). Om sy poging tot permanente bekendheid in tyd en ruimte te fnuik, was daar “the imposition of a ban on the mention of his name” (93). Terwyl Mandela in die tronk was, was daar streng sensuurregulasies oor wat oor hom en ander terroriste gepubliseer mag word. Hulle het immers nie ‘n navolgenswaardige voorbeeld gestel nie. Byvoorbeeld, geen foto van Mandela was toe in plaaslike publikasies toelaatbaar nie.

In die Griekse mitologie is Artemis ‘n dogter van Zeus en die godin van die jag, die maan en vrugbaarheid. “By die Romeine word Artemis met die Ou Italiese vrugbaarheidsgodin en die godin van die maan, Diana, geassosieer” (Adelaïde van Reeth, Ensiklopedie van die mitologie, Vlaeberg Uitgewers, 1994, p 28). Diana was ook die godin van plantegroei en die slawe (61). Die tempel waarom dit hier gaan, was die tweede een wat omtreeks 550 vC opgerig is nadat die eerste Artemis-tempel in ‘n vloed in die 7de eeu vC vernietig is. Die Artemisium verskyn op ‘n vroeë lys van wêreldwonders wat deur die historikus Herodotus (484-425 vC) opgestel is. In 323 vC is begin met die oprigting van die derde Artemisium, wat in 401 nC vernietig is. Hierdie tempel is ook as ‘n wêreldwonder beskou. Die herbouing van die tempel het dus in ‘n sin Herostratos se vernietigingswerk verydel. Die verbod op die noem van sy naam was egter nie geslaagd nie. Sy naam word in verskeie antieke geskrifte genoem. Publisiteit is die lewensbloed van diegene wat aan die Herostratos-sindroom ly. Naamerkenning word in hierdie konteks ‘n vorm van verheerliking.

Borowitz skryf: “A famous person, property, or institution is often chosen as victum or target … [eg] a killer may hope, by his attack, to absorb the celebrity of his prey” (106). Jaloesie kan ook ‘n rol speel. Herostratos is al “the first terrorist who entered history” genoem (121). “A leading expert on modern terrorist activity, Walter Laqueur [1921-2018], … has written in the wake of the attack on the World Trade Center [2001], ‘Over the centuries, terrorism has appeared in many guises. It is not an ideology or a political doctrine, but rather a method – the substate application of violence or the threat of violence to sow panic and bring about political change'” (121). “In Terrorist lives (1994), Maxwell Taylor and Ethel Quayle express their belief that ‘a core element in any account of terrorism is that it involves the use of violence to achieve political ends'” (137).

Dit lyk asof hedendaagse terrorisme grootliks polities gemotiveerd is. By Moslem-terrorisme word daar in laaste instansie ook ‘n politieke doel nagestreef omdat die ideaal is dat Moslem-geestelikes in beheer van die regering van ‘n land en selfs die hele wêreld moet wees. Maar die Moslem-terroris kan naas saligheid in die hiernamaals ook deur selfverheerliking gemotiveer word, naamlik die begeerte om in die geheue van mense voort te leef, dus sekulêre of wêreldse onsterflikheid. “The Palestinian terrorists’ self-sacrifice may now be encouraged less by the ‘idea of winning a place in paradise’ than by the prospect of living on in human memory” (173). In Suid-Afrika was dit die “perceived injustice” (155) van apartheid wat Mandela tot terrorisme aangespoor het. “Like many political terrorists, Herostratos and his successors appeared dedicated to the destruction of an unjust world” (155).

‘n Kenmerk van die hedendaagse terroris is “his passion for media attention” (155). “Media attention does not, however, merely serve the purpose of publicizing and advancing the goals of a political cause, but also may appease the desires of individuals at the summit or base of the terrorist organization for personal stardom. The terrorist’s achievement of fame carries with it an intoxicating sense of empowerment such as Herostratos felt when the temple’s fire leapt up to the night sky of Ephesus” (173). “James Bowman … argues that our media culture has fostered a new era of Herostratos by trivializing the standards for acquiring reputation. He notes that in heroic ages reflected in Homer and in medieval epics such as The Song of Roland, reputation was equated with ‘honor’ … In Bowman’s view, the times of heroism and honor have given way to a ‘Herostratian age’ ruled by a media-fueled obsession with celebrity, whether for good or ill” (3875). Mandela was ‘n toonbeeld van ‘n publisiteitsoeker. Nadat hy in 1990 uit die tronk vrygelaat is, het hy nie net plaaslik aandag en verheerliking gesoek en gekry nie, maar wêreldwyd. Hy het talle lande die een na die ander besoek om vereer te word en geld vir die terroristiese ANC in te samel. Dit was asof Mandela met hierdie reise sy vryheid gevier het en probeer het om daarmee sy jare van inperking te ontgroei. Maar hy verdien nie verering op grond van sy terreurdade nie. “Only God deserves to be glorified for He is perfect” (754).

Borowitz beskryf latere gebeure wat as uitdrukkings van die Herostratos-sindroom beskou kan word. Enersyds polities gemotiveerde terrorisme, bv die vernietiging van die Stari Most (Ou Brug) in Mostar, Bosnië-Herzegovina. Die konstruksie van die Stari Most oor die Neretva-rivier het nege jaar in beslag geneem (1557-1566) – “a monument to civilization” (1727). Hierdie brug was die verbinding tussen die Kroate se gebied op die wesbank en die Moslems se gebied op die oosbank. In die stryd om onafhanklike etniese state in Joego-Slawië te vestig, het die Serwiërs in 1991 die brug beskadig, maar dit was die Kroate wat dit in November 1993 vernietig het (1711). Dit is een van die min gebeure in daardie gebied en tyd waarvoor die skuld nie op die Serwiërs gepak word nie. Die kernprobleem was dat die Weste, insluitende Navo, hulle aan die kant van die Moslems geskaar het (Praag 12.05.2018).

Andersyds is daar om religieuse redes uitdrukking aan die Herostratos-sindroom gegee, bv die verwoesting van die twee groot Boeddhistiese beelde, 35 en 53 meter hoog, in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, in Maart 2001. Hierdie beelde is in onderskeidelik die jaar 507 en 554 in sandsteen uitgebeitel. Die Taliban, ‘n fundamentalistiese politieke beweging en militêre organisasie, het die beelde met bv bomme en dinamiet vernietig omdat die Moslemgeloof geen afbeeldings van gode toelaat nie en die Boeddhiste deur Moslems as ongelowiges beskou word. Die Taliban het “creating a pure Islamic state” as ideaal in Afghanistan (1808). Die vernietiging van die beelde is “anticultural terrorism”, “cultural cannibalism” (“the intentional elimination of symbolism representing a culture”) en “identicide” (“the destruction of places of identity”) genoem (1792). Westerse instansies het vooraf aangebied om die beelde te koop, maar die reaksie uit Moslem-geledere was: “We refer to be remembered as the destroyers of statues, rather than as the sellers of them” (1824).

Dit is nie net met die verwoesting van voorwerpe, soos ‘n brug of standbeeld, wat terroriste daarin slaag om bekendheid te verwerf nie. Dit kan ook bereik word deur bekende mense te vermoor. Dink bv aan die talle suksesvolle en onsuksesvolle aanslae op die lewe van Amerikaanse presidente. Die sluipmoordenaars, volgens David Brin, “showed a yearning for attention, both in the headline-grabbing nature of their crimes and in their polemics after capture” (3891). In Suid-Afrika is dit ‘n briljante intellektueel en staatshoof, Hendrik Verwoerd, wat twee keer die slagoffer van ‘n sluipmoordaanval was. Hulle misdade is die enigste rede waarom die name van David Pratt en Dimitri Tsafendas bekend geword het en onthou word.

