Leon Lemmer: Jaap Durand se herinneringe aan die ‘bevrydingstryd’

As teologiedosent aan die Universiteit van Wes-Kaapland (UWK) vanaf 1973 en daarna as viserektor aan dieselfde inrigting (1981-1996) het Jaap Durand (gebore in 1934) bekendheid as bevrydingsteoloog verwerf, onder meer weens sy leidende aandeel in die formulering van die Belydenis van Belhar en sy verheerliking van Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) as ‘n martelaar wat teen die Nazi-bewind in opstand gekom het. Durand het studente aangemoedig om hulle ingelyks teen die “apartheidsregime” te verset. In sy jongste boek, Protesstem: oomblikke van herinnering (Wellington: Bybelkor, 2016, 264p, R190), is dit duidelik dat dit vir hom eerder om linkse politiek as akademiese oorwegings gegaan het. “Ons identiteit hang saam met ons herinnerings” (p 9).

In die eerste hoofstuk noem die outeur dat die teks nie ‘n outobiografie is nie (10), al kom outobiografiese inligting daarin voor. Sy eerste vrou kom oor as iemand wat polities selfs meer militant as hy was. Sy drie kinders het polities ook die verlangde solidariteit betoon (156-157, 165-166, 186-187). Durand het darem twee swaers met “regse politieke opvattings” (195). Hy verwys na homself as ‘n Afrikaner (153, 210), maar dit beteken nie veel meer nie as dat hy ‘n blanke Afrikaanssprekende is. Hy het bv van jongs af geweier om iets met volkspele te make te hê (22). Sy hele oriëntasie is ter bevoordeling van bruines en swartes. “Die amaXhosa het my mense geword” (29). “Ek het hulle liefgekry” (48). “Swart mense inderdaad mense en nie vreemde wesens was nie” (57). Dit lyk nie asof sy liefde konserwatiewe blankes insluit nie. Hy het geen goeie woord vir die blanke politieke bewind van weleer en geen slegte woord vir die huidige politieke opset nie. “Die apartheidsituasie in die land het … my … met afsku vervul” (61). Hy wou “‘n verskil maak” (225). “Ek [het] op my manier na verandering gesoek” (227). Die naaste wat Durand aan kritiek op die ANC kom, is deur sy teleurstelling uit te spreek dat Thabo Mbeki deur Jacob Zuma vervang is (191-192).

Toe Durand in 1975/6 drie maande in Amerika was, was sy versugting “om veral met swart Amerikaanse teoloë gesprekke te kan voer” (81). Hy was onder meer “by die Universiteit Howard in Washington, waar byna uitsluitlik swart studente deur swart personeel onderrig word” (82). Durand veroordeel hierdie opset egter nie as die uitdrukking van rassisme of rassesegregasie nie. Vir wittes en swartes geld daar myns insiens glad te dikwels verskillende maatstawwe. Hy verwys eerder na “wit Amerikaners se onbegrip van die swart Amerikaners se reële lewensnood” (82). Die Universiteit Howard herinner aan die huidige druk op eens blanke Suid-Afrikaanse universiteite om te verswart terwyl tradisioneel swart universiteite ongesteurd kan voortgaan om byna uitsluitlik swart te bly. Van die skandaligste skuiwe wat die ANC-regering ooit gemaak het, was om ruim studiebeursgeld aan die Universiteit Howard te skenk; glo as ‘n gebaar van vergoeding vir die skade wat Amerika in 2005 weens die orkaan Katrina gely het. Geen haan het oor hierdie skenking gekraai nie.

Durand begin sy vertelling met verwysing na Sharpeville (1960). Sy magisterverhaling handel oor Johannes Calvyn (1509-1564) se “reg van verset teen ‘n owerheid” (25). In Durand se doktorale proefskrif word beweer: “‘n kerk wat op rassegrondslag verdeeld was, nie die toets van die Christelike evangelie kan deurstaan nie” (12). Die NG Kerk-familie moet volgens hom een word. Afrikaans as kerktaal sal myns insiens ernstig deur ‘n samesmelting van die NGK en die Verenigende Gereformeerde Kerk (VGK) benadeel word, maar daarvoor gee Durand blykbaar nie ‘n snars om nie. Durand word aan sy teologievriende geken. Willie Jonker, Beyers Naudé en Bennie Keet word reeds in hoofstuk 2 genoem en daar word goedkeurend na die bundel Vertraagde aksie en die Wêreldraad van Kerke se Cottesloe-beraad (1960) verwys.

Regse teoloë word geëtiketteer, bv Koot Vorster as “die groot indoena van die NG Kerk” (16) en Kosie Gericke as die “biskop van Stellenbosch” (17). Eugene Terreblanche het hom by Kodesa glo skuldig aan “hansworsagtige optrede” gemaak (207). PW Botha word deur Durand “die Groot Krokidil” genoem (158). Al diesulke sal seker kwalifiseer vir die etiket van “konserwatiewe konkelaars” (122). Daarteenoor is daar “die formidabele Nelson Mandela” (203). Aan die UWK is daar na Durand as “die ajatolla” verwys (121). In Die Kerkbode was daar ‘n “hoogheilige artikel oor die teologiese regverdiging van die bedeling in Suid-Afrika” (62). Die Kweekskool op Stellenbosch word “die teologiese krip van die NG Kerk” genoem (22). Durand verwerp die idee van “ewige en onveranderlike beginsels” (24). Hy was nie iemand “wat baie aan beginsels geglo het” nie (22).

Aan die Kweekskool het Durand ‘n tweede doktorsgraad verwerf. Sy proefskrif handel oor Thomas van Aquino (1225-1274) maar sy konserwatiewe promotor, FJM Potgieter, het glo “geen snars van my eintlike bedoelings begryp … nie” (73). Durand verwys na sy “totale verwydering van die teologie wat in die NG Kerk bedryf is” (63). Die meeste van sy publikasies handel oor “die skerpste moontlike afwysing van ‘n ‘apartheidsteologie'” (189). Daar is glo met “bedrieglike subtiliteit … in apartheidsdenke met die Bybel omgegaan” (84). By Durand is daar geen woord van veroordeling vir die toestand waarin teologiese opleiding in die Fakulteit Teologie aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch verval het nie. Maar hy dink nogtans dat sy pa se “sin vir reg en regverdigheid” (19) in hom wortel geskiet het (20).

Durand roem daarop dat hy nooit as ‘n NGK-predikant gedien het nie. Te Cala in die Transkei en in Kwazakhele, Port Elizabeth, was hy as sendeling in diens van die NG Kerk in Afrika. Hy het toe bewus geword van “die andersheid van die mense rondom jou” (30). “Tog het die wit personeel in hulle klein wit wêreldjie geleef” (32). Hy noem dit die “apartheidsmentaliteit in die sendingwerk van die NG Kerk” (33). Maar die bevrydingsteoloog David Bosch het nie hierdie mentaliteit gehad nie (33). As teologiedosent aan die Universiteit van Wes-Kaapland was Durand in diens van die NG Sendingkerk. Hy woon op Stellenbosch. “omdat Bellville ons nie juis aangestaan [het] as blyplek nie, veral omdat daar aan ons vertel is dat dit ‘n redelik verkrampte plek was om te woon” (142). Linkse politiek oefen in talle opsigte ‘n deurslaggewende invloed op sy lewe uit. Hy is ‘n lidmaat van die Rynse gemeente van die VGK op Stellenbosch (82). Hy beskuldig die NGK van “skynheiligheid” (78). Apartheid is glo deel “van ‘n soort volksteologie” (94). Sy oortuiging is “dat die stryd teen apartheid in Suid-Afrika ten diepste ‘n religieuse stryd was” (94).

Die Belydenis van Belhar word deur Durand as “die sluitpunt” van sy lewe beskou (70). Hy wy ‘n hele hoofstuk daaraan. Hy stel glad nie belang in wat positief oor apartheid gesê kan word nie. “Ek het my bly afvra: Wat is teologies verkeerd met apartheid?” (84). Hy was vasberade “om na ‘n onomstootlike teologiese argument te soek dat apartheid of afsonderlike ontwikkeling, selfs in sy ideaalste vorm (as daar ooit so iets sou kon wees in die hande van sondige mense) die evangelie van Jesus Christus weerspreek” (85). Dat hy naarstiglik moes soek, dui daarop dat daar nie ‘n voor die hand liggende teologiese fout met apartheid is nie. Na ‘n soektog het Durand uiteindelik “die teologiese grondfout van die apartheidsdenke” (86) gevind: “Apartheid is in stryd met die versoening omdat die uitgangspunt daarvan is dat mense onversoenbaar is. Daarom moet hulle uitmekaar gehou word … Die gedagte dat daar in die ‘apart’ ‘n fundamentele fout opgesluit lê vir hulle wat versoening in Christus bely, het nooit by hulle opgekom nie” (87).

Het dit al ooit by Durand opgekom dat die Universiteit Howard ‘n toonbeeld van die apartfout is? Die onversoenbaarheid van mense kan myns insiens ook aan hulle sondigheid toegeskryf word, al was hulle hoe opreg in hulle geloofsbelydenis. In die onvolmaakte aardse werklikheid kan rassesegregasie ‘n voortreflike bydrae tot groter rus en vrede en harmonie lewer. Die hoogs gewelddadige samelewing waarin ons ons bevind en wat tot oorlopens toe vol haat is, toon dat die afskaffing van apartheid nie magiese versoening bewerkstellig het nie. Apartheid kan nie die enigste sondebok wees vir die onverkwiklike situasie waarin ons ons sedert 1990 bevind nie. Dit lyk asof daar êrens ‘n grondfout in Durand se redenasie is. Op die koop toe sit ons met ‘n onbekwame, ondoeltreffende, korrupte, immorele ANC-regering waarvan die einde nie in sig is nie.

Die oggend na Durand se vermeende ontdekking van die grondfout het hy sy finalejaar-teologiestudente gevra om onderling oor “die basiese teologiese beswaar teen apartheid” te gesels (88). Een van die studente was die “besonder knap” Russel Botman (88). Hierna het Durand ‘n beskrywingspunt vir die komende Sinode van die NG Sendingkerk geformuleer. Daarvolgens is die gedwonge skeiding van mense op grond van ras en kleur in stryd met die evangelie van versoening, word wit mense daardeur bevoorreg, geskied geregtigheid dus nie aan almal nie en word die menswaardigheid van die nie-bevoorregtes aangetas (89-90). Dié voorstel is in 1978 deur die Sinode aanvaar (91). Durand se formulering is suiwere bevrydingsteologie. Dit word egter nie in die nuwe Suid-Afrika toegepas wanneer op grond van ras en kleur teen blankes gediskrimineer en swartes bevoorreg word nie; ook nie as ongeregtigheid aan blankes geskied en hulle menswaardigheid met tweederangse burgerskap aangetas word nie.

Allan Boesak is tot voorsitter van die Wêreldbond van Gereformeerde Kerke verkies. Hy het “die besluit van die NG Sendingkerk se Sinode van 1978 voorgedra en ‘n groot rol gespeel in die besluit wat sou volg, naamlik dat die teologiese regverdiging van apartheid kettery is en dat dit ‘n staat van belydenis daarstel. ‘n Staat van belydenis beteken eenvoudig dat ‘n dwaling so erg is dat die kerk nie anders kan as om oor die aangeleentheid ‘n belydenis af te lê nie” (95). Durand was sekerlik trots op die sneeubal-effek wat sy sinodevoorlegging internasionaal gehad het, asook die rol wat sy dissipel Boesak daarin gespeel het. Ook dat net blankes in die beskuldigde bank geplaas is en dat die veroordeling van bv terrorisme nie eens deur die Wêreldbond oorweeg is nie.

Die volgende stap was om ‘n belydenis te formuleer. Hierdie pil is soos volg versuiker: “Die Belydenis van Belhar was … nie gerig teen die NG Kerk as sodanig nie, maar teen die vals teologie wat deur baie in die kerk, hoewel nie deur almal nie, aangehang is” (100). ‘n Onderskeid word dus tussen die progressiewe skape en die konserwatiewe bokke gemaak. Toe die NGK later nie sonder meer die Belydenis van Belhar wou aanneem nie, het Durand dit “‘n kerkregterlike slenter” genoem (101). Hierdie groot voorstander van gelykheid, van bv een mens, een stem in die politiek, wou hê die Belydenis van Belhar moet op ‘n ondemokratiese manier aan alle NGK-lidmate afgedwing word. Met so ‘n prosedure sou hy daarin geslaag het om nog groter verdeeldheid in die NGK te saai as wat hy reeds bewerkstellig het. Durand is van mening “dat God sy kerk nie demokraties nie, maar deur sy Woord en Gees regeer” (102); uiteraard soos vertolk deur Jaap Durand.

Durand as viserektor en Dirkie Smit, sy opvolger as teologiedosent aan die UWK, het opdrag gekry om ‘n konsepbelydenis op te stel. (96). Wat hierna gebeur het, is soos volg verwoord: “Die basisteks is die geesteskind van Jaap Durand wat deur Dirkie Smit verwerk is” (98). “Die belydenis … handel oor die eenheid van die kerk, die onderlinge versoening tussen mense en ten slotte geregtigheid” (97). Die kernbegrippe is dus kerkeenheid, versoening en geregtigheid. Die verskynsel van susterkerke is as “‘n verskeurde kerk” – en nie as (gesonde) kerklike verskeidenheid nie – geëtiketteer (96). “‘n Verdeelde kerk het onlosmaaklik saamgehang met ‘n gees van onversoenlikheid en onwilligheid om oor rasse- en kultuurgrense heen saam as gelowiges die pad te stap” (96). “Die idee van die onversoenbaarheid van mense [het] direk gelei tot ‘n beleid van afsonderlikheid waarin noodwendig onreg gepleeg is teenoor die noodlydendes, die armes en die ellendiges” (97). In die geval van die laasgenoemde drie groepe is klaarblyklik (veral) aan nie-wittes gedink. Aan hulle is spesiale status in die oë van God toegeken, pleks daarvan om daardie verlangde bevoordeling aan die opstellers en instemmers van die belydenis toe te skryf. In artikel 4 van hierdie belydenis staan dat God “op ‘n besondere wyse die God van die noodlydende, die arme en die veronregte is.” Die volledige teks van die belydenis is op die internet beskikbaar.

In werklikheid is ons terug by George Orwell (1903-1950) se waarneming dat party (mense) meer gelyk as ander is. Ingevolge die bevrydingsteologie borduur Durand soos volg voort op wat in die Belydenis van Belhar staan: “In die 20ste eeu het ‘n verdere implikasie van die evangelie van die kruis van Christus al hoe meer deel geword van Christene se oortuiging dat die nood van mense wat in armoede, ellende en verdrukking leef, die besondere sorg van God mag verwag, en juis daarom ook van ons” (242). Die VGK stel aanvaarding van die Belydenis van Belhar op ‘n buffelagtige manier as ‘n ononderhandelbare voorwaarde vir samesmelting met die NGK. Teen hierdie VGK-liefdeloosheid opper Durand geen beswaar nie.

‘n Hele hoofstuk handel oor die “apartheidsregime” se Veiligheidsdiens. “Hulle het wel informante gebruik. Van hierdie tipes was daar seker baie meer as wat ek besef het” (43). Die ironie is dat Durand ook sterk op informante en skinder vir inligting aangewese was ten einde apartheid en die blanke politieke bewind te ondergrawe. Hy kon nie verstaan waarom die Veiligheidsdiens in sy doen en late belangstel nie omdat hy syns insiens “hoegenaamd nie kan kwalifiseer as ‘n persoon wat ‘n gevaar vir die staat inhou nie” (106). Maar dan erken hy dat hy “probeer het om die situasie in ons land te verander” (115). Juis daarom het hy “beleef dat ek binne kerklike kringe (spesifiek binne die NG Kerk en veral onder die kerkleiding) beskou is as ‘n persoon wat ‘n gevaar vir die staat inhou en die staat ondermyn” (115). Dat Durand nie (heeltemal) onskuldig was aan wat op die UWK-kampus plaasgevind het nie, bv die studente-onrus, blyk uit die volgende. Hy was verbaas dat sy aanstelling as viserektor vanaf 1981 so gou ministerieel goedgekeur is “ten spyte van wat alles tussen 1973 [sy eerste jaar as dosent] en 1980 gebeur het, die rol wat die Fakulteit Teologie in hierdie tyd gespeel het en my eie rol daarin” (121). Hy beskryf homself immers as een van die “meestanders in die struggle” (133).

Toe meeluisterapparaat in sy viserektorskantoor ontdek word, het hy dit as “vermetelheid” beskou (136). “Die hoof van kampusveiligheid [het] afgeluister” (137). Durand het gewonder: “Wat het ek nie alles self gesê nie!” (137), iets waaroor iemand wat ‘n regeringsondersteuner was hom nie sou bekommer het nie. Durand het die afluistering teen veral een administratiewebeampte gehou wie se naam (dalk as vergelding) herhaaldelik in die teks genoem word. Durand se informante word egter nie by die naam genoem nie. Hy het gedreig om as viserektor te bedank en dan die UWK, wat hy ‘n “apartheidskepping” genoem het, in die pers in die verleentheid te stel. Sy afdreiging het die verlangde gevolge gehad. Die betrokke amptenaar is ontslaan en Durand het toe nie bedank nie. “‘n Geskikte afsluiting van ‘n saak van meeluistering onder die ou rergime” (141).

