Anthea Jeffery – praag.co.za

Leon Lemmer: ANC-kamerade as vernietigende jakobyne

Vir inligting oor die ANC as ‘n gewelddadige, terroristiese instansie is daar geen beter of meer gesaghebbende bron nie as Anthea Jeffery se People’s War: New light on the struggle for South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2014, 676p; Kindle $9,19). Dit blyk dat by verre die grootste lewensverlies onder swartes was. Die bloed wat gevloei het, was nie soseer om Suid-Afrika van apartheid (dus die blanke bewind) te bevry nie, maar by uitstek om te verseker dat die ANC so oorheersend moontlik die politieke mag bekom. Wat die ANC voorhou as ‘n bevrydingstryd was uiteindelik primêr ‘n politieke magstryd, veral gemik teen sy hoofopposisie, die Inkatha Vryheidsparty (IVP). Dat die ANC hierdie “People’s War” in 1990/94 gestook het, blyk uit die volgende: “After the 1994 election there was a dramatic decline in political violence” (James Myburgh, bron hier onder, Kindle 365).

Vir inligting oor die ANC se politieke grondslag is daar onlangs ‘n onontbeerlike boek gepubliseer: James Myburgh se The last Jacobins of Africa: The ANC and the making of modern South Africa (Politicsweb Publishing, 2020, 262p; Kindle $11,49). Dit is die onderwerp van hierdie rubriek. Maar ek moet noem dat dit vir my uiters moeilik was om Myburgh se teks in woorde te klee omdat die onderwerpe so ineengestrengel is. Soos gebruiklik vul ek die teks aan met my eie menings. Myburgh het die aanlyn koerant Politicsweb in 2007 gestig (Kindle 231), met as leuse: “Fair, but fearless” (3). Wat daarin aangebied word, is meer konserwatief as waaraan die linkse Daily Maverick hom skuldig maak. Die teks van die boek is gebaseer op Myburgh se navorsing en sy doktorale proefskrif wat in 2007 goedgekeur is: The African National Congress under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1997-2002) (184).

Mbeki se presidentskap strek amptelik van 1999 tot 2008, maar hy het eintlik van die begin af grootliks die rigting bepaal wat die ANC-regime ingeslaan het; dus ook tydens die presidentskap van Nelson Mandela (1994-1999). Mandela was in baie opsigte hoogs onprakties en gewoon onbekwaam om ‘n staatshoof te wees. Mbeki het namens Mandela politieke leiding aan die ANC-regime gegee en bv as voorsitter by kabinetsvergaderings opgetree. “It is difficult to discern any coherent philosophy within the speeches of President Mandela, the product, as they were, of many hands and minds” (1652). Mandela is veral gebruik om die openbare beeld van die ANC (en homself) plaaslik en in die buiteland te bevorder en om blanke Suid-Afrikaners, veral die Afrikaners, oor die swart magsoorname te paai deur mooi broodjies te bak. Patti Waldmeir skryf (naïewelik) in 1998 (toe Mandela die liefling van die wêreld was): “Mandela made non-racialism the new civil religion of South Africa. He spoke of giving nervous minorities a ‘silver bridge to cross’ to the new South Africa … The politics of reconciliation reigned supreme in those early days” (365). Onnodig om te sê: Die silwer is lankal gesteel en daarna die handevatbrug.

Naspers/Media24 het reeds in 2004 ‘n ooreenkoms met Myburgh vir die publikasie van sy proefskrif aangegaan (195). Die voltooide teks vir die boek is in 2007 aan die uitgewery besorg. Een van die anonieme beoordelaars van die manuskrip het geskryf: “It would raise hackles in the ANC” (225). Uiteindelik is besluit “the book was too controversial to publish” (237). Met ander woorde, Naspers begeer skoothondjiestatus en wil dus nie die ANC aanstoot gee nie. In hoe ‘n mate Naspers sedert 1994 ideologies ontaard het, blyk uit die onlangse publikasie deur Tafelberg-uitgewery van Patric Tariq Mellet, ‘n ANC/MK/SAPK-lid, se boek, The lie of 1652 (Praag 10.10.2020). Naspers se huidige beleid, wat by al sy inligtingsmedia, bv koerante en tydskrifte, waarneembaar is, is: Die ANC moenie aanstoot gegee word nie. Maar die plaaslike blankes, veral die Afrikaners, kan maar grondig met ‘n prulboek soos dié van Mellet beledig word.

Die feit dat Myburgh se boek ‘n teks uit 2007 is, het my aanvanklik laat twyfel of dit die moeite werd sou wees om die e-boek te koop. Nadat ek die boek gelees het, het ek tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat dit noodsaaklike leesstof is vir enigeen wat die werklike aard van die ANC wil verstaan. In sy 2020-voorwoord skryf Myburgh: “If you wish to understand the origins of South Africa’s current predicament, one needs to study the beginnings of the evils we witness today” (266). Baie van die inligting wat hy verskaf, het nie (duidelik) uit koerantberigte geblyk nie. Myburgh verhelder die historiese, wesenlik kommunistiese, grondslae van die ANC. Die val van die Berlynse Muur in 1989 het veroorsaak dat baie van die lande wat deel van die Sowjetunie was, nie-kommunisties geword het. Die ironie is dat hierdie selfde gebeurtenis, wat FW de Klerk genoop het om onderhandelinge te begin en mandaatloos die mag aan die swartes oor te gee, tot ‘n wesenlik kommunistiese bewind in Suid-Afrika gelei het. Suid-Afrika is steeds uit pas met die wêreld; steeds nie ‘n normale samelewing nie. Ons beleef die hoogbloei van rassediskriminasie terwyl dit taboe in die res van die wêreld is.

Volgens die HAT beteken jakobyn “vurige voorstander van die Franse Revolusie.” In die Collins World Encyclopedia (2003) word die term Jacobin, wat in die boektitel voorkom, soos volg verduidelik: “member of an extreme republican club of the French Revolution … they proclaimed the French republic, had the king executed, and overthrew the moderate Girondins … they began the Reign of Terror [October 1793 to July 1794], led by Robespierre [1758-1794]. After his execution … the club was abandoned and the name ‘Jacobin’ passed into general use for any left-wing extremist” (p 476). Toegepas op Suid-Afrika kan gesê word dat ons in 1990/94 ‘n revolusie beleef het, dat die ANC die nie-kommunistiese NP-regering omver gewerp het, dat die ANC eerder ‘n klub vir sy elite-lede as ‘n politieke party is, dat voortgesette geweld en terreur ‘n wesenskenmerk van die nuwe Suid-Afrika is en dat die ANC ongetwyfeld ‘n uiters linkse instansie is. Let ook daarop dat in die jakobyn-konteks hier bo van ‘n republiek gepraat word en nie van demokrasie nie.

In die voorwoord noem Myburgh dat hy sedert 1997 politieke navorsing doen; aanvanklik vir die Demokratiese Alliansie (18) en van 2001 af as student aan die St Antony’s College in Oxford (65). In die boek maak hy in ruime mate van amptelike, interne dokumente van die ANC gebruik. Hy vestig telkens die aandag op die verskil tussen wat die ANC amptelik intern aan sy lede meedeel en wat openbaar gemaak word. Dit kom neer op doelbewuste misleiding van die publiek oor die ANC se beleid en motiewe (6171). “The assurances and concessions made in each stage were never meant to provide a permanent obstacle to the attainment of those longer-term goals” (82). Ek onthou dat Mbeki vroeg in die ANC-bewind gesê het dat die ANC hom nie gebonde voel aan die ooreenkomste wat daar met die NP-regering aangegaan is nie omdat die ANC toe nog nie in beheer van die land was nie. Myburgh beaam dit (1983).

Reeds in 1997 het die ANC op sy hoofdoel besluit, naamlik “the enforcement of ‘demographic representivity’ across all spheres and levels of endeavour” (36). Jare later het FW de Klerk begin neul dat die ANC-beleid nie die letter en veral gees weerspieël waarop die NP (naïewelik) met die ANC ooreengekom het nie. Myburgh skryf: “This was a plan for mechanistically replacing white with black domination, or ‘African hegemony’ as the ANC described it. Enforcing such outcomes would also clearly require unending racial discrimination against the country’s racial minorities” (36). “The ANC was very careful to ensure that the constitution enshrined neither the ‘irrelevance of clour’ nor ‘individual merit as the criterion of privilege’ for this, it was felt, would entrench the advantages of the white minority in perpetuity” (6214).

Wat die ANC bedryf, kan onmoontlik ‘n liberale demokrasie wees. “Liberal democracy is based upon the careful counterbalancing of the principle of majority rule, with minority rights” (3217). “Once political office was secured the ANC turned … to reshaping the state so that it too came to embody the will of the black majority” (3246). “The role of the ANC was to exercise power on the behalf of the black majority” (3270).

Die ANC het hierdie beleid in Mandela se dienstermyn as president (1994-1999) aanvaar. Enersyds dui dit op die absolute valsheid van Mandela se bewering dat hy teen swart heerskappy gekant was. Andersyds belig dit die algehele mislukking van De Klerk se beloofde magsdeling, wat in verswelgende meerderheidsregering getransformeer is. Die ANC het beweer dat sy bevrydingstryd teen rassediskriminasie gemik was; dat dit die groot euwel in die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing was waaraan hy ‘n einde wou maak. In werklikheid sit die ANC (verskerpte) rassediskriminasie voort, myns insiens ter groter benadeling van die land as ooit tevore, met die swartes wat buitensporig daarby baat terwyl die belange van veral die blankes uitermate benadeel word. Die doelbewuste ontheemding van die blankes het veral duidelik geword toe Mbeki met die verkondiging van sy swart Afrikaan-nasionalisme, die Afrika-renaissance genoem, begin het (77).

Nog ‘n skandalige beleid is daarna begin: “In 1997 and 1998, the ANC implemented a policy of cadre deployment whereby party loyalists would be ushered into all centres of power in society” (42). Byvoorbeeld, die ANC “largely dismantled the ‘merit-system’ in civil service appointments in favour of a patronage-based one” (82; ook 2266). Ook dít het tydens die Mandela-bewind ‘n aanvang geneem terwyl daar dikwels voorgegee word dat dinge nie te sleg tydens die Mandela/Mbeki-era (1994-2008) gegaan het nie; dat agteruitgang eers met Jacob Zuma se presidentskap (2009-2018) begin het. Die destruktiewe gevolge van kaderontplooiing het met verloop van tyd al hoe duideliker geword.

Tans veroorsaak kroniese ondoeltreffendheid en toksiese korrupsie/steelsug dat die land ‘n mislukte staat op die rand van algehele ineenstorting is. In die land se geskiedenis was daar nog nooit so ‘n groot konsentrasie van immoreles in hoë poste soos tans nie. Desnieteenstaande gee die ANC-regime graag voor dat hy moreel die hoë grond beklee. Tussen die ANC se nasionale konferensies is die mag in die hande van ‘n klein groepie ANC-kornuite gekonsentreer, naamlik die ongeveer honderd lede van die nasionale uitvoerende komitee, wat kwartaalliks vergader, en die ses lede van die dagbestuur of nasionale werkskomitee wat al om die ander week byeenkom (3537).

Die ANC gee voor dat Suid-Afrika se geskiedenis eintlik eers in 1994 begin het. Hy het natuurlik goeie rede om ‘n sluier te probeer trek oor die afmetings wat sy onbeskaafde vernietigingswerk en terrorisme van 1961 af tot vóór die algemene verkiesing in 1994 aangeneem het. Die blanke politieke bewind van 1652 tot 1910 word as kolonialisme afgemaak en sedert Uniewording in 1910 as “colonialism of a special type” (94). In hierdie opsig, soos in so baie ander opsigte, was (die swartes in) die ANC afhanklik van die (ideologiese) leiding wat daar van (die blankes in) die Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party (SAKP) uitgegaan het. “By the end of the 1980s the ANC was dominated by the SACP” (563).

In 1962 het die SAKP op daardie “special type”-formulering besluit, asook op die “National Democratic Revolution” (NDR) (94). Met die NDR is daar sedert 1994 stadig maar seker vordering gemaak. Dit is iets waarop John Kane-Berman die aandag gevestig het (Praag 23.06.2017), moontlik vanweë beïnvloeding deur Myburgh se manuskrip (249). Min ander kommentators is bedag op die deurlopende vordering wat die ANC met sy NDR maak. Dit is ‘n voortgesette swart Afrikaan-revolusie waarin blankes per definisie al hoe minder en uiteindelik geen lewensruimte gegun sal word nie. Die jongste NDR-skuif is die onteiening sonder vergoeding van blankes se eiendom. Maar die ANC het reeds in 1988 hierop besluit (1019). “The 1994 election was a ‘breakthrough’ not a ‘settlement'” (6237). Met die eerste revolusie in 1994 het die ANC/SAKP sy voet in die deur gekry deur die regering oor te neem. Die tweede revolusie beoog die omverwerping van die kapitalistiese stelsel met sosialisme (976). Die term “sosialisme” word as ‘n eufemisme vir kommunisme gebruik. Maar dit word nie openlik erken nie. Skynheiligheidshalwe “the ANC should not publicly tie itself to Marxism-Leninism” (983).

In 1994 het die ANC homself bedrieglik voorgedoen as “a non-racial liberal democracy” (281). Al drie begrippe wek ‘n gunstige indruk, maar al drie aansprake is vals. Volgens Mbeki “true ‘democracy’ lay not in the right of the electorate to freely choose (and change) their government, but in the ability of the national liberation movement to recognise and pursue their real and ultimate will” (3924). “Only the ANC leadership recognised, and could pursue, the real interests of the nation” (3938). Dit is kom neer op paternalisme en staatkundige sabotasie. Die kiesers bepaal nie die ANC se beleid nie. Die ANC besluit watter beleid die (ongesofistikeerde, ongeletterde, oningeligte) kiesers nodig het.

Die ANC-regime in Suid-Afrika sou glo duidelik verskil van die swart regerings in die res van Afrika. Nadat die ANC sy mag gevestig het, was daar egter “a drift towards one-party dominance, centralised control and racially driven politics” (289). Die verraad wat in 1990/94 gepleeg is, het al hoe duideliker geword, met as gevolg: “The permanent exclusion of the white minority from any share of political power” (320); dus presies die teenoorgestelde van wat De Klerk vóór die 1992-referendum aan die blanke kiesers belowe het.