Daar is aanvanklik gepoog om Herostratos se naam uit die geskiedenis te verwyder. Wat gebeur dan? Behalwe sy misdaad is daar eintlik geen ander eerstehandse inligting oor hom beskikbaar nie. Die gevolg is dat daar gespekuleer word oor hierdie “symbol of destructiveness” (3064). Verbeelding word gebruik om ongegronde inligting oor hom te versprei. Fiksie- en “feite”-tekste oor Herostratos en soortgelyke misdadigers word gepubliseer. Byvoorbeeld, in sy kortverhaal, “Erostratus” (in The wall and other stories, 1948), beweer Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) Herostratos het “a sense of freedom by committing a gratuitous criminal act” ervaar (3195). Sartre het die begrip vryheid gebruik om feitlik enigiets waarvan hy gehou het, goed te praat. Edmund Burke (bron hier onder) verwys na die “‘all-atoning name’ of liberty … But what is liberty without wisdom, and without virtue? It is the greatest of all possible evils; for it is folly, vice, and madness, without tuition or restraint. Those who know what virtuous liberty is, cannot bear to see it disgraced by incapable heads” (Kindle 998).

Sartre was een van die domonnosele in die politiek. Hy skryf: “For myself, who, until then, had never heard of Erostratus, his story was encouraging. He had been dead more than two thousand years and his act was still shining like a black diamond” (Borowitz 3214). Dit is Sartre wat met spesifieke verwysing na Algerië geskryf het: “The only true culture is that of the Revolution” (Preface, Frantz Fanon, The wretched of the earth, London: Penguin, 1961/2001, p 11). “It demands no less than a complete demolishing of all existing structures” (10). “There is one duty to be done, one end to achieve: to thrust out colonialism by every means” (18). “Once the last settler is killed, shipped home or assimilated, the minority breed disappears” (20).

Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935), ‘n Portugese skrywer met ‘n Suid-Afrikaanse agtergrond (1896-1905), het teen die einde van sy lewe ‘n boek geskryf: Erostratus and the search for immortality (Borowitz 3826). Die Russiese eksistensialistiese skrywer, Lev Shestov (1866-1938), het in ‘n essay, “Destroying and building” (1923, in Potestas clavium, 1968), hoogs sinvol geskryf “the final goal of man is to build and that destruction is in itself a terrible thing that can be justified only if it is a temporary step leading to new building … People like Herostratus must be put into chains in order not to be able to destroy” (3858). ‘n Terroristiese organisasie soos die ANC, wat van 1961 tot 1994 ‘n beleid van verskroeide aarde gevolg het – soos die Britte in die Anglo-Boereoorlog – is toegelaat om mandaatloos die politieke mag oor te neem. As regering is die ANC ‘n volslae mislukking, want hoewel sy terroriste suksesvol kon afbreek, vind hulle dit moeilik, indien nie onmoontlik nie, om die land te herbou.

Revolusie

Ek het met Edmund Burke (1729-1797) kennis gemaak toe ek James Boswell se klassieke biografie, The life of Samuel Johnson (1791, Amazon Kindle $0), gelees het. Al drie was lid van ‘n klub, waaroor daar onlangs ‘n uitstekende boek gepubliseer is: Leo Damrosch se The Club: Johnson, Boswell, and the friends who shaped an age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019, 498p; Amazon Kindle $16,32). Burke was ‘n Ier wat lank ‘n Britse parlementslid was (1766-1794). Wat uit hierdie twee boeke blyk, is dat Burke ‘n denker met uitnemende substansie was; veel meer ewewigtig as Johnson. Damrosch het tereg groot waardering vir Johnson, maar hy dink nie veel van Boswell nie. Mettertyd is Burke al hoe meer as die grondlegger van hedendaagse konserwatisme erken.

Revolusie: “opstand teen die staat wat tot ‘n algehele ommekeer van die stelsel lei.” Evolusie: “geleidelike ontwikkeling” (HAT). Die Franse Revolusie (1789) is seker die bekendste revolusie. Kort ná die aanvanklike revolusie (eintlik het die revolusie tot 1799 geduur) het Burke ‘n boek daaroor gepubliseer: Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). In hierdie rubriek gebruik ek die volgende teks, gebaseer op Burke se 1790-boek: The evils of revolution (London: Penguin, 2008, 100p; Amazon Kindle $8,10).

Burke het sy boek geskryf in reaksie op die ingenomenheid van die Britse Constitutional Society en Revolution Society met die Franse Revolusie. Hy kontrasteer bv die Britse geskiedenis en (ongeskrewe) Grondwet met dié van die Franse. Burke doen dit nie net om op kenmerkende wyse die meerderwaardigheid van die Britte te probeer tuisbring nie. Die Britte het ‘n eeu vroeër hulle “Glorious Revolution” (1689) gehad, maar dit het nie die weefsel of kern van die Britse samelewing vernietig soos wat met die Franse Revolusie gebeur het nie. “The question is not now of the vices of that monarchy, but of its existence. Is it then true, that the French government was such as to be incapable or undeserving of reform; so that it was of absolute necessity the whole fabric should be at once pulled down, and the area cleared for the erection of a theoretic experimental edifice in its place?” (779). “Along with much evil, there is some good in monarchy itself” (790). Insgelyks was apartheid glad nie net sleg nie. “When ancient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot possibly be estimated. From that moment we have no compass to govern us; nor can we know distinctly to what port we steer” (610). Ten spyte van periodieke ontwrigtings het daar by die Britte ‘n deurlopendheid behoue gebly. Deurlopendheid is wat sedert 1994 in Suid-Afrika ontbreek. Daar was ‘n absolute breuk met ons geskiedenis; dus, in 1994 was daar ‘n revolusie.

Die vraag is: Het Afrikaanssprekende blankes hulle deur hierdie onverkwiklike gebeure tot verlooptheid laat ontspoor? In hoeverre het hulle Afrikanergetrou gebly? Burke het sy vertroue in die Franse gees/kultuur behou. “It is a thing to be wondered at, to see how very soon France, when she had a moment to respire, recovered and emerged from the longest and most dreadful civil war that ever was known in any nation. Why? Because among all their massacres, they had not slain the mind in their country” (414). Het die Afrikaner se gees onblusbaar sterk uit enersyds die verraad in eie kring en andersyds die naakte terrorisme van die vyand gekom? Loutering kan hartversterkend wees. Afrikaners behoort te bly streef na ‘n normale samelewing. “Believe me, Sir, those who attempt to level, never equalize. In all societies, consisting of various descriptions of citizens, some description must be uppermost. The levellers therefore only change and pervert the natural order of things” (425). “By having a right to every thing, they want every thing” (457).

Burke skryf dat hy die Franse nie met hulle revolusie geluk kan wens alvorens daar duidelikheid oor sekere sake is nie, bv “with solidity of property, with peace and order, with civil and social manners. All these (in their way) are good things too; and, without them, liberty is not a benefit whilst it lasts, and is not likely to continue long. The effect of liberty to individuals is, that they do what they please. We ought to see what it will please them to do, before we risque congratulations, which may be soon turned into complaints” (108). Die klem wat in Frankryk op vryheid geplaas is, het spoedig in sy kolonies weerklank gevind. Dit het tot opstand in bv Haïti gelei, waar die blankes op groot skaal suksesvol uitgemoor en onafhanklikheid in 1804 verkry is. Dit was ‘n geval van “the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and excess” (306).

In Suid-Afrika het die inwoners sedert 1994 die vryheid om bv paaie te versper en voertuie met klippe te bestook. Die veiligheidsituasie is sodanig dat jy nie in jou eie woonplek veilig is nie, om nie te praat van die feit dat jy in baie opsigte nie vry is om te gaan waar jy wil nie, want jy doen dit op die gevaar af dat jy aangeval, beroof en selfs gedood kan word. Maar die ANC-regime verwag dat ons elke jaar Vryheidsdag op 27 April moet vier, die dag in 1994 waarop swart oorheersing begin het. Sedertdien is blankes nie eens meer vry om poste in bv die staatsdiens te beklee nie. Hulle is nie eens meer vry om eie woongebiede en skole te hê nie, ens.