Die 1976 het die opstand in Soweto plaasgevind. “Dit sou spoedig oorspoel na die Wes-Kaap en tot groot onrus op die kampus van UWK lei. Die owerhede het egter hierdie opstande gewelddadig onderdruk. Die swartbewussynsbeweging van Steve Biko [1946-1977] het sterk aanklank by die studente gevind. Vir die studente van die teologiese fakulteit was dit ‘n groot uitdaging [ANC-terminologie!] om as senior leiers onder die studente hulle eie posisie te bepaal en te bevestig. Dit was dan ook hulle wat die grootste slagoffers was van die owerheid se optrede, waaronder intimidasie en veral aanhouding sonder verhoor” (85). Suiwer akademies was hierdie studente se posisie myns insiens egter dat hulle aan die UWK was om te studeer en nie om klasse te ontwrig, optogte te hou en skade aan te rig nie. Die studente se politieke aktivisme het blykbaar groot genoegdoening aan Durand verskaf.

“Dit was veral opvallend dat die teologiestudente aan die spits gestaan het van verskeie studente-aksies” (143). “Omdat die teologiestudente aan die spits van hierdie aksie[s] gestaan het, het dit beteken die dosente in teologie moes noodwendig [?] wys waar hulle staan” (144). Omdat sommige van die dosente konserwatief en behoudend en nie uitgesproke anti-regering was nie, het dit Durand en “Bernard Lategan gelaat om die studente die ondersteuning te gee wat onder dié omstandighede moontlik was” (144). Van hierdie twee was Durand polities die radikaalste linksgesind. Later, toe Lategan in Duitsland was, was Durand “die enigste persoon in die [teologie]fakulteit … wat my openlik by die studente geskaar het … Die vertroulike byeenkomste wat ons [met die studente] gereël het om die situasie te bespreek [eerder as om dit te ontlont], na die studente te luister [eerder as om hulle die leviete voor te lees] en hulle optrede te monitor (as dit die regte woord is) [dalk eerder: om hulle tot optrede aan te hits?], het bekend geword onder diegene wat in beheer van die veiligheidsituasie in die land was … Baie duidelik word aan my gestel dat ek onder geen omstandighede in aanraking mag kom met die studente wat in aanhouding was nie” (152).

Toe Durand nog ‘n sendeling was, het hy gesien hoe studente van die Universiteit Kaapstad by die parlementsgebou betoog. Hy het die polisie verkwalik omdat hulle die studente agtervolg het tot in die Anglikaanse katedraal waarheen hulle gevlug het (63). In 1976 was Durand se vrou ‘n assistente in die UWK se teologiebiblioteek. Sy het skuiling aan studente-kwaaddoeners in die boekmagasyne verskaf (147). Sedert diensaanvaarding het mevrou Durand “baie vinnig ‘n besonderse verhouding met die studente opgebou; nie alleen deur die mooi manier waarop sy hulle gehelp het om die literatuur te vind wat hulle nodig gehad het nie, maar ook op verskeie ander maniere was sy soos ‘n ma vir hulle gewees. Dit is dus verstaanbaar dat hulle tydens die spanning op die kampus en met die gevaarlike toestande wat met die polisie se teenwoordigheid ontwikkel het, hulle dikwels tot haar gewend het, onder meer om skuiling in die biblioteek te soek” (148-149). Die Durand-egpaar het ongetwyfeld solidariteit met die studente teen die polisie geopenbaar. Soos Van der Ross en daarna Jakes Gerwel was hulle onbehulpsaam met die bestryding van (politiek-gemotiveerde) misdaad.

Dit is waar “die baie konserwatiewe hoofbibliotekaris, ‘n sekere mnr de Kock” (149), in die prentjie kom. Aan die einde van 1976 is mevrou Durand “ewe hoflik in kennis gestel dat haar pos in die biblioteek afgeskaf is en dat haar dienste dus nie meer benodig word nie” (149). Eers in 1978 is ‘n ander biblioteekassistent aangestel (149). Durand verkwalik klaarblyklik vir De Kock vir die diensbeëindiging van mevrou Durand en gooi dit oor ‘n politieke boeg, naamlik die konserwatisme van De Kock. Die vraag is of hier nie gewoon in die akademiese belang van die universiteit opgetree is nie. Andries de Kock (1930-1999) was ‘n uitnemende bibliotekaris en ‘n Israeliet sonder bedrog. Dit is hy wat bv die voorstelle van die argitekte vir ‘n nuwe gebou aangepas het om ‘n prakties funksionerende biblioteek moontlik te maak. Maar dit het met die UWK as akademiese inrigting te make terwyl Durand se aandag op die politiek toegespits is.

Die 1976-onluste op die UWK-kampus word deur Durand nie as danig erg voorgestel nie. “Die feit bly staan dat die toestande op die kampus in 1976 nog geensins buite beheer geraak het nie en nie by benadering die afmetings aangeneem het soos later in die baie oproerige tagtigerjare nie” (154). Dus eers in die 1980’s, toe Durand die viserektor was, sou die UWK “die leidende kampus” in politieke onrus word (146); “een van die sentrums van die opstand teen die staatsowerheid” (159). Ek het die indruk dat hierdie wantoestand Durand eerder verbly as beskaam het. Met die 1976-UWK-onluste moet daar egter nie so ligtelik omgegaan word soos wat Durand doen nie. Ek het voorheen in besonderhede hieroor geskryf na aanleiding van Cornelius C Thomas se boek, Wakker wakker en aan die brand: Waarneminge van ‘n studente-aktivis, UWK, 1976 (Praag 21.12.2014). Klaarblyklik het dit deesdae prestigewaarde om ‘n anti-apartheidsaktivis of -vandalis of selfs ‘n -terroris te wees.

“Die wit beheer van die universiteit [was] die eintlike steen des aanstoots vir die studente” (143). Dit is ‘n rasgebaseerde beswaar. Toe Richard van der Ross as die eerste bruin UWK-rektor (1975-1986) aangestel is, was die ironie dat sy aanstelling juis heeltemal in ooreenstemming met die apartheidsbeleid was. Daarna het die studente egter die doelpale verskuif. Van der Ross is uitgekryt as ‘n verteenwoordiger van die regering. Die anargistiese studente het enige gesagsuitoefening uitgedaag. Om nie as regeringsgesant beskou te word nie, het Van der Ross – uit eie erkenning in sy outobiografie – geweier om met die staat se veiligheidsmagte saam te werk

Dit is glo polisieteenwoordigheid wat ‘n gevaarlike situasie op die kampus geskep het; nie die opruiende gedrag van die studente nie. Insgelyks vind Durand dit “absoluut gek” dat wit mans in die nag tydens onrus vrywillig blanke woonbuurte gepatroleer het (150). Durand het “geweier om enigiets daarmee te doen te hê … hulle optrede is belaglik … hulle optrede was onnodig konfronterend” (151). Verset teen boosheid word blykbaar as uit die bose beskou. Dit is sodanige houding wat tot die roemlose ondergang van die blanke politieke bewind gelei het. “Van die kant van die struggle-aktiviste is alles in die stryd gewerp om die land onregeerbaar te maak. Ongelukkig [!] vir hulle het die polisie en weermag die wit gebiede in groot mate teen grootskaalse ontwrigting beveilig” (166). As die veiligheidsmagte nagelaat het om Durand se gedrag te monitor, sou hulle myns insiens hulle plig skromelik versuim het.

Durand het die aanbod van die minister van polisie om orde op die kampus te handhaaf as “stiksienig” beskou en selfs met die dwase voorstel gekom (wat onlangs op ‘n ander kampus ook in die huidige studente-onrus opgeduik het) dat die UWK eerder vir vyf jaar summier gesluit moet word (162). Wat Durand betref moet die kampus sonder owerheidsbeskerming aan die genade van anargistiese studente oorgelaat word. Anders sou hy sy “eie beeld enorme skade aangedoen het” (163). Dus, eerder skade aan die universiteit (wat baie geld verg) as skade aan sy ego (wat kosteloos geskied). Oor die wenslikheid (eintlik noodsaaklikheid) van polisiehulp skryf Durand: “Die wit mense, insluitende baie van my vriende, sou miskien nog verstaan het, maar nie die bruin en swart wêreld met wie ek my in daardie stadium onherroeplik verbind het nie. Ek kon nie met eerlikheid sê dat ek nou vir hulle bevryding [dus nie akademiese vorming nie] binne die dominante wit gemeenskap gaan werk nie … Die mense wat vir my belangrik was, insluitende medestanders by die universiteit wat hulle lojaliteit teenoor my daadwerklik betoon het, sou so iets as verraad beskou het” (163).

Dit het vir Durand gegaan om wat vir hom met sy beperkte insig belangrik was; nie om wat in die akademiese belang van die UWK of moontlik ten bate van die land in sy geheel was nie. Let op hoe hoogs subjektief/irrasioneel sy benadering was: “Binne-in my was daar ‘n diep gevoel van onbehaaglikheid, selfs van woede, oor die onreg wat in ons land gepleeg word, en in die UWK het ek ‘n instansie gesien wat, ten spyte van al sy probleme, foute en onbeholpenhede, een van die bes moontlike agente van verandering kon wees” (163). Hier het ons dus ‘n viserektor wat die universiteit nie primêr as ‘n instrument vir die akademiese vorming van studente beskou het nie, maar as ‘n staatsgefinansierde voertuig vir politieke verandering. Hy het ook die slegte tradisie help skep, wat tydens die onlangse student-onrus telkens opgeduik het, dat daar nie bevele aan studente gegee word nie. Die nuwe wonderkuur was om eerder “met die studente te onderhandel” (171). Dit was ook “onderhandelings” wat die doodsklok vir blanke politieke mag gelui het.

In 1980 is van Durand se “groot vriende” en “politieke geesgenote,” naamlik Jakes Gerwel en ses ander UWK-personeellede, gearresteer. Hoewel Durand toe nog nie visierektor was nie, het hy hom aangematig om alle “gewillige” personeellede op te roep tot ‘n vergadering gedurende die etensuur. Hy het ‘n brief opgestel gerig aan die staatshoof, PW Botha, waarin versoek word dat die aangehoudenes aangekla of vrygelaat word (255). 218 personeellede, waaronder net 10 dosente (eintlik professore?), het die brief saam met Durand onderteken (157). Die UWK was fluks op pad na sy “doelgerigte beleid om ‘n universiteit te wees wat sy lot ingooi by die onderdruktes van ons land” (135). Die UWK se blanke prokureur is bv met ‘n bruin prokureursfirma vervang (135). Kinders uit die hoërskole is openlik by die UWK-studente se massavergaderings betrek (159). Dit het uiteraard gehelp om onrus in veral bruin skole te stig. Durand het klaarblyklik geen beswaar hierteen gehad nie omdat dit die soort politieke verandering wat hy wou hê, aangehelp het.

Hierna het dit van kwaad tot erger gegaan. In 1985 het UWK-studente petrolbomme in die Moslem-gebedskamer op die kampus gemaak (174). Die idee was om die polisie in ‘n hinderlaag te lei en hulle dan met petrolbomme te bestook (175). “Die een oplossing was natuurlik: Skakel die polisie en lig hulle in oor die hinderlaag wat op hulle wag” (176). Dit sou egter “beteken dat die studente vir goed die vertroue wat hulle nog in ons as bestuur gehad het, sou verloor” (176). Die probleem is met behulp van studenteraadslede ontlont (179). Tugstappe is nooit eens teen die misdadige studente oorweeg nie. Hulle het hulle immers vir politieke verandering beywer; iets wat viserektor Durand (onvoorwaardelik) gesteun het.

In 1986 is ‘n aantal UWK-studente by die polisiestasie in Bellville aangehou. Iemand kom toe “met die briljante idee vorendag dat ons [die universiteitsbestuur en -personeel] saam met die studente [na die polisiestasie] moet stap” (183) met rektor Van der Ross en natuurlik viserektor Durand vooraan. “Van almal – studente én personeel – [is] verwag [!]… om aan die optog deel te neem” (183). Dít is sekerlik strydig met (akademiese) vryheid. Van der Ross het “‘n gedenkwaardige dag” afgesluit met die woorde: “Today, UWC has come of age!” (182). Van der Ross “was meesterlik in sy lofbetuiging van ‘n universiteit wat in sy geheel – akademiese personeel, administratiewe beamptes en studente – solidêr teenoor die regering en sy onderdrukkende maatreëls te staan gekom het. Dit was die UWK se ‘coming of age'” (185). Durand noem die gebeurtenis “‘n hoogtepunt in die geskiedenis van die UWK” (182). “Teen hierdie tyd het die universiteitsbestuur al by soveel geleenthede getoon dat hulle … ten minste die studente se politieke aspirasies deel” (183). Hoe bedenklik is dit nie as so iets as ‘n hoogtepunt gereken word in die geskiedenis van ‘n instansie wat veronderstel is om ‘n akademiese inrigting te wees. Ingevolge die politieke klimaat wat daar geheers het, het die UWK aan die einde van Durand se dienstermyn in 1996 ‘n eredoktorsgraad aan hom toegeken (187). Durand is myns insiens egter iemand wat by voorkeur eerder linkse politiek as die akademie gedien het.

Na die aftrede van Van der Ross het die marxis en ANC-aktivis, Jakes Gerwel, in 1987 die UWK-rektor geword met Durand steeds ‘n viserektor. “Jakes het die daaglikse administrasie van die universiteit, insluitende die bouprogram, aan my oorgelaat” (191). Gerwel het hom in selfs groter mate as Durand met nie-akademiese bedrywighede besiggehou. Reeds in 1986 het hierdie twee mense ANC-leiers in Lusaka ontmoet. Wie het hulle reis- en verblyfskoste betaal? Die ‘apartheidsregime'”? Hulle vernaamste “kontak” was Thabo Mbeki. “Ons het nagte om met hom gesels en na video’s gekyk wat in Suid-Afrika verbode was” (191). Durand en Gerwel was uiteraard ook Dakar-gangers. “Vir ‘n tyd lank was ons die swart skape van die wit samelewing, nie dat dit my juis gepla het nie” (201).

In die voorlaaste hoofstuk vertel Durand hoeveel moeite hy gedoen het om van die ANC die valse versekering te ontvang dat hierdie instansie die idee van ‘n Afrikaner-volkstaat simpatiek gesind is. Durand het onder andere met Constand Viljoen se tweelingbroer, Braam, gesprek gevoer. “Ek skaam my om dit vandag te erken, maar daardie dag was ek bang dat iemand my dalk sou herken terwyl ek met die ‘generaal’ gesels wat regse Afrikaners se held is” (216). Durand, wat volgens eie erkenning swartes lief het (kyk hier bo), wil nie eens saam met ‘n regse persoon gesien wees nie. Wat hom betref kan blankes maar verswelg en ondergeploeg word: “Christene, as hulle errnstig is oor hulle Christenwees op die politieke terrein, bereid moet wees om die pad van selfverloëning te stap en nie ten alle koste, en daarom [?] ten koste van ander, te probeer vasklem aan selfbehoud nie” (228). “Ons almal [?] weet God het ons van ‘n afgrond [bv ‘n burgeroorlog (207)] gered” (249). By Durand is daar klaarblyklik geen skuldgevoelens oor die soort regering waarmee Suid-Afrika tans opgesaal sit en die toestand waarin die land verval het nie en nog minder oor sy aandeel daarin. Hy is myns insiens ‘n onboetvaardige en onredbare kernkameraad.

Durand se uiters linkse politiek en die uitvloeisel daarvan, te wete bevrydingsteologie, is vir my verwerplik. Maar sy doelbewuste aantasting van die wese van die universiteit en die akademiese lewe is net so afkeuringswaardig. Durand gee ‘n sekerlik heeltemal onbedoelde groot kompliment aan die “apartheidsregime” wanneer hy skryf: “Die regering het sover moontlik die indruk probeer skep dat hulle aan die UWK ‘n sekere mate van onafhanklikheid gun en dat hulle nie sonder meer sou inmeng met die besluite van die Universiteitsraad oor die algemene rigting wat die universiteit moet inslaan nie” (121). Die NP-regering het die outonomie van universiteite sover moontlik eerbiedig. Dit is waarom mense soos Durand en Gerwel met so baie politiekery ten koste van die akademie weggekom het. Vergelyk dit met die huidige tragiese situasie waarin die ANC-regering weier om enige universitêre onafhanklikheid te erken en die rektore, sonder ‘n enkele vermeldingswaardige uitsondering, hulle daarin berus.

Sonder enige kritiek noem Durand dat Gerwel as rektor die UWK tot “the intellectual home of the left” verklaar het (191). Albei het die universiteit as ‘n verlengstuk van hulle linkse politiek beskou. Dit is waarom ANC-kamerade soos Kader Asmal, Dullah Omar en Trevor Manuel daar aangestel is. Akademiese pretensie is om linkse politieke redes laat vaar en die wese van die universiteit, naamlik dat daar ‘n vrye wisseling van idees moet wees, is verder aangetas. Hier het ons met ware vermetelheid te make. Van die “apartheidsregime” is verwag om vir hierdie anti-blanke politieke sirkus te betaal. Maar dan kom Durand met hierdie klagte: “Die regering het alles in sy vermoë gedoen om die UWK uit blote wraaksug finansieel te knyp” (181). Hy gee egter geen redes waarom die NP-regering gedreig het om die UWK se staatsubsidie in te kort of op te skort nie (181).

Omdat die UWK deur Durand en Gerwel as ‘n instrument vir politieke verandering misbruik is, is besluit om – in weerwil van die Suid-Afrikaanse kiesers se wense dat die UWK ‘n universiteit vir bruin studente moet wees – die universiteit in twee opsigte “oop” te verklaar. Enersyds is swartes aangemoedig om hulle vir studie aan te meld. Andersyds is die toelatingsvereistes verlaag deur nie matrikulasievrystelling te vereis nie. Oor die verlaging van akademiese standaarde sou Durand hom seker nie bekommer het nie. Politieke opportunisme het voorkeur gekry.