“The NP leadership had achieved very little, in constitutional terms, from the negotiations (indeed, probably less than Ian Smith had in Rhodesia, from a greatly weaker position, in 1980)” (416). In die geval van Rhodesië is ooreengekom dat 20 blankes sewe jaar lank sitting in die Zimbabwiese parlement van 120 lede sou hê. In Suid-Afrika se geval hoef daar nie ‘n enkele blanke parlementslid te wees nie. Ian Smith (1919-2007) haal Cicero aan: “A nation can survive its fools … but it cannot survive treason from within” (The great betrayal, London: Blake Publishing, 1997, p 320). Alex Henshaw skryf: “There is no dishonour in a lost cause – the shame is with those who betrayed you” (327).

Die reaksie van die meeste plaaslike blankes op hierdie verraad was egter teleurstellend. Myburgh skryf: “There had been very little opposition by whites either to the loss of statutory privileges – most of which had been removed by the previous [NP] government – or to the redistribution of government expenditure” (2526). “After the 1994 election there was a widespread acceptance of, or resignation to the new political order by white South Africans … Afrikaner nationalism, which had shaped the course of South African politics for forty years, ceased to be a powerful political force” (406). “According to Patti Waldmeir, the ANC were expecting far greater resistance and were surprised by the rapidity with which Afrikaners made peace with the new order” (1929).

Myburgh verwys ook na “the rapidity with which Afrikaner power had collapsed” (422). Enersyds kan dit dui op die doeltreffendheid van die pro-ANC-propaganda van die Nasperskoerante, Engelse koerante en die SABC. Andersyds toon dit dat apartheid oordrewe anti-swart voorgestel word. Wat in Suid-Afrika ná 1994 gebeur het, is verder soortgelyk aan wat ná 1980 in Zimbabwe plaasgevind het: “A long line of opportunists attempting to climb on the bandwagon” (Smith, 359). (Die ooreenkomste is so groot dat ek ‘n plan behoort te maak om oor Smith se boek te skryf.)

Myburgh skryf: “Within the South African context, the implementation of Afrikaner hegemony after 1948 provoked vehement opposition … The concentration of power by the ANC, however, provoked only pinpricks of dissent” (3674). Die Afrikanerdom en Afrikaans het onmeetbaar by nasionalisme gebaat. Ons heil en die heil van Afrikaans hang van die herlewing van Afrikanernasionalisme af, in direkte opposisie teen swart of Afrikaan-nasionalisme en verengelsing. Myns insiens behoort Afrikaans die enigste amptelike taal in Suid-Afrika te wees. Oor die ANC se aanhang van swart nasionalisme behoort daar geen twyfel te wees nie. Tydens die Rivonia-verhoor in 1964 het Mandela gesê: “The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been, the creed of African nationalism” (584).

Sedert 1994 word daar grootliks volgens ras in Suid-Afrika gestem (296). Waarmee ons opgeskeep sit, is ‘n skyndemokrasie. “As James Madison [1751-1836] argued, a shifting majority, and the concomitant possibility of being displaced in power, was a crucial inducement to restraint for the ruling party” (428). In Suid-Afrika is daar die skandalige “majoritarian nature of the final constitution; the consentration of power at the centre; the growing weakness of parliament’s ability to place any check on the executive; the blurring of the lines between party and state; and, the increasing tendency of the ANC to dismiss the legitimacy of opposition” (445). “From its own standpoint there is nothing undemocratic in the party’s enjoying a monopoly of power within the state” (680). Nog erger: “There is no sphere of collective endeavour regarded as falling outside of the realm of politics – and which should not have to submit to the goals of the national democratic revolution” (3307).

Ons sit met “’totalitarian democracy’, but what this book will call Jacobin democracy” (691). “Jacobin democracy … was based upon the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics … It widens the scope of politics to embrace the whole of human existence” (698). Hiervolgens val niks buite die ANC se bevoegdheid vir inmenging nie. Daar is ‘n verskil tussen ‘n “congress”, soos die ANC, en ‘n “party” – “the former being more radical and confrontational than the latter. While the party recognised the legitimacy of other political groupings, the congress claimed to represent ‘all the people’; to embody the national will” (667); dus “the democratic will of the people as a whole and particularly its black majority” (900). Maar met “the people” word meesal eksklusief die swartes bedoel. “The ANC regarded itself as synonymous with ‘the people'” (3280).

Die ideologiese leiding wat die ANC van die SAKP ontvang, is deur veral Jode geformuleer. ‘n MK-lid, Michael Harmel, het in 1950 vorendag gekom met die karakterisering van blank Suid-Afrika as “colonialism of a special type” (773). Volgens Mbeki “the relationship between ‘the white rulers of South Africa and the non-white masses is essentially imperialistic. In a word: there are two nations in South Africa … White South Africa is a semi-independent imperialist state. Black South Africa is its colony'” (782).

In 1954 skryf Harmel: “The economic content of national liberation in South Africa must centre on the redivision of the land and the nationalisation of the principle means of production” (791). “Very soon after, the Freedom Charter, drawn up in 1955 and adopted by the ANC as its official programme the following year, gave voice to such demands. It called for the land to be ‘re-divided amongst those who work it’; the ‘national wealth’ of the country to be ‘restored to the people’; and, for the ‘mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry’ to be transferred to ‘the ownership of the people as a whole'” (799). Hierna is die SAKP se The road to South African freedom (1962) hoofsaaklik deur Harmel geformuleer. Onder meer word Vladimir Lenin se standpunt onderskryf: “That what the white minority had attained had been entirely at the expense of the black majority” (854).

Mandela het in 1994 beweer: “It is the labour of black workers that has built the cities, roads and factories” (1108). Mbeki het in 1979 die swartes as “the producers of wealth” gedefinieer (1039). “It followed that the ANC-SACP were entitled to return this wealth to ‘the people’ through the expropriation of white-owned property” (1048). Eie prestasie deur blankes word sonder meer ontken. “The material wellbeing of the white minority and its political, social and economic privileges were rooted in its racial domination over, and exploitation of, the African majority and Coloured and Indian minorities” (927). Soos Lenin wil die SAKP “a dictatorship of the people” daarstel (874). “This democratic state … would suppress the former ruling classes and set about effecting a transformation of society” (884).

Sedert 1969 onderskryf die ANC die SAKP se “programme of Africanisation in the state, economy, and educational system – which would, necessarily, require extensive racial discrimination against the white minority. At the same time then as demanding ‘equal opportunities for all’ the SACP [and ANC] insisted that in order to correct ‘the legacy of colonialism, priority must be given to the training of African and non-white specialists in every field'” (909). Die inherente rassisme van die ANC, soos blyk uit die absolute voorkeur wat aan die belange van swartes gegee word, is deur die Joodse kommunis, Ben Turok, beaam: “The movement must be … led by black leaders … it is an essential requirement if the movement is to maintain its credibility with the mass of the people” (948). Dus, die ANC is rassisties omdat sy ondersteuners rassisties is. Dit is waarom ANC-gesinde kiesers ingevolge ras stem. Maar dit is die ANC wat eens valslik beweer het dat hy ‘n Grondwet beoog waarin “racism … shall be outlawed” (1268). Die ANC se riglyne vir ‘n Grondwet “remained overwhelmingly Jacobin. Political rights and freedoms were conditional on support for the ANC’s goals” (1268). Tony Leon het voorspel: “Reverse discrimination will be accorded constitutional preference over other, perhaps more fundamental, rights” (1289).

“The ANC Policy guidelines of 1992 stated that, ‘Management in both the public and private sectors will have to be de-racialised so that rapidly and progressively it comes to reflect the skills of the entire population'” (1304). Met die oog hierop word “racial preferences in appointments and promotions” vereis (1304). “De-racialise” noodsaak dus die uiterste rassisme. “The term ‘de-racialise’ was now used instead of ‘Africanise’, ‘non-racialism’ instead of ‘revolutionary nationalism'” (1723). “‘Africanising’ … was hardly reconcilable with the values of non-racialism. The Oxford English Dictionary defines non-racial as ‘Not involving race, racial factors, or racial discrimination’; and non-racialism as ‘The principle or practice of not discriminating on the basis of race’; while to Africanise is ‘To give an African character to; to make African; to subject to the influence or domination of Black Africans'” (1739). Waarmee die ANC besig is, is “the re-racialisation of society” (3347).

“Affirmative action would be so powerful as to override all personal rights and freedoms as well as to supercede the specific provisions of the property clauses” (1324). As dit hoe is, beweer die ANC egter dat daar nie rassediskriminasie in die toepassing van regstellende aksie sal wees nie. “This will not be done at the expense of others, nor lead to a lowering of standards” (1594). “Affirmative action would be used not to discriminate, but simply to ensure that ‘those who were disadvantaged by apartheid in the past’ had an opportunity to catch up” (1604).

Kort voor die 1994-verkiesing het Mandela ‘n beroep op die blankes gedoen om nie die land te verlaat nie (1585). Enkele jare later het Mbeki gesê die blankes wat wil emigreer, kan dit gerus maar doen. Die aanslag van die ANC was nie net teen apartheid gemik nie, maar ingevolge die leerstelling van “uitsonderlike soort kolonialisme” teen al die blanke inwoners. “It proceeded though to negate the contribution of white South Africans to the building of the economy, state, and society … Whites had not achieved or contributed anything other than at the expense, or through the exploitation, of the black population … The roots of the ‘historic injustice’ reached back all the way to the first white settlement in 1652” (1759). In 1995 “Mbeki stated that among the great ‘distinguishing features’ of this history were: ‘the genocidal destruction of the Khoisan, the importation of slaves from the East, the massive land dispossession of the indigenous majority'” (1766).

Die ANC het daarop aangedring dat die finale grondwet ná die 1994-verkiesing deur die gekose grondwetlike vergadering opgestel moet word (1837). Die armsalige NP-onderhandelaars het hiertoe ingestem. Dit het meegebring dat die bepaling in die tussentydse 1993-Grondwet dat Afrikaans se status nie aangetas mag word nie, uit die 1996-Grondwet gelaat is. Die kommunistiese Jood, Joe Slovo, wat tydens die oorgangstyd in groot mate die strategie van die ANC bepaal het, het na afloop van die grondwetlike onderhandelinge gesê: “We got pretty much what we wanted … Eveything in the interim constitution can be rewritten by the democratically elected representatives of the people” (1844).

‘n Meer verdoemende getuigskrif vir die NP-onderhandelaars is kwalik denkbaar. Hulle het hulle deur kommuniste aan die neus laat lei. “The National Party had promised white South Africans power-sharing in the 1992 referendum, and the ANC allowed the NP to believe that this system could be enshrined in the final constitution” (1852). “The ANC ensured however that such half-promises were not, in any way, constitutionally binding” (1861). In 1992 het die ANC besluit ‘n regering van nasionale eenheid sal slegs aanvaarbaar wees “if it does not delay or obstruct the process of orderly transition to majority rule and … the parties that have lost the elections will not be able to paralyse the functioning of government” (1861).

Die Grondwet het Mandela in staat gestel om die lede van die Konstitusionele Hof te benoem. “There was not a single person on the court who could be described as unsympathetic to the ANC” (1881). Tydens die NP-regering het dosente in die regte deurlopend kapsie gemaak teen apartheid en omtrent alles wat die regering gedoen het. Doeltreffende polisie-optrede om wet en orde te handhaaf, is verdag gemaak deur te beweer dat die land ‘n polisiestaat is. Sedert 1994 het al hierdie grootbekke stil geword. Die verpolitisering van die regstelsel word nie gekritiseer nie. “The English newspapers and universities no longer took an oppositional stance to government” (2436) – eintlik ook nie die gedrukte Afrikaanse koerante nie.

Voorheen is ‘n LLB-graad vir aanstelling as regter vereis. “The constitution … set out no minimum qualifications for appointment at any level of the judiciary, requiring only that they be ‘appropriately qualified'” (2956). ‘n Diploma in die regte is dus voldoende en afdoende praktykondervinding word nie vereis nie (2962). In 1999 was daar 1 550 blanke advokate in Suid-Afrika en 300 nieblanke advokate (2962). Die Regterlike Dienskommissie/Judicial Services Commission (JSC), met Dullah Omar as justisieminister (1994-1999), dus toe Mandela die president was, het toegegee aan die eis “that race become the overriding criterion in the appointmemt and promotion of judges” (3036).

“Race, therefore, becomes the main criterion, with government secure in the knowledge that most blacks aspiring to be judges are party supporters … They could be expected to ally themselves with the racial goals of the movement … The ‘ultimate objective’ was ‘that the judiciary reaches a stage when it is able to reflect the demographics of South Africa” (3055). “Overall 89 per cent of new judges appointed to the bench between 1994 and June 2004 would be black, Coloured or Indian” (3065). “It signalled the subservience of that body [JSC] to the racial agenda of the ruling party … The ANC had an in-built majority in the JSC … Furthermore … ‘it is common currency in legal circles that a de facto [ANC] caucus exists and operates in the commission'” (3044). Maar regsgeleerdes, feitlik sonder uitsondering, leef kritiekloos saam met hierdie ernstige wantoestand.

Daar is geen duidelike onderskeid meer tussen die wetgewende en regterlike gesag nie. “The Constitutional Court … was packed with lawyers who shared the movement’s [ANC’s] worldview” (3389). Vandaar ‘ n hofuitspraak soos dié oor die taalbeleid van Free State University. “By 2004 … at least seven of the 11 judges had been ANC members before their appointment to the bench … All five of the non-black judges on the court had an ANC background” (3389). Johann van der Westhuizen was deel hiervan (2004-2016). Wat hy ook al skryf, maak nie saak hoe vergesog of dwars nie, word in Media24 se koerante gepubliseer. “The Constitutional Court … saw its central role not as the protection of racial or political minorities, but ensuring that government held to the substantive provisions of the Constitution (designed to uplift the historically deprived majority)” (3395).

“The promise made by Mandela in 1994 that South Africa was now ‘one nation’ was displaced by the ‘two nations’ thesis. In a speech in May 1998, Mbeki described South Africa as [a] ‘country of two nations’ – the origins of which lay in ‘the arrival of European colonists in our country, almost 350 years ago” (3148). Teen 1998 was die ANC se versoeningsbeleid vergete en het sy beleid al hoe meer radikaal geword. “A ‘normal’ or ‘non-racial’ society was defined as one where every state and social institution – at every level – reflected the current demographic composition of the country as a whole” (2821). Toe is 75% swart verteenwoordiging vereis. Deesdae, weens die hoë geboortesyfer onder swartes en die invloei van (onwettige) inkommers, het daardie syfers 80%+ geword.