In Brittanje, anders as in Frankryk, is die monargie nie afgeskaf nie, Historiese kontinuïteit is beswaar deur eerder die mag van die koning/koningin te beperk en die funksie van die monargie van uitvoerend na formeel of seremonieel te verander. Die Britse parlement “cannot renounce its share of authority. The engagement and pact of society, which generally goes by the name of the constitution, forbids such invasion and such surrender. The constituent parts of a state are obliged to hold their public faith with each other … Otherwise competence and power would soon be confounded, and no law be left but the will of a prevailing force” (151). In Suid-Afrika is daardie seëvierende mag die terroristiese ANC, wat sy sin selfs in die aanhef tot die Grondwet (1996) gekry het: “We, the people of South Africa, recognise the injustices of the past.” Dus, daar moet ‘n revolusionêre breuk met die slegte verlede wees. Soos Burke voorspel het (in die vorige paragraaf) het die euforie van 1994 spoedig vir ontnugtering plek gemaak. Tekens van bekwaamheid (Burke verwys hier bo na “competence”) in die ANC-regime is skaars. Alles waarvoor die regime nie die nodige vaardigheid het nie, word uitdagings (“challenges”) genoem. Daar is baie van hulle en dit lyk asof hulle al hoe meer word.

Burke het in 1790 tereg voorsien dat daar verdere revolusionêre veranderings in Frankryk sou kom; dat die situasie nie stabiel was nie. Wat nodig was, was “to make the Revolution a parent of settlement, and not a nursery of future revolutions” (228). Revolusies is geneig om teenrevolusies te ontlok, al is daar hierdie waarheid: “a revolution will be the very last resource of the thinking and the good” (285). Die uitkoms van die 1990/94-onderhandelinge was so skandalig en vergesog dat daar in 1993/94 die wesenlike moontlikheid bestaan het dat die veiligheidsmagte (weermag en polisie) in opstand sou kom. Een van die redes waarom dit nie gebeur het nie, is omdat daar nie groot duidelikheid was oor wat al die gevolge van die verbroude onderhandelinge sou wees nie. Valse versekeringe uit sowel ANC- as NP-geledere het die gemoedere verder gekalmeer, gerugsteun deur die massa-inligtingsmedia. Namate die kloof tussen die welvarende ANC-voorbokke en die verarmde gepeupel verbreed, word die moontlikheid van ‘n verdere revolusie egter al hoe groter.

Pleks van radikale verandering, naamlik revolusie, verkies Burke geleidelike aanpassing, dus evolusie. “These opposed and conflicting interests, which you consider as so great a blemish in your old and in our present constitution, interpose a salutary check to all precipitate resolutions. They render deliberation a matter not of choice, but of necessity; they make all change a subject of compromise, which naturally begets moderation; they produce temperaments, preventing the sore evil of harsh, crude, unqualified reformations; and rendering all the headlong exertions of arbitary power, in the few or in the many, for ever impracticable” (327). In ‘n revolusionêre klimaat gebeur die teenoorgestelde” “Moderation will be stigmatized as the virtue of cowards, and compromise as the prudence of traitors” (1008).

Die Suid-Afrikaanse bevolking is nie naasteby homogeen nie. Wat sedert 1994 gebeur, is dat die ANC-regime grootliks met in agname van eerstens hulle eie belang en tweedens die belang van die swart meerderheid regeer. Daar is weinig sprake van die gematigdheid wat Burke aanhang. Die belange van die bruines, Asiate en veral blankes word dikwels glad nie in ag geneem nie. Dit is waarom daar deur die ANC-regime openlik vir bv die onteiening sonder vergoeding van blankes se besittings geywer word.

Die volgende kan seker ook van die ANC en die nuwe Suid-Afrika gesê word: “France has bought undignified calamities at a higher price than any nation has purchased the most unequivocal blessings! France has bought poverty by crime. France has not sacrificed her virtue to her interest; but she has abandoned her interest, that she might prostitute her virtue … All other people have laid the foundations of civil freedom in severer manners, and a system of a more austere and masculine morality” (360). “The French rebel against a mild and lawful monarch, with more fury, outrage, and insult, than ever any people has been known to rise against the most illegal usurper, or the most sanguinary tyrant” (381).

Die ANC se terrorisme het geen perke geken nie. Die onbeskaafdheid daarvan was grenseloos. Tog word die ANC nie daarvoor tot verantwoording geroep nie, word daar nie verskoning gevra nie en word daar nie skadevergoeding betaal nie. “To make a revolution is a measure which, prima fronte, requires an apology. To make a revolution is to subvert the ancient state of our country; and no common reasons are called for to justify so violent a proceeding” (811). “Were all these dreadful things necessary? Were they the inevitable result of the desperate struggle of determined patriots, compelled to wade through blood and tumult, to the quiet shore of a tranquil and prosperous liberty?” (381).

Besluit self wat van die volgende op die ANC van toepassing is: “Not one drop of their blood have they shed in the cause of the country they have ruined. They have made no sacrifices to their projects of greater consequence than their shoe-buckles, whilst they were imprisoning their king, murdering their fellow citizens, and bathing in tears, and plunging in poverty and distress, thousands of worthy men and worthy families. Their cruelty has not even been the base result of fear. It has been the effect of their sense of perfect safety,* in authorizing treasons, robberies, rapes, assassinations, slaughters, and burnings throughout their harrassed land. But the cause of all was plain from the beginning” (392) – naamlik, in die geval van die ANC, om ten alle koste die politieke mag te bekom. [* Dink aan die ANC-lede wat knus in die buiteland as ‘n “regering in ballingskap” vertoef het.]

Die volgende is naatloos op ons situasie van toepassing: “Till power and right are the same, the whole body of them has no right inconsistent with virtue, and the first of all virtues, prudence.* Men have no right to what is not reasonable”** (490). “This sort of people are so taken up with their theories about the rights of man, that they have totally forgot his nature” (534). Die reg op vryheid word vertolk asof (feitlik) alles veroorloof is. Daarom hoef daar nie betaal te word vir wat ontvang of gesteel word nie. Onder “regstelling” word vergoeding vir die beweerde euwels van apartheid verstaan; nie boetedoening vir misdade soos terrorisme nie. [* In die sin van bedagsaamheid. ** Byvoorbeeld, onteiening sonder vergoeding.]

Dan volg hierdie beroemde woorde van Burke: “Society is indeed a contract … It becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born” (652). Hoe is dit vir verloopte Afrikaners moontlik om so fundamenteel ontrou aan hulle voorgeslagte te wees? Waarom word verloopte Afrikaners in so ‘n groot mate in die dampkring van die Afrikanerdom verdra, soortgelyk aan die verraaiers en joiners in en ná die Anglo-Boereoorlog? Hoe kry verloopte Afrikaners dit reg om Afrikaner-kinders en -jongmense in die oë te kyk terwyl hulle versoenend en inskiklik oor die onderploeging van hulle tradisionele geboortereg is? My nageslag is teen astronomiese koste besig met voorbereidings om die land te verlaat. Ek moedig hulle aan omdat dit vir jonger mense die regte ding is om te doen. Maar dit laat my verbitterd.

Hoe tipies of kenmerkend is die volgende nie van die nageboorte van ons eie revolusie nie? “When all the frauds, impostures, violences, rapines, burnings, murders, confiscations …and every description of tyranny and cruelty employed to bring about and to uphold this revolution, have their natural effect, that is, to shock the moral sentiments of all virtuous and sober minds, the abettors of this philosophical system immediately strain their throats in a declaration against the old monarchical government of France. When they have rendered that deposed power [NP government] sufficiently black, they then proceed in argument, as if all those who disapprove of their new abuses, must of course be partizans of the old [apartheid]; that those who reprobate their crude and violent schemes of liberty ought to be treated as advocates for servitude [baasskap] … Have these gentlemen never heard, in the whole circle of the worlds of theory and practice, of any thing between the despotism of the monarch [government by whites] and the despotism of the multitude [unqualified majority rule]?” (737).