Mense soos Durand en Gerwel het die NP-regering doelbewus uitgetart maar terselfdertyd verwag/geëis dat hulle eie salarisse en die ernorme bedryfskoste van die UWK sonder beswaar deur die staat betaal moet word. Dit is wat ek blatante vermetelheid noem. Les bes swyg Durand oor die verengelsing van die UWK. In hierdie Afrikaanse boek word Afrikaans glad nie aan die orde gestel nie. Dit bly vir my onbegryplik waarom Hermann Giliomee in 2006 vir Durand en Gerwel by die Vlottenburg-beraad oor die status van Afrikaans aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch betrek het. Dit was om van wolwe skaapwagters te maak.

In die voorwerk noem die uitgewer dat sy publikasies vir “gelowiges, gemeentelede en leiers van ons land” bedoel is (3). Hou dus in gedagte dat Durand se heilsboodskap aan ons gebring word danksy die welwillende samewerking van Bybelkor.

Leon Lemmer: Birobidzhan, die Joodse tuisland in Rusland

Dit is nie algemeen bekend nie dat daar sedert 1934 ‘n selfregerende Joodse gebied (“oblast”) in die verre ooste van Rusland aan die grens met China is. Hier moet Kosakke* die Chinese buite probeer hou. Die eerste Joodse setlaars het in 1928 daar aangekom, deur bv armoede uit die Oekraïne en Belarus gedryf. Die naam Birobidzhan is ‘n samevoeging van die name van twee plaaslike riviere, die Bira en die Bidzhan. Hierdie dorp is in 1937 gestig en het die hoofstad geword. Die oblast word gewoonlik Birobidzhan genoem maar die naam van die hele gebied, 36 000 vierkante kilometers groot, is eintlik Yevreyskaya. Die hoofstad het om die spoorwegstasie Tikhonkaya** gegroei, wat in 1912 as deel van die Transsiberiese spoorlyn gebou is. Aanvanklik was daar geen behoorlike toegangspaaie nie. [* “Kosak” is ‘n Turkse woord vir “lid van ‘n krygshaftige Suid-Russiese volkstam, veral beroemd as ruiters” (HAT). ** Tikhonkaya beteken letterlik “‘Little Quiet One,’ which was someone’s polite way of saying ‘godforsaken'” (Gessen, bron hier onder, Kindle 860).]

Die hoofstad lê aan die Bira-rivier, ‘n tak van die Amoek-rivier. Dit is ‘n hoogs bergagtige gebied met moerasagtige valleie wat as onherbergsaam en met muskiete besmet, beskryf word. Dalk verduidelik dit waarom hierdie terrein as ‘n Joodse tuisland verklaar is; “it’s so far away from everything” (1571) en “Jews were effectively exiled and tied to this land at the end of the earth” (1652). Ander etniese groepe in Rusland, asook in die destydse Sowjetunie, het geografies beter grondgebiede gekry, bv die Tatarstan-republiek, waar ongeveer die helfte van die inwoners Moslems is, met Kazan as die hoofstad.

Afrikaners wat ‘n tuisland begeer, kan in die voorbeeld van Birobidzhan belangstel. As inligting daaroor op die internet nagegaan word, is daar egter talle teenstrydighede, so asof werklik betroubare eerstehandse inligting skaars is. Ek het dit dus verwelkom toe Masha Gessen se boek, Where the Jews aren’t: The sad and absurd story of Birobidzhan, Russia’s Jewish autonomous region (New York: Schocken, 2016, 192p; Amazon Kindle $15,95), onlangs gepubliseer is. Gessen is in Rusland gebore maar het as tiener in 1981 saam met haar ouers na Amerika geëmigreer. Die boek het in die reeks Jewish Encounters verskyn, “a project devoted to the promotion of Jewish literature, culture, and ideas” (3). Wat ook opval, is dat die outeur nie net Joodsheid nie, maar ook haarself soms tussen die leser en die onderwerp plaas, bv sy verwys na “my partner and … three kids … The parliament was discussing ways to remove children from LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender] families” (236).

“I lived in the United States until I was in my mid-twenties, then returned to Moscow – first as an American reporter, an outsider, but gradually turning native again. When I wrote the first draft of this book, in 2010, I was raising two children in Russia, a country whose Jewish culture had been virtually erased … The virulent anti-Semitism I remembered from my childhood was gone … When should the Jews stay put and when should the Jews run? How do we know where we will be safe? Does departure ever signal cowardice?” (222). In Desember 2013 is Gessen terug na Amerika (236). “This time, the choice did not have to do with being Jewish: the Kremlin had unleashed a campaign against gays, and my partner and I happened to be that, too” (236).

Gessen het bevind dat die Russe polities onbetroubaar is. Die keersy is dat sommige Jode in baie lande, bv Suid-Afrika, hulleself insgelyks as polities onbetroubaar bewys het. Die Jode is met ‘n tuisland in Rusland vergoed vanweë “their perceived support of the Bolsheviks and disloyalty to the czar” (519). Maar dit het nie alle Jode gegeld nie. Die bolsjewistiese regering het dadelik begin met “the process of putting its Jewish house in order, screening out the Zionists and the Hebraists for their predominantly anti-Bolshevik stand and pulling the Yiddishists into the fold” (572). In bv Amerika word politieke verdeeldheid steeds by Jode aangetref. Sommige is bv kommunisties of liberalisties terwyl ander konserwatief of regsgesind is.

Daar is opsigte waarin die Jode my aan Afrikaners herinner, bv dat hulle ‘n minderheidsgroep is in al die lande (behalwe Israel), dat hulle gehaat word en dat daar teen hulle gediskrimineer word. Byvoorbeeld, in Rusland, “Jews faced extreme hurdles gaining admission to universities and obtaining jobs; the study of Hebrew and most forms of Jewish communal life were criminalized” (134). Die posisie van Afrikaners en Afrikaans is tans nie veel beter nie. Gessen noem dat Amerika, Kanada en Australië asiel aan Russiese Jode verleen, maar “the countries of Western Europe were not giving out visas to Jews fleeing Russia” (140). Dit maak dit des te meer absurd as Europa eerder Moslem-inkommers toelaat.

“The Jewish writers who grew up in the Russian Empire at the turn of the twentieth century were steeped in many living languages. Hebrew was the language of their studies and, for many of them, of their wildest dreams. Yiddish* was the language of their homes and, more often than not, their streets. It also turned out to be the best language for describing what went on and what was said, sung, and felt in those streets. Russian was the language of higher education and secular discussion” (327).

[* Jiddisj: “Taal van baie Jode, met ‘n woordeskat ontleen aan Duits, Balto-Slawiese dialekte en Hebreeus; Jode-Duits” (HAT). Jiddisj word nie as ‘n variant van Duits gepropageer nie. Insgelyks behoort die mengeltaal Kaaps nie as ‘n variant van Afrikaans erken te word nie. Maar dit is presies wat bv die Afrikaanse Taalraad, die Afrikaanse Taalmuseum en -monument asook die ATKV polities korrek doen en die gedrukte Afrikaanse koerante sing dieselfde deuntjie. Kaaps normaliseer die besoedeling van Afrikaans met Engelse woorde en uitdrukkings en bevorder die ondergang van Afrikaans. In “The last lesson” (beskikbaar op die internet) skryf Alphonse Daudet (1840-1897): “When a people are enslaved, as long as they hold vast to their language it is as if they had the key to their prison.” Dié Daudet-teks kan Afrikaanslojaliste tot trane beweeg en hulle aanspoor om die hanskakies te verdoem wat Afrikaans in ons skole en aan ons universiteite en elders vernietig.]

Die bolsjewistiese staat het in 1917 tot stand gekom. “Soon after coming to power, the Bolshevik government adopted a strategy of trying to harness nationalism to preserve the empire rather than pull it apart – by granting each self-identified ethnic group a form of autonomy, ranging from a national village soviet at the bottom to a national republic at the top” (810). “The Russian Empire would be reconstituted as a federation of national autonomies – a Jewish autonomy, one among many, for the Jews, after centuries of discrimination and decades of pogroms, would finally be treated like any other ethnic group” (188). Verskeie Joodse nedersettings in die vorm van kollektiewe plase het met die geldelike ondersteuning van Amerikaanse Jode in die Krim-skiereiland en in Suid-Oekraïne tot stand gekom (810).

Die Jode sou in Birobidzhan sosiale en kulturele outonomie verkry, “which would include education in a Jewish language [and] community self-rule” (379). Maar daar was beperkings. Jode sou toegelaat word om hulle kulturele erfenis uit te leef maar grootliks sekulêr. Judaïsme* en Sionisme** was nie vir Josef Stalin (1879-1953, diktator sedert 1928) aanvaarbaar nie. Judaïsme het teen die staats-ateïsme ingedruis en Sionisme teen Russiese nasionalisme. [* Judaïsme: “Godsdienstige leer en instellings van die Jode” (HAT). ** Sionisme: “Oorspronklik, strewe van, beweging onder die Jode om hul eie staat in Palestina te stig, en tans [sedert 1948] om hierdie staat te ontwikkel” (HAT).]

“In the late 1920s and early 1930s, tens of thousands of Jews moved to Birobidzhan, chased from the shtetlach* by poverty, hunger, and fear. They were enticed to come, greeted upon arrival, and written about breathlessly by a small group of intellectuals who envisioned building a country like no other: a home forged by the Jews for the Jews, a place where the Jews worked the land, a place where the Jews had nothing to fear but the cruel climate and the Siberian tiger. They envisioned turning Yiddish, the ‘jargon’ of their households, into the universal language of secular Judaism … In the 1930s, Yiddish was, briefly, the unofficial state language of Birobidzhan. The short period of state-building ended in the mid-1930s with arrests and purges of the Communist Party and the cultural elite … The Birobidzhan project went silent” (195). Dit verwys veral na Stalin se “great purge” van 1936-1938 weens sy “newfound fear of foreigners” (1217). [* Shtetlach: “A small Jewish town or village in Eastern Europe” (The Free Dictionary).]

“Following the Second World War [1939-1945], Russia was the only European country whose Jewish population numbered not in the hundreds or even thousands but in the millions” (188). Birobidzhan het toe “a new influx of Jews” ervaar, maar “another wave of arrests swept through Birobidzhan in the late 1940s” (209). Jode is toe eerder na Siberië verband as na Birobidzhan gestuur. Dit was ‘n terugslag vir die Jode in vergelyking met Stalin se houding tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog toe hy kon staatmaak op die steun van die Jode teen die Nazi’s. “The Jews [were] no longer needed to organize international support for the war effort; in the new postwar disposition they had become more suspect than they had ever been before … with the founding, in 1948, of the State of Israel, the Jews, in Stalin’s eyes, became, like the other minority nations of the Soviet Union, potentially allied with a foreign power. They became internal enemies” (1530). “Of the roughly five million Soviet Jews, half had been murdered; perhaps as many as half of the rest had been displaced” (1543).

Gessen het Birobidzhan blykbaar slegs ‘n enkele keer vir enkele dae in 2009 besoek. Sedertdien het sy gesukkel om vorm en inhoud aan die teks te gee, met weglating van baie van die inligting wat op die internet beskikbaar is. ‘n Duidelike beeld en begrip van Birobidzhan kristalliseer nie. Vir die leser is dit moeilik om van die inligting in die aanvangshoofstukke in verband met Birobidzhan te bring, bv wat sy wydloping oor Simon Dubnow (1860-1941), David Bergelson (1884-1952) en judaïsme geskryf het. Dubnow het “secular Judaism as the basis for national identity” voorgestaan. Gessen voeg by: “I recognized [it] as the foundation of my own Jewishness” (343). Dubnow het verduidelik: “We aim only to negate the supremacy of religion, but not to eliminate it from the storehouse of national cultural treasures” (365). Dit lyk asof die outeur gesukkel het om die karige (nuwe) inligting wat sy oor Birobidzhan versamel het tot boeklengte aan te dik. Die teks vloei nie. Van haar kan gesê word, sy “not only spoke with an accent, but also wrote with one” (321).

“My Soviet documents specified that, regardless of my citizenship, my ‘nationality’ was Jewish” (350). Vir Afrikaners kan dit ‘n handige onderskeid wees: dat ons Suid-Afrikaanse burgerskap het, maar dat ons nasionaliteit Afrikanerskap is. Dubnow het van die Jode gesê (en dit geld ook Afrikaners): “They had no trappings of a nation – only the essence of one” (350) en daarna geskryf: “When a people loses not only its political independence but also its land, when the storm of history uproots it and removes it far from its natural homeland and it becomes dispersed and scattered in alien lands, and in addition loses its unifying language; if, despite the fact that the external national bonds have been destroyed, such a nation still maintains itself for many years, creates an independent existence, reveals a stubborn determination to carry on its autonomous development – such a people has reached the highest stage of cultural-historical individuality, and may be said to be indestructible, if only it clings forcefully to its national will. We have many examples in history of nations that have become despersed among other nations. We find only one instance, however, of a people that has survived for thousands of years despite dispersion and loss of homeland. This unique people is the people of Israel” (350). Dit is inderdaad ‘n buitengewone en moontlik unieke prestasie, hoewel ondertrouery en assimilasie ook by die Jode voorgekom het en steeds voorkom. Ek wens ek kon dieselfde mate van onvernietigbaarheid en nasionale wil aan Afrikaners toedig en dieselfde hoop dat Afrikaners plaaslik, asook ons diaspora* in ander lande, as Afrikaners sal voortbestaan. My waarnemings dui eerder op die teendeel. Byvoorbeeld, dink aan die Afrikaners in Argentinië wat binne enkele geslagte Spaans en selfs Rooms-Katoliek geword het. [* Diaspora: “Verstrooiing, nie saamwoon met geloofsgenote” (HAT).]

Bergelson het hom by die kommuniste geskaar: “He realized that he was already a prisoner of Soviet reality” (1491). Terselfdertyd het hy alles moontlik gedoen om die belange van die Birobidzhan-tuisland vir Jode te bevorder, hoewel hy hom nooit self daar gevestig het nie. Hy was teen die Sioniste en hulle vooropstelling van Hebreeus gekant omdat hulle “no use for Yiddish” gelaat het nie, terwyl hy sy werke in hierdie “endangered language” geskryf het (721). Bergelson was ontsteld oor die onverskilligheid van baie Jode jeens hierdie tuislandprojek (wat herinner aan talle Afrikaners se huidige houding jeens bv Orania): “Jewish communities in Russia decide that there are no longer Jews in the world.” “He accused Soviet Jews of ‘scratching off their own Jewishness until blood starts to run'” (620, 1363). Dit is soos sommige blanke Afrikaanssprekendes wat deesdae om die dood nie as Afrikaners geïdentifiseer wil wees nie, maar as Suid-Afrikaners, Afrikane en wêreldburgers.

Soos Dubnow is Bergelson deur die Stalin-bewind vermoor weens hulle vermeende “Yiddish nationalist conspiracy” (1797), omdat hulle gedink het “Birobidzhan, and not the Soviet Union, is a homeland for Jews” (1810). Hulle het gedink Birobidzhan sou ‘n Joodse republiek word. Om by ‘n owerheid te kruip, is nie altyd lonend nie. “Russification” het oorgeneem en “Yiddish was abolished as the primary language of instruction” in Birobidzhan (1870), soortgelyk aan die verengelsing en afrikanisering wat in Suid-Afrika ervaar word. Na hulle aankoms in Amerika in 1981 wou Gessen se ouers ook enigiets behalwe Jode wees: “All my parents wanted was the option, finally, of not being Jewish” (2384).

In 1930 was daar sowat 30 000 Jode in Birobidzhan, ‘n kwart van die bevolking. In 2009 was daar volgens Gessen slegs 4% Jode, “four times the percentage of Jews in the general population of the Soviet Union. In absolute figures, that was about nine thousand” (2302). Op die internet word die getal Jode in Birobidzhan in die 2010-sensus egter as 1628 of ongeveer 1% aangegee. Sedertdien het hierdie getal verder verminder. Enersyds was daar ondertrouery, maar die hoofoorsaak by verre vir die afname in die getal Jode is emigrasie na Israel en Westerse lande in die na-Stalin-era.

Die vestiging van Jode in Birobidzhan in die 1920’s en 1930’s herinner in verskeie opsigte aan die vestiging van die Britse setlaars in die Oos-Kaap ‘n eeu vroeër, in die 1820’s. In albei gevalle is die invoer van vreemdelinge skepties deur die plaaslike bevolking bejeen. Albei moes, sonder dat hulle dit vooraf besef het, as buffer teen vyande dien; teen die Chinese in Rusland en teen die swartes in die Oos-Kaap. Albei immigrante-bevolkings was aanvanklik veronderstel om te boer terwyl die meeste van hulle geen ondervinding van boerdery gehad het nie en die terrein ongeskik daarvoor was. In albei gevalle het baie van die immigrante eerder begin om hulle vorige beroepe te beoefen. Ander het moed opgegee en teruggekeer vanwaar hulle gekom het, bv die Britse setlaar Thomas Pringle (1789-1834) wat in 1826 na Brittanje teruggekeer het. Albei groepe is aanvanklik in tente gehuisves. In albei gevalle is die eerste oeste deur vloede vernietig. Daar was tiere in Rusland en luiperds in die Oos-Kaap, wat veeboerdery bemoeilik het. Albei het kleihutte of -huise gebou om in te woon. Anders as in Rusland is talle setlaars in die Oos-Kaap deur swartes uitgemoor en hulle eiendom vernietig. Daar is ‘n pragtige nuwe boek oor die Britse setlaars beskikbaar, Ralph Goldswain se Roughing it: 1820 settlers in their own words (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2016, 208p, R285; Amazon Kindle $20,85). Baie van hierdie setlaars het na groot ontberings voortreflike landsburgers geword. Dit grief my dat hulle positiewe nalatenskap deesdae vertrap word deur Algoabaai en die metropolitaanse gebied Nelson Mandela-baai te noem. Selfs die plaaslike universiteit dra die Mandela-naam terwyl hy eintlik niks in en op hierdie gebied tot stand gebring het nie. ‘n Ander boek van Ralph Goldswain is The chronicle of Jeremiah Goldswain (30 Degrees South Publishers, 2015, 328p; Amazon Kindle $11,39).