“In order to advance the movement [ANC] towards these goals discrimination was encouraged. And, in order to set, and monitor, the attainment of these racial targets, race classification was reintroduced according to the old apartheid designations. As Mbeki later stated, the goal of the ANC was to ‘ensure that all levels of our society reflect the racial and gender composition of South Africa’. Equality of opportunity, or treatment, which prohibited differentiation between black and white would allow these racial disparities to endure” (2821). Die rassediskriminasie teen blankes “would continue until this ‘racist legacy of inequality’, manifested in ‘white over-representation’ across society, had been completely eliminated” (2828). Waarop dit neerkom, is dat, as dit van die ANC afhang, hierdie rassediskriminasie teen veral die blankes tot in die oneindige voortgesit sal word.

Soos in die geval van ‘n broer wat in die tronk is, word daar nie gepraat oor die blatante rassediskriminasie wat universiteite deesdae pleeg nie. Die blankes word grootliks van die gesogste beroepe uitgesluit. In 1998 het die minister van gesondheid aangekondig “that medical schools would be obliged to implement a quota system to ensure demographic representivity in their 1999 intake of first year medical students. According to the Director General of Health, funding to medical schools would be proportional to the number of black medical students enrolled” (2828). Gaan gerus die keuringsbeleid van Stellenbosch University se mediese fakulteit op die internet na.

Die ANC-regime het die vuil gewoonte om die plaaslike universiteite in alle opsigte tot onderdanigheid te dwing deur te dreig om hulle owerheidsfinansiering af te skaal of te beëindig. Van die universiteite se kant is daar hartlike samewerking met die ANC-regime. Daar is geen sprake van verset en aandrang op universitêre outonomie nie. In die advertensies om poste word openlik gesê dat by aanstellings voorkeur gegee sal word aan diegene in die aangewese groepe (2858), dus dat sover moontlik teen die blankes, veral mans, gediskrimineer sal word.

“Although the ANC’s own policies had resultated in a decline in the quality of school education, it remained insistent that universities – like all other institutions in society – conform to the ‘demographics’ of society. The National Plan on Higher Education (2001) stated that ensuring that the ‘student and staff profiles progressively reflect the demographic realities of South African society’ – in both admissions and graduations – remained strategic objectives of government. It warned that if institutions did not put in place ‘equity targets’ to address black under-representation ‘or put in place clear strategies for achieving them, the Minister will have no hesitation in introducing quotas in the future'” (4220).

“Conformity to the goal of ‘demographic representivity’ – particularly for the more prestigious degrees – required the lowering of minimum requirements for entry and the racial exclusion of many white and Indian students who were ‘overrepresented’ among the top achievers” (4304). Volgens ANC-beleid moet die aanwesigheid van swartes in sport ook demografies verteenwoordigend wees. “For two to three years, let’s not mind losing international competitions” (4381). Dit is dieselfde ANC/UDF wat vóór 1994 verkondig het dat politiek uit sport geweer moet word.

Myburgh beweer: “Having given up power, there was no discernible decline in their [the white’s] fortunes. This powerlessness made their continued prosperity less, rather than more, tolerable for the ANC” (4405). Baie blankes lê besondere kundigheid en vindingrykheid aan die dag. Maar die blatante rassediskriminasie van die afgelope kwarteeu het groot smart in baie blanke huise veroorsaak. Wanneer ek die ná-1994-verskynsel van blanke bedelaars op die strate sien, wonder ek hoe die NP-onderhandelaars, in hulle weelderige huise, dit met hulle gewetes versoen – veronderstellend dat hulle gewetes het.

In 1998 ‘n ANC “document rejected the notion that the state should be a ‘neutral, non-partisan entity’ and endorsed the idea that instead it should be ‘an instrument’ in the hands of the liberation movement … and used to pursue the interests of the racial majority” (3065). Dit is duidelik dat die ANC-regime sy magsposisie sover moontlik misbruik om die blankes se belange soveel moontlik te benadeel. “The apartheid state has to be destroyed in a process of fundamental transformation” (3074). Met die oog hierop is ‘n National Deployment Committee in 1998 daargestel (3090). Om die funksionering van hierdie komitee aan te help word lyste bygehou “of key positions as well as the cadres available to fill them … The ANC needed to conduct a ‘skills audit of all our cadreship'” (3108).

As geswore Afrikanis, wat ‘n sterk anti-blanke gesindheid insluit, was Mbeki oorsensitief vir enige tekortkominge van of kritiek op swartes. In hierdie verband skryf Thomas Hodgkin: “African nasionalists have been compelled to develop their own counter-attack; to answer the myth of African barbarism and backwardness with the counter-myth of African civilisation and achievement. This answer took such forms as glorifying those African leaders who had resisted the colonial intruders and emphasising the better qualities of pre-colonial African society” (3973). By gebrek aan ‘n ander substansiële voorbeeld van ‘n vroeë beskawing in Afrika word dan na antieke Egipte verwys, wat bitter min indien enigiets met swart Afrika te make het. Mandela het ook hierdie laai in sy outobiografie uitgehaal. Hy is ook ‘n toonbeeld van verset teen die blanke bewind en word gevolglik sedert 1994 heeltemal oordrewe gehuldig. Die probleem is dat Mandela se roem berus op wat hy vernietig het; nie op wat hy tot stand gebring het nie.

Met oordrewe retoriek het Mbeki beweer: “We the Africans, who led the ancient world in science, technology, intellectual activity and the arts, have stood by as the rest of the world moved forward while we regressed towards becoming a historical curiosity. Whereas as a continent we gave birth to all humanity, we are today seen as the least advanced of all human societies anywhere in the world. For a millennium, including the passing century, we have failed to destroy the insulting and criminal prejudice which has described the black human complexion as the very representation of everything that is sub-human within the human race” (4548). Die 21ste eeu sou glo “the African Century” wees (4563). Tot dusver is bitter min hiervan waarneembaar.

Myburgh skryf: “In order to fully answer the myth of African inferiority, African nationalism had to find an explanation for the disparity of achievement between Europe (and her descendants) and black Africa which lent this myth its apparent plausibility. It was in this context that the idea that Europe, and her descendants in Africa, had attained their advantages through the exploitation of black Africans had such resonance” (3996). “It ascribed the present advantages of the white group to the enslavement, dispossession, and exploitation of the black majority” (4058). Afrika-nasionaliste verkies om te glo dat Afrika, vóór die koms van die blankes, ‘n paradys was. Hulle bly hunker om daarheen terug te keer, “to be ‘reborn’ to her glorious past” (4483). “The idea of rebirth was intrinsic … to African nationalist thought” (4003). Vandaar Mbeki se gewaande Afrika-renaissance, waarvan eintlik niks tereg gekom het nie en waarvan ons ook nie eens meer hoor nie. “The end of white rule in Africa had not brought the long promised, and long delayed, continental rebirth” (4738). Sonder ekonomiese voorspoed is herlewing nie moontlik nie. Voorspoed is onmoontlik as die staatskas leeg gesteel word. “Ultimately genuine equality and true recognition could only be built upon real achievement” (4752).

Voordat in die laaste twee hoofstukke, 7 en 8, by Mbeki se berugte MIV/vigsbeleid uitgekom word, verskaf Myburgh die volgende opsomming. “The ANC needed to mobilise against the white minority after the transfer of power in order to hold ‘the [black] nation’ together … Mbeki … was driven by a passionate desire to prove that black Africans could govern successfully, and democratically, and manage a sophisticated and modern economy. Yet the policies of centralisation and deployment employed to hasten the attainment of that goal resulted in institutional decay and a drift towards authoritarianism. There was, from the beginning, a refusal to acknowledge the trade-offs that would have to be made between ‘affirmatief action’ and efficiency, Africanisation and non-racialism … When the predictable consequences of these policies became self-evident, the only way to maintain the purity and infallibility of the ANC’s ultimate purposes was to conjure up the ‘demon’ of white racism” (4765).

Ek skryf nie in besonderhede oor Mbeki se MIV/vigs-debakel nie omdat dit van min aktuele belang is. “HIV/Aids did not fit easily into the African nationalist paradigm, which saw all the woes of the black majority as a product of colonialism and apartheid” (4786). “Aids may confirm Western racial prejudices about black Africans … The idea that Aids had originated in Africa [is] a ‘calculated racial insult'” (4798); “[ie] the thesis about the alleged original transmission of HIV ‘from animals to humans'” (6123). Die hoë voorkoms van vigs onder swartes kan die indruk wek of versterk dat swartes seksueel ooraktief of losbandig is. Mbeki het ‘n renons in enige kritiek op swartes. Hy wou nie erken dat MIV (mensimmuniteitsgebreksvirus) vigs veroorsaak nie. Hy het die oorsaak eerder in sosio-ekonomiese status gesoek (5640), bv in “poverty, malnutrition, poor sanitation and parasitic diseases” (5633).

Hiermee het Mbeki vigslyers vrygeskel van verantwoordelikheid en die geleentheid geskep om die skuld eerder op die blankes te pak. “The idea that immune deficiency was caused mainly by poverty fitted into the old anti-colonial paradigm of the liberation movement, since poverty was a ‘legacy of apartheid and colonialism'” (6137). Op hierdie manier Mbeki “defended the dignity of the black majority, absolved the ANC of moral responsibility, and placed the blame for the epidemic back onto the ‘legacy of the past'” (6310). “Taken together, Mbeki argued, … scientific claims confirmed the racial stereotypes he believed white people held about blacks” (6130). Chris McGreal het gesê: “Mbeki is obsessed by race” (5927).

Rusty Bernstein (1926-2002), ‘n Joodse kommunis, was die hoofskrywer van die Vryheidsmanifes van 1955, wat die grondslag van die ANC se beleid is. Ben Turok (1927-2019) het die ekonomiese beleid vervat in die manifes geformuleer. Hierna het nog Joodse kommuniste, soos Michael Harmel (1915-1974) en Joe Slowo (1926-1995), die beleid verder bepaal. Mbeki, self voorheen ‘n SAKP-lid, was sedert 1994 die hooftoepasser van hierdie beleid, wat tot op hede, wat die hoofoogmerke betref, dieselfde gebly het. Die nuwe Suid-Afrika kon dit kwalik slegter getref het as met ‘n regime soos die openlik rassistiese, ondoeltreffende en immorele ANC.

Die ANC se oogmerk is “to transform South Africa ‘from a European outpost in Africa into an African country, with a predominantly African cultural character, and showing a face to the world that is nationally representative of its peoples'” (2876). Dit word normalisering genoem (2882). Ek is ‘n Europeër of Westerling in Afrika. Dit is vir my mooi as iets opgebou en bewaar word. Dit is vir my weersinwekkend as wat onder die leiding van blankes oor eeue daargestel is, afgebreek en vernietig word. Dit is wat die ANC doen.

Sydney Gregan: Die revolusie in snelrat

Dr Anthea Jeffery se aanvanklike werk The People’s War (2009) is waarskynlik deur min mense gelees (676 bladsye), alhoewel dit van groot belang is vir die verstaan van ons politieke situasie. In 2019 het sy ‘n verkorte uitgawe daarvan die lig laat sien wat, soos mens dit graag wil noem, “verpligte leesstof” is vir elkeen wat werklik wil verstaan wat in ons land aan die gang is. Veral die laaste hoofstuk daarvan is ‘n meesterlike opsomming en vertolking van die ware oogmerke van die ANC en hulle hanteerders, die SAKP, met hierdie land.

“…the story of the people’s war is the key to understanding how the ANC gained its hegemonic grip over the new South Africa. It is also the key to understanding a host of adverse social phenomena that continue to plague the country. Among other things, the ANC’s success in making South Africa ‘ungovernable’ in the decade up to 1994 is a major factor in the persistent vandalism, destructive protests and seeming contempt for authority that persist to this day”.

—Anthea Jeffery, The People’s War, 2019

In 1978 het die SAKP/ANC ‘n besoek aan Viëtnam gebring en onder andere met die “meester”-strateeg, generaal Vo Nguyen Giap beraadslaag hoe om deur middel van ‘n revolusionêre “volksoorlog” die mag te gryp. Dit is dan ook met groot sukses geïmplementeer deur onder meer die politieke opposisie uit te skakel voor die 1994-verkiesing en die land “onregeerbaar” te maak. Dit het doeltreffend daarin geslaag om ‘n geweldskultuur te skep terwyl die blaam op die “apartheidsregering” en partye soos Inkatha geplaas is. Met die opposisie behoorlik geneutraliseer het die “nuwe” Suid-Afrika soos ‘n ryp appel in die skoot van die ANC geval – om nooit weer uit die kloue daarvan te ontsnap nie.

Die volksoorlog se doelwit is om die Sowjet-geïnspireerde Nasionaal Demokratiese Revolusie (NDR) deur te voer. En wat is die doel van die NDR?:

“… to take South Africa, by gradual and incremental steps over four decades or more, from a free-market system to socialism and then communism.”

Danksy die “volksoorlog” het ons nou ‘n “hollowed-out democracy, a shell without substance”. Jeffery wys ook op die feit dat die oorgangsgrondwet en die huidige grondwet deur die ANC beskou word as:

“…nothing more than temporary agreements that reflected the balance of forces prevailing at the time – and that could always be changed once the balance of forces had shifted sufficiently to allow this”.

Wat ons dus het as gevolg van die suksesvolle “oorlog om die nasie” is ‘n post-apartheidera sonder ‘n doeltreffende opposisie en sonder konstitusionele meganismes om mag af te wentel en te versprei en belangriker nog:

“without a commitment by the ruling party to regard even the final constitution as binding upon itself”.

Die ANC se beheer oor die land is trouens nou van so ‘n aard dat dit met gemak van die eerste na die tweede fase van die revolusie kan beweeg. Die eerste fase was natuurlik die “nasionale bevryding” en die tweede, alhoewel verskans deur ander mooiklinkende terme, volbloedsosialisme en daarna, kommunisme. Die strategie van die NDR het “only one possible outcome”, die verwesenliking van ‘n sosialistiese samelewing.

Ten einde hierdie oogmerke te bereik is dit noodsaaklik vir die ANC om volle beheer oor die myne, industrie, banke en ander monopolieë te verkry. Die SEB (Engels: BEE)-wetgewing is ‘n belangrike metode om dit te bewerkstellig. Beheer oor die “levers of power” in die vorm van die openbare uitsaaier, die media, die privaatsektor, die universiteite en alle ander entiteite wat die klimaat (van opinie) kon wysig, moes verkry word. Daarin is reeds volkome geslaag. In 1997, by die ANC se konferensie in Mafikeng is boonop blatant gestel dat beheer oor hierdie “centres of power” sal vereis dat “cadre [deployment] policy” gevolg sal moet word ten einde te verseker dat die ANC ‘n leidende rol speel in al hierdie instellings. Die ANC het dus sy mag gekonsolideer sodat, ongeag die geraas oor korrupsie en verantwoordbaarheid, dit meedoënloos kan voortgaan om die land op ‘n sosialistiese pad te plaas.