In Frankryk is daar en in Suid-Afrika word daar steeds buitensporig oordryf oor hoe sleg die vóór-revolusionêre era was en hoe wonderlik die ná-revolusionêre era is. “I know how easy a topic it is to dwell on the faults of departed greatness” (769). “Those who are habitually employed in finding and displaying faults, are unqualified for the work of reformation” (887). Verwyte geslinger teen die vorige regering kom van ‘n regime waarvan gesê kan word: “[It] thought proper to commit a thousand crimes and to subject their country to a thousand evils … Is it then a truth so universally acknowledged, that a pure democracy is the only tolerable form into which human society can be thrown, that a man is not permitted to hestitate about its merits, without the suspicion of being a friend to tyranny, that is, of being a foe to mankind?” (758).

“Of this I am certain, that in a democracy, the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the minority, whenever strong divisions prevail in that kind of polity, as they often must; and that oppression of the minority will extend to far greater numbers, and will be carried on with much greater fury, than can almost ever be apprehended from the dominion of a single sceptre. In such a popular persecution, individual sufferers are in a much more deplorable condition than in any other … those who are subjected to wrong under multitudes, are deprived of all external consolation. They seem deserted by mankind; overpowered by a conspiracy of their whole species” (769). Inderdaad, dit voel asof niemand buite die Afrikanerdom werklik oor die lot van Afrikaners begaan is nie.

Slot

Gewelddadigheid as die wesenlike aard van terrorisme en die vernietinging inherent in revolusie is wat vir beskaafde mense verwerplik is. “Is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed? Your [France’s] mob can do this as well at least as your assemblies. The shallowest understanding, the rudest hand, is more than equal to that task. Rage and phrenzy will pull down more in half an hour, than prudence, deliberation, and foresight can build up in a hundred years” (854).

Hier bo het ek na Samuel Johnson en James Boswell verwys. In 1773 het hulle ‘n reis na die Skotse eilande, die Hebride, onderneem. Albei het ‘n verslag oor hierdie reis gepubliseer: Johnson in 1775 (A journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Amazon Kindle bv $1,14) en Boswell in 1785 ( A journal of a tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson, Amazon Kindle bv $0). Sedert ek Boswell se beroemde Johnson-biografie en hierdie twee reisverslae gelees het, is dit een van my genotvolste ervarings om leunstoelreise na hierdie eilande te onderneem. Onlangs het ek van die oudste dokumentasie oor die Skotse eilande gelees: A description of the Western Islands of Scotland ca 1695 (1703) and A late voyage to St Kilda (1698) by Martin Martin, and Description of the occidental ie Western Islands of Scotland by Donald Monro (1549) (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 1999/2018, 384p; Amazon Kindle $6,89). Monro lys sowat 250 eilande. Volgens die Wikipedia is daar meer as 900. Martin se 1703-boek handel nie net oor die Hebride in die noordweste nie, maar ook oor twee eilandgroepe in die noorde van Skotland: Orkney en Shetland.

Wat my aangegryp het, is die volgende paragraaf wat meer as drie eeue gelede oor ‘n kerkgebou op die eiland Suid-Ronaldsay, Orkney, geskryf is : “Ladykirk, in South Ronaldsha, though ruinous, and without a roof, is so much reverenced by the natives, that they choose rather to repair this old one, than to build a new church in a more convenient place, and at a cheaper rate: such is the power of education, that these men cannot be cured of these superfluous fancies, transmitted to them by their ignorant ancestors” (Kindle 3623). Om iets te bou, in stand te hou, te bewaar en waardeer, dít is van die beste en mooiste vrugte van beskawing. Dit is iets wat die ANC nog moet leer.

Leon Lemmer: Denis Worrall: Verligtheid baar die nuwe Suid-Afrika

Deesdae mag daar eintlik nie oor ras gepraat word nie. Ons is glo almal net mense. Daar is dus net een ras, die menseras. Almal word as gelyk en wesenlik eenders beskou. Almal is dus bekwaam genoeg om almal se lot te bepaal; vandaar demokrasie. Die meerderheid moet die oppergesag uitoefen anders word ‘n misdaad teen die mensdom gepleeg. In die Suid-Afrika van weleer is vier rasse onderskei: blankes, bruines, Asiate en swartes. Die blankes het die oppergesag uitgeoefen. Onder hulle leiding is die land ontwikkel tot die suksesvolste en voorspoedigste in Afrika. Die blankes het van die veronderstelling uitgegaan dat hulle die land beter as die nie-blankes kan bestuur. Daar was dus ‘n hiërargie van rasse. Deesdae word geredeneer dat sodanige hiërargie op stereotipering berus; dus dat ‘n valse veralgemenende beeld van die kwaliteit (bv kundigheid, bekwaamheid) van daardie vier rasgroepe doelbewus deur die blankes ter eie bevoordeling geskep is.

Binne die tradisionele rasgroepe kan verskillende etnisiteite onderskei word. Wat opval, is dat diegene wat ‘n geskiedenis van (relatiewe) prestasieloosheid het, verkies om die werklikheid van ras- en etniese groepe te ontken. Op hierdie manier deel die nie-presteerders in die prestasies van die presteerders. ‘n Ons/hulle-onderskeid word as uit die bose beskou. Die nie-presteerders ag hulleself gevolglik as die gelyke vennote van die presteerders. As die nie-presteerders in die meerderheid is, verseker ‘n demokratiese opset (een mens, een stem) dat hulle ‘n kwalitatiewe minderheid kan oorskadu; dus dat hulle ‘n polities meerderwaardige posisie inneem; selfs ‘n moreel meerderwaardige posisie deur bv te lieg en die geskiedenis te herskryf.

Naas ‘n blanke, bruin en swart ras word ‘n geel ras soms onderskei. Die Chinese en Japannese het histories gepresteer en doen dit steeds. By hulle is daar dus ras- en etniese trots en geen noemenswaardige beswaar klink daarteen op nie. Daar is net een ras wat deesdae wêreldwyd trots op hulle prestasies misgun word en dit is die blankes. In Suid-Afrika is daar twee etnisiteite wat ‘n land geskep het wat as ideaal en trekpleister vir swartes in Afrika dien, naamlik die Afrikaners en die blanke Engelssprekendes (oftewel Engelse). Die Afrikaners het in veel groter mate lewensruimte aan die Engelse gegun as andersom. Die Engelse (bv Charles Somerset en Alfred Milner) wou die kulturele kern van die Afrikaner, te wete Afrikaans, vernietig. Deesdae poog die ANC-regering om dieselfde te doen. Die tradisionele onderskeiding van vier rasse word tans voortgesit, maar met ‘n ander motivering as voorheen: om swartes soveel moontlik te bevoordeel en blankes soveel moontlik te benadeel. Die veronderstelling dat swartes ‘n land net so doeltreffend soos die blankes kan bestuur, lê reeds meer as twee dekades lank aan skerwe, met bv Eskom as ‘n toonbeeld van swartes se onbekwaamheid en geneigdheid tot roofbou (uitputting/afbreking van ‘n instansie) en korrupsie, oftewel steelsug.

Vanaf 1652 tot omstreeks 1980 is die werklikheid van ras en die noodsaaklike rol wat dit in die voortbestaan van die land moet speel plaaslik algemeen erken. Daarna het vermurwing ingetree. Die kernwaarheid is dat blankes tradisioneel in beheer van die land was. Rasse(onder)skeiding is in blanke geledere algemeen aanvaar as ‘n noodsaaklike voorwaarde vir die voortbestaan nie net van die blankes nie, maar ook vir ‘n voorspoedige land. Rassesegregasie/apartheid/afsonderlike ontwikkeling met (oorwegend) blanke stemgeregtigdes was die meganisme waarmee blanke beheer oor die land verseker is. Die aftakeling van rasse(onder)skeiding sou noodwendig oorheersing deur swartes tot gevolg hê. Denis Worrall (gebore in 1935) skets die rol wat hy in die vernietiging van blanke politieke gesag gespeel het in sy boek, The independent factor: My personal journey through politics and diplomacy (2018, 236p, R275; Amazon Kindle $9,19). Die outeur het die gedrukte uitgawe self gepubliseer.