Gessen noem Birobidzhan “perhaps the worst good idea ever” (147). Maar iets vergelykbaar hiermee word nie eens aan Afrikaners gegun nie. Volgens al die politieke partye wat in die parlement sitting het, mag daar nie so iets soos ‘n Afrikanertuisland of -volks- of -nasiestaat bestaan nie. Dit is sonder meer as ‘n onding verklaar. Nie-behoort, nie-tuisvoel, tuisteloos wees, is ons voorland. ‘n Klein groepie blanke Afrikaanssprekendes het in 1990/94 die grondslag vir ons huidige onverkwiklike situasie gelê. Soos Dubnow dit met verwysing na die Jode gestel het (1327):

“Hy het sy volk in die woestyn gevind, in ‘n onbewoonbare land” (Deuteronomium 32:10).

Leon Lemmer: Gelykheid, ‘n utopiese droom

Wat is gelykheid (“equality”)? Dit kan “van dieselfde hoogte” beteken. In die natuur is ‘n vlakte of ‘n plato min of meer gelyk; so ook die wateroppervlak van ‘n meer of die see. Maar berge is nie gelyk nie. Hulle dui juis op die ongelykheid van die aardoppervlak. As riviere gelyk was, sou die water nie vloei nie. As ons na die hemelruim kyk, sien ons bolvormige voorwerpe soos die son, maan en planete. Dan besef ‘n mens dat die planeet Aarde ook ‘n bol is, dus eintlik glad nie gelyk is nie. In die natuur is “die groter prentjie” dus dié van ongelykheid. “Contrary to what some have claimed and are still claiming, the fundamental building block of nature is not equality but inequality” (Martin van Creveld, bron hier onder, Kindle 3893). Eeue lank was die mensdom op die verkeerde spoor toe veronderstel is dat die aarde plat of gelyk is. Dit toon dat die meerderheid mense op ‘n dwaalspoor kan wees. Daarom kan ongekwalifiseerde algemene stemreg in ‘n demokrasie gevaarlik wees.

Wat vir die natuur geld, geld nie noodwendig vir die mens nie. Die mens word immers dikwels die kroon van die skepping of werklikheid genoem. As ‘n skare staan of sit of lê, is die volwasse mense seker min of meer gelyk, dus dieselfde hoogte. Maar die begrip gelykheid, soos gebruik in die politiek, het meer met die mens in sy geheel en veral met sy gees te make. Dit beteken nie dat die liggaam geen rol speel nie. Volgens die mode-ideologie van die oomblik moet sowel liggaamlik as geestelik gestremdes as gelykes, in die sin van “(potensieel) net so goed of bekwaam,” behandel word. Blindes moet dus toegelaat word om in dieselfde mate as siendes wegkruipertjie te speel of vir minerale te prospekteer. Verstandelik gestremdes moet in dieselfde skoolklas as nie-gestremdes kan presteer. In die praktyk is die resultate egter ontnugterend. ‘n Skynplossing vir hierdie probleem word verkry deur ‘n verbod op akademiese rangorde te plaas. Skoliere mag nie weet of selfs vermoed dat sommige van hulle beter as ander presteer nie. Mededinging en gevolglik ook prestasie word ontmoedig. Akademiese onbekwaamheid, selfs waar daar ‘n gebrek aan toewyding is, word met ekstra aandag beloon terwyl die belange van buitengewoon begaafde skoliere, die potensiële leiers in die samelewing, verwaarloos word.

Die getal en veral die gehalte van Martin van Creveld (gebore in 1946) se boeke is indrukwekkend. Ek bepaal my aandag by een van sy jongste werke, Equality: the impossible quest (Kouvola, Finland: Castalia House, 2015, 282p; Amazon Kindle $7,97). In hierdie boek speur Van Creveld die gebrek aan gelykheid van die vroegste tye af tot op hede na. Die veronderstelling van gelykheid maak diskriminasie taboe (Kindle 20). Daar word geredeneer: “Where there is no equality there can be neither justice nor liberty. On the other hand, equality itself is not without its dangers. Should it be pushed too far, it can easily reach the point where it limits, or even eliminates, both liberty and justice” (20). Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) word soos volg geparafraseer: “Perfect equality, like its concomitant perfect liberty, can only exist when each individual lives alone in a desert, where it is meaningless” (316). Waar daar, soos in die nuwe Suid-Afrika, regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging is, word bepaalde etniese groepe, naamlik nie-wittes en veral swartes, vir bevoordeling uitgesonder en kan daar nie sprake van die gelyke behandeling van etniese groepe wees nie. ‘n Kern vergryp in die nuwe Suid-Afrika is dat sommige mense (nie-wittes, veral swartes) op grond van hulle etnisiteit/groepverwantskap bevoordeel word pleks van op grond van individuele verdienstelikheid. Insgelyks word ander mense (veral blankes) suiwer op grond van hulle etnisiteit/groepverwantskap benadeel, sonder inagname van hulle individuele verdienstelikheid. Inter-etnies is daar nie gelykberegtiging nie.

Dit is moeilik om gelykheid te definieer omdat dit in wyd uiteenlopende kontekste gebruik word: “There is equality before God and there is equality here on earth. There is natural equality and there is the kind of equality that human society creates. Some people even want to extend equality to animals and plants as well. There is equality of body and there is equality of mind. There is economic equality and there is equality before the law. There is civic equality and there is political equality and there is equality of opportunity and there is equality in death. There is equality among individuals and there is equality among groups, nations, and races. In Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World [1932] this truth is held to be self-evident that men (and women, though Huxley does not say so) are equal in respect to their bodies’ physico-chemical makeup but in no other way” (33). ‘n Groot mate van DNS-eendersheid sluit egter nie groot kulturele verskille uit nie.

In Suid-Afrika is die blankes ‘n minderheidsgroep. In Amerika is die tradisionele wit meerderheid vinnig besig om ‘n minderheid te word. “Increasingly, society is treating the minority, which in developed Western countries consists of able-bodied heterosexual white males, as if they were less than equal. As so often in history, equality for some can only be achieved by discriminating against all the rest” (95). Hoewel gelykheid deesdae as iets voorgehou word wat letterlik natuurlik is, is die teenoorgestelde in werklikheid die geval. “However much some people may resent the fact, in nature inequality and not equality seems to be the rule” (108). Elkeen behoort te kry wat hy verdien eerder as wat hy begeer (183). Mededinging/kompetisie is ‘n beproefde manier om mense aan te moedig om te presteer, dus om die voordele van dominansie, van beter wees, te geniet (133). Mededinging is egter iets wat in bv sosialistiese SJW-samelewings* ter bestendiging van die gelykheidsmite ontmoedig word. Byvoorbeeld, selfs Karl Marx (1818-1883) het besef dat “egalitarianism is incompatible with the needs of a sophisticated industrial civilization” (308). [* SJW = “Social Justice Warrior”: ‘n geykte Amerikaanse frase wat as etiket gebruik word vir diegene wat hulle op ‘n selektiewe manier beywer vir die bevoordeling van veral sekere etniese en geslagsgroepe (Praag 1.11.2015).]

Van die vroegste tye af was daar ongelykheid. “All human societies recognize differences of age and sex* which translate into differences in the ability to produce food as well as different rights and duties … some of the oldest justifications for inequality originated in magic, spirit-worship, religion, or whatever a sense of the supernatural is called … at first, prophets, sharmans, and assorted micracle-workers were able to translate their knowledge into influence. As influence gradually grew into authority, authority into power, and power into property and privilege, chiefdoms emerged” (424). Religie impliseer “some kind of claim of closeness to the gods” (530), maar ingebou daarin is daar ‘n hiërargie van ongelykheid. “Among humans as well as many animals, inequality, accompanied by deference – meaning inequality that is recognized – was exactly what held the community or group together” (431). In die geskiedenis was ongelykheid “perhaps the most important means of maintaining social order and stamp out any attempt to resist it” (1264). [* In die hedendaagse samelewing word die ontkenning (in beginsel) van enige vorm van geslagsongelykheid of -verskille dermate oordryf dat ons die gevaar loop om almal as mono- of multi-seksueel bestempel te word.]

In antieke Mesopotamië en Egipte was daar “some of the most unequal and most hierarchical despotisms” (496). In antieke Griekeland is mense se plek in die hiërargie deur drie faktore bepaal: “their politico-military prowess, their wealth, and their ancestry” (454). Daar was bv aristokrate en gewone mense (461) en natuurlik ook slawe (600), wat nie-burgers was (648). Vroue is ook nie as burgers erken nie (820). In Sparta “only old men could be elected to the Senate, and … the kingship was hereditary and limited to members of just two families” (593). In Athene was daar mettertyd wel gelykheid voor die wet (641, 668). “In both Sparta and Athens equality … was rather exclusive. Inside each city it only embraced a fairly small part of the population” (827). “What equality existed came at the expense of liberty (in Sparta) and stability (in Athens)” (834).

In ander antieke stadstate rondom die Middellandse See, bv Kartago, was aristokrate in beheer en is vreemdelinge nie as burgers aanvaar nie (850). Rome en sy Ryk was vier en ‘n halwe eeue lank ‘n aristokratiese republiek (863) of monargie (923). Behalwe slawe was daar drie klasse: die senatore, ridders en gewone mense. Gelykheid voor die wet het nie bestaan nie (863). Ongelykheid is as vanselfsprekend aanvaar (883), bv dié van vroue, kinders, slawe en vreemdelinge (897). In die Romeinse Ryk en in mindere mate in antieke Griekeland was daar soms slawe-opstande (1303). “The Romans … were one of the most hierarchical empires in the whole of history. Furthermore, the collapse of Rome laid the basis for European, ie Christian, feudalism”* (524). Die feodale stelsel het burokrasieë omvat wat deur “the crassest forms of inequality” gekenmerk is (530) en het uit “the three classes: warrior-aristocrats … priests … and peasants” bestaan (1196). [* Feudalism: “At the head of the system the crown owned all the land. Beneath the crown, an intricate network of duties and obligations linked royalty, tenants-in-chief (such as barons), under-tenants (knights), and villeins (serfs)” (Collins World Encyclopedia, 2003, p 337).]

Die lede van die vroeë christelike gemeentes het hoofsaaklik uit die laer klasse gekom “and were as egalitarian as any communities have ever been” (1053). Toe die christelike religie egter die staatsgodsdiens geword het, die Kerk “lost no time in building an enormously elaborate hierarchy that consisted of patriarchs, hegemons, cardinals, archbishops, bishops, deacons, and a whole host of less important dignitaries” (1053). Hiërargieë het gehelp om die orde/dissipline te bewaar (1394, 1692). In die kloosters was daar, afgesien van die hoof, egter ‘n groot mate van gelykheid (1394). “Socially the only distinctions are those between veteran monk and novice, guru and student” (1407).

In Oosterse lande het dit onder die invloed van bv Confucius (551-479 vC) om harmonie gegaan en nie om gelykheid nie (998). Hy het hiërargie beklemtoon (4012). Eers vanaf 1912 is die Chinese politiek nie meer op Confucianisme gebaseer nie. Oor gewone mense het Confucius gesê: “They needed to be kept firmly in their place” (1012); ‘n elementêre les wat nog nie deur bv die ANC-regering en die plaaslike universiteitsowerhede geleer is nie. “The Quran itself contains several verses that prohibit believers from questioning social inequalities, claiming that they were instituted by Allah in person,” maar “equality before God … few doubted” (1073). Soos in die geval van die christelike religie “equality before God served as an excuse not to institute it on earth” (1080). Maar anders as in die Rooms-Katolieke Kerk “the Moslem clergy, or ulama, remained surprisingly egalitarian” (1087).

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) het geredeneer dat gelykheid net in ‘n “absolute state” afgedwing kon word. John Locke (1632-1704) het gelykheid uit die christelike godsdiens probeer aflei (1753). Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) het hierby aansluiting gevind met sy uitspraak: “All men are created equal” (1903). In werklikheid vind ons dat kinders in dieselfde gesin van die begin af aansienlik kan verskil, bv wat intelligensie betref. Daarom skryf Van Creveld: “In all of history, nothing could be less self-evident than the idea that everybody was, or ought to be, equal” (2452). Dit geld nie noodwendig slegs individue nie, maar (dalk) ook “rasse” (2452). “To deny that different groups of human beings have different physical characteristics is sheer hypocrisy … True racism consists of three elements. First, there is the notion that the groups in question differ not only physically but mentally … Second, those characteristics are said to be inherent and heritable, so that they pass from one generation to the next. Third, the people of some races are superior to others and are entitled to rule over them … There probably has never been a society that did not hold at least one of these beliefs” (2458).

Volgens Charles Montesquieu (1689-1755) beteken gelykheid “not that everybody should command, or that no one should be commanded, but that we obey or command our equals … for socio-economic equality, political equality was largely meaningless” (1882). Dit verduidelik wat die dryfkrag agter parasitering in die vorm van bv swart ekonomiese bemagtiging in die nuwe Suid-Afrika is. In die menseregteverklaring van die Franse Revolusie (1789) staan: “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights” (1956). Die slagspreuk van vryheid, gelykheid en broederskap het weerklank in opstande onder kleinboere/”peasants” (1359) en slawe gevind (1316) met chaotiese gevolge, want “equality and liberty are, in principle, incompatible” (1760). Die Vichy-regering in Frankryk (1940-1944) het ‘n heeltemal ander slagspreuk gehad: “Work, family, fatherland” (1984).

“The idea of equality goes back to ancient Athens, and that of liberalism to the ancient Roman libertas” (2079). Die term “sosialisme” is in 1832 die eerste keer gebruik en “kommunisme” agt jaar later. “Both terms have in common that they refer to ideologies intended to combat the kind of socio-economic inequality which democracy and liberalism barely touched” (2079). “Vladimir Lenin [1870-1924] drew a clear line between socialism and communism. Socialists hoped to achieve their goals gradually, peacefully, and by democratic means as more people voted for them. Not so communists, who believed they could only do so by setting up a tight body of disciplined party members, engaging in bloody revolution, and imposing the dictatorship of the proletariat” (2218). “Proletariaat” beteken letterlik “die klas wat nie eiendom besit nie”. Dit is hierdie massa, die gepeupel, wat weens ongekwalifiseerde algemene stemreg in 1994 in groot mate (skynbaar) beheer oor die lot van Suid-Afrika oorgeneem het. Karl Marx het voorspel dat so ‘n gebeurtenis “led to the creation of the dictatorship of the proletariat or, to be precise, of a small clique of determined leaders who claimed to represent it” (2313).

Burgerlike of politieke gelykheid bring egter nie outomaties sosio-ekonomiese gelykheid mee nie (2225), vandaar die talle maatreëls van die ANC-regering om blanke besittings aan swartes te verkwansel. Sosio-ekonomiese gelykheid is tot ‘n mensereg verhef (3483). Oor Suid-Afrika skryf Van Creveld: “Today, especially when it comes to government work, instead of whites discriminating against blacks, blacks in power often discriminate against whites” (2751). Hy vra tereg: “Is there really any reason why some should be entitled to something regardless of work, merit, or accomplishment?” (2272).

Sedert 1965 word in Amerika en toenemend in die res van die wêreld vereis dat sogenaamde benadeeldes “be treated equally with everybody else and be given special rights … equal opportunity is essential, but not enough” (3217). “This is equality with a vengeance … often it made the more equal more equal still” (3239). “Equality was manipulated to favor the less equal” (3258). “Being white, male and heterosexual gradually became a handicap” (3245). “To cite George Orwell [1903-1950]… people who fall into any of these three categories have been turned into unpersons” (3258); [ie have been] “dehumanized” (3333).

In hulle Kommunistiese Manifes (1848) maak Marx en Engels (1820-1895) daarop aanspraak dat werkers geen vaderland het nie. “Did not Lenin and his successors declare themselves to be ‘internationalists’?” (2582). Dalk verduidelik dit waarom bv Suid-Afrikaanse universiteite deesdae eerder van Afrika en van die hele wêreld wil wees en neersien op plaaslikheid/parogialiteit. Die bevordering van veral Afrikanerkultuur word as die toppunt van bekrompenheid/benepenheid geëtiketteer. “Starting in 2001 more than seventy public universities have introduced admission standards designed to make the less equal more so and the more equal less so” (3293). “To make some people more equal others are systematically being made less so” (3306).

Mense kan nie lewe sonder om onderskeide (bv tussen ons en hulle) te maak nie. Slegs as ‘n mensegroep heeltemal vry van onderskeide was, sou die utopiese droom van gelykheid werklikheid word. “Where there are no distinctions there can be no superiority” (1896). In die geskiedenis is die kwessie van gelykheid aanvanklik selde genoem. “Too often people could not even imagine it” (1685). “Maintaining equality over time is at least as hard as establishing it” (1889). “Whatever equality was established never lasted for long” (1288). “Generally the more homogeneous an empire, ethnically speaking, the longer it lasted” (1251).