Onteiening sonder vergoeding (EWC) en die Nasionale Gesondheidsversekering (NHI) is verder stappe in hierdie proses om ‘n sosialistiese staat te skep. Die doel van EWC is nie om grond in die hande van swartes te plaas nie, maar om die ANC die eienaar van die grond te maak sodat dit beheer oor die “gebruikers” daarvan kan behou. Niemand minder as Ramaphosa is die groot voorstander van EWC; dit terwyl blanke liberaliste al hulle hoop op hom gevestig het om die land weer “op koers” te kry na die Zuma-bewind.

Jeffery wys op die belangrike feit dat die SAKP nie Ramaphosa se kandidatuur vir presidentskap (van die ANC en die land), sou gesteun het as hulle nie seker was van sy toegewydheid aan die NDR nie. Dus, blanke liberaliste het verniet miljoene spandeer om ANC-lede om te koop om vir Ramaphosa te stem – hy was reeds in die sakkie van die SAKP! Pas nadat Ramaphosa verkies is, verklaar hy in Januarie 2018 die noodsaaklikheid daarvan om die NDR te bevorder; iets wat die Blanke sakemanne wat hom befonds het seker met ‘n wrang smaak in die mond gelos het; tensy hulle natuurlik deel van die uitgelese elite is wat vir hulle eie belange sal sorg in die tweede fase van die revolusie.

Watter verdere stappe word beoog ingevolge die NDR?

Die inlywing in die 1996-grondwet van verskanste sosio-ekonomiese regte (soos belowe in die Freedom Charter);
Die sistematiese verswakking van die magte van die parlement (grotendeels reeds bewerk deur die “Disaster Management Act” waar die beheer van die land in ‘n uitgesoekte groepie se hande geplaas is en waarvan hulle baie moeilik gaan afstand doen);
Volgehoue aanslae teen die regbank in die naam van “transformasie”;
Verdere kaderontplooiing deur die ANC om beheer te verkry oor ”all key levers of power”;
Verdere SEB-wetgewing om privaat ondernemings se outonomie verder af te breek;
Nasionalisering van water en minerale regte;
Arbeidswetgewing wat, in plaas van werkloosheid hok te slaan, werkloosheid bevorder;
Die NHI wat privaat mediese fondse wil vernietig en daarmee saam die private mediese bedryf;
Die erodering van outonomie op skool- en universiteitsvlak met verlaging en vernietiging van standaarde;
Die volgehoue afhanklikheid van 17 miljoen (en steeds groeiend) bevoordeeldes van maatskaplike toelaes van die staat vir hulle daaglikse oorlewing;
EWC as die finale slag om finale beheer te kry en die bestaande ekonomie te vernietig.

Jeffery stel dit onomwonde:

…land expropriated without compensation will be owned by the state, not transferred to black South Africans. This is the fraud at the heart of the EWC idea. EWC will empower the government, not the individual, and will be used as a patronage tool and to deepen dependency on the ANC”.

Die NDR is die sleutel om te verstaan wat in die afgelope 26 jaar van ANC-bewind gebeur het. Maar min blankes besef wat die eerste en tweede fase van die revolusie werklik behels. Vir die gemiddelde blanke is dit blykbaar ondenkbaar om te glo dat die ANC eenvoudig niks voel vir die meerderheid mense in hierdie land nie en dat dit ideologies gedrewe is om die land te verswak en selfs te vernietig ten einde sy doelwitte te bereik. Vanuit die SAKP/ANC-perspektief is daar ‘n “compelling logic” met die NDR-strategie:

“If the economy was thriving and millions of well-skilled South Africans could easily find well-paying private sector jobs outside of state control, the ANC would soon lose its grip on power.”

Om dus die bevolking afhanklik eerder as onafhanklik te maak, is van kardinale belang vir die ANC. Deur kaderontplooiing binne die openbare sektor en sowat 17-20 miljoen wat van hulle daaglikse brood afhanklik is van maatskaplike toelaes (uitgedeel en beheer deur die ANC), is die ANC ten volle in beheer van die revolusie. Die Covid-19-fiasko het die ANC se greep op die land boonop verstewig deurdat ‘n groot deel van die onafhanklik denkende middelklas ook nou tot bedelstand verlaag is en van die ANC afhanklik sal wees vir oorlewing.

Werkloosheid wat steeds groter word skeel die ANC-elite min; hulle eie poste is verseker (en verskans). Daarom dat hulle ook nie enige erg het daaraan dat die ekonomie skade ly as gevolg van die irrasionele en idiotiese inperkings nie; hulle salarisse word steeds betaal met die bykomende voordeel dat hulle nie eers op kantoor hoef te wees nie!

“… the more the NDP was implemented, the more the economy would be crippled and the more dependency upon the state will grow. Soon, the damage from the NDP would become self-perpetuating and increasingly difficult to reverse”.

Die woord “revolusie” het in sommige (links-liberale) kringe ‘n bekoring asof dit ‘n towerwoord is waarmee alles wat kwansuis verkeerd is, reggestel kan word. Min besef dalk dat dit ‘n totale omverwerping van alle bestaande strukture beoog en radikale verandering meebring. So asof ‘n nuwe samelewingstruktuur eensklaps kunsmatig gevorm kan word terwyl dít wat daar was eeue geneem het om te skep! Feit is dat daar deur die afbreek van orde en strukture ‘n vakuum onstaan waarin wetteloosheid, eerder as ‘n nuwe ordelike struktuur, beslag kry. Dit is wat nou in ons land ontplooi. Daar is geen gesag waarna opgesien word nie; geen gemene deler wat ons saambind nie, maar veel eerder ‘n veragting vir die regime en hulle vergrype deur diegene wat nog vir hulleself dink, terwyl die res in paniek en vrees lewe en ewe gedienstig elke belaglike regulasie en dekreet navolg asof hulle lewens daarvan afhang.

Wat is die lewens- en wêreldbeskouing van die nuwe Suid-Afrika? Dit is nie Christelik nie en beslis ook nie nasionaal nie. Dit is eerder onchristelik, barbaars en Gods- en naasteveragtend. Dit is omdat dit revolusionêr is want die wese van enige revolusie, aldus die Nederlandse denker en filosoof Groen van Prinsterer, is ongeloof!

Die (tweede fase) van die ANC-revolusie is besig om ons almal in te sluk al sal dit dalk ook sy eie kinders (die ANC) in die proses opvreet. Niemand van ons (tensy jy deel is van die elite wat die toutjies trek) gaan hieruit ongeskonde kom nie. Anargie, as noodwendige neweproduk van hierdie revolusie, dreig nou om heeltemal hande uit te ruk. Ontsag vir die lewe is lankal (soos met die Franse Revolusie) daarmee heen. Mense word soos wilde diere afgemaai en geslag. Eers wanneer ons besef dat hierdie bestel (revolusie) nie “beter” gemaak kan word of “hervorm” kan word nie, maar iets anders in die plek daarvan (of afsonderlik daarvan) daargestel sal moet word, sal werklike geesdrif onder ons mense kan posvat. Want dan sal ons weer ‘n gemeenskaplike deler hê: ‘n gemeenskaplike ideaal om na te strewe.

Intussen is ons besig om die branders met ‘n besem te probeer terugvee…

Leon Lemmer: Die ANC as oorlogsugtige instansie

“KZN [KwaZulu-Natal] is a province awash with violence. It is no longer the violence of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the ANC and IFP fought a bitter battle for supremacy in the province. That contest has been decided, and the ANC has come out on top. Now the murderous battles take place within the party, in the fight for office and material benefits” (Kindle 97). So begin die eerste hoofstuk van Greg Ardé se boek, War Party: How the ANC’s political killings are breaking South Africa (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2020, 256p, R215 (loot), R297 (Exclusive); Amazon Kindle $13,34). Die outeur is ‘n koerantman wat reeds dekades lank ondersoekende joernalistieke werk in veral Natal doen. Ten einde die lengte van my teks te beperk, onderskei ek nie altyd duidelik tussen Ardé en ander mense se menings nie.

Die boek is die resultaat van navorsing wat ‘n jaar in beslag geneem het (2181, 2477). “This book is highly critical of the ruling party” (1540). “The narrative points to a ruling party, an organised group of people controlling the levers of the state, who, by their collective action, be it by omission or commission, are perpetuating violence” (2490). “[The ANC] has become a war party” (2509). “Arguably a growing number [of ANC members] are getting up with murderous intent, prepared to kill one another in their quest for power or to satisfy their greed” (2513).

Die ANC is in 1912 gestig en het hom aanvanklik besig gehou met besware teen veral die paswet en arbeidsake, wat soms tot protesaksies en stakings gelei het. Die ANC het toe vir die blanke regering nie veel meer as lastigheidswaarde gehad nie. Op 16 Desember 1961 het die ANC sy tweede fase betree toe sy militêre vleuel, Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), tot geweldpleging oorgegaan het. Die latere vredesikoon, Nelson Mandela, het beslag aan gewelddadigheid as die nuwe hoofkenmerk van die ANC gegee. ANC-geweldpleging word tot op hede voortgesit. Dit is dié nalatenskap van Mandela. In 1964 is Mandela tot lewenslange tronkstraf veroordeel en is die terrorisme van die ANC/MK deur ander gewelddadige kamerade voortgesit.

Omdat die ANC ‘n verbanne organisasie in Suid-Afrika was, is die United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 gestig om as binnelandse vleuel van die ANC te funksioneer. Hierdie derde fase van die ANC se geweldstradisie het onder die leiding van Desmond Tutu en Allan Boesak plaasgevind. Die vierde fase, met die noodlottigste geweld, het van 1990 tot 1994 geduur en is onder die leiding van Mandela bedryf. Dit was die direkte gevolg van FW de Klerk se dwase toespraak op 2 Februarie 1990. ANC- en SAKP-lede is toegelaat om vryelik Suid-Afrika binne te kom. Wapens is op groot skaal die land ingebring. Die ANC se geweldsaksie het toe van die blankes na die swartes verskuif ten einde alle swart kiesers tot onderdanigheid aan die ANC te dwing. Die ANC wou veral die Inkatha-Vryheidsparty (IVP), potensieel die hoofopposisieparty, ten alle koste vernietig, sodat die ANC politieke beheer oor die land kon oorneem.

Nadat die ANC die algemene verkiesing in 1994 gewen het, het die ANC sy vyfde fase, die vierde gewelddadige een, betree. Die huidige geweldsfase is nie na buite die ANC gerig nie. Dit is ‘n stryd om poste en materiële gewin binne die ANC. Dit is die onderwerp van Ardé se boek. Die beste karakterisering van die ANC as gewelddadige instansie is egter te vinde in Anthea Jeffery se boek, People’s War: New light on the struggle for South Africa (2009, Kindle $9,19). Jeffery se boek handel oor die vierde fase in die ANC se bestaan, toe baie meer swartes in politieke geweld deur die ANC gedood is as waaraan die blanke politieke bewind ooit met sy sogenaamde sistemiese geweld skuldig was.

Ten einde sy gewelddadigheid te kamoefleer, het die ANC (grootliks) valslik gepoog om die geweldpleging aan ‘n “Derde Mag”, die blanke bewind se veiligheidsmagte (polisie en weermag), toe te dig. Dit was veral die geval ná die Boipatong-slagting in 1992 toe Inkatha die ANC vir ‘n verandering goed opgehel het. Die dodetal was 45. Maar wat moet ons dikwels in die praktyk aanhoor? Die absolute valsheid dat die 1990/94-era ‘n vreedsame oorgang na bevryding en demokrasie was. Ardé stel dit onomwonde: “Violence is the political capital [of the ANC]” (1333). ‘n ANC-lid skryf: “Never in their wildest dreams did the ANC founding fathers, when they met in Bloemfontein [1912], imagine that they were in effect colluding in the creation of a criminal syndicate … The ANC exists for no other purpose than to loot the state” (2424).

In 1990/94 het die stryd tussen die ANC en Inkatha aan die Rand en veral in Natal gewoed. Sedertdien word hierdie geweldpleging, nou reeds ‘n goed gevestigde ANC-tradisie, in veral hierdie twee gebiede voortgesit, maar hierdie keer binne ANC-geledere. Dit is waarop Ardé sy aandag toespits. Dat die ná-1994-geweld in ‘n mate ‘n voortsetting van die ANC se 1990/94-geweld is, blyk uit die feit dat daar bv steeds sogenaamde “Self-Defence Units (SDUs)” is; hierdie keer om die belange van spesifieke ANC-politici of aspirantpolitici te bevorder (128). “ANC members seem to have become more at ease with violence, be it to settle scores or to remove obstacles in the path of their enrichment or power play” (736). “Violence increasingly features in the factional disputes and competition for jobs, favours and tenders that make up life in the ANC. It is becoming the dominant currency of the party in KZN” (746).

Daar is groot werkloosheid onder veral swartes, wat saamhang met ‘n groot gebrek aan sowel talent as bekwaamheid by sommige ANC-lede. “Some people who wouldn’t qualify for jobs as labourers were earning R15 000 a month as councillors. They immediately adjust their lifestyle and thereafter clung to their jobs” (816). Dit is bekend dat sommige van hierdie politici nie funksioneel geletterd is nie. “There is no consequence management. People in power don’t answer when you question their actions. If they do, their answers are thin and evasive” (378). Dit is hierdie relatief talentlose elemente wat verbete om poste in die politiek meeding. Sedert 1994 is daar op die drie vlakke van regering (sentraal, provinsiaal en munisipaal) meer hoogslonende politieke poste as ooit tevore geskep.

“There were about 400 MP’s countrywide, 80 MPLs in KZN and more than 200 councillors in Durban alone … The remuneration packages [are] … inordinately high. Extra money is derived from the tender system, corruption and kickbacks” (820). In die Ramaphosa-kabinet is daar ‘n sestigtal ministers en adjunkministers wat elkeen buitensporige salarisse en byvoordele ontvang. Die opset is sodanig dat ANC-kamerade feitlik enigiets sal doen om politieke poste in te palm en daarna sal poog om niks te doen wat meebring dat hulle die voordele van hulle luukse leefstyl moet inboet nie. “They believe it was time to eat” (413). “The culture of ‘our turn to eat’ had developed around council posts, with business people lining up to secure favours from the councillors and benefit from municipal contracts” (1888). “Being indepedent-minded, being caring: these are scarce traits in the ANC now” (365).