In die eerste voorwoord maak David Grant, ‘n politieke geesgenoot van Worrall, gewag van “real reform” (Kindle 149) en loof hy Worrall se “massive contribution to the process of democratisation in South Africa” (157). Regter Ian Farlam verwys in die tweede voorwoord na “meaningful change” en Worrall se “enlightened views” (170). Werklike hervorming, demokratisering, betekenisvolle verandering en verligtheid is almal eufemistiese formulerings van wat ons as gevolg daarvan het, naamlik swart politieke oorheersing. In sy eie voorwoord noem Worrall sy boek “a memoir” (206). Hy bedank mense soos “my old friend” (2539), “my good friend” (2648), Max du Preez, en Jannie Momberg (wat ‘n ANC-parlementslid en daarna ambassadeur in Griekeland was) vir hulle ondersteuning (214). Later skryf Worrall oor Donald Woods, wat uit Suid-Afrika verban is en wat voorheen die uiters linkse redakteur van die Oos-Londense koerant, die Daily Dispatch (in die volksmond beter bekend as die Daily Disgrace) was: “I knew and liked Donald very much and I saw quite a lot of him in London” (2568). Dit gee ‘n aanduiding van hoe uiters links Worrall se politiek is.

Worrall het ‘n ma van Ierse afkoms en ‘n Engelssprekende pa gehad. Sy ouers was Sappe wat in 1961 teen republiekwording gekant was. Worrall het later ‘n lid van die Verenigde Party geword. Hy het in Cradock, Wellington en Bellville grootgeword. Veral in Bellville het hy Afrikaans en Afrikanerkultuur goed leer ken. “My upbringing and specifically my schooling in Bellville freed me of that ‘benign superiority towards Afrikaners’ which characterised white English-speakers down the years” (292). “Whereas to English-speaking whites, and a very powerful leader like General Smuts and even Jan Hofmeyr, the discrimination against black people and persons of colour which they introduced and enforced as policy was simply racial in kind. By contrast, the driving force behind the apartheid of Afrikaners was as much nationalism and the natural determination to grow itself as racial consciousness. In the end, the real struggle for control of South Africa would be between two indigenous nationalisms – the Afrikaner and the African” (300). “[Nowadays] there is a new national identity emerging in which white South Africans are likely to be subordinate players” (292).

Die outeur het vroeg met Edmund Burke (1729-1797) en John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) se liberalisme kennis gemaak. Aan die Universiteit Kaapstad het Worrall veral in die filosofie (tot die verwerwing van ‘n magistergraad) en die regte studeer. Hy het later die graad LLB aan die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika (Unisa) voltooi. Hy het ‘n lektor in politieke wetenskap aan Unisa geword. Hy het spoedig ‘n Fulbright-studiebeurs ontvang vir doktorale studie van 1961 af aan Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, waar hy ‘n assistentdosent in die departement politieke wetenskap was. Andrew Murray se onderrig in politieke filosofie aan die Universiteit Kaapstad het blykbaar ‘n deurslaggewend invloed uitgeoefen en hom gemotiveer om sy doktorale studie oor federalisme in Nigerië te onderneem. Hy moes ook die doktorale program suksesvol voltooi. Hy het met bv Allan Bloom (1930-1992) en William Buckley jr (1925-2008) kennis gemaak.

“I familiarised myself with the race relations situation academically and in a practical way by participating in organised study groups to the South – notably Mississippi and Alabama. These trips made two strong inpressions on me. The first was just how ubiquitous segregation was; and, secondly, the arrogance of Northerners towards Southern liberals who were working to change the situation – especially given what was clear, that the problem was not simply a Southern one. Country club discrimination was widespread in the north as was evident in the Rotary clubs I was invited to address and even Ithaca, where Cornell is situated, had its significant African-American suburb” (548). Lyndon Johnson het die Civil Rights Act (1964) en die Voting Rights Act (1965) op die wetboek geplaas. “What should be very evident is that I admired Lyndon Johnson enormously” (598).

“President Kennedy was the first in 1961 to use the term ‘affirmative action’ as a way of redressing the advantages of discrimination that had persisted” (598). Na aanleiding van die swart burgerregtebeweging in die jare sestig stel Worrall hierdie vrae oor die Amerikaanse samelewing: “Was it a society of individuals, as the founding fathers assumed and the Constitution instructed? Or was it a society of communities and individuals?” (598). “The widely accepted view until then was that the US was a country of immigrants, and as new waves of [white] immigrants came, they melted into the existing American nation” (605). Nathan Glazer en Daniel Moynihan het hierdie siening in hulle boek, Beyond the melting pot (1963), bevraagteken. “Their researches had shown that the children and grandchildren of earlier immigrants to New York City had retained their ethnic consciousness and therefore that the phenomenon of persistent ethnic identities over the course of generations would continue” (605).

Die bevolking van ‘n land bestaan uiteraard uit sowel ras-/etniese groepe as individue. Maar blankes is in groter mate as swartes individualisties, wat egter geen regverdiging bied vir die buitensporige bevoorregting van swartes as minderheidsgroep in Amerika en die absolute afwesigheid van groepregte vir die blanke minderheid in Suid-Afrika nie. Die assimilasie van die hoofsaaklik blanke immigrante in Amerika verskil van etniese groep tot etniese groep, met bv die Jode wat meesal moeilik en net deels assimileer. Voor die Tweede Wêreldoorlog was die uitgesproke voorkeur in Amerika vir blanke immigrante, wat vanweë kleiner kulturele verskille veel makliker geassimileer het as die baie nie-blanke immigrante wat sedertdien wettig en onwettig op die land toesak.

Die groot mate waarin die situasie van die blanke Amerikaners versleg het, blyk uit die teenstand wat Donald Trump vir die bou van ‘n muur op die grens met Mexiko ondervind. Daar word openlik kant gekies vir onwettige immigrante, dus vir diegene wat hulle aan ‘n misdaad skuldig (wil) maak. Maar dit is niks in vergelyking met die situasie van die kleiner wordende blanke minderheid in Suid-Afrika nie. Onwettige immigrante kom op groot skaal (miljoengewys, soos by korrupsie) oor die grens maar geen politieke party of ander instansie voer ‘n veldtog daarteen nie omdat hulle nie, al is dit valslik, van vreemdelinge haat en rassisme beskuldig wil word nie.

Daar word nie meer van Amerikaanse swartes verwag om met die blankes te integreer nie. Aan swartes word die keuse gelaat om apart of tussen die blankes te woon; ‘n keuse wat nie in dieselfde mate vryelik deur blankes uitgeoefen mag word nie. In Suid-Afrika is die ANC-regering ingestel op die verswelging van die blanke minderheid deur die swart meerderheid. Gedwonge integrasie geld dus as ‘n opgedringde verpligting op alle terreine, bv woongebiede, skole en universiteite. Die swartes het egter ‘n vrye keuse: hulle kan in tradisioneel swart gebiede woon en aan tradisioneel swart skole en universiteite studeer, of hulle kan hulle tuismaak in tradisioneel blanke woongebiede, skole en universiteite. Dit word geregtigheid genoem.

Worrall skryf oor Amerika: “Yes, desegregation had to happen – social and economic backgrounds caused by centuries of political inequality had to be compensated for by group-based affirmative programmes and actions. These would involve racial preferences and quotas, and when applied in, for example, educational institutions they raised all sorts of questions. How would this affect academic standards? How would it affect university autonomy? And how would quotas affect groups who were possibly overly represented in America’s best universities – for example Jewish Americans?” (614). “We have yet to find answers to the thorny question of how one reconciles a commitment to individual liberty and rights with the rights and interests of groups” (620).