Wanneer almal kameradelik broers en susters word, word daar steeds ‘n onderskeid gemaak. En as daar net broers is? Selfs dan word ‘n verskil soos ongelykheid nie noodwendig uitgesluit nie. Dink bv aan wat Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965) gesê het: “The African is my brother, but he is my younger brother by several centuries” (Frank S Pepper, Contemporary biographical quotations, London: Sphere Books, 1986, p 248). Verskille in ontwikkeling word deesdae dikwels ontken of verswyg. Daarom het Van Creveld reg wanneer hy skryf: “Man is the animal that invents its own past” (2079). Waar sal ons uiteindelik gelykheid vind? “Death is the great equalizer” (3654). Selfs dít is nie in alle opsigte waar nie. In die nuwe Suid-Afrika ervaar ons daagliks hoe sommige dooies gehuldig word: “Heroes are transformed into villains, villians into heroes. Equilibrium, meaning a situation in which all are equal, is never achieved in death any more than it is in life” (3769).

By mense is sowel gelykheid as eendersheid mites, oftewel wensdenkery. Maar hierdie onrealistiese begeerte is onderliggend aan die ras- en geslagskwotas wat in sport en aan universiteite en in feitlik iedere sektor van die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing opgedring word. Maar kwotas geld uitsluitlik ter bevoordeling van nie-wittes, veral swartes. Daarom kon die Suid-Afrikaanse sokkerspan tydens die Wêreldtoernooi, wat in 2010 plaaslik aangebied is, doelbewus as ‘n toonbeeld van swart nasionalisme alle blanke spelers uitsluit. Blankes moet voortaan in al die nasionale krieketspanne ‘n minderheid (hoogstens 5 uit 11) wees. Die ANC-regering skryf voor dat sportsoorte soos krieket en rugby geen internasionale byeenkomste plaaslik mag aanbied alvorens hulle genoegsaam getransformeer het nie. Tydens apartheid is politieke inmenging in sport veroordeel en is blanke spanne verbied om internasionaal mee te ding. Deesdae word erge politieke inmenging sonder meer geduld omdat dit onder meer ter bevoordeling van swartes en ter benadeling van blankes bedryf word.

Veralgemenend kan gesê word dat dit lyk asof party etniese groepe of individue opbou en ander afbreek. Daar mag nie gesê word dat een beter as die ander is nie, maar hulle verskil sekerlik. Waarom is daar geen debat oor of die misdadigers wat by die vernietiging van skole, universiteite, treine, ens, betrokke is die demografie weerspieël nie? Waarom word daar nooit verskoning gevra vir sulke wandade en misdade nie? Dit lyk asof etniese groepe en individue nie bloot verskil nie, maar selfs hemelsbreed kan verskil. Hulle is so ver van gelykheid en eendersheid verwyderd dat een die ander nie naatloos kan vervang sonder skouspelagtige verbetering of ernstige insinking nie.

Wat ek probeer aantoon het, is dat daar hedendaags die neiging is om gelykheid en by implikasie eendersheid te beklemtoon en ongelykheid en verskille te ignoreer. Ter wille van ewewig behoort ons daarop aangewese te wees om ook ongelykhede en verskille te erken. Sommige ongelykhede en verskille is dalk vatbaar vir verandering terwyl ander so stewig ingebed kan wees dat transformasiepogings vrugteloos blyk te wees.

Leon Lemmer: Oor politieke korrektheid in kuns

Kerstyd word met mooi en aangename dinge soos geluk en vrede geassosieer. ‘n Mens kan jouself afvra in hoeverre sulke mooiheid nog in ons brutale en hoogs ontaarde samelewing moontlik is; seker hoofsaaklik in gesinsverband. Ek onthou hoe Swart Piet in die goeie ou dae sonder om te mor of te kla vir Kersvader onbaatsugtig bygestaan het deur die rendiere te versorg en die skoorstene skoon te maak. In die nuwe Suid-Afrika het Swart Piet spoorloos verdwyn. Skynbaar het die breuk gekom toe hy op gelyke status met Kersvader aangedring het. Daar word beweer dat Swart Piet by ‘n vakbond aangesluit en trekarbeid veroordeel het. Hy is laas gesien toe hy in ‘n onpadwaardige minibus vertrek het. Daar is darem nog ‘n Swart Piet in Nederland maar polities korrek is hy deesdae wit. In die hedendaagse samelewing is blankes die enigstes wat sonder bohaai ‘n onderdanige rol vervul.

Tradisioneel was Kersfees op mooi dinge ingestel. Die wysgerige studie van kuns en skoonheid (“beauty”) staan as estetika bekend. Dit is deel van waardefilosofie of aksiologie. Iets, bv ‘n voorwerp of handeling, is waardevol as dit bv nodig is of verkies word. Waarde word toegeken ingevolge goed of sleg, reg of verkeerd, mooi of lelik, verhewe of banaal, vry of gebonde, ens. Waardes vind aansluiting by kennis, betekenis, waar- en valsheid, heiligheid en onheiligheid, ens. Naas waardefilosofie is daar dus ander wysgerige dissiplines soos logika, kennisleer (of epistemologie) en metafisika. Naas estetika is etiek ‘n belangrike deel van waardefilosofie. In estetika is skoonheid ‘n belangrike soort waarde, maar dit gaan nie net om skoonheid by mense en hulle skeppings (bv geboue, motors) nie. Die natuur (bv blomme, ‘n sonsondergang) kan ook mooi wees. Etiek, daarenteen, is uitsluitlik op menslike gedrag of handeling ingestel; wat mense doen of nie doen nie (bv die kwessie van behoort/”ought”) maar etiket en goeie maniere word uitgesluit. Daardie handelinge of gebrek aan handeling word geëvalueer as goed of sleg, reg of verkeerd, wenslik of onwenslik, deugdelik of ondeugdelik, ens. Naas estetika en etiek is daar algemene waardefilosofie omdat bv die weer of ‘n gebou bv goed of sleg kan wees.

Waarde kan enersyds intrinsiek (dus wesenlik) of inherent (dus eie aan) en andersyds bv relasioneel, instrumenteel of bydraend wees. Ek gaan my aandag voortaan tot estetika beperk. Om duidelikheid oor sekere sake te verkry, is dit wenslik dat ons die aandag verder tot die skone of hoë kunste (“fine arts”) beperk; dus, blote kundigheid of bedrewenheid (“skill”), soos by ambagsmanne (“artisans, craftsmen”), word uitgesluit. Beoefenaars van die skone kunste moet naas kundigheid ook oor bv verbeelding of intuïsie en skeppingsvermoë of kreatiwiteit (dus oorspronklikheid) beskik. Dit bring die kwessie van smaak (“taste”) ter sprake en ook elegansie en styl. In kuns speel die sintuie, dus waarneming of persepsie, ‘n rol, maar ook die intellek en sekerlik ook emosie of gevoel.

In die skilderkuns was voorstellingsvermoë (“representation”) aanvanklik van deurslaggewende belang. Skilders moes in staat wees om wat hulle in die sintuiglike werklikheid waarneem so getrou moontlik weer te gee. Dit word realistiese of figuratiewe kuns genoem. Veral na die uitvinding van fotografie kom nie-figuratiewe kuns algemeen voor, bv verwringing van die werklikheid en abstrakte kuns. In nie-figuratiewe kuns word daar nie gepoog om die sintuiglike of natuurlike werklikheid (getrou) na te boots nie, al slaag nie-figuratiewe en selfs abstrakte kunswerke soms juis vanweë die mate waarin assosiasie met die natuurlike werklikheid behoue gebly het. Baie klem word deesdae op moontlike verskille tussen die bedoeling of intensie van die skilder en die reaksie of respons van kykers gelê.

Estetika is ‘n buitengewoon problematiese studieterrein. “I find aesthetics to be at the same time one of the most interesting and one of the most pointless branches of philosophy. Interesting because it helps us to attend to the various ways in which art matters; pointless because art is too varied for there to be any hope of defining what it is or what gives it value. Nevertheless, much of philosophy’s value derives not from its ability to deliver neat answers, but in its power to make us attend to what matters, what we might otherwise have missed. If, at best, aesthetics can come up with a menu of possibilities, some of which apply to some works of art, some of which to others, that is not a worthless achievement” (Julian Baggini, Philosophy: All that matters, London: Hodder Education, 2012, p 97; Amazon Kindle $7,10).

Wat ek tot dusver geskryf het, is sterk veralgemenend maar kan die tradisionele benadering tot die skone kunste genoem word; dus voordat die hedendaagse ontaarding plaasgevind het. Van deurslaggewende belang vir die doeleindes van hierdie rubriek is verskille in benadering tot kuns, hetsy uit die oogpunt van die kunstenaar of die waarnemers. Daar is onder meer hierdie twee moontlikhede. Enersyds kan kuns (primêr) om kunsonthalwe (“art for art’s sake”) beoefen word, dus om sigself (“disinterested”), as iets wat selfgeldend (“self-justifying”) is; dus kuns as iets wat begeer word of die moeite werd is omdat dit aan bv die skilder en die kykers bv emosionele en/of intellektuele bevrediging en plesier verskaf. Andersyds kan kuns (primêr) om nie-estetiese, bv instrumentele, redes beoefen word, bv om geld te maak of propaganda te versprei. Dit bring hierdie rubriek by ‘n punt waarby uitgekom moes word.

Tot dusver is wat ek geskryf het veral met die skilderkuns in verband gebring. Daar is egter baie ander soorte skone kuns. Byvoorbeeld, letterkunde is ook ‘n kunssoort. ‘n Skrywer kan bv ‘n roman of gedig om bv kuns- of propaganda-onthalwe skryf. Plaaslik het skrywers soos André P Brink en Antjie Krog geen geheim daarvan gemaak nie dat hulle (onder meer) om politieke redes skryf. Dit is soortgelyk aan die sosialistiese realisme of materialisme van die marxiste, wat ‘n didaktiese funksie aan kunstenaars opdring, wat op sy beurt vrye selfuitdrukking en individualiteit aan bande lê. Materiële en omgewingsfaktore, bv ekonomiese omstandighede, beïnvloed of bepaal glo kulturele (insluitende kuns-) uitdrukking. Ingevolge sosialistiese realisme moet bv leidende kommuniste tot helde verhef word en ‘n blink toekoms optimisties en entoesiasties aan die inwoners van kommunistiese lande voorgehou word. Deesdae vind sosialistiese realisme in nie-kommunistiese lande uitdrukking in kulturele marxisme. Kulturele marxisme vind uitdrukking in bv multikulturaliteit, politieke korrektheid en die verheerliking van homoseksualiteit. (Terloops, Jakes Gerwel, ‘n self-erkende marxis, het toe hy ‘n Afrikaansdosent was graag gesê dat hy nie Afrikaans doseer nie maar literatuursosiologie. Onder die dekmantel van Afrikaanse letterkunde het hy marxistiese ideologie gepropageer. Om die voorstanders van Standaardafrikaans te tart, verkies Krog die woord “beautiful” bo “mooi”.)

Sohrab Ahmari het onlangs* ‘n boek oor politieke korrektheid in die skone kunste gepubliseer: The New Philistines: How identity politics disfigure the arts (London: Biteback Publishing, 2016, 144p; Amazon Kindle $5,26). Die Filistyne is die mense wat in die bybelse tyd oorlog teen die Israeliete gevoer het. Daar word egter ook ander betekenisse aan die woord geheg. Filistyn: “Lid van ‘n vyandige groep mense” en “Bekrompe, kleingeestige persoon; kultuurlose mens” (HAT). Byvoorbeeld, die kritikus Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) was voortdurend in ‘n stryd met die Filistyne gewikkel. Arnold het hom daarvoor beywer om ‘n nuwe kultuur gebaseer op artistieke en intellektuele waardes in victoriaanse Engeland tot stand te bring. [* ‘n Vroeëre boek oor dieselfde onderwerp is Roger Kimball se The rape of the masters: How political correctness sabotages art (Encounter Books, 2005, 225p; Amazon Kindle $11,39).]

In die boektitel word daar ook na “identity politics” verwys. ‘n Mens se identiteit is wat jy individueel en groepgewys is. In die hedendaagse (veral Westerse) wêreld word identiteit verideologiseer en veral verpolitiseer. Mense se identiteit word tot enkele kenmerke gereduseer: veral etnisiteit/velkleur, geslag (manlik of vroulik) en seksualiteit.* Met die oog op bevoordeling word daardie kenmerke dan deur aktiviste selektief oorbeklemtoon. Dit gaan vir hulle nie om alle mense nie, maar om nie-wit en veral swart mense. Dit gaan nie om mans nie, maar om vroue. Dit gaan nie om heteroseksuele nie, maar om homoseksuele. Hierdie groepe word uitgelig omdat hulle na bewering benadeel is en nou bevoordeel moet word. Die nuwe uitgeworpenes is heteroseksuele, blanke, Westerse mans. Omdat laasgenoemdes tot skurke verklaar is, moet die “Western artistic canon” waarin veral hulle kunswerke erkenning kry, glo hersien word. “The things we hold dearest are trampled and desecrated” (Kindle 81). ‘n Soortgelyke gees vind plaaslik uitdrukking in die studente-onrus. [* Al hoe meer soorte homo- en/of andersoortige seksualiteit word by “gender dissidents” onderskei. Ahmari verskaf hierdie beginletters: LGBTTQQFAGPBDSM. As dalk oor die F gewonder word, dit beteken “Flexual” (402).]

Ingevolge identiteitspolitiek kan ‘n mens dubbel benadeel wees, bv as jy ‘n swart vrou is. As jy daarby ook lesbies is, kan jy op drievoudige benadeling en dus drievoudige bevoordeling aanspraak maak. Hierdie onderlinge versterking van twee of drie benadelingskategorieë word interseksionaliteit genoem. Diegene wat (militante) feminisme dryf, is dikwels lesbiërs, dus mense wat op dubbele benadeling en dubbele bevoordeling aanspraak kan maak. In identiteitspolitiek is burgerlike en menseregte hoog op die agenda. Aan veral Amerikaanse universiteite word kursusse in identiteitspolitiek aangebied, bv Black Studies, Women’s Studies, Queer Studies, ens.

‘n Ander woord in die boektitel waarop ek die aandag wil vestig, is “disfigure”. Dit is duidelik iets anders as die tradisionele figuratiewe en nie-fuguratiewe kuns waarna ek hierbo verwys het. Hierdie soort verwringing is ‘n skending van skone kuns omdat dit skoonheid inkort en selfs ignoreer. In die opdrag voor in die boek verwys die outeur na Spreuke 5:18: “Sing die lof van jou eie fontein, verheug jou oor jou eie vrou,” waarmee hy seker probeer sê: Wees jou normale self; moenie toelaat dat verdorwe byderwetsheid jou mislei nie. Om sake te vereenvoudig, het ek hierbo veral na skilderkuns verwys. Ahmari span sy net wyer en betrek ook ander skone kunste: “The book ranges freely over the visual, performing and literary arts, drawing examples from dance, film, painting, theatre and the novel, as well as newer forms such as installation, performance art and video. The emphasis is on high art, the kind on display at museums, art institutes and serious galleries” (43).

Sohrab Ahmari is ‘n Rooms-Katolieke Irannees wat Amerikaanse burgerskap verkry het en as joernalis vir die Wall Street Journal in Londen werk. Hy is van huis uit afwysend teenoor verdorwe kuns en onthuts oor die ontaarding van Westerse kultuur. In sy boek wek hy die indruk van ‘n belese esteet wat die moed het om tradisionele estetiese en morele waardes te bepleit, al maak dit hom ongewild by progressiewe Bohemers.

Hy skryf oor die hedendaagse kunswêreld soos hy dit eerstehands in veral Londen ervaar, bv in kunsgalerye, kunsmuseums en teateropvoerings. “The word ‘beauty’ isn’t part of its lexicon. Sincerity, formal rigour and cohesion, the quest for truth, the sacred and the trancendent – none of these concerns, once thought timeless, is on the radar among the artists and critics who rule the contemporary art scene. These ideals have all been thrust aside to make room for the art world’s one totem, its alpha and omega: identity politics” (28). “The identitarians think they already have the answers: a set of all-purpose formulas about race, gender, class and sexuality, on one hand, and power and privilege, on the other” (35).

“This degree of politisation means that Western art no longer fulfils its central role, to serve as a mirror and repository of the human spirit. The state of affairs should worry not just artists and art lovers, but anyone who cares about the future of Western civilisation” (35). “Identity politics came to disfigure our culture … [and] shapes popular culture … compliance with its edicts is increasingly the measure by which we judge movies and TV” (43). Die outeur besef dat identiteitspolitiek nie die enigste sondaar is nie. Daar is ook “the wider collapse of critical standards, the deleterious effects of social media on our attention spans, the sense that art has no new frontiers left to cross” (43), ens.

Identiteitspolitiek is een van die euwels wat Westerse kuns onvry maak. “Much of our art is so doctrinaire, so incapable of conveying any meaning other than the imperatives of identity politics” (58). “Throughout the book, I write of beauty and truth to which all art should aspire” (58). Hy besef dat skoonheid en waarheid ingewikkelde begrippe is maar wil nie daaroor uitwei nie. Skoonheid en waarheid word in die wysbegeerte in veral twee dissiplines, estetika en kennisleer, aangespreek. “Contemporary identitarian art rejects the very possibility of objective, universally accessible beauty and truth … So long as you reject the rejection of universal truth and objective beauty, you are in my camp” (66). Daar is kunswerke wat tydlose skoonheid het en hulle status as meesterstukke verdien. Ons hoef nie altyd saam te stem oor wat mooi is nie, maar dit is objektief (dus sonder bv ideologiese oorwegings) waar dat bv die huise in Constantia mooier as dié in Khayelitsha is.