Dit is nie ‘n verskynsel wat tot Natal of die Rand beperk is nie. Die staatsdiens en semi-staatsdiens is grootliks ‘n verlenging van ANC-politiek. Daar is nie meer ‘n (duidelike) skeiding van die wetgewende en uitvoerende mag nie. Die oorvloed poste wat sedert 1994 in hierdie sektore geskep is, is seker die ANC-regime se suksesvolste poging tot werkskepping. By verre die meeste poste is tans slegs vir ANC-lede beskikbaar. Dit bring noodwendig mee dat opportuniste uit ander politieke partye na die ANC migreer. Die verlies aan lidmaatskap wat die IVP weens ANC-geweldpleging in 1990/94 gelei het, word gevolglik voortgesit.

Ardé vertel bv van iemand wat van die IVP na die ANC oorgeloop het. “The ANC helped him set up a security company … and then they gave him government tenders” (943). Hy het vir hom ‘n luukse Lamborghini-motor aangeskaf (952). Sowel die Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) as die National Freedom Party (NFP) word as surrogaat ANC-partye getakseer, wat migrasie na die ANC vergemaklik (1040). “What became clear in KZN over the years was that the ANC, having once overcome the IFP and determined not to lose against them again, absorbed many of its former enemies, especially the strongmen. Their background, ideology and personal morality are of no consequence to the ANC, especially when measured against their ability to mobilise or terrorise” (1535).

Moenie dink dat hierdie probleem slegs eie aan Natal is nie. Dit kom landswyd voor, maar in groter mate in Natal. By ‘n vorige geleentheid het ek oor die toestand in Knysna geskryf en ‘n plaaslike raadslid aangehaal: “The people instigating the riots and the violence are those who want to become leaders themselves … They can’t all be councillors … In my place is going to be one councillor … I see four of them who want to be in the race. And only one of them can win. It will split them and that is going to cause a problem” (Anelia Schutte, For the people, 2014; Kindle 3289, 3337 – Praag 5.10.2019). Die onrus sal dus voortduur. Opstoking tot geweld is die bewese manier om ‘n leier in die (swart) gemeenskap te word. Mandela het geweldpleging op die hele plaaslike samelewing losgelaat en op hierdie manier die staatshoof en selfs ‘n wêreldvredesikoon geword.

“The horror of political assassination in KwaZulu-Natal, beyond what it foretells for the country as a whole, is that people have become inured to the violence. The bloody brutality, the cruelty and the human loss have largely become masked in the public eye. It is the new normal” (610). Die plaaslike politiek en samelewing is na verloop van dekades in so ‘n mate deurdrenk van moord en verwoesting dat die inwoners geneig is om (oor)gewoond daaraan te word en gevolglik hulle senstiwiteit vir misdaad, selfs moord, te verloor. Daar is beperkte belangstelling in wat in hierdie opsig daagliks in die land gebeur, gevolglik is daar min berigte daaroor in die massa-inligtingsmedia. Aan slegs die afgryslikste gevalle word publisiteit verleen en selfs dan nie eens prominent nie. Wanneer laas het u ‘n berig oor bv ‘n plaasmoord op die voorbladsy van ‘n koerant gesien?

Ardé het ten minste met die oog op die historiese waarde daarvan ‘n groot guns aan ons en ons nageslag bewys deur die huidige funksionering van ANC-lede as gewelddadig of oorlogsugtig te dokumenteer; dus by implikasie dat die ANC eintlik’n oorlogsparty is. Dit gaan letterlik om “thousands of politically attributed murders” (49). “Mass murder [1990/94] morphed into targeted assassinations” (75). Dit is dus ironies dat “our constitution enshrines the right to life” (365).

“The ANC is spinning out of control because of violence” (370). “KZN … threatens to be the harbinger of a fully fledged gangster state where might is right and the big guns call the shots” (80). “[It is] a ‘culture of blood’ [2652] fed by greed, which prizes money over human life. In KZN murder is increasingly the currency of power … The ANC, the party of liberation, is becoming a war party” (85). Dit is waarom ek Frans Cronje se deurgaans vreedsame toekomsscenarios onaanvaarbaar vind (Praag 18.07.2020).

Dit het geen of min sin om in hierdie rubriek die name te noem van al die vermoordes en al die moordenaars wat in Ardé se boek vermeld word. Daar is ‘n lys van tersaaklike inligtingsbronne in die boek (2546-2642). Ek bepaal my by algemeenhede. Dit is eintlik bewonderenswaardig hoe die outeur die onverkwiklikhede van individuele gevalle ontrafel het. “Few journalists have the time or the inclination to unpack a welter of names, places and events to find common threads and see the bigger picture, to unearth the convergence between the hitmen, their paymasters and ANC dynamics in KZN” (1101). Ongelukkig kom hy nooit uit by breër perspektiewe oor die saak nie, soos die afbrekende rol van nieu-marxisme, die negatiewe voorbeeld wat wetteloosheid en chaos in ander lande aan plaaslike misdadigers stel en die absolute ongeskiktheid van (Westerse) demokrasie as staatsvorm vir Suid-Afrika.

As lede van ‘n gemeenskap oorwegend tot ‘n ander party as die ANC behoort, word hulle voordele ontsê, dus benadeel (173). ANC-gesinde gemeenskappe en individue, daarenteen, word bevoordeel, bv veroordeelde misdadigers word na vrylating uit die tronk in regeringsposte aangestel (205). Oud-MK-terroriste speel ‘n rol in die geweld. “The vets were demanding jobs, tenders and government houses” (205). Na aanleiding van “the 2017 demonstration by Umkhonto weSizwe Military Veterans who laid siege to the ANC’s headquarters of Luthuli House in Johannesburg” is gesê: “This sort of thing deliberately lays the groundwork for civil war … This is leading to the militarisation of South Africa” (374).

Korrupsie neem talle vorme aan, bv: “In 2019 it was an open secret in Richmond that R30 million worth of timber grown on munisipal land had been stolen and the … ANC councillors had turned a blind eye in return for a slice of the proceeds” (223). Die gesin van die korrupte hooffinansiële beampte van Richmond het 16 voertuie besit (241). In Umzimkhulu in daar in 2012 begin om die Gedenksaal te moderniseer teen R4 miljoen. “Five years and two contractors later, the cost of the project had escalated to R16 million but most of the work was still incomplete” (624). Intussen is drie van die betrokke persone vermoor (624), insluitende ‘n raadslid wat geweier het om dokumente vir hierdie projek te onderteken (628). ‘n ANC-kameraad in ‘n ander geval “benefited from an inflated municipal contract to run public viewings of Nelson Mandela’s funeral” (763). “The bid was awarded the contract at five times the amount that it cost to provide the service” (772), naamlik R994 500 pleks van R196 319, “a profit of R798 181 for work it did not itself undertake” (782). Sulke vergesogte munisipale dienste word gelewer pleks van die dienste wat deur plaaslike owerhede ekonomies en doeltreffend gelewer behoort te word.

Wat Ardé duidelik uitwys, is dat daar ‘n onder- en ‘n bowêreld in die ANC se korrupte geledere bestaan (268). In die onderwêreld is daar diegene wat die misdade pleeg, bv sluipmoordenaars. In die bowêreld is die ANC-kornuite wat die misdadigers betaal en deur die misdade bevoordeel word, bv met poste of ander finansiële gewin. Daar is vroeër vanjaar berig “that around 90 people with some official standing have been killed in KZN since 2015. They were councillors, political party officials or municipal officials; most were affiliated to the ANC” (274). Die dooies sluit fluitjieblasers teen korrupsie in (283). Korrupsie neem onder meer die vorm aan van die onwettige verkoop van “RDP houses” vir eie gewin (301).

Dit is dikwels moeilik om die veroordeling van misdadigers te bewerkstellig omdat die saaklêers gesaboteer word (310) of verdwyn. Getuies word geïntimideer om nie in sulke hofsake te getuig nie, of word selfs vermoor (507, 597, 1893, 2305). Party keer verdwyn ‘n hoofgetuie in die niet (1518). Die polisie word soms omgekoop sodat sulke sake nie ondersoek word nie (561). “Police incompetence and political manipulation” kom voor (838). “50 magistrates … had been found to have taken bribes between 2014 and 2019” (2319). Dit is nie duidelik of hierdie getal op KZN of die land in sy geheel betrekking het nie. ‘n Gebrek aan getuienis lei dikwels tot die ontslag van misdadigers, insluitende moordenaars (702). Die regskoste van ANC-kamerade wat van misdade aangekla word, word soms deur die ANC betaal (324, 422). As iemand ‘n lojale of invloedryke ANC-lid is en aan misdrywe skuldig is, word hy dikwels in ‘n ander pos herontplooi (328, 422). Diegene wat wel in ‘n hof tot tronkstraf gevonnis word, word (spoedig) op parool vrygelaat (383, 471).

Hoe gevaarlik die situasie vir ‘n raadslid kan wees as hy korrupsie probeer bestry, blyk uit die geval van iemand wat om hierdie rede binne ANC-geledere geïsoleer is. Hy is voor ‘n keuse gestel: “If he didn’t resign, he would be dead … [He] didn’t trust the police to help. He also ‘did not trust the security company that was contracted by the municipality'” (444). ‘n Munisipaliteit soos Dundee verkwansel maandeliks R1 miljoen aan veiligheidsdienste (477). In die Gwala-distrik (Kokstad, Umzinkhulu, Bulwer, Ixopo, Underberg) is R8.7 miljoen vir sekuriteitsdienste in ‘n enkele jaar betaal, terwyl dit veronderstel is om R241 000 per maand te kos, maar “in some months payments ballooned to almost double that amount” (667). In Gwala het ‘n raadslid verplig gevoel om sy besware op skrif te stel: “about the financial irregularities and misconduct of comrades and [he] sent it to the ANC provincial head office. It was suggested that he be charged with misconduct for bringing the ANC into disrepute” (667).

Dit is nie net Natal wat ‘n oorlogsone is nie. Die hele land gaan gebuk onder geweld veroorsaak deur ANC-kornuite of geweld wat voortspruit uit die korrupsie en ondoeltreffendheid van die owerheid. In 2017 is berig: “South Africans spend R45 billion a year on private security, 30% more than the government allocated to the police force. In that year there were 490 000 active private security personnel in South Africa, working in armed response, cash-in-transit, and guarding. By contrast, the South African Police Service employed 194 852 people and the South African National Defence Force 77 597 … In 2018 … government spending on private security had ballooned from 6.1 billion in the 2015/16 financial year to R7 billion in 2017/18” (956).

Soos by begrafnisse vóór 1994 word die begrafnis van ‘n raadslid wat in onguns verval het deur die ANC gekaap (458) en word daar dan valslik voorgegee dat die ANC teen korrupsie gekant is en daarteen optree. Daar word beweer: “As the ANC we are a law-abiding organisation, and we will always abide by the law” (698). ‘n Waarnemer het egter gesê: “The national evil … has seen the ruling party manipulate and undermine the rule of law and effectively replace it with the politics of the stomach, enforced mainly in KZN through the barrel of a gun” (914). “ANC leaders in KZN often claim that their actions are aimed at advancing peace but it often seems more like entrenching ANC hegemony at any cost” (1540).

In 2016 is die Moerane-kommissie aangestel (785) om “violence in KZN between 2011 and 2017” te ondersoek (794). Verslag is in 2018 gelewer (802). Advokaat MTK Moerane se verslag “is a damning indictment of the politics of KZN” (798). “The violence in KZN demonstrated the ‘depravity to which human beings can descend … to murder another human being for material gain'” (811). “Corruption is the backbone of South African politics, Moerane said. ‘And that’s the cause of violence'” (824). ‘n ANC-kameraad het voor die kommissie getuig: “The only way to stop political killings would be for his beloved ANC to lose at the polls” (861). “Moerane’s report seems to be largely ignored by the government” (785). “The exercise cost R15 million” (802). “He slated the political deployment of ANC cadres in government” (802). Onlangs het dit uit persberigte geblyk dat twee van Nelson Mandela se dogters, Zindzi en Zenani, as ambassadeurs in onderskeidelik Denemarke en Suid-Korea gedien het. Sover ek weet is geen beswaar teen sodanige kaderontplooiing in die onlangse koerantberigte geopper nie.

Die omvang wat ondoeltreffende bestuur en administrasie, asook korrupsie, by munisipaliteite aanneem, is ongelooflik. Byvoorbeeld: “When we visited, Newcastle had debts amounting to about R1.3 billion and its income was less than its expenses. Ten years earlier the municipality had cash reserves of R248 million” (516). R400 miljoen is aan ‘n nuwe seweverdieping munisipale gebou bestee terwyl die inwoners meer as R1 biljoen aan onbetaalde dienste skuld (530). ‘n Vorige burgemeester het ‘n R2 miljoen selfoonkontrak aan sy broer toegeken (525). Hierdie burgemeester het sedertdien sy multimiljoenrand huis verkoop en na Dubai uitgewyk (521). “Most Newcastle comrades … seem equally tainted and to have benefited from a range of multi-million-rand contracts either not completed or shoddily finished, including a swimming pool and two community halls” (602).

Daar is entrepreneurs in hierdie moordbedryf. “He will arrange the hit and take a percentage. He doesn’t do the shooting. He gets the hitman” (746). Sluipmoordenaars word in die taxi- of privaat sekuriteitsbedryf gewerf (498, 746, 1296) of in die (afgetrede) geledere van die polisie en weermag (971). “Hostels [are] reservoirs for hitmen” (870). “Between 70% and 90% of [hostel] residents are unemployed” (874). “Residents living in blocks controlled by hitmen were forced to pay ‘protection money’, the funds from which bought guns and ammunition, paid for killers, and used to bribe police officers and court officials” (879). “Too many cops were on the take” (1342).

“Hitmen … often … come from the rural areas and are known as izinkabi (singular inkabi) … They are increasingly being used in political assassinations, in the factional feuds within the ANC, to eliminate opponents” (1296). “Izinkabi … are there because the government doesn’t regulate [the taxi] industry” (1342). “The real masterminds behind the killings, the mafiosi, remained untouched” (1347). “All types of weapons are in circulation and it is not effectively controlled” (842). Soms word “state-issued R1 firearm[s]” in sluipmoorde gebruik (685) of polisiedienspistole (975). “State-issue firearms, such as R4s and R5s, police radios, uniforms and other police and army equipment were often recovered during hostel raids” (883).