Die agterstand van swartes kan myns insiens nie sonder meer uitsluitlik aan beweerde benadeling deur blankes toegeskryf word nie. In Amerika word sogenaamde regstellende aksies deesdae afgeskaal. Om die bevoordeling van swartes op ‘n rasgebaseerde/rassistiese grondslag asook raskwotas sonder meer volgens die Amerikaanse model op Suid-Afrika van toepassing te maak, is hoogs onbillik; onder meer omdat swartes nie, soos in Amerika, as ‘n minderheid nie, maar sedert 1994 as die oorweldigende meerderheid polities in beheer van die land is. Dit is ook skandalig dat geen keerdatum vir regstellende aksie in Suid-Afrika gestel is nie.

‘n Rektor soos Wim de Villiers verknies hom nie oor die verlaging van akademiese standaarde en die verlies van universitêre outonomie en die inkorting van akademiese vryheid nie. Vir De Villiers is dit ‘n passie om te doen wat polities reg is. Om te handel volgens wat akademies reg is, is klaarblyklik van mindere belang. In Amerika het die stelsel dermate ontaard dat ‘n beperking geplaas word op die getal Jode en Asiate wat tot universitêre studie toegelaat word, dus daardie twee groepe wat akademies die beste presteer. Hierdie irrasionele versteuring word veroorsaak deur die voorkeur wat om nie-akademiese redes aan swart studente gegee word. In Suid-Afrika word daar openlik en doelbewus kwaai gediskrimineer teen die groep wat akademies die bewese voortreflikste akademiese presteerders is, naamlik die blankes, bv by toelating tot studie in die geneeskunde aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch.

“African independence was followed in the US in the 1960s with immense pride and optimism. The general sentiment, especially among academics and church people was … ‘that the Africans were creating a wonderful new world, a sort of new humanism’ … That this heavy optimism was to end in profound disappointment is not part of my story” (628). Hoekom nie? Worrall het hom deurgaans beywer vir die afskaffing van apartheid en vir swart politieke oorheersing in Suid-Afrika. Ter regverdiging van sy politieke rol behoort hy te erken dat hy drooggemaak het en wenke te gee oor hoe die skade herstel kan word.

Worrall haal die historikus, Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), aan: “South Africa is important to the whole world – because if it can find answers as to how its different races, languages and religions can live together in peace, nobody in the world can claim to fail” (739). Worrall voeg by: “I believed in this statement of his and must have quoted it in hundreds of speeches and articles I wrote” (739). Maar Toynbee se ydele hoop is tot dooie letters getransformeer. Die nuwe Suid-Afrika is berug as een van die gewelddadigste samelewings in die wêreld. Dié geweld het sy oorsprong feitlik uitsluitlik in swart geledere. Anders as tydens die blanke bewind kan dit nie meer goedsmoeds regeringsgeïnisieerde sistemiese geweld genoem word nie. Het dit nie tyd geword dat groepe en individue verantwoordelikheid vir hulle gedrag aanvaar, verskoning daarvoor vra en daar dan drastiese maatreëls getref word om geweld aan bande te lê nie?

Vir sy doktorale proefskrif het Worrall ‘n jaar lank veldwerk aan die University of Ibadan in Nigerië gedoen. In Nigerië is daar, soos in Suid-Afrika, groot kulturele verskille by die verskillende etniese groepe. Daar is wyslik op ‘n federale regeringstelsel besluit. Dit is iets wat Suid-Afrika reeds sedert 1910 nodig het, maar die magsbehepte ANC het op ‘n gesentraliseerde eenheidstaat aangedring en die ruggraatlose grondwetlike onderhandelaars van die NP het daaraan toegegee. Federalisme is dus iets wat Suid-Afrika by Nigerië kan leer.

‘n Ander opsig waarin Nigerië (en bv Senegal) ‘n navolgenswaardige voorbeeld stel, is dat verkiesings oor naweke plaasvind. In Suid-Afrika het die ongesonde gewoonte posgevat om verkiesings in die middel van die werksweek, dus op Woensdae, te hou, wat verseker dat die ekonomie maksimaal ontwrig word. Verkiesingsdag word tot ‘n openbare vakansiedag verklaar en gevoeg by die buitensporig baie ander openbare vakansiedae. Geen politieke party of ander instansie het die sin om beswaar teen hierdie dwase praktyk te opper nie. Myns insiens moet verkiesings op Saterdae plaasvind. Die dag daarna kan kennis van die uitslae geneem en indien nodig feesgevier word. Voor en ná so ‘n naweek behoort daar soos normaalweg gewerk te word.

Ná ‘n besoek aan sy familie in Kaapstad het Worrall na Amerika teruggekeer. Agtien maande het daarna verloop voordat hy sy proefskrif voltooi het en dit goedgekeur is. In 1964 het hy in Amerika ‘n Romeense vrou, Anita Denise Ianco, ‘n doktorale student in sielkunde, ontmoet. Nadat sy haar geboorteland verlaat het, het sy agtereenvolgens in Israel, Kuba en Kanada gewoon. Worrall hou daarvan om haar as ‘n kosmopolitiese mens voor te hou. In 1964 was Worrall ‘n assistent-professor aan die University of California Los Angeles en van 1965 af vir twee jaar ‘n lektor in politieke wetenskap aan die Universiteit van Natal in Durban. In 1965 het Worrall met Anita getrou en het sy sielkunde aan dieselfde universiteit in Durban doseer.

“On my return to South Africa I began to identify persons I wanted to meet and from whom I could get a better grasp of where the country was going and what their hopes and concerns were. So it was that, aside from local city and provincial officials, I wrote to several national figures among whom were Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, Minister of Justice John Vorster and Harry Oppenheimer of Anglo American” (781). Al drie het ‘n onderhoud aan hom toegestaan. Verwoerd het hom met sy intelligensie beïndruk. Toe Worrall later ‘n parlementslid was en Vorster die eerste minister “we used to play chess together on a Friday or Saturday evening at his Groote Schuur residence” (818). Oppenheimer “was … responsible for Anglo American funding Anita’s research in South Africa” (796). Sy het haar doktorsgraad eers in 1972 aan Cornell University voltooi.

Worrall se loopbaan het veral twee opvallende kenmerke. Eerstens was dit vir hom ‘n passie om belangrike en invloedryke mense te leer ken; reeds in Amerika en later in Brittanje, maar ook en veral in Suid-Afrika. Byvoorbeeld, “Anita and me being sought after by Embassy people” (1046). By my het dit die indruk van vrypostigheid gewek. Wie hy geken het, het die meetsnoere vir hom in lieflike plekke laat val. Deel van hierdie strategie was om dikwels onthale aan te bied. Byvoorbeeld, “Our modest apartment [in Pretoria] became an intellectual salon to which Anita’s cosmopolitanism added enormously” (1057). Hy verwys ook na “several dinner parties at our home in Linden” (1140). Ek vra my af: Hoeveel leestyd het sy sosiale bedrywighede vir hom gelaat? Tweedens het hy nooit lank in dieselfde pos gebly nie. Dit lyk asof hy in so ‘n mate ‘n trekvoël was dat sodra hy sy werksituasie onder die knie gehad het en werklik ‘n bydrae vir sy werkgewer kon lewer, hy op vertrek na elders gestaan het. Een van die kenmerke van die boek wat ek die hinderlikste vind, is selfverheerliking. Dwarsdeur sy loopbaan het hy blykbaar die gunstige kommentare bewaar wat oor hom gelewer is en hy haal hulle blykbaar sonder skroom oorvloediglik in die boek aan.

Van die mense waarmee Worrall bevriend geraak het, was koerantredakteurs en ander joernaliste wat vir gunstige publisiteit kon sorg. Hy het agtereenvolgens weeklikse rubrieke in die Sunday Tribune, Die Beeld en Rapport behartig, wat hom landswyd bekend gemaak het as “an enlightened English-speaking South African” (912). Dit het vir hom om die daarstelling van ‘n “inclusive society” in Suid-Afrika gegaan (929). Hy het die maandelikse meningstydskrif, New Nation (1967-1974), tot stand gebring. Die koste is deur die intekenaars, kopers en adverteerders gedra. “We brought together the most extraordinary collection of relevant thinking people in South Africa at that time” (960).