In die Globe-teater, waar Shakespeare-werke opgevoer word, word daar polities korrek gestrewe na “50/50 gender parity among actors onstage, regardless of the ramifications for storytelling, performance or meaning” (133). Dit is soortgelyk aan die plaaslike sportkwotas wat voorskryf hoeveel spelers nie-wit moet wees en hoeveel van die nie-wittes swart moet wees. Emma Rice, die artistieke direktrise van die Globe sê: “It’s the next stage for feminism and it’s the next stage for society to smash down the last pillars that are against us. Also, my generation have come of age and come into positions of power and we have to use it for good. That’s certainly what I intend to do” (141). “For Rice, directing on Shakespeare’s stage would be a fundamentally political enterprise. It would be about winning and using ‘power’ to promote feminist ends and ‘smash down’ opponents, including the Bard [Shakespeare] himself” (148).

Nog ‘n voorskrif van Rice is: “The plays would have to be made more ‘relevant’ … she finds the Bard tedious and inaccessible … ‘He was writing 400 years ago, there is no way in the world every line can still be relevant.’ The plays are too long, the language too archaic” (148). “‘Relevant’ in 2016, aesthetically and politically, meant the production lost sight completely of Shakespeare’s timeless genius … Relevance meant rewriting the play – and not just rewriting, but bad rewriting” (179). Plekverwysings is na Londen, “a cheap wink at a London audience. Worse was the vulgar contemporary slang marring the dialogue … Relevance also meant punctuating scenes with song-and-dance routines … The entire action, moreover, was accompanied by Indian music” (179). Die polities korrekte bedoeling was “to bash the ‘dominant’ culture … opposing the ‘oppressive’ mainstream” (194).

Daar was bv “fairies as Versailles coutiers-turned-transvestite-zombies with nipple tassels and grotesquely elongated forehead masks” (194). Die hedendaagse dwelm- en verkragtingskultuur word ook bygesleep; dinge wat vreemd aan Shakespeare se werke is (202). “Helena was Helenus, a gay man” (210) gevolglik word ‘n “gay relationship” uitgebeeld (217). “It is Pohypnol that drags Demetrius out of the closet, reconciling him with his homosexuality and his repressed love for Helenus” (217). Die outeur noem hierdie aanpassings van Shapespeare “P[olitically] C[orrect] cant” (210). Die Shakespeare-teks word in Rice se vertolking “just another ‘contemporary issue to explore'” (225).

“This last is identitarian art’s greatest injustice against the culture since social power dynamics and collective identity are all that such art knows and cares about, its practitioners can’t grapple with individuality, with things of the soul, with the inner life – the very things that draw most of us to art in the first place” (225). Dit is hierdie kenmerke wat Shakespeare se werke “timeless and universal” maak (225). Maar identiteitspolitiek breek dit af. “Identity politics now pervade every medium and mode of art, from architecture to dance to film to painting to theatre to video, from the highest avant-garde to the lowest schlock” (233).

“What unites the identitarians who lord over the art world is the belief that art is primarily, even solely, a political enterprise. That was also the premise of Socialist Realism” (233). “Today’s identitarian art puts a high premium on shock value and ironic subversion … the revered subjects are women, racial and sexual minorities victimised by and/or bravely resisting patriarchy, heteronormality and other Western depredations … these groups … become political types, stand-ins for ideological causes, almost always left wing, rather than individual souls” (240).

“Identitarian art finds justification in the work of a new class of hyper-ideological critics, much as the old Soviet hatchet-men upheld Socialist Realism. Today it is a new generation of journalists, academics and social-media personalities who defend the primacy of group identity in art … [They] care little for art history and aesthetics. What they are blessed with is lots of opinions about everything – all of which invariably revolve around race, gender and class, power and privilege. Call them the New Philistines” (250).

“Artforum is the leading US contemporary arts magazine and the intellectual home of America’s tenured avant-garde” (258). “For its editors and contributors, art is mainly a vehicle for advancing an ideological agenda: a heady mix of radical feminism, racial grievance, anti-capitalism and queer theory” (265). “‘Queer’ is as much an identity as an activity aimed at disrupting stable identity. You can be queer, but it is also something you do. ‘It’s a verb,’ as one of the contributors to Artforum’s identity issue put it. You can queer places where gender norms are performed: the family, the strip club or the church. Or you can queer places where artistic norms are performed: the art gallery, the museum, the literary text or the theatre” (265).

“To ‘queer art’ means to disavow aesthetic achievement as a primary aim of the artist. Traditional criticism, formal criteria, even the way artists, curators and viewers interact in the white cube – all of these things are extensions of the institutional and ‘discursive’ structures that oppress us, according to queer theorists. Beauty itself is suspect. After all, if something as fundamental as gender has no basis in biology or human nature but is just a script imposed by power relations, if there is nothing essentially masculine or feminine, as queer theorists believe, then beauty’s status is even more precarious. ‘Beauty’ is whatever those in power – straight, wealthy white men, basically – say it is. Nothing is inherently or objectively beautiful. The British artist Grayson Perry summed this up nicely: … ‘To judge a work on its aesthetic merit is to buy into some discredited, fusty hierarchy, tainted with sexism, racism, colonialism and class privilege’ … It is hard to overstate the awful influence of these ideas on contemporary art. Queer theory treats judgements about beauty, quality and form as impositions of power. And of course to speak of a ‘soul’ or the inner life is nonsensical … Queering art means, in short, the subjugation of art to ideology … The identitarians of Artforum, however, see themselves pursuing social justice, a cause that overrides the passé demands of form, aesthetics and self-expression” (273).

In Artforum word ineengestrengelde taal gebruik, dikwels “Foucauldian* lingo” (318), sodat die presiese betekenis moeilik agterhaalbaar is. In hierdie konteks verwys die outeur na George Orwell wat gewaarsku het dat taal “becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts” (288). Orwell se opstel, “Politics and the English language” (1946), is myns insiens een van die bestes wat ooit oor Engels en taal in die algemeen geskryf is. Hy was eintlik ‘n voorloper van die grootliks Britse linguistiese wysbegeerte. Daar is baie meer substansie in Orwell se nalatenskap as bloot Animal Farm en Nineteen Eighty-Four. [* Eintlik “Foucaultian”. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was ‘n linksgesinde Franse filosoof, anargis en homoseksueel wat aan vigs dood is en baie oor bv magsdinamika te sê gehad het.]

“Discussions among in-the-know artists, academics en critics … all agree about nearly everything: everyone knows that ‘neoliberalism’ is something bad; that liberal democracy is merely a more subtle form of tyranny; that Western societies are racist and sexist by design” (295). Nêrens ontleed die outeur liberalisme en demokrasie nie. ‘n Myns insiens ernstige gebrek in sy boek is dat hy hierdie twee verskynsels sonder meer as goed omarm; heel moontlik omdat hy uit die onderdrukkende teokrasie in Iran ontsnap het. Dit is nie prakties om hierdie saak hier verder te bespreek nie. Die beste is om bloot in gedagte te hou dat vryheid vir die ware kunstenaar belangrik is; dat sy skeppingsvermoë nie ten beste kan gedy in ‘n korset soos sosialistiese realisme of identiteitspolitiek nie.

“Arguments aren’t presented in point-counterpoint fashion … or in any logical sequence. Identitarian theory provides a common grammar or set of rules, and the point of the game is to signal political correctness. You can dip in and out of the stream of jargon as you please; it always flows in the same direction” (303). Huey Copeland het dit teen bv “homophobia, antiblackness, sexism, misogyny” wat hy “forms of violence” noem (303). Kobena Mercer praat in hierdie konteks van “culture wars” (310). “Copeland worried, the wider culture has yet to be fully transformed. We still aren’t nearly identitarian enough … the real crux of the matter [is]: What is art’s role in this political project? … the abstruse language disguised something very raw and simple – the desire for political mastery” (318).

“As with Emma Rice at Shakespeare’s Globe, here again it became clear that political power is the purpose and true measure of art in the identitarian mind. The question is never, ‘Does this piece of art express something true, beautiful or good?’ or even, ‘Do I enjoy this?’ … the criteria identitarians apply to art all have to do with power dynamics. The most important of these are intersectionality, visibility, individualism and legibility. To define these concepts is to expose the illiberalism of the ideas behind them” (325). Die rol wat politieke mag (“power”) hier speel, toon duidelik dat identiteitspolitiek ‘n manifestasie van kulturele marxisme is. (Aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch het sowel Russel Botman as Wim de Villiers te kenne gegee dat hulle die samelewing wil verander – glad nie noodwendig verbeter nie – klaarblyklik ooreenkomstig die wense van die marxisties-deurweekte ANC.)

Hier bo het ek reeds na interseksionaliteit verwys. “Intersectionality describes a method of investigating various social situations to determine which group is more oppressed and therefore has the better moral claim. As [Michelle] Kuo defined it, intersectionality ‘addresses the ways in which different kinds of discrimination overlap – how we never experience racism or gender bias in isolation – and treats identities as inseparable from institutional power.’ Think of it as a sort of grievance Olympics” (325). Gestel daar is in ‘n Franse klaskamer konflik tussen ‘n dosent wat ‘n vrou en gay is en ‘n student wat ‘n Moslem en Arabier is. Ingevolge magsdinamiek is die student vanweë bv kolonialisme en kapitalisme glo die mees benadeelde (333). “It is on account of intersectionality that identitarians insist that only whites can be racist” (333).

“Identitarian art devotes a great deal of energy to intersectionality, especially when it tries to uncover the racism, colonialism, sexism, transphobia, heteronormativity etc etc that are allegedly embedded in the art world itself: in the museums, in the collectors’ markets, in curatorial decisions and so on. Intersectionality provides the political script for these inquisitions, and if you know the oppression hierarchy among various group identities, you can easily figure out what the artist is trying to say … intersectionality … is one of the main culprits behind the sheer predictability of identitarian art” (341).

Oor sigbaarheid (“visibility”) word daar soos volg in identiteitspolitiek geredeneer: “Hitherto, certain groups of people have been marginalised or excluded from the culture on account of their race, sex, class and so on, and the injustices committed against them have likewise remained hidden” (348). Dit is die rede waarom hierdie groepe hulle deesdae alewig op die voorgrond dring. Dit help ‘n mens om te verstaan waarom die Afrikaanse Taalmuseum en -monument (ATM) nie die Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners en die twee mense wat die ontwerp van die Taalmonument beïnvloed het (CJ Langenhoven en NP van Wyk Louw) huldig nie maar onlangs verkies het om eerder ‘n byeenkoms oor die destydse slawerny te hou en jaarliks ‘n rieldanskompetisie aan te bied. Die ATM doen alles moontlik om bruin mense te betrek. Terselfdertyd word geen spesiale poging aangewend om die museum of monument of Afrikaans as Afrikanernalatenskap en -prestasie te bemark nie. Afrikaners se eiendomsreg op Afrikaans en op die Taalmonument behoort erken te word, nie net in die onderwerpe van die voordragte wat aangebied word nie, maar ook in gereelde bv boeremusiek-, volkspele- en jukskeibyeenkomste. Wat doen die ATM vir die Voortrekkerbeweging? Die ATKV borg die rieldanskompetisie. Waarom nie ook Afrikanerbyeenkomste nie?

“In the 1980s and ’90s the identitarians adopted visibility as a goal … Nav Haq has written, ‘For artists, there was a deep desire to be made visible – identifiable – exactly for who they were. Subsequently, it could be said that they were offered the conditions to position the defining factor of their marginalisation – ie their race, gender, sexuality – as being something intrinsic to their art'” (387). Ron Karenga van die Black Arts Movement skryf: “Black Art must be for the people, by the people and from the people … all art that does not discuss or contribute to revolutionary change is invalid” (394).

“Identitarian art … has little patience for individualism … This … is another facet of identitarian art’s illiberalism” (441). Hannah Black skryf: “Art is not a space of pure self-expression” (441). MaarAhmari redeneer tereg: “Liberal culture insists there is something in each of us, something unique and immutable, that can’t be reduced to group identities such as race, nationality, gender, sexuality – in short, to collectivity” (448).

Identiteitspolitiek verafsku kuns wat universeel en tydloos verstaanbaar is, dus leesbaarheid (“legibility”) het (456, 510). Hieroor skryf Ahmari: Hedendaagse kuns is soms onleesbaar “owing to the loss of technical mastery and the erosion of standards. To be clear, legible art doesn’t have to be simple, populist, or conventionally beautiful. Such art doesn’t even need to be figurative or narrative-driven. I am not crying out for idyllic landscapes with ducks and geese (though these things have their rightful place) … But art shouldn’t be inept or ugly, and too often today outré politics justify plainly inept art” (471). Die ware kunstenaar “wrestles with the timeless and transcendent things in the world. The identitarians know, too, that their ideology can’t supplant the pure joy we take in the energetic brushstroke, in the playful line, in shape and colour, in the nobility of the human form, in the ecstasies of the human body in motion, in self-expression unbound – both for their own sake and for the deeper things they say about our love of beauty” (510).

In sy voorlaaste hoofstuk skryf Ahmari onder meer oor ‘n Acosta. In ‘n onlangse opvoering “he lies seductively on the floor and asks a mostly white audience to count as he twerks more than a thousand times – one twerk for every African-American killed by the police in the US in 2015” (746). “The twerk … is a hip-hop dance, in which the dancer squats low to the ground and rapidly thrusts and gyrates the derrière” (684). Sou ‘n blanke akteur toegelaat word om dieselfde oor bv plaasmoorde voor ‘n swart gehoor te doen?

In die laaste hoofstuk skryf Ahmari: “For many people in the West, all thinking about culture has been reduced to a single mental reflex: art is worthwhile if it validates the narratives, identities and feelings of ‘maginalised’ groups or, conversely, lays bare the injustices of the ‘mainstream'” (795). Na aanleiding van die voorafgaande vra hy: “Is it any wonder … that Americans and Europeans are increasingly embracing nationalist parties and illiberal movements – or why Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán and their like are making significant gains at the ballot box?” (819). “They can do identity politics, too: it’s called white nationalism” (830).

Jare gelede toe Marilyn Martin die direkteur van die Nasionale Kunsmuseum in Kaapstad was, was sy gaande oor die skilderye van wat sy as dié van ‘n onbekende swart kunstenaar beskou het. Daarna het dit geblyk dat dit die werk van ‘n miskende blanke skilder is wat ‘n swart naam en van op sy skilderye aangebring het om te toets of die keuring ingevolge kuns of politiek gedoen word. Wat ons hier en in Ahmari se boek mee te make het, is simptomaties van ‘n kultureel siek samelewing.

Gelukkig geld dit nie almal in die samelewing nie. Konserwatiewe, tradisievaste burgers, soos in regse geledere aangetref word, is goed teen skadelike ideologie verskans. Maar hulle moet desnieteenstaande waaksaam wees, want hulle word in die massamedia (pers, radio, rolprent, televisie, internet) en elders, bv by opvoerings, “kunstefeeste” en self by die Afrikaanse Taalmonument, dikwels blootgestel aan politieke korrektheid en verwante hedendaagse ideologiese euwels. Gelukkig is daar steeds kunstenaars, soos skilders, wat in hulle ateljees ongesteurd voortgaan om kuns om kunsonthalwe te beoefen en daar is gelukkig ook kopers vir wie mooi steeds mooi en nie-ideologies is.

Leon Lemmer: Van slawerny tot progressiewe arbeid?

Daar is ‘n literêre werk wat deur Edmund Wilson (1895-1972) bestempel is as die belangrikste boek wat in die Amerikaanse Konfederasie geskryf is. Hy verwys na Mary Boykin Chesnut (1823-1886) se Diary (edited by Isabella D Martin and Myrta Lockett Avary, Digireads, 1905/2014, 214p; Amazon Kindle $1,13). Chesnut se pa, Stephan Miller (1788-1838), was die goewerneur van Suid-Carolina en later ‘n senator in Washington DC. Haar man, James Chesnut (1815-1885), was voor die uitbreek die die Amerikaanse Burgeroorlog (1861-1865) eweneens ‘n senator en daarna ‘n adjudant vir die president van die Konfederasie, Jefferson Davis (1808-1889), en ‘n generaal in die konfederale leër. “It was always his luck to arrive in the nick of time and be present at a great battle” (Kindle 2451).

Die Konfederasie verwys na die sewe (later elf) suidelike Amerikaanse state wat van die Unie weggebreek en Richmond, Virginia, as hoofstad gehad het. In hierdie suidelike state is geredeneer dat hulle vrywillig by die Unie aangesluit het, dat die sentrale regering in Washington DC net beperkte gesag oor hulle in ‘n aantal duidelik omskrewe sake het en dat iedere staat die vryheid het om van die Unie weg te breek. Daarenteen was die president van die VSA, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865, president 1861-1865), van mening dat die Unie ten alle koste behoue moet bly; dat daar ‘n sterk sentrale regering en ‘n enkele Amerikaanse nasie moet wees. Toe sommige van die suidelike state van die Unie wegbreek, het die Burgeroorlog gevolg.

Mary Chesnut het in die hoogste politieke kringe in die Konfederasie beweeg. Sy en haar man en die presidensiële Davis-egpaar was huisvriende. Hulle was baie patrioties en het dwarsdeur die oorlog bly glo dat hulle saak reg is. “The real ammunition of our war is faith in ourselves and enthusiasm in our cause” (2504). “Our people are brave, our cause is just; our spirit and our patient endurance beyond reproach” (2622).”I would rather live in Siberia, worse still, in Sahara, than live in a country surrendered to Yankees” (2253). Yankees is die naam vir die inwoners van die noordelike state. Die suidelike state het bloot op hulle vryheid, hulle reg om alleen gelaat te word, aangedring terwyl die Unie, met Lincoln aan die spits, ‘n oorlog ter verowering teen hulle gevoer het.