Die taxibedryf is ‘n prominente werklikheid in Suid-Afrika. Ardé wy ‘n hele afdeling in sy boek daaraan omdat dit ‘n integrerende deel van die geweldskultuur is. “According to a 2017 report, the South African National Taxi Council (SANTACO) estimated there were 200 000 minibus taxis in the country, generating R90 billion in fares a year, or R450 000 on average per taxi for every owner. Other figures suggest there are upwards of 250 000 minibus taxis … The industry is reputedly the biggest purchaser of fuel in the country and it pays significant indirect taxes, including the fuel levy imposed on petrol and diesel sales and value added tax on vehicle purchases and spare parts” (1113). Dit word as ‘n “wildly profitable industry” beskryf (1118).

Gewone sterflinge betaal egter ook al die genoemde belastings maar daarbenewens ook inkomstebelasting. Die kern van die saak is dat die taxibedryf inkomstebelasting op groot skaal vryspring. “No receipts are issued” (1624). “A taxi running the route between Chatsworth and the Durban CBD made about R15 000 a week, mostly tax-free” (1150). Daar is bv eienaars met ‘n vloot van 20 taxi’s (1136, 1166). “[A] taxi boss told me he made R25 000 a day in profit on his fleet … ‘The only reason to have taxis is to steal from SARS” (1180). ‘n Ander taxi-eienaar het 24 taxi’s met ‘n maandelikse omset van R400 000. “He had a string of luxury cars, three wives and eight children” (1459). Dit is ‘n voorbeeld van “a culture of bling” (2466).

Die taxibedryf is feitlik uitsluitlik in swart besit. Om hierdie rede is die ANC-regime hierdie bedryf goedgesind. Talle ander bedrywe en beroepe ly groot finansiële verliese weens die Covid-19-inperking. Met hulle het die ANC-regime min simpatie. Die taxibedryf, daarenteen, is vir regeringsbystand van miljoene der miljoene rand uitgesonder, al ontduik die eienaars inkomstebelasting. Pleks van dankbaar te wees, kla taxi-eienaars steen en been dat te min Covid-19-skadevergoeding aan hulle betaal word. Hulle het daarop aangedring dat taxi’s (oor)vol gelaai moet kan word. Die ANC-regime het voor hierdie eis geswig ten spyte van die wesenlike gesondheidsgevaar wat dit inhou.

“On the face of it, the taxi industry is out of control, resistant to regulation, and a law unto itself” (1687). “Even the violence that marks it is a means of regulating the market, by keeping competition down and prices up … With its estimated annual turnover of R90 billion, it bears comparison as a form of organised crime with the illicit tobacco industry” (1691). “They were now run like a mafia and the leaders had become warlords” (1718).

Omdat taxi’s so ‘n lonende bedryf is, asook weens die grootskaalse werkloosheid, is daar sterk kompetisie in hierdie sektor (1145), wat op sy beurt tot omvangryke geweldpleging, insluitende moorde, lei. Volgens ‘n waarnemer was daar in hierdie sektor volgens mediaberigte 458 moorde in 16 jaar (1243). Daar is te veel mense wat in hierdie rykdom wil deel. “The market is overtraded” (1180). “Route dominance was down to firepower” (1175). “The problem with the taxi industry … is that too many cops are involved. They own taxis or they take bribes” (1170). “[A] taxi cop described the industry as a ‘mafia business driven by sheer greed” (1225). “It is not unfair to accuse the police of not having a handle on taxi violence” (1252). “Too many cops and government officials are involved” (1230).

Die taxi-oorlog (1101) woed veral oor die hoogslonende langafstandroetes (1092). “Short routes like Soweto to Johannesburg are small potatoes … The big money is made on long-haul routes like Durban to Johannesburg. Twenty-two-seater [Toyota] Quantum vehicles run these routes and the fares were R450 per passenger one way. The profits are massive … The income is R9 900 per trip. Petrol for one trip is R1 200, tolls about R250, and you pay the driver one passanger fare of R450. So R9 900 less R1 900. That is R8 000 for your pocket …If you have 10 taxis, you are making R80 000 profit a day … With that kind of money at stake, no wonder that protection rackets have sprung up in the industry, enforced by big, well-armed security firms” (1189). “PSIRA, the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority … has 1.5 million security guards on its books, though only 500 000 are active and they work for nearly 9 000 security firms” (1221).

Taxibestuurders is dikwels die enigstes in die bedryf wat die gramskap van die publiek moet verduur. ‘n Taxibestuurder wat nie ‘n taxi besit nie, het egter geen weelderige of gerieflike lewe nie. “Most Johannesburg [taxi] drivers worked six or seven days a week and earned on average R2 000 a month … They had no job security and put in 14 to 16 hours a day. The pressure on them to turn a buck and their fatigue made them liable to cause fatal accidents” (1722).

Die laaste afdeling in die boek handel oor Durban, wat beskryf word as “the city central to the rot that had spread through the ruling party during Zuma’s years in the presidency” (1924). Die taxibedryf is so uitermate lonend nie net omdat inkomstebelasting ontduik word nie, maar ook omdat ander openbare vervoer gebrekkig is. In stede soos Kaapstad en Durban is gepoog om owerheidsvoorsiende openbare vervoer per bus en trein te verbeter. Maar dit maak inbreuk op die aanvraag en dus winsgewendheid van die taxibedryf (1549). Daar word dus met eise vir skadevergoeding vorendag gekom. Omdat dit ‘n manier is wat nooit bevredigende resultate kan oplewer nie, word die toevlug tot die Mandela-opsie, geweld, geneem.

Die poskantoor kan nie sinvol skadevergoeding eis omdat elektroniese boodskappe sy eertydse glorie geknou het nie. Maar die taxibedryf beskou homself as ‘n uitsonderlike geval wat op vergoeding van owerheidsweë geregtig is. Hierdie dispuut het al in Durban tot sluipmoorde gelei (1567). Die voorgestelde vervoerstelsel word GO!Durban genoem. “GO!Durban promised to reduce violent taxi competition … More than a hundred taxi drivers and bosses had been assassinated in west Durban in recent years” (1602). Diegene in beheer van die taxibedryf kla dat daar nie genoeg met hulle oorleg gepleeg word nie, maar terselfdertyd word vergoeding geëis vir die tyd wat hulle aan samesprekings met die owerheid moet afstaan (1593).

Dat daar groot fout in die bestuur en administrasie van Durban is, blyk uit die feit dat die eThekwini-munisipaliteit, die plaaslike owerheid vir Durban en omstreke, nie voor die Moerane-kommissie getuig het nie (1764). Hierdie gebied word gekenmerk deur dieselfde misdrywe en misdade as wat elders in Natal voorkom, soos mense, bv getuies, wat vermoor word om hulle stil te kry (1838, 1847). Daar is onmin oor wie die ANC-leiers en -lede mag wees (1870). “Armed guards controlled who was allowed to enter meetings and policed what was allowed to be said. Other allegations include branch numbers being inflated with ghost members and legitimate members not being informed of last-minute venue changes for meetings … The ANC’s internal democracy … was being suppressed as a result, and careerism and corruption had become institutionalised in the party. In poor areas … becoming a branch leader or a councillor seemed to be one of the few ways out of penury … Manipulation of the process of selecting councillors … stoked political violence” (1879). “Procedures were manipulated and votes were bought” (2158).

Munisipale bouprojekte word vertraag omdat hulle onderbreek word weens geldafpersing (1951). Ouditeure word verhinder om hulle werk te doen omdat hulle met die dood gedreig word (1968). Soos elders in die land is daar onwettige water- en elektrisiteitsverbindings (2042). Dit kom onder meer voor by huise wat televisie-ontvangs het (2047). Ensovoorts. Durban toon in geografies gekonsentreerde vorm al die onverkwiklikhede wat in die res van die provinsie aangetref word.

‘n Ingeligte waarnemer, Adriaan Kruger, het plaaslike bestuur in Suid-Afrika soos volg gekarakteriseer. “Imagine a retail chain with nearly 300 outlets, supplying essential services to a captive market, with guaranteed annual price increases and no competition. It would be unbelievable if this retailer struggled to survive, especially if taxpayers were forced to support the enterprise to the tune of 40% of its annual turnover. Kruger said municipalities were essentially retailers of water, electricity, refuse removal, sewerage services and car licences. Municipal revenues were nearly R400 billion in the year to September 2019 … Of that, R106 billion went to salaries. Municipalities wrote off R16 billion to bad debt and spent less than 10% of their budget on the maintenance of infrastructure such as roads and water pipes” (2429).

Is dit moontlik om entoesiasties oor en positief beïndruk met die nuwe Suid-Afrika en talle van sy inwoners te wees? Gaan die ANC/SAKP se helde na. Hulle het nie opgebou nie. Hulle het afgebreek. Die nuwe Suid-Afrika is ‘n noodlottig gebroke weergawe van die ou Suid-Afrika.

Leon Lemmer: RW Johnson: Die nuwe Suid-Afrika, ‘n nagmerrie

Dit is moeilik, selfs onmoontlik, om ‘n lys saam te stel van die verliese wat Suid-Afrikaners sedert 1994 gely het. Uit die blanke oogpunt is die verlies van ‘n gemeenskapslewe een van die sake wat my die meeste hinder. Daar was pragtige stede en dorpe met ‘n Europese atmosfeer. Die plattelandse dorpe het hoofsaaklik Afrikanersakeondernemings gehad. Die dorpe was skoon, ordentlike, veilige plekke, grootliks vry van misdaad. Die plaaslike owerheid is deur blankes beheer, bv ‘n eerbare burgemeester en ‘n bekwame, opgeleide stadsklerk of dorpsbestuurder. Elke dorp het grootliks aan homself behoort en sy eie heil uitgewerk. Goeie, bekostigbare, betroubare munisipale dienste is gelewer. Dit was aangenaam om in so ‘n omgewing te woon. Daarna het die hele atmosfeer verander. ‘n Ander manier van dink en doen is deesdae aan die orde van die dag en dit is nie ‘n beter manier nie.

Nadat die land in 1994 mandaatloos aan swartes oorgegee is, het die (midde)stede en dorpe beheer oor hulleself verloor. Enersyds is metropolitaanse gebiede geskep deur middestede en die omliggende gebiede elk onder ‘n enkele owerheid in te dwing. Andersyds is groepe dorpe in makro-munisipaliteite saamgegroepeer. Die hoofmotivering hiervoor was dat daar nêrens in die land ‘n plaaslike owerheid mag wees waar die nie-blankes, veral die swartes, in die minderheid is nie. Die gevolg was dat poste in al die plaaslike owerhede meesal deur onervare en onkundige nie-blankes, veral swartes, verswelg is. Die koste van munisipale bestuur en administrasie het eksponensieel gestyg terwyl die gehalte van die dienste dramaties gedaal het. Die blanke belastingbetalers is die hoofverloorders omdat hulle al hoe meer in ruil vir al hoe minder moet opdok terwyl hulle, danksy FW de Klerk en sy groepie meelopers, geen deurslaggewende beheer oor die verslegtende situasie het nie.

Dit is nie net die plaaslike owerhede wat in die hande van veral swartes beland het nie, maar ook die sentrale en provinsiale regerings. Immigrante stroom meesal onwettig uit veral die res van swart Afrika en die Indiese subkontinent die land binne. Hierdie inkommers is oorwegend ongeskoolde mense vir wie daar plaaslik geen aanvraag bestaan nie. Hulle plak, tree op as bv voertuigwagte, straatsmouse en misdadigers en misbruik gratis mediese en onderwysdienste. Die land het reeds miljoene werkloses wat die staatskas uitput weens toelaes waarop hulle aanspraak maak en as stemvee vir die ANC funksioneer. Tydens die “bevrydingstryd” het die ANC die plaaslike swartes geleer om nie vir munisipale dienste te betaal nie. Die meerendeel van hulle hou vol met hierdie onsosiale, misdadige gedrag terwyl die inkommers met hierdie parasitiese leefwyse akkoord gaan. Die resultaat is ‘n onhoudbare en onvolhoubare situasie. Gewelddadige diensleweringsbetogings deur nie-betalers is ‘n daaglikse verskynsel wat groot skade veroorsaak terwyl daar nie doeltreffend teen hierdie misdadigers opgetree word nie. Die relatief klein groepie belastingbetalers moet ook vir hierdie skade betaal.

Seker geen plattelandse dorp kan meer daarop aanspraak maak dat dit ‘n goedversorgde blanke dorp is nie. Die sakeondernemings het in die hande van veral inkommers beland. Die tradisionele Afrikanerwinkels (met hier en daar ‘n Engelse of Joodse een) het plek gemaak vir bv Somaliese winkels waarin Westerlinge geen behae het nie. Selfs in die middestede en dorpe word daar geplak. Straatslapers is ‘n algemene verskynsel. Die strate en sypaadjies is dikwels onversorg en die paaie wat plekke verbind is vol slaggate. Betroubare, veilige openbare vervoer bestaan feitlik nie. Eie vervoermiddels kan nie eens meer snags veilig in die straat gelaat word nie. Ek onthou ‘n tyd toe motors nie gesluit is nie; toe motors uit gewoonte ongesluit in Adderleystraat in Kaapstad geparkeer is. Private sekuriteitsdienste het toe nie bestaan nie. Daar was bitter min misdaad. ‘n Doeltreffende polisiediens en regspleging het verseker dat enigeen, behalwe misdadigers, geluk onder die son kon vind.

Dit is asof daar geen werklike besef is van die mate waarin die land binne ‘n kwarteeu agteruitgegaan het nie. Dit is asof baie inwoners hulleself probeer wysmaak dat ons omstandighede nie dramaties versleg het nie. Wat veral ontstellend is, is dat dit ook Afrikaanssprekende blankes is wat opportunities en met ‘n groot skeut valsheid voorgee dat al wat nodig is, is dat ons almal die bedenklike owerhede moet onderskraag; dat sodra die amptenare genoeg gesteel en KFC geëet het, hulle gaan lostrek om die nuwe Suid-Afrika “te maak werk” en dat ons almal dan een groot gelukkige familie saam met ons broers en susters in die res van Afrika gaan wees. Een van die opvallendste verskynsels in die swart sektor is die misdaadgeneigdheid, waarvan korrupsie ‘n voorbeeld is. Mense wat hulleself van 1994 af as bekleërs van die hoë morele grond bestempel het, het geblyk opperste misdadigers te wees. Ek dink nie enige blanke het by die intrede van die nuwe Suid-Afrika werklik besef hoe endemies swart misdadigheid op alle vlakke gaan blyk te wees nie. Die tyd toe Hans Strijdom (1893-1958, eerste minister 1954-1958) sy eie posseëls en koppiespelde gebruik en sy ampsmotor nooit vir eie gewin misbruik het nie, voel asof dit ligjare van die hede verwyder is. ‘n ANC-bewind was die laaste ding wat Strijdom sou koester.