Van 1967 af was Worrell vier jaar lank ‘n senior lektor in politieke wetenskap aan Unisa. In 1971 is die volgende boek met hom as redakteur gepubliseer: South Africa: Government and politics; “an introductory textbook and general guide to the institutions of government and the processes of politics in this country” (1066). Toe was Worrall reeds van die begin van daardie jaar af senior lektor in die department internasionale betrekkinge aan die Universiteit van die Witwatersrand (Wits). Die Worrall-egpaar het ‘n babaseuntjie aangeneem. Later, in 1974 en 1975, het sy vrou geboorte aan twee seuns geskenk. “I developed relations with most [newspaper] editors at the time” (1103). Die Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit “was a major source of connections under the vice-chancellorship of Pieter de Lange. But, to be perfectly frank, I expanded and developed the relations I already had with Potchefstroom [University]” (1132). [Vir Pieter de Lange se bedenklike rol in die politieke magsoorgawe aan swartes: Praag 23.09.2018. Kyk ook hier onder.]

Ná net twee en ‘n half jaar by Wits het Worrall in Julie 1973 die direkteur van die Institute of Social and Economic Research aan die Universiteit Rhodes in Grahamstad geword. Maar reeds in November 1973 het hy, sonder dat hy ‘n lid van die Nasionale Party was, vir John Vorster, die eerste minister, gaan spreek oor die moontlikheid om tot die politiek toe te tree. Dit lyk vir my na opportunisme. Soos deur Vorster aanbeveel, het hy in Desember 1973 ‘n onderhoud met PW Botha, die NP se Kaaplandse leier, gehad. ‘n Algemene verkiesing is in April 1974 gehou en op 30 Mei 1974 is Worrall met Vorster se goedkeuring, eerder as dié van Botha, as ‘n NP-senator aangestel. Hy het ‘n huis in Oranjezicht, Kaapstad, gekoop.

“As a member of the National Party caucus and having declared my interest in foreign affairs and all aspects of race relations, I joined those committees and spoke in those debates” (1298). “I made some pretty advanced public pronouncements obviously of a highly verligte nature (in the political idiom of the time), which I could do because I was an appointed Senator and, secondly, because everybody knew that I only became a member of the National Party after my appointment as a Senator. I devoted my maiden speech to promoting the interests of the coloured community. I opposed censorship and book bannings. I made the case for English-speakers to play a mediating role in South Africa. I backed and praised Brian Bamford for a speech calling for the government to let races mix freely … I positioned myself very clearly on the left wing of the National Party” (1305).

“In a debate at the University of Cape Town … I said I was committed to the creation of a political system in which citizenship would be realised for all South Africans” (1313). “I also adopted a strong liberal position relating to private schools and their freedom to choose their pupils” (1321). Deesdae word nóg private nóg openbare skole toegelaat om hulle leerlinge vryelik, dus sonder regeringsinmenging, te kies. Het Worrall al beswaar daarteen aangeteken? Ek dink nie so nie.

Teen die einde van 1975 was Worrall die NP-kandidaat vir ‘n tussenverkiesing in Durban-Noord maar die kandidaat van die Progressiewe Party het gewen. In 1977 was hy die NP-kandidaat vir die algemene verkiesing in Kaapstad-Tuine. Worrall het met ‘n meerderheid van 1 761 stemme gewen. “Three years later the NP would lose the constituency with Dr Dawie de Villiers, a candidate with the highest Afrikaner pedigree” [?] (1395). Een van die redes wat Worrall vir sy sukses in Tuine aanvoer, is: “I had a cosmopolitan and photogenic wife who was known to speak five languages and who did her share of canvassing” (1405). Waarna Worrall gestreef het, was “increasingly expanding the inclusiveness of the South African social and political system” (1440).

PW Botha het hom aangestel as die voorsitter van die Konstitusionele Komitee. “The Prime Minister’s appointment of me, probably the most verligte member on government benches, to the position therefore came as an unpleasant surprise to right wingers” (1448). Hy noem Pik Botha “the most enlightened member of the Cabinet in terms of domestic policy” (1648). Ná PW Botha se rubicon-toespraak in 1985 het Pik glo gevra: “What can I do to get this old bastard to change?” (2053). Worrall skryf: “PW Botha fell into the Rubicon he had promised to cross” (2083). Hy noem PW se toespraak “visceral xenophobia” (2083) terwyl PW in werklikheid getoon het dat hy die ruggraat het om nie, soos sy opvolger daarna gedoen het, eerloos aan swart mag oor te gee nie.

Aan die begin van1983 het Worrall diens as Suid-Afrika se ambassadeur in Australië aanvaar. “A very general view was that I was being shipped out to Australia because of a conflict with Chris Heunis, the Minister of Constitutional Development and my direct superior. Closely connected to this was the opinion that views I had expressed about the essential inclusion of black South Africans in any constitutional framework exceeded the bounds of government policy at the time” (1483). Hy verwys na “the presence in Australia of a growing number of South African emigrés. In my time as Ambassador it would have numbered around 100 000 but today [2018] it is probably closer to 200 000” (1532). “One thing we assiduously avoided in all public statements was any reference to Australia’s race relations problem” (1570). “Australia is probably the most successful melting pot in the world – more so even than the United States. It has an intellectual culture, which includes brilliant art, literature, music and architecture, and it has exceptional facilities to experience all this” (1627). Dit kon ook van die Suid-Afrika van weleer gesê word. In albei gevalle danksy ‘n blanke regering.

In Augustus 1984 het Worrall in Londen aangekom as die Suid-Afrikaanse ambassadeur in die Verenigde Koninkryk. “Prime Minister [Margaret] Thatcher met President PW Botha once and was not impressed” (1652). Sy het glo min ondersteuning vir haar anti-sanksies-standpunt betreffende Suid-Afrika van die Amerikaanse president, Ronald Reagan, gekry. Worrall “supported her fundamental assumptions about South Africa and what South Africa needed to do” (1734), naamlik “internal liberalisation” (1756), bv die afskaffing van apartheid, die vrylating van Nelson Mandela en oorgawe aan ‘n swart politieke bewind. Thatcher hoef immers nie daagliks self, soos ons die afgelope kwarteeu, in so ‘n opset te probeer lewe nie. Desnieteenstaande skryf Worrall: “Thatcher was South Africa’s best friend internationally” (2024). “She needed to see progress in South Africa to a more racially inclusive society” (2024).

Worrall verwys glad nie na Robin Renwick, die Britse ambassadeur in Suid-Afrika (1987-1991), nie, omdat Renwick ná Worrall se vertrek uit Londen hier begin funksioneer het. Maar Renwick het beklemtoon dat Thatcher teen apartheid was en dat die mate wat sy die NP-regering met haar anti-sanksie-standpunt ondersteun het met ernstige voorbehoude gepaard gegaan en dus op losse skroewe gestaan het. Eintlik het sy ook maar die ondergang van die plaaslike blanke politieke mag begeer en aangehelp (Praag 28.10.2017).

Destyds het die linkse Dene Smuts na ‘n besoek aan Londen geskryf: “Worrall’s notable views included the creation of multiracial local councils and a clear statement of intent about the inclusion of black South Africans” (2032). Die eufemismes wat vir Thatcher en Worrall se standpunt gebruik is, is “move forward” (1756, 2360) en “sufficient movement” (2310); dus, stuur Suid-Afrika oor die afgrond van swart mag. Daardie verlangde vooruitgang/”progress” het sedert 1994 geblyk agteruitgang te wees. Charles Powell, “Thatcher’s foreign affairs private secretary” (1734), het gesê: “I used the reformist Worrall, who had political ambitions of his own, almost as my spy within South African officialdom” (1741). Dit lyk vir my na ‘n disfunksionele en onetiese ambassadeur wat met ‘n buitelandse regering saamspan terwyl hy veronderstel is en betaal word om die Suid-Afrikaanse regering te dien. Geoffrey Howe, die Britse minister van buitelandse sake het Suid-Afrika in 1986 besoek. “Somebody who impressed him very much was Professor JP de Lange, who at the time was die head of the Afrikaner Broederbond organisation” (2331).