“Madame, your country is invaded” (620). “If we could only separate … and not have a horrid fight for divorce” (468). “We would be only too grateful to be left alone” (1580). Suid-Carolina is ‘n “poor, little, hot-blooded, headstrong, rash, and troublesome sister State” genoem (730). Die suidelike state was landbou-georiënteerd en afhanklik van slawe-arbeid; iets wat nie in dieselfde mate vir die noordelike state met hulle nywerhede gegeld het nie. Slawerny was nie die oorsaak van die Burgeroorlog nie, maar Lincoln het die slawe in die Konfederasie enersyds tot opstand aangehits en hulle andersyds aangemoedig om na die noorde te dros sodat hy hulle onder meer teen die konfederale soldate kon gebruik. In die dagboek word daar verwys na ‘n “black regiment” (4218). Vir die suidelike state was dit ‘n geval van “Yankees in front and negroes in the rear” (627). Lincoln het hom, soos FW de Klerk meer as ‘n eeu later, in so ‘n mate vasgeverf met sy uitlatings oor die swartes dat die slawe na die Burgeroorlog as vrye wesens oor die land losgelaat is.

Die outeur blyk ‘n goed ingeligte, intelligente persoon te wees wat sowel Frans as Duits magtig was. Sy was ‘n fyn waarnemer. “I am a tolerably close observer, a faithful watcher have I been from my youth upward of men and manners. Society has been for me only an enlarged field for character study” (4717). Hoewel Chesnut gelowig was, was sy nie eng godsdienstig nie. Sy was teen slawerny gekant. “Slavery has to go, of course, and joy go with it” (1151). Hulle huwelik was kinderloos. “Women have such a contempt for a childless wife” (2030). “Of course, I know nothing of children: in point of fact, am awfully afraid of them” (3541). Daar is tekens van feminisme by haar te bespeur.

Die dagboek is goed geskryf en die lesers leer haar ken as iemand wat maklik lag. “The reason I can not bear Mrs Chesnut is that she laughs at everything and at everybody” (2720). “If I laugh at any mortal thing it is that I may not weep” (4762). Sy was dikwels depressief en siek en het maklik gehuil. “I cried with a will” (5570). “This woman cries with her whole heart, just as she laughs” (4887). Die dagboekinskrywings dek die tydperk 8 November 1860 tot 2 Augustus 1865. “For the first time in my life no books can interest me. Life is so real, so utterly earnest, that fiction is flat” (2491). “I write daily for my own diversion. These mémoires pour servir may at some future day afford facts about these times and prove useful to more important people than I am” (1984).

Die Chesnut-egpaar het as welvarende plaaseienaars die oorlog binnegegaan maar na die oorlog as verarmdes gespook om te oorleef. Inflasie het sy tol geëis. “You take your money to market in the market basket, and bring home what you buy in your pocket-book” (3974). “The loss of our private fortune the smallest part” (3798). “Our best and bravest are under the sod” (4672). “All that pleasant company are dead, and our world, the only world we cared for, literally kicked to pieces” (3342). “Hearts do break in silence, without a word or a sigh” (4404). Van party gewonde soldate het min ledemate, ens, oorgebly. Van een van hulle is gesê: “He has body enough left to hold his soul” (3941). “They were awfully smashed-up, objects of misery, wounded, maimed, diseased” (4482). “War leads to love-making … the farce is ‘Cupid on Crutches'” (4040).

Die Konfederasie het tevergeefs op buitelandse steun gehoop. “From the outside no help indeed cometh to this beleaguered land” (1969). Die aanvoerder van die Unie-magte, William Sherman (1820-1891), word in die noordelike state geloof, maar hy het ‘n beleid van verskroeide aarde in die Konfederasie gevolg. Chesnut noem hom “vandal Sherman” (4952). “My husband said Nature is a wonderful renovator” (5385). “Nature is so luxuriant here, she soon covers the ravages of savages” (5392).

In die Konfederasie was daar een opsie wat nooit oorweeg sou word nie, naamlik Britse herkolonisering. “The British are the most conceited nation in the world, the most self-sufficient, self-satisfied, and arrogant. But each individual man does not blow his own penny whistle; they brag wholesale” (1862). “It is a crowning misdemeanor for us to hold still in slavery those Africans whom they [the British] brought here from Africa, or sold to us when they found it did not pay to own them themselves. Gradually, they slid or sold them off down here; or freed them prospectively, giving themselves years in which to get rid of them in a remunerative way” (1882). Tydens die Burgeroorlog moes die suiderlinge William Howard Russell (1820-1907) as joernalis van die Londense koerant, The Times, verduur. Hy het met “three P’s – pen, paper, prejudices” – gekom (970).

Die heel eerste dagboekinskrywing noem dat Lincoln tot Amerikaanse president verkies is. Iemand het gesê: “Now that the black radical Republicans have the power I suppose they will Brown us all” (232). Die Republikeinse Party was teen slawerny gekant en in daardie sin pro-swart. “Brown” verwys na John Brown (1850-1859) wat slawerny wou afskaf deur opstande te stook. “Now if slavery is as disagreeable to negroes as we think it, why don’t they all march over the border where they would be received with open arms? It amazes me. I am always studying these creatures. They are to me inscrutable in their way and past finding out. Our negroes were not ripe for John Brown” (1391).

Die outeur het gesien hoe ‘n swart slavin opgeveil word. “She seemed delighted with it all” (375). Oor ‘n slaaf: “He is awfully grateful to us for buying him” (3535). Daar is verwag dat die slawe tydens die Burgeroorlog in algehele opstand sou kom, maar “not by one word or look can we detect any change in the demeanor of these negro servants” (696). “They don’t go to the enemy, because they are comfortable as they are, and expect to be free anyway” (3163). ‘n Slavin het gesê: “We were comfortable every way — good house, everything” (783). ‘n Slaaf het in lewensgevaar vir sy eienaar “a bucket of ham and rice,” wat hy gekook het, op die slagveld geneem (1378).

“The best way to take negroes to your heart is to get as far away from them as possible. As far as I can see, Southern women do all that missionaries could do to prevent and alleviate evils. The social evil has not been suppressed in old England or in New England, in London or in Boston. People in those places expect more virtue from a plantation African than they can insure in practise among themselves with their own high moral surroundings … The Northern men and women who came here were always hardest, for they expect an African to work and behave as a white man. We do not” (2044).

“Mrs Preston and I were talking of negroes and cows. A negro, no matter how sensible he is on any other subject, can never be convinced that there is any necessity to feed a cow. ‘Turn ’em out, and let ’em grass. Grass good nuff for cow'” (2583). “Evas are mostly in the heaven of Mrs [Harriet Beecher] Stowe’s [1811-1896, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 1852] imagination. People can’t love things dirty, ugly, and repulsive, simply because they ought to do so, but they can be good to them at a distance; that’s easy. You see, I can not rise very high; I can only judge by what I see” (2057).

Teen die einde van die oorlog het die aanslag op die konfederale hoofstad, Richmond, begin. “Am I the same poor soul who fell on her knees and prayed, and wept, and fainted, as the first gun boomed from Fort Sumter? Once more we have repulsed the enemy. But it is humiliating, indeed, that he can come and threaten us at our very gates whenever he so pleases. If a forlorn negro had not led them astray (and they hanged him for it) on Tuesday night, unmolested, they would have walked into Richmond” (4107).

Na die oorlog skryf Chesnut: “These negroes are unchanged” (5345). “The fidelity of the negroes is the principal topic. There seems to be not a single case of a negro who betrayed his master, and yet they showed a natural and exultant joy at being free. After we left Winnsboro negroes were seen in the fields plowing and hoeing corn, just as in antebellum times. The fields in that respect looked quite cheerful. We did not pass in the line of Sherman’s savages, and so saw some houses standing” (5398). “Nothing is left to us now but the bare land, and the debts contracted for the support of hundreds of negroes during the war … The negroes would be a good riddance. A hired man would be a good deal cheaper than a man whose father and mother, wife and twelve children have to be fed, clothed, housed, and nursed, their taxes paid, and their doctor’s bills, all for his half-done, slovenly, lazy work. For years we have thought negroes a nuisance that did not pay. They pretend exuberant loyalty to us now. Only one man of Mr Chesnut’s left the plantation with the Yankees” (5431).

“The negroes have flocked to the Yankee squad which has recently come, but they were snubbed, the rampant freedmen. ‘Stay where you are,’ say the Yanks. ‘We have nothing for you.’ And they sadly ‘peruse’ their way. Now that they have picked up that word ‘peruse,’ they use it in season and out. When we met Mrs Preston’s William we asked, ‘Where are you going?’ ‘Perusing my way to Columbia,’ he answered. When the Yanks said they had no rations for idle negroes, John Walker answered mildly, ‘This is not at all what we expected.’ The colored women, dressed in their gaudiest array, carried bouquets to the Yankees, making the day a jubilee. But in this house there is not the slightest change. Every negro has known for months that he or she was free, but I do not see one particle of change in their manner. They are, perhaps, more circumspect, polite, and quiet, but that is all. Otherwise all goes on in antebellum status quo. Every day I expect to miss some familiar face, but so far have been disappointed” (5516).

“Went to our plantation, the Hermitage, yesterday. Saw no change; not a soul was absent from his or her post. I said, ‘Good colored folks, when are you going to kick off the traces and be free?’ In their furious emotional way, they swore devotion to us all to their dying day … ‘Well, William, what do you want?’ asked my husband. ‘Only to look at you, master; it does me good” (5542). Hedendaagse Amerikaanse swartes stel slawerny heeltemal anders voor as in Chesnut se eerstehandse verslag; dermate dat hulle op kompensasie aandring. Insgelyks stel Suid-Afrikaanse swartes apartheid so wreedaardig en verontmenslikend moontlik voor ten einde soveel moontlik bevoordeel te word.

Chesnut wek die indruk dat slawerny ‘n parasitiese stelsel ten koste van slawe-eienaars was. Hedendaagse Amerikaanse swartes, daarenteen, stel slawerny voor as ‘n uitbuitende opset waarin hulle voorgeslagte nie na behore vir hulle arbeid vergoed is nie. Daar word dan met vergesogte eise gekom waarvolgens huidige vrygebore swartes vir die beweerde benadeling van slawe vergoed moet word. Sonder dat individuele swartes iets hoef te doen, maak groeplidmaatskap hulle glo geregtig op terugbetaling. Dié geld moet opgedok word deur ander mense as die (veral blanke) dooies wat glo destyds onregmatig deur slawerny bevoordeel is.

Lank na emansipasie in 1865 het Amerikaanse swartes op groot skaal begin koerskies uit die suide na die noorde en weste van Amerika. Hulle het ten minste aanvanklik vryelik die sekuriteit van kos, huisvesting, ens, in ruil vir hulle arbeid verkies. Hierdie etniese groep het klaarblyklik nie in dieselfde mate as blankes waarde aan vryheid geheg nie. In Afrika is na bewering tradisioneel net sowat ‘n kwart van die swart bevolking nie deur hulle medeswartes verslaaf nie (Hinton Rowan Helper, The negroes in Negroland, New York: GW Carleton, 1868, 225p; Amazon Kindle $1,13, 541, 560, 1745). “Slavery in Africa as a national institution … seems to have existed always” (655).

“The liability to fall into a condition of servitude is not so frightful in Africa as it is where there is a higher appreciation of personal liberty; nor does the same odium attach to the term slave as is attached to it among civilized men. The African sees very little difference between the authority exercised over him by one whom he acknowledges as his master and the petty tyranny which is exercised by most African chiefs over their subjects; and so long as he is worked moderately, and treated kindly, he has but little cause for dissatisfaction, and not infrequently by his own choice places himself in this condition” (570). Die voorafgaande twee sinne is heeltemal in ooreenstemming met Chesnut se standpunt.

Slawerny het voor- en nadele gehad. Ek mik na ‘n konstruktiewe aanwending van die positiewe aspekte in die hedendaagse Suid-Afrika. Naas Helper se boek is daar ‘n ander bron waarna ek by ‘n vorige geleentheid verwys het. William Buckley “proposed, several years before Governor Reagan offered his hard-nosed welfare-reform program in California, that all welfare recipients be required to do ‘street cleaning and general prettification work’ for the city. Here was the first conservative enunciation of the workfare principle, or as Buckley put it rather crudely, ‘No workee, no dolee'” (Lee Edwards, William F Buckley Jr: The maker of a movement, Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Insitute, 2014, 208p; Amazon Kindle $11,39, 1249).

In Suid-Afrika word protes, wat dikwels gewelddadige afmetings aanneem, as ‘n fundamentele mensereg beskou, seker omdat geweld in die DNS van die ANC is. Dit misken ‘n fundamenteler beginsel: dat iets in ruil vir niks ‘n onding is. Diegene wat nie vir dienste betaal nie behoort geen reg te hê om oor gebrekkige of geen dienste te betoog nie. Nie-betalers behoort verplig te word om iets in ruil vir dienste, huisvesting, ens, te doen, bv strate te vee, rommel op te tel en plante te versorg.

Deesdae is die Amerikaanse middestede die nuwe plantasies waar swartes aangetref word. “Under slavery, blacks had to work; today’s blacks don’t have to work to inhabit the progressive plantation” (Dinesh D’Souza, Hillary’s America, Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2016, 256p; Amazon Kindle $19,24, 366). Die verskil tussen enersyds die hedendaagse werkloosheidstoelae en andersyds vergoeding vir werk is so klein dat baie mense verkies om nie te werk nie. Staatstoelaes aan gestremdes en bejaardes kan geregverdig word, maar nie oorkompensasie aan diegene wat nie (wil) werk nie. In Suid-Afrika is die wanverhouding tussen diegene wat ‘n bate vir die samelewing is en diegene wat ‘n (finansiële) las vir die land is veel groter as in Amerika. Hierdie situasie versleg eksponensieel. Die huidige beleid van staatsaalmoese is nie volhoubaar nie.

Nelson Mandela het graag beweer dat Suid-Afrika se mense die land se grootste bate is. Hy het dit gedoen om populêr te wees en natuurlik ook omdat hy en sy politieke party meerderheidsteun geniet het. Maar in ‘n land waarin die meeste mense onproduktief is en baie van hulle roofbou toepas, dus afbreek pleks van opbou, is ruim die helfte van die inwoners eerder ‘n ekonomiese las as ‘n bate. Maniere moet gevind word om die onproduktiewes en sosiaal skadelikes tot ‘n voorbeeldige leefwyse te transformeer. Dit kan gedoen word deur minder rojaal enersyds met staatstoelaes en andersyds met bv minimum vergoeding te wees. Die nie-produktiewes is soos die spoorwegnetwerke: hulle is daar maar hulle word nie na behore benut nie.

Onder diegene wat in die nuwe Suid-Afrika as politieke leiers ontpop het, is daar ‘n hele aantal tronkvoëls wat oorsimpatiek jeens misdadigers is. Anders as in sommige beskaafde lande is sake in die nuwe Suid-Afrika so bewimpel dat prisoniers niks in ruil vir hulle onderhoud hoef te doen nie en hulle boonop stemreg het. In die goeie ou dae kon dikwels gesien word hoe bandiete op paaie of plase werk. ‘n Bewaarder het hulle opgepas en hy het die reg gehad om enigeen wat probeer ontsnap, te skiet. Toe was dit nie nodig dat daardie bewaarders superbewaarders moes hê om oor hulle toesig te hou nie. Ontsnappings het selde indien ooit plaasgevind. Prisoniers en onwettige immigrante behoort verplig te word om werk in ruil vir hulle onderhoud te doen, of daar behoort ten minste sodanige opsie te wees, wat dalk vir baie van hulle aanvaarbaar sal wees.

Weens die huidige preokkupasie met menseregte, bv vryheid, kan slawerny kwalik in sy oorspronklike vorm teruggebring word. Maar dit is moontlik dat baie werkloses die sekuriteit van ‘n werk en ‘n inkomste sal verkies bo die kreperende vryheid van leeglê. Dit het sielkundig groot voordele om eerder ‘n nuttige burger as ‘n oorlas te wees. Daarmee word selfrespek teruggewen. As staatstoelaes ingekort word, moet leeglêers eerder tot werk as misdaad verplig word. Dit kan deur strenger en doeltreffender wetstoepassing bewerkstellig word.

Wanneer die ANC iets doen wat weersin by sommige wek, word ‘n mooi klinkende naam daarvoor uitgedink. Vandale en terroriste word “vryheidsvegters” genoem. Swart oorheersing word “demokrasie” genoem. “Demografies verteenwoordigend” beteken minstens 80% swart. Die akademiese agteruitgang van universiteite word “transformasie” genoem. Rassediskriminasie teen en benadeling van blankes word “regstellende aksie”, “bemagtiging”, ens, genoem. ‘n Stelsel wat werkloses tot werk verplig of selfs net aanmoedig, sal deur liberaliste afgeskiet word. Dit sou onvanpas en dalk selfteenstrydig wees om dit “liberale arbeid” te noem. Maar “progressiewe arbeid” klink vir my na ‘n gepaste benaming. Werkkolonies behoort geskep te word waar werkloses vir ‘n bepaalde tydperk en teen vasgestelde vergoeding gekontrakteer word. Nuttige werk, soos die herstel van paaie, kan deur hulle onderneem word. Daar moet liewer in landsbelang gedink word en nie ingevolge oordrewe menseregte, soos vryheid sonder verantwoordelikheid, nie.

In propaganda word ons wysgemaak dat “vryheidsvegters” vir ons die salige staat van demokrasie, in die vorm van swart oorheersing, besorg het. Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) het vryheid as die afwesigheid van inmenging gedefinieer. Philip Pettit het vryheid as nie-dominansie herdefinieer (Jason Brennan, Against democracy, Princeton University Press, 2016; 304p; Amazon Kindle $18,43, 1745). Die waarheid is dat die belange van blankes in die nuwe Suid-Afrika nie net aan voortdurende inmenging deur die swart regering blootgestel is nie, maar ook aan naakte dominansie. Vir blankes is die nuwe Suid-Afrika ‘n era van onvryheid, dus in daardie opsig soos slawerny. Dink aan hoe blanke sakemanne en boere verplig word om van hulle eiendom, sonder enige teenprestasie van swartes, aan swartes af te staan. Vryheid vereis regte wat ons vrywaar teen inmenging en dominansie. Sodanige regte bestaan nie. Maar dan kom mense soos FW de Klerk en Leon Wessels en vertel herhaaldelik dat ons in ons noppies met die grondwet moet wees.