Hiermee het ek hoofsaaklik enkele van die sigbare verliese uitgelig wat ons sedert 1994 gely het. Van veel groter belang is die minder sigbare en onsigbare verliese wat Afrikaners aangedoen is. Daar is ‘n onoorbrugbare kloof tussen Afrikaners wat trots op hulle verlede én hulleself is en diegene wat die nuwe bedeling omarm en die skuldkultus aanhang pleks van skuldmoeg en gatvol vir die vyande van die Afrikanerdom te wees. Daar is Afrikanerkultuurverlies weens grondige wantroue in kerkgenootskappe wat die koers byster geraak het; dus van die smalle weg afgedwaal en die breë weg van globalisme van die Suid-Afrikaanse Raad van Kerke en die Wêreldbond van Kerke betree het. Die ongedurigheid van die NG-gemeente Moreletapark met die NG Kerk kan onder meer hieraan toegeskryf word. Die NG Kerk is nie meer ‘n volkskerk nie. Daardie eer kom veel eerder die Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk (APK) toe.

Daar is die smart wat geradbraakte Afrikaans veroorsaak en die afskaling en selfs uitroeiing van Afrikaans in skole en aan universiteite. Daar is liggaamlike en geestelike vryheid en selfbeskikking wat deur Afrikaners koerster word maar waarop tans ernstig inbreuk gemaak word. Blanke woongebiede en eie skole is die minimum vereistes vir Afrikanerselfbeskikking. Inklusiwiteit, diversiteit en multi-kulturaliteit werk vernietigend in op Afrikaners se lewensruimte. Samevattend kan gesê word dat daar sedert 1994 ‘n hartverskeurende verlies aan (Europese) beskawing en selfs van doodgewone ordentlikheid, is. Deesdae dien brutaliteit as plaasvervanger vir beskawing. Gelukkig is daar steeds diegene wat kultureel onoorwinlik suiwer Afrikaners bly met onuitroeibare Afrikanerskap diep in hulle gees en hart en niere en wat hulle Afrikanerwees ook spontaan na buite uitleef.

Daar is veral twee Engelstaliges wat ‘n meer realisties blik op die nuwe Suid-Afrika as baie van die Afrikaanse outeurs bied. Die een is Anthea Jeffery, wat uitstekende boeke soos People’s war (2009), The truth about the Truth Commission (1999) en BEE: Helping or hurting (2014) gepubliseer het. Die ander een is RW Johnson met voortreflike boeke soos South Africa’s brave new world (2010), How long will South Africa survive (2015/2017) en The African university? (2012). Laasgenoemde handel oor die Universiteit KwaZulu-Natal.

Malegapuru William Makgoba, rektor 2004-2014, het gepoog om kennis van Zoeloe van al die studente en personeellede te verwag; klaarblyklik om blankes en Indiërs sover moontlik uit te werk. In sy jongste boek (kyk hier onder) skryf Johnson: Makgoba “had all but destroyed the University of KwaZulu-Natal (p 61). ‘n Mens kan jou afvra: Waarom het die eens Afrikaanse universiteite nie soortgelyke moed openbaar deur eentalige Engelse studente en personeellede uit te sluit nie? Die hoofrede hiervoor is dat ten gunste van swartes gediskrimineer word. Die nuwe Suid-Afrika het nie ‘n era van gelykheid en nie-diskriminasie ingelui nie. “Aspiring academics or researchers would find that many universities had a ‘blacks only’ appointments policy” (88), wat niks anders as blatante rassediskriminasie is nie. Die Wikipedia-artikel oor Makgoba bied interessante leesstof.

Sowel Jeffery as Johnson het die tradisionele liberalisme as vertrekpunt en veroordeel apartheid met oorgawe, bv: “Apartheid was a dreadful, inhumane, and degrading system, but it was a long way short of slavery” (160-161). Johnson verwys sonder meer na “the nonsense of Bantustans” (201). Terselfdertyd is Jeffery en Johnson egter uitstekende waarnemers van die onverkwiklikhede en ongeregtighede van die nuwe Suid-Afrika, bv: “Ironically, the West and East Africans who throng to South Africa today have little or no sense of victimhood and frequently comment on how curious it is that black South Africans exhibit this trait so strongly, together with an accompanying sense of entitlement” (161). Die veronregting en bevoordeling van Amerikaanse swartes word deur die plaaslike swartes nageboots terwyl hulle en hulle voorsate nooit eens slawe was nie. Met verwysing na werkloosheid, wat tans die lot van minstens 10 miljoen in Suid-Afrika is (terwyl toegelaat word dat inkommers die land binnestroom), het Joan Robinson (1903-1983), ‘n marxistiese ekonoom, geskryf: “The misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited” (161).

Fighting for the dream

RW Johnson (gebore in 1943) se jongste boek is Fighting for the dream (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2019, xii, 244p, R275; Amazon Kindle $12,18). Die hooftema is: Die 1994-droom het ‘n nagmerrie geword. “What this book is about is how it came to this. What are the real problems? And what will be necessary to fight for the dream?” (p 13). Die outeur was ‘n dosent aan die Universiteit Oxford en het soos baie ANC-kamerade in 1995 na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer, waar hy mettertyd al hoe meer ontnugter is. Johnson skryf vloeiend en onderhoudend. Die boek lees maklik en bestaan uit kort hoofstukke met onderhoofde. Die outeur is buitengewoon goed ingelig oor wat in Engels oor Suid-Afrika gepubliseer word.

Let op hierdie ná 1994 gevonde realisme: “The uncomfortable truth has to be faced that the Afrikaner Nationalists were quite correct in their designation of their opponent: they pointed to the disasters wrought by African nationalists elsewhere and argued that if the ANC was allowed to come to power in South Africa, the results would be the same. For obvious reasons a large section of international opinion found it convenient to accept the ANC claims of exceptionalism. Nobody [?] today would argue that apartheid was ever justifiable, but it is a bitter truth for liberals in South Africa today (myself included) that in this respect, at least, their National Party opponents have been vindicated” (101). “The ANC has been in power for a quarter of a century and its policies have resulted in failure on almost every front” (116).

Vir ingeligte lesers behoort baie van die inligting in die boek bekend te wees, maar dit word oortuigend en gesaghebbend in duidelike kontekste geplaas. Johnson is glad nie (meer) ‘n bewonderaar van die ANC nie. Hy kam al die staatshoofde sedert 1994 af, insluitende Nelson Mandela en Cyril Ramaphosa. Oor Mandela skryf Johnson: “South Africa’s downward slide began under him” (16). Suid-Afrika het ‘n “formerly developed country” geword (86). Die buitensporig groot kabinet word beskryf as “a forum where ignorance, incompetence and ideological blindness jostled to produce often extraordinary arguments and proposals” (3). “This was Mandela’s most damaging legacy: an overlarge and massively overpaid and underskilled bureaucracy” (18). “The ANC had always been squeamish about disciplining its own, so when the job had to be done it was invariably whites or Indians in the ANC who had to chair the disciplinary committee. In the case of Malema, the job was given to Derek Hanekom” (4).

Johnson verduidelik hoe onseker Ramaphosa se posisie in die ANC is. Die ANC-parlementslede word deur die ANC-party uit Luthuli-huis bestuur. Die sekretaris-generaal van die ANC, Ace Magashule, en sy adjunk, Jessie Duarte, is Zuma-ondersteuners en eintlik teenstanders van Ramaphosa. Verder is die lojaliteit van Ramaphosa se adjunk, David Mabuza, onseker. Mabuza was ‘n Zuma-ondersteuner maar het tydens die 2017-ANC-kongres sy steun aan Ramaphosa toegesê. Dit was heel moontlik ‘n opportunistiese skuif. In die topses in die ANC-uitvoerende komitee is daar nou geen Zoeloes nie, terwyl die helfte Zoeloes was in Zuma se termyn (54). As ‘n Venda-stamlid kan Ramaphosa nie op substansiële stamsteun aanspraak maak nie.

“Every possible sort of manipulation and vote-buying was possible in the election of delegates to the ANC conference” (6). Ook tydens die konferensie kan afgevaardigdes geïntimideer en stemme gekoop word. “Undeniably many votes were bought and many more were rigged” (52). Dit is amper ‘n wonderwerk dat Ramaphosa met 179 stemme gewen het; des te meer omdat Nomvula Mokonyane, “one of his [Zuma’s] strongest supporters, was made head of elections for the conference” (53). “Ramaphosa has no control over Luthuli House, the ANC’s headquarters office, and also is at the mercy of shifting majorities at the party’s NEC [National Executive Committee] meetings” (185).

Oor die ANC se wapenskandaal skryf Johnson: “There were recurrent reports that he [Thabo Mbeki] received $20 million. It is highly probable that a considerable cast of lesser characters received pay-offs and that the deal also paid for the ANC’s election campaign in 1999, thus solving a major problem for Mbeki” (22). “There is little doubt that the vast amounts of money spent by government departments and SOEs [state-owned enterprises] in ‘wasteful and irregular expenditure’, noted every year by auditors, played a considerable role in funding the party, as well as filling many other private pockets” (23). “The ANC leadership had no objection to corruption in itself, only to its political consequences” (28). Korrupsie is ‘n endemiese probleem in ANC-geledere (28). “As much as R100 billion may have been stolen through state capture by the Guptas and others” (87). Sylvia Lucas, wat in 2014 die premier van die Noord-Kaap geword het, staan bekend as “‘the Fast Food Premier’, spending R53 000 on fast food in her first ten weeks in office” (47).

Die vakbond Cosatu is soos die Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party ‘n alliansievennoot van die ANC. Vakbonde is van die hoofstruikelblokke in die pad van ‘n vreedsame, voorspoedige Suid-Afrika. Die ANC-regering het nie die moed of oortuiging om bv buitensporige looneise teen te staan en onnodige poste te verminder nie. “The Eskom workers won a 7.5 per cent increase despite the fact that Eskom was 66 per cent overstaffed and even more overpaid” (76). Daar is 15 000 tot 20 000 onnodige Eskom-“werkers” (208). Die gemiddelde salaris van Eskom-werkers is glo R700 000 per jaar (109), dus R58 000+ per maand. Kan dit werklik die geval wees? Maar ‘n mens kan dieselfde vraag oor die volgende stel: In Februarie 2019 het Eskom se skuld R420 biljoen beloop (150). “Its debt was expected to soar to R600 billion by 2022” (151).

Die buurstate van Suid-Afrika (Angola, Namibië, Zimbabwe en Mosambiek) wat ná 1974 polities onafhanklik geword het, het minstens een kenmerk gemeen: Dit gaan om die vestiging van ‘n welvarende swart opperklas en nie soseer om die lot van die armes te verlig nie. In hierdie opsig is die nuwe Suid-Afrika geen uitsondering nie. “Chiefs everywhere had begun to charge rent on land that had historically always been bestowed free, thus using their power to transform themselves into a wealthy landlord class” (92). Oor BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) word gesê: “The whole emphasis of the policy was bent towards the creation of black fat cats” (92). Daar is in werklikheid “a redistribution process from poor to rich” (83). “The only real attempt at redistribution towards the poor lay in the system of social grants, which at least kept many of the most poverty-stricken from starving. This was largely paid for by the minority of taxpayers” (92). Die groter wordende welvaartsgaping tussen ryk en arm word gerieflikheidshalwe maar valslik aan die eertydse blanke bewind toegedig. Die werkloses het van 3.7 miljoen in 1994 tot 9.6 miljoen in 2018 gestyg (86, 109).

“Effectively South Africa is now run for the benefit of a smaller minority than it was under white rule” (90). Johnson noem die nuwe swart opperklas ‘n “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (82). “In 1998/99 there were 1.17 million civil servants. By 2014 there were 2.161 million – 455 701 at national level, another 1 118 748 in the nine provincial administrations, 311 361 in local government and 275 851 in other government organisations (though not including SOEs). This was ludicrous overstaffing and featherbedding … by 2018 there were well over 2.2 million civil servants, earning average salaries of R338 000 per annum [R28 000+ per month]… ‘the largest gravy train ever seen in Africa'” (123-124). “Civil-service salaries take up no less than 35 per cent of the national budget, and year after year such workers enjoy inflation-plus increases, even when the economy is not growing” (90). Dit gebeur ook in die res van swart Afrika.

Hierbenewens is daar ook ‘n tradisionele opperklas wat buitensporig baie staatsgeld inpalm: “By 2010 there were no fewer than 13 kings or queens in South Africa’s strange republic. In that year, it was decided to reduce the number to seven, but the pressure to increase that number again would be insistent” (92). Die ANC betuig graag lippediens aan die nuwe demokratiese Suid-Afrika, asof die regering (altyd) doen wat die meerderheid kiesers verlang. In werklikheid is die ANC “a naturally authoritarian movement” (94). Die land sit opgeskeep met “a Soviet-style democratic centralism. The party continued to view its electoral rivals not as opponents but as ‘enemies'” (95).

“The real reason why, despite all the ANC’s averrals [assertions of truth], African nationalism in South Africa has taken an almost exactly similar course as it did in the rest of the continent is that once in power it is driven by the same politically dominant class, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Moreover, the explosive factor that drives them far off course is also the same, the almost irresistible (and apparently bottomless) appetite of that class for primary accumulation. The fundamental problem, of course, is that a bureaucratic bourgeoisie is not productive in the way that a commercial and industrial (or even agricultural) middle class is. Because it does not itself generate wealth, it is inevitably parasitic and can achieve its goals only through patronage and corruption” (106). Hierdie geneigdheid tot parasitering verduidelik deels waarom die Ramaphosa-ANC so entoesiasties oor die onteiening van blankes se eiendom sonder vergoeding is. ‘n Ander rede is doodgewone wraaksugtigheid.

Die swartes word deur die ANC as die enigste egte Suid-Afrikaners en Afrikane beskou; dus “the assumption that the whites, Indians and even coloureds were mere settlers, not fully rooted in South African society” (108). Voorheen wou die bruines blank wees en het hulle geroem op moontlike blanke bloed in hulle are. Sedert 1994 probeer talle bruines ter eie bevoordeling om (generies) swart te wees en beklemtoon hulle die mate waarin hulle slawe- en ander swart bloed het. Die onregte en vergrype waaraan hulle blanke voorsate na bewering skuldig is, word hulle gerieflikheidshalwe nie toegereken nie.