Oor sy tyd as ambassadeur in Londen skryf Worrall: “While I knew I could handle the situation politically, intellectually and emotionally, after four years I had a strong sense of having been let down by my own side” (2506), verwysende na die NP-regering wat nie vinnig genoeg “vorentoe beweeg” nie; al het dit later geblyk agteruitgang te wees. “I understood that the ANC was and would be an essential part of a peaceful [!] solution to the South African situation” (2576). Die ANC het egter nooit sy voorliefde vir geweld afgesweer nie. Tydens die grondwetlike onderhandelinge en sedertdien kan Suid-Afrika nie as ‘n vreedsame land gekarakteriseer word nie. Ná skaars twee jaar as ambassadeur in Londen het hy Suid-Afrika in die laaste vier maande van 1986 vier keer besoek. “Between September 1986 and early Januarie 1987 I told a handful of people of my planned resignation and my intention to run in the May election as an independent candidate” (2591). Johann Rupert en Harry Oppenheimer het hom hierin finansieel ondersteun.

Worrall het as ambassadeur bedank en in Februarie 1987 in Suid-Afrika aangekom; “the great white hope of South African politics” (2719; ook 2961). Die NP het sy nuttigheidswaarde vir Worrall verloor. Hy het besluit om as ‘n onafhanklike kandidaat die stryd teen Chris Heunis as die sittende NP-parlementslid in die Helderberg-kiesdafdeling, Somerset-Wes, aan te knoop. Maar Worrall se verkiesingswerkers was, soos dit ‘n linkse politikus betaam, hoofsaaklik lede van die Progressiewe Party. “My colleagues and I promoted an end to all discrimination, the scrapping of the Group Areas Act, the unbanning of political parties, the release of political prisoners and open-ended negotiations towards a new democratic constitution for all South Africans” (2799). Dit het vir Worrall om “radical change” gegaan (2815); dus dat blanke oorheersing plek vir swart oorheersing moet maak. Het daar toe in 1994 ‘n einde aan rassediskriminasie gekom? Is dit maar goed en reg dat daar sedertdien suiwer rassisties en toenemend blatant teen blankes gediskrimineer word?

Daar was buitelandse inmenging in die algemene verkiesing in Helderberg in Mei 1987, bv eerste minister Margaret Thatcher se “indirect but highly publicised association with my campaign” (2855). Uit ‘n totaal van meer as 18 000 stemme het Worrall met 39 stemme teen Heunis verloor. Daarmee het hy bewys dat sy politieke beleid lewensvatbaar kan wees. In Maart 1988 is die Onafhanklike Party gestig, met Worrall, Wynand Malan en Esther Lategan as die leidende politici, “dedicated to achieving open-ended negotiations aimed at creating a peaceful South Africa with equal rights for all” (3007). In April 1989 is die Onafhanklike Party ontbind in die Demokratiese Party (DP, wat later die Demokratiese Alliansie, DA, geword het) met ‘n driemanskap, Worrall, Malan en Zach de Beer, as leiers. Nie een van die drie se ego was klein genoeg om vir die ander terug te staan nie.

In die algemene verkiesing in September 1989 was die DP se ideaal “the creation of a single harmonious nation” (3331). Deesdae is daar steeds geen Suid-Afrikaanse nasie nie en is daar nog minder sprake van harmonie. ‘n Federale konstitusionele opset is deur die DP in die vooruitsig gestel. As ‘n aanhanger van globalisme was Worrall blykbaar meer begaan oor wat buitelanders dink as oor die fatale gevolge van die DP se beleid vir blanke Suid-Afrikaners. Hy het die blanke kiesers gevra “to send a message to the international community … the days of apartheid are over” (3406). Dit word “normalisation” genoem (3456). Worrall was die DP-kandidaat in Durban-Berea en is met ‘n meerderheid van 4 279 stemme tot parlementslid verkies. Sowat 30% van die Afrikaanssprekende blankes het in daardie algemene verkiesing vir die DP gestem. Die NP het minder as die helfte van die blanke kiesers se stemme getrek, met die Konserwatiewe Party wat groot winste behaal en die amptelike opposisieparty geword het.

Die kiesers het hulle rug al hoe meer op die NP gedraai. In hierdie onbenydenswaardige situasie het FW de Klerk sy fatale parlementêre openingstoespraak op 2 Februarie 1990 gelewer waarin hy die DP se beleid in groot mate onderskryf het. “I must confess to having shared every bit of the excitement and admiration for De Klerk’s performance” (3483). “The real issue facing us is not reform of our society but its transformation” (3512), dus oorgawe aan meerderheidsregering en swart mag, spesifiek oorgawe aan die gewelddadige, kommunistiese ANC. Dit blyk dat Worrall reeds die vorige Kersfees op sy opportunistiese manier ‘n kaartjie met goeie wense aan “Madiba” gestuur het (3519). Nelson Mandela verkies dat die troetelnaampie “Madiba” gebruik word wanneer hy aangespreek word (3526). “Everybody who had met him had come away impressed” (3526). “It also struck me that he was a natural conservative” [!] (3533). Mandela het hom mos teen die oorheersing van enige rasgroep oor ‘n ander uitgespreek maar hy het in werklikheid sy lewe gewy aan sy ideaal dat swartes die land moet regeer; maak nie saak hoe onbeholpe, korrup, ondoeltreffend en onsuksesvol nie.

Worrall het blykbaar ervaar dat die grondwetlike onderhandelinge in die “regte” rigting beweeg. Oor die lot van die blankes het hy hom nie bekommer nie. “The main advantage of participation in the negotiations was the individuals I met” [!] (3583). Hy was “particularly impressed by … Roelf Meyer … [he] has an uncluttered mind” [!] (3583). In 1993 is die Oorgangsgrondwet aanvaar en op 27 April 1994 is die “eerste demokratiese algemene verkiesing” in Suid-Afrika gehou. Die ANC het 62.6% van die stemme gekry en die DP 1.7%. Volgens Worrall het die land nou “a viable alternative political system” gehad (3660). “To the extent that I, with my support base, contributed to this momentum and signalled the end of ‘white only’ politics, I have a sense of achievement and of making a difference” (3685). Verandering is egter nie noodwendig verbetering nie. “As in the 1980s, most South Africans [not: most whites] recognise the need for change, reform, redress and redistribution” (3692).

Tony Leon het in Mei 1994 die leier van die DP geword. En Worrall? Soos Leon Wessels het Worrall nie kans gesien om ‘n parlementslid te wees in die nuwe politieke opset waarvoor hy en Wessels hulle beywer het nie. Vergete was sy stelling: “I always regarded myself as a politician of vocation” (2531). Hy het hom van 1994 af eerder met ander dinge besig gehou, bv “as a consultant to international investors and foreign business companies” (191), dus globalisme; nie blankes se belange en sekerlik nie Afrikanerbelange nie.

Die enigste resensie van die boek wat ek gelees het, is dié van Jannie Gagiano (Eikestadnuus, 7.02.2019, p 10). Dit raak nóg kant nóg wal omdat die aard van die boek duister bly. Warroll het op sy kenmerkende manier op dié resensie gereageer deur die Stellenbossers “I got to know well” te lys en ander besonderhede oor homself te publiseer (Eikestadnuus, 28.02.2019, p 7). Naas publisiteit vir homself was hy op soek na lesers vir en veral kopers van sy boek. Die boek is op 2 Maart in Stellenbosch bekend gestel, nadat hierdie kosmopoliet dit reeds in November in Londen gedoen het. Wat buitelanders van hom en Suid-Afrika dink, is vir hom skynbaar steeds belangriker as hoe die plaaslike blankes teen wil en dank daagliks die nuwe Suid-Afrika ervaar.