“In the quarter-century that followed the ANC’s accession to power, the black middle class grew at great speed. Primarily it was composed of the overpaid workers of the massively overstaffed public sector, particularly its affluent upper ranks, but increasingly a black business class came into existence, usually feeding off state and other public-sector contracts and the preferential procurement laws applied to both public and private entities” (108). Dit is dus nie primêr bv inisiatief, kundigheid en toewyding wat swart sakelui laat slaag en hulle welvarend maak nie, maar blatante ANC-bevoordeling; dus rassediskriminasie ten koste van veral blankes en Asiate.

“Despite the theory that this patriotic bourgeoisie was merely afforcing the principal driver, the working class, it was apparent from the first that the former group was granted an absolute supremacy over the latter. Thus, for example, the forced sale of white farms to black interests invariably led to the loss of large numbers of farmworker jobs as production collapsed on the farms taken over, but usually the bankable asset of the land ended up in the hands of the black elite” (108). “Almost 90 per cent of the farms thus transferred have failed because farming is a highly specialised, competitive and tough business. In fact, relatively few Africans want to be farmers: far more want urban land or land that they can develop or sell for cash. Land is simply a proxy issue for feelings of black dispossession and inequality, feelings that can never be assuaged by any mere legislative proposal” (118).

“An even more clear-cut case [than farms] was the mines, in which successive editions of a Mining Charter compelled higher and higher equity shares (30 per cent by 2018) for black investors. The result was to stifle the mining industry almost completely, and many thousands of mining jobs were lost. Clearly, these lost jobs mattered much less to the ANC than the help they were trying to give to would-be black capitalists” (108-109). Johnson verwys na die ANC se poging “to insert a new and parasitic upper social class – the owners of that 30 per cent equity share – into the existing social structure. In effect, the insertion of this new layer would destroy the profitability of the capital already invested in the mines” (109).

“By insisting on the primacy of the interests of this would-be black bourgeoisie, the ANC guarantees that South Africa will be unable to compete internationally – after all, where else in the world do governments insist that investors simply give away 30 per cent of their equity?” (109-110). “The black middle class is clearly still, in Marx’s terms, only a class for itself – a multitude of individual interests all pushing and manoeuvring for personal advantage” (112). “What was missing was any conception of a national or common good” (112). “It is almost as if the ANC is intent on throttling the economy. Mining and agriculture are, after all, the historic mainstays of the economy and the Mining Charter and EWC [expropriation without compensation] seem almost designed to bring both to a halt” (121).

Vergelyk dié hede met die goeie ou dae. “The group that the ANC and SACP misnamed as the ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ [kapitaliste met buitelandse bande], ie the white business classes, really constituted far more of a ‘patriotic bourgeoisie’. Over many generations the white and Indian business classes had built thousands of productive and lasting businesses, a powerful and independent financial sector, highly successful retail chains that fed and clothed the population and a successful commercial agriculture sector that grew the country’s food. These were deeply rooted institutions that had invested massively in South Africa over the years and had also contributed philanthropically to many schemes and NGO’s with the aim of furthering the national future. They had of course done this for profit and their ranks included the normal number of scoundrels, but their overall achievement was not to be denied” (112).

“That old [white/Afrikaner] ruling class had many sins to its name [?] but over the 84 years since Union in 1910 it built a formidable infrastructure, a developed economy and a series of powerful and efficient institutions – the armed forces, Eskom, Transnet (including a large railway and port system), the civil service, a strong police force, a highly developed water distribution [and roads] system – and much else besides. It was able to do all this because it was a class for itself with a strong solidaristic consciousness of itself. This was crucial, for it ensured that individual or sectional interests within that ruling group were held in check and subordinated to a strong sense of a national interest” (122).

“The new [ANC] ruling elite is a merely bureaucratic bourgeoisie … This group has no settled relationship with the forces of production in the way that a class of farmers or industrialists might have. Instead, it is an artificial creation, existing only on the taxes paid by old productive businesses and the white middle classes, which it resents and despises (though also seeks to emulate). It is pumped up in size and income purely as a matter of political fiat and without any regard to function or utility. Inevitably it is opportunistic, with its members continually seeking to build business careers by means of illicit family companies to which they attempt to divert state procurement. All attempts to prevent such practices have failed and, indeed, they are endemic” (123). “The [black] elite wants power not in order to use it to achieve various policy goals but simply in order to possess it, to be in charge, to get rich and enjoy the perquisites of office” (182).

Aan die begin van die hoofstuk oor die DA (Demokratiese Alliansie) skryf Johnson: “As soon as the organisation grows to encompass all races, one begins to find separate racial caucuses forming” (127). Die DA het ‘n aparte swart koukus wat indruis teen die wese van ‘n (histories) liberale party (129). Aparte koukusse dui daarop dat mense naas gemeenskaplike belange ook groepbelange van ‘n eiesoortige aard het, bv ras-, etniese en kulturele belange. Wat plaaslik en elders (bv in Amerika) gebeur, is dat nie-blankes, veral swartes, die opsie van eie koukusse en verenigings gegun word as uitdrukking van hulle solidariteit, maar as blankes op ‘n soortgelyke manier uitdrukking aan hulle eiebelange gee, word dit as rassisme afgemaak.

Weens algemene stemreg vir volwassenes sedert 1994, met alle stemme wat gelyke waarde het (die stem van die plakker dra dieselfde gewig as dié van die nyweraar – tipies nuwe Suid-Afrika-geregtigheid) is daar die volgende werklikheid waarmee alle politieke partye gekonfronteer word: “South Africa was now and forever an African-majority country” (128). Op grond daarvan het die DA besluit: “To be competitive a party had to have African leaders” (128). Dit is ook waarom die “nie-rassige” ANC nooit iets anders as ‘n swarte as leier sal hê nie. Die noodsaaklikheid van ‘n swart leier druis nie net in teen die ideaal van kleurblindheid nie, maar ook teen die DA se “principle of meritocratic selection for all posts” (128). Die punt is: Sedert 1994 is dit nag vir die plaaslike blankes, met die komplimente van die Nasionale Party se grondwetlike onderhandelaars.

Weens sy ingesteldheid op die steun van swart kiesers het die DA swartes soos Lindiwe Mazibuko, Mamphela Ramphele en Mmusi Maimane voortydig in leierskapposisies gedruk. “It was a textbook case of how accelerated promotion through affirmative action can lead to overconfidence and an overdeveloped ego. For the curious nature of affirmative action is that even those who are most in favour of such a policy are wholly unwillling to believe that they themselves are affirmative action appointees” (130). Dít en die verwysing na “overdeveloped ego” laat my spontaan aan Jonathan Jansen dink. Teen die feite in (wat ek by vorige geleenthede verstrek het) beweer Jansen dat hy suiwer op grond van meriete as opvoedkunde-dekaan aan die Universiteit Pretoria en as rektor van die Universiteit Vrystaat aangestel is. Toets gerus hierdie waarheid: Hoe kleiner die ego, hoe groter die gees en hoe groter die ego, hoe kleiner die gees.

Soos in sy vorige boeke beskou Johnson dit as (feitlik) onafwendbaar dat rommelstatus-Suid-Afrika boedel aan die Internasionale Monetêre Fonds (IMF) en die Wêreldbank sal moet oorgee. “An IMF bail-out looks increasingly likely” (143). Faktore soos gereelde salarisverhogings bo die inflasiekoers, lae produktiwiteit, minimum salarisse, stakings, meer as ‘n dosyn openbare vakansiedae, die behoud van oortollige personeel,* gratis tersiêre onderrig, die dalende landbou-opbrengs waarby al hoe minder boere betrokke is, asook endemiese korrupsie,** gaan die kameel se rug breek. “Just as pools of stagnant water inevitably attract mosquitoes, so in modern South Africa any large pool of capital – amased for whatever purpose, in a bank, trust, pension fund or state account – will attract looters” (146). In ruil vir geldelike hulpverlening sal die IMF vereis dat Suid-Afrika op ‘n gesonde ekonomiese grondslag geplaas moet word. Byvoorbeeld, Argentinië, met ‘n bevolking van 45 miljoen, is deur die IMF verplig om sy kabinet tot tien ministers te verklein. In Suid-Afrika, met ‘n bevolking van 60 miljoen, is daar naas die president en sy adjunk 33 ministers en 31 adjunk-ministers.

[* “The commitment made [by Cyril Ramaphosa] at the jobs summit in October 2018 that there would be no retrenchments at all anywhere in the public sector” (183).

** “Only 33 out of South Africa’s 257 municipalities got a clean audit in 2018” (209).]

“A key objective would be to make South Africa as internationally competitive as possible in order to maximise investment and job creation.* For a start, all taxes on investment would have to go. This would mean the abolition of BEE, of all rules governing racially directed procurement, of the Mining Charter and the various other industry charters, and also of affirmative action. This would doubtless produce some resistance, but once it became clear that these changes would vastly increase the number of jobs, that would soon fade away. South Africa needs to study such African success stories as Rwanda, Mauritius and Ethiopia – none of which allow any of these taxes on investment – and copy them” (164-165). “It would be pointed out that BEE and affirmative action were merely more recent varieties of social favouritism, akin to job reservation under apartheid, and that around the world most other countries had long since abandoned such practices. (The United States is a partial exception, but even there affirmative action is under attack almost everywhere.)” (165).

[* “In the period 2008-2018 South Africa lost 300 000 manufacturing jobs – nearly 15 per cent of the total” (198).]

Die afgelope 30 jaar het die Suid-Afrikaanse bevolking verdubbel. Daar is groot werkloosheid, ‘n nypende tekort aan behuising en ook waterskaarste. Desnieteenstaande stroom inkommers die land grootliks ongehinderd binne. “In March 2018 South Africa signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, which calls for the free movement of goods, capital and labour throughout the continent, a clear attempt to emulate the formula that has made the EU [European Union] a success. No one can doubt that freer trade and investment across borders would be beneficial, but for South Africa any agreement to a free movement of labour would constitute an almost suicidal triumph of ideology over common sense … if one does nothing, immigration control will be forced in the end through the explosion of xenophobic violence” (166-167).

“Why, for example, are SAA’s [South African Airways] costs per seat-kilometer 53 per cent higher than the average of their international competitors? Why does it cost several times as much to build a kilometer of motorway in South Africa as it does in the USA, despite higher American wages? Why are South African port charges and airport charges among the highest in the world? Why are South Africa’s educational levels among the worst in the world despite one of the highest proportions of GDP [gross domestic product] spent on education?” (209). Waar lê die fout? ‘n Aanduiding van waar die probleem gesoek moet word, kan dalk in ‘n stelling van Nelson Mandela gevind word. Hy het gesê: Suid-Afrika se grootste bate is sy inwoners. Die teenoorgestelde kan waar wees. Is baie Suid-Afrikaners (bv finansieel, maatskaplik) ‘n bate of ‘n las vir die land?

Wie betaal vir die gelag, eintlik ramp, genaamd die nuwe Suid-Afrika? “Only 13 per cent of the population pay income tax, which provides government with 38 per cent of all its revenue. And the wealthiest one per cent of the population pays 61 per cent of all income tax … 80 per cent of all income tax is paid by just three per cent of the population … taxes have increased 25 per cent since 1994, with South Africa now one of the world’s most highly taxed countries … In effect, all this heavy taxation in South Africa has a single purpose – the creation and maintenance of a large bureaucratic elite whose salary levels are 30 to 40 per cent above those for comparable jobs in the private sector … one finds that 36 per cent of all government revenue is spent on the public-service wage bill – a quite crazy figure. And another 17 per cent of the budget is spent on the social grants that essentially serve to keep the poorest from starving or rising in revolt” (204-205).

Al betaal almal koopbelasting (eufemisties belasting op toegevoegde waarde – btw – genoem ) sou dit ‘n veel beter opset wees as net diegene wat inkomstebelasting betaal stemreg het; dus net inwoners wat ‘n substansiële belang in die heil van die land het en moontlik werklik produktief is. Van politici op al drie regeringsvlakke moet nie net funksionele geletterdheid vereis word nie, maar ook ‘n graad, want matriekstandaarde het so laag gedaal dat matrikulasie geen waarborg vir effektiewe funksionering in die politiek is nie. Hierdie voorstelle bied die grondslag vir ‘n beter funksionerende en welvarender Suid-Afrika.

Wat doen Ramaphosa aan hierdie benarde situasie? Hy bak mooi broodjies wat nie met konstruktiewe aksies opgevolg word nie. “What he hopes to do is simply to talk up the economy – what Larry Summers, the former US treasury secretary, once called ‘the cheapest form of economic stimulus'” (211). “One has to ask such basic questions as to whether the ANC has ever been capable of a comprehensive South African patriotism. After all, what did all those decades of militant nationalist struggle amount to if, in practice, ANC leaders were willing to sell their country down the river at the bidding of a criminal family of Indian immigrants? It’s as if the whole ANC pursuit of power was really a journey powered by individual self-enrichment” (213).Wat kan gedoen word? Die beste skyn te wees om oor te begin. “It would be best to return to the status quo ante of 1994, that is to say, a GNU [government of national unity]” (215). Daarby moet nie net politici van die verskillende partye betrek word nie, maar ook “a few non-political businessmen and managers” (215).

Teen die einde van sy boek het Johnson verdere (hoewel gekwalifiseerde) komplimente vir Afrikaners in vergelyking met ANC-kamerade. “As one looks back, one realises that for most of the 20th century the white Afrikaners who constituted the ruling class enjoyed certain advantages. True, they were committed to white supremacy and, within that, to Afrikaner domination. But they felt a powerful patriotism towards their country, even if not to all its peoples, and their morale as a solidary group and their Calvinist morality exercised a strong limit on personal corruption. The net result was that they presided over a long period of successful national development in which not just Afrikaners but all the other groups shared: their numbers, per capita income, educational levels and life expectancy all increased. The sins and downside of Afrikaner rule are too well known to require re-enumeration but they nonetheless provide the only benchmark that there is. No Afrikaner leader feathered his nest in the way Jacob Zuma did. Already ANC rule has seen steep falls in African life expectancy (due to Mbeki’s Aids denialism) and the last five years have seen a steady fall in per capita income. Moreover, future economic development has already been blighted by the way the ANC has transformed Eskom from having a surplus of cheap electricity to dire shortages of very expensive electricity. The comparison is, indeed, so unflattering for the ANC as to make it clear that it cannot succeed on its own” (214); vandaar Johnson se voorstel dat die ANC-regering deur ‘n regering van nasionale eenheid vervang moet word.