Leon Lemmer: Oor pers gesigte en ‘n swart Beethoven

Aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch (US) het twee blanke damesstudente hulle gegrimeer om soos ruimtewesens te lyk. Hulle het hulle gesigte pers gesmeer. Die US-bestuur het op grond van foto’s geoordeel dat hulle hulle gesigte swart gesmeer het. In die oë van die polities korrekte US-bestuur is dit ‘n doodsonde as blankes voorgee dat hulle swart is. Dit kan bv daarop neerkom dat blankes valslik daarop aanspraak maak dat hulle net so voortreflik soos swartes is. Ook kan die beleid van raskwotas weens swartgesmeerde gesigte in chaos gedompel word. Die twee dames is onmiddellik uit ‘n US-koshuis geskors.

Lede van die militante Open Stellenbosch is toegelaat om die leviete oor rassisme, ens, aan al die inwoners van daardie koshuis voor te lees. Later het die US-bestuur agtergekom dat die dames hulle gesigte nie swart gesmeer het nie, maar pers. Die oortreding was dus nie so ernstig as wat aanvanklik gemeen is nie. Die twee dames is dus toegelaat om weer hulle intrek in die koshuis te neem. ‘n Onafhanklike ondersoeker het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat die universiteitsbestuur nie gefouteer het nie. Hierdie bevinding bevestig dat die US-bestuur weet watter kant om in enige wit-swart dispuut te kies. Dit blyk bv uit die voorkeur wat aan Engels as onderrigtaal gegee word. Ebbe Dommisse skryf: “Op Stellenbosch het ‘n onervare bestuurspan verlede November ook sowat alles probeer verengels” (Rapport, Weekliks, 13 November, p 4; ook LitNet 21 November). Die vraag is of dit nie ook ‘n onbekwame bestuurspan is nie.

Hierdie persgesig-insident is kenmerkend van die soort misplaaste politieke korrektheid wat uit Amerika hierheen oorgewaai het. Volgens Wim de Villiers, die US-rektor, geniet transformasie (pleks van akademiese oorwegings)* voorkeur in iedere vesel van die US. Daar is ‘n spesifieke Amerikaanse universiteit wat in hierdie opsig as voorbeeld vir die US dien, naamlik Stanford University, by Palo Alto in Kalifornië. Soos die US is Stanford voorheen akademies hoog aangeslaan. Die anti-akademiese virus word daar nie transformasie genoem nie, maar multikulturaliteit. David O Sacks en Peter A Thiel het ‘n boek daaroor geskryf: The diversity myth: Multiculturalism and political intolerance on campus (Oakland: The Independent Institute, 2nd edition, 1998, 323p; Amazon Kindle $10,25). “The ‘diversity myth’ is the myth that universities are doing a good job promoting diversity” (Kindle 227). “Our primary goal was simply to present an accurate account of what ‘diversity’ politics and its alter-ego ‘multiculturalism’ have meant at a major university,” naamlik Stanford (281). Naas transformasie is diversiteit een van die terme wat deesdae graag deur die US-bestuur rondgeslinger word. Daar is al gepraat van die Diversiteit Stellenbosch. [* Oor Stanford is geskryf: “The professors, appointed out of political motives and less talented academically than their own students …” (5261). Ook aan die US speel nie-akademiese oorwegings, soos ras en geslag, dikwels ‘n deurslaggewende rol by aanstellings en bevorderings.]

Polities gemotiveerde anti-akademiese gesindheid word algemeen aan universiteite in Amerika en Suid-Afrika aangetref. By sommige universiteite is dit in groter oordaad as by ander aanwesig. Die kernproses is ontwestering, wat al “ghettoizing of knowledge” genoem is (525). “Multiculturalism filled the vacuum created by the elimination of the West” (963). “Multiculturalism amounts to nothing less than a war on Western civilization and, beyond it, a war on the very idea of civilization” (202). Die ideaal van ontwestering is wat die huidige studente-onrus in Suid-Afrika aanblaas.

Wat ek interessant vind, is dat die outeurs vroeg in hulle boek naas Stanford vir Cornell University, te Ithaca, New York, uitsonder as ‘n ander groot en bekende universiteit waar multikulturaliteit, bv swart bevoordeling, ‘n deurslaggewende rol speel (298). Jonathan Jansen, die vorige rektor van die Universiteit Vrystaat (UV), het na studie aan die Universiteit van Wes-Kaapland in 1987 ‘n magistergraad aan Cornell en in 1991 ‘n doktorsgraad aan Stanford voltooi. Jansen het onlangs as ‘n navorsingsgenoot na Stanford teruggekeer. Die multikulturaliteit waarin die eertydse akademiese integriteit van Stanford sedert 1987 (485) versink het, is veral die maaksel van ‘n bioloog (450), Donald Kennedy, wat twaalf jaar lank (1268), van 1980 tot 1992 (4946), die president of rektor van Stanford was. Jansen was ‘n biologie-onderwyser voordat hy in Amerika gaan studeer het. Wat tydens sy rektorskap aan die UV gebeur het, getuig (soos by Stanford) van die gevaar as iemand wat (grootliks) onkundig in die humaniora en sosiale wetenskappe is as rektor op ‘n universiteit losgelaat word. Vir ‘n rektor is ‘n mediese agtergrond nie minder gevaarlik as ‘n biologie-agtergrond nie. ‘n Medikus kan vertrou word met raad oor bv spysvertering en purgasie, maar daar kan kwalik van hom verwag word om as rektor insig te toon en leiding te gee oor ideologiese en taalsake of hoedanig ‘n universiteit behoort te wees. Let op dat Jansen tydens Kennedy se ampstermyn ‘n student aan Stanford was.

In hierdie rubriek is daar nie ruimte om die hele inhoud van Sacks en Thiel se boek aan die orde te stel nie. Wat hierdie boek baie duidelik maak, is dat Stanford tot in sy kern akademies en moreel verrot is. “Institutions like Stanford University are indoctrinating the current generation of American graduates with a new mythology – a complete pantheon, filled with heroes and villians, deified victims and demonized oppressors” (4354). “Bursting with revolutionary consciousness and run by a corrupt elite, Stanford truly had come to resemble something like the Third World” (4643). Aan Stanford “the multicultural state came to resemble a despotic Third World regime not only in its fervent ideology, but also in the endemic corruption throughout its ranks” (4865).

Ek gaan egter my aandag beperk tot ‘n enkele tipiese voorval op die Stanford-kampus wat aan die US se persgesig-voorval herinner. Soos in die geval van die persgesig-insident is Stanford se Beethoven-voorval ondersoek en is ‘n verslag daaroor vrygestel. Daardie voorval toon die mate waarin polities korrekte irrasionaliteit die oorhand oor Amerikaanse universiteite gekry het, met Suid-Afrikaanse universiteite wat al hoe meer net ‘n kortkop agter hulle is. Die voorval is so verregaande dat ek liefs probeer om my van lopende evaluerende kommentaar te weerhou en ek my eerder tot verduidelikende kommentaar beperk.

Lesers kan gerus ook die buitensporige afmetings wat die Reitz-insident aan die UV aangeneem het, in gedagte hou. As remedie vir die pyn wat die Reitz-gebeure glo veroorsaak het, is die Sentrum vir Versoening en Sosiale Geregtigheid deur Jansen tot stand gebring. Die direkteur, André Keet, en sy adjunk, JC van der Merwe, is onlangs daarvan beskuldig dat hulle die studente-onrus op die kampus aanblaas en dat hulle die oortreders openlik in die hof bystaan. Dit toon hoe gevaarlik dit is as ‘n universiteit hom eerder deur politieke as akademiese oorwegings laat lei.

Stanford het ‘n koshuis, Ujamaa House,* waarin swart kultuur die koshuistema is en waarin daar oorwegend swart inwoners is. In Amerika is daar deesdade ‘n neiging tot skeiding van etniese groepe. Swartes wil apart wees wanneer dit hulle pas. In Suid-Afrika vind die teenoorgestelde plaas, naamlik gedwonge rasse-integrasie in koshuise aan eens blanke universiteite. Toe ek laas gehoor het, was ‘n koshuis vir swartes aan die UV ‘n Jansen-toegelate uitsondering. In Amerika, bv aan Stanford, word koshuise en gradeplegtighede deesdae in groot mate volgens etnisiteit apart gehou. [* In Suid-Afrika word die voorbeeld wat militante Amerikaanse swartes stel om omstrede en selfs afstootlike benamings te kies, dikwels nagevolg. Ujamaa was die naam van Julius Nyerere se mislukte sosiale en ekonomiese beleid in Tanzanië, bv kollektiewe boerdery, wat tot die ontworteling en dood van derduisende inwoners gelei het.]

Op 29 September 1988 het twee blanke eerstejaarstudente, Gus Heldt en Ben Dugan, in Ujamaa House ‘n openbare gesprek met ‘n swart tweedejaarstudent, BJ Kerr, gevoer. “The discussion’s topics included black influence on music … BJ informed the students that ‘all music is black’ and that ‘all music listened to today in America has African origins – beats, drums, and so forth.’ A white bystander asked, ‘What about classical music? Beethoven?’ Undeterred, BJ declared that Beethoven also had been black – he had read it in a book in the Ujamaa library. Ben and Gus were incredulous. BJ expressed displeasure with Gus and Ben for doubting. The idea that Beethoven had been black ‘was so far from their own truth,’ he declared, that the two freshmen ‘could not accept it'” (1318).

Hier moet ek verduidelik dat sogenaamde identiteitstudies, bv Black Studies, Women’s Studies en Queer Studies, onder ‘n verskeidenheid benamings deesdae as baccalaureuskursusse, selfs as voorgraadse hoofvakke, en as nagraadse studieterreine erken word. Hierdie onderwerpe word nie soseer doseer om feitelike inligting aan die studente oor te dra nie maar eerder om die studente goed te laat voel.* Dit gaan primêr nie om kennis nie, maar eerder om terapie. Die gevolg is dat vergesogte stellings gemaak word ten einde bv swartes, (feministiese) vroue en homoseksuele goed te laat voel. Dit is dus moontlik dat in ‘n handboek oor Black Studies beweer word dat Beethoven swart was. Die waarheid word gerelativeer en as subjektief geag. ‘n Swart Beethoven is BJ se waarheid maar nie Gus en Ben se waarheid nie; ook nie dié waarheid nie. [* Vandaar die versugting plaaslik op eens blanke kampusse dat swart studente daar tuis moet word. Dit word bewerkstellig deur blanke studente te ontheem, dus minder tuis te laat voel, deur bv gebouname te verander, standbeelde te verwyder en selfs leerplanne en leergange te wysig, bv te verafrika.]

“The following evening, Ben noticed a Stanford Symphony recruiting poster featuring a picture of none other than Beethoven himself (in the poster, Beethoven appeared white). Inebriated, Gus and Ben used crayons to color in the Beethoven flier with the stereotypical features of a black man – brown face, curly black hair, enlarged lips – and then posted the flyer on a ‘food for thought’ bulletin board adjacent to BJ’s door. The black residents of Ujamaa did not consider the satire amusing. BJ, who had lectured other people on Beethoven’s blackness just several days earlier, was particularly flabbergasted. ‘I coundn’t believe anybody would do that. You see things like that in the movies or on TV. It’s the kind of thing someone would do in their room and joke about but it didn’t seem like anyone would be bold enough to put it on a door.’ One of the black resident assistants (RAs) in Ujamaa added that the flyer was ‘hateful, shocking. I was outraged and sickened.’ Overnight, with the most minute shift in inflection, the symbolic significance of the claim that Beethoven was black had changed 180 degrees – from a source of multicultural pride to a point of multicultural derision” (1326).

“Ben and Gus’s satire was certainly in bad taste [?]. But BJ’s words and the two white students’ drawing had said precisely the same thing. Nevertheless, the fact that these students were of different races made BJ’s expression legitimate and the white students’ something of a crime. A black student who said that Beethoven was black was bolstering racial pride, while white students doing the same – with the ‘wrong’ intentions – were racist rabble-rousers. To the multiculturalists, for whom truth is subjective, the accuracy or falsehood of the original claim was irrelevant. Because ‘subordinated’ groups are not subject to criticism by ‘superordinated’ groups, the relevant issue was not what was said, but who said what to whom” (1335).

“On October 16, an emergency house meeting was called to discuss the Beethoven flier. An Ujamaa ‘teaching assistant’ (TA) had succeeded in extracting a confession from Gus by warning him that ‘people* are really angry,’ ‘people* are really suspicious of you,’ and there are people* planning ‘to beat the hell out of you.’ According to the Final Report, ‘We asked TA Brown if in fact there were residents planning to beat up [Ben] and [Gus]. He said no; this was a ruse to get [Gus] to tell the truth” (1344). [* Die etnisiteit word nie gespesifiseer nie.]

“If Gus’s confession was extracted by intimidation, the emergency house meeting resembled a show trial. Ujamaa’s residents had been discussing the matter among themselves for the previous two weeks, and the atmosphere was highly charged. Gus attempted an explanation: He had been disturbed and offended to find that people cared so much about race at Stanford, and he thought the focus on ‘ethnic differences’ was counterproductive. Gus suggested that the poster had been attempted as ‘food for thought,’ educational, and ‘avant-garde’ art. Ujamaa’s residents, however, were not interested in an art lesson, much less the suggestion that their focus on race – of which the show trial was but the latest instance – was excessive. A resident interrupted Gus’s speech: ‘You arrogant bastard, how dare you come here and not even apologize. I want an apology.’ Gus’s flip reply indicated that he remained unrepentant: ‘1, 2, 3, we’re sorry.’ The ‘apology,’ needless to say, was inadequate,* and some of the residents began to demand that Ben and Gus be removed from the Stanford dorm system. Ron Hudson, an assistant dean of student affairs, suggested rather lamely that it would be good to keep the two freshmen in the dorms so they could receive a better multicultural education” (1344). [* In Suid-Afrika word van blankes verwag om nie net verskoning vir bv apartheid te vra nie, maar om dit herhaaldelik te doen en in oortreffende mate anders is dit onaanvaarbaar.]

“The din of the crowd quieted as BJ rose to speak. Noting that Dean Hudson’s suggestion was silly, BJ stated that Ujamaa’s residents should not educate the two freshmen because ‘this all came about because [black Ujamaa residents] were trying to educate [these two] about African history [in the first place].’ It would be a waste to educate persons with ‘such dogmatic racism who came to Stanford with eighteen years of belligerent ideology,’ and he ‘shouldn’t have to pay $20 000 to educate white people about racism’ in his own home. BJ concluded that the proper remedy would consist of throwing the culprits out of the dorm” (1344).

“In the course of his speech, BJ had become more and more emotional. There are conflicting accounts of what occurred next, but observers interviewed for the university’s Final Report generally agreed that towards the end of his speech, BJ started to gesticulate wildly, lunged violently at the two white freshmen, and, seemingly to have lost his mind, collapsed on the floor. According to the residence staff, when people caught BJ ‘he was groaning and flailing his arms;’ it ‘seemed as if BJ had lost his mind;’ he was ‘not in control of his actions’ and was carried out of the lounge to his room by about six students, while he was ‘crying, screaming and having a fit'” (1362).

“BJ’s tantrum was only the beginning of the end of the house meeting. The university’s Final Report describes the pandemonium that broke loose next:

‘As many as 60 students were crying with various degrees of hysteria. At least one student hyperventilated and had to be assisted in breathing. According to R[esident]F[ellow] Brooks there was “utter chaos.” People were “crying, screaming,” “hysterical” and “distraught.” R[esident]F[ellow] Weiss said that there was “mass chaos,” “people were holding hands and crying, tears were running down”, the “staff was running around trying to collect people.” She compared the scene to the mass hysteria that occurred when the [space] shuttle exploded or the US exhibition air show in Germany where a group of planes simultaneously crashed. R[esident]F[ellow] Brooks told the staff “to make sure no one was alone.” R[esident]A[assistant] Johnson reported that “one woman was jumping up and down saying this is not fair.” She “herded” crying persons into her room which was “a wreck,” “bodies everywhere”‘ (1371).

“Multicultural diversity has its limits, and at Ujamaa events had moved far beyond the breaking point. Two freshmen, at Stanford for only a few weeks, had done nothing more than poke fun at multiculturalism with a satirical flier. In the subsequent days, the flier’s significance became exaggerated to the point where it caused an entire dorm to have a collective nervous breakdown. Since the administration was unwilling to tell Ujamaa’s minority* residents (members of a privileged multicultural group) that they had overreacted, Ben and Gus had to be found guilty of instigating** the entire episode. They were blamed for the ‘painful experience’ and were removed from university housing for the remainder of the year. The fact that Ujamaa’s residents were largely responsible for blowing events out of all proportion*** was conveniently overlooked in the cathartic hunt for scapegoats” (1379). [* In Amerika beteken “minority” nie-wit. ** Dus, Ben en Gus se reaksie het die insident begin, nie BJ se stelling dat Beethoven swart is nie. *** Vergelyk die doodskisvoorval in Suid-Afrika. Niemand is beseer of gedood nie maar hierdie beuselagtige gebeurtenis kry baie meer verontwaardigde publisiteit as die wreedste plaasmoord.]

“As unfortunate as the entire episode was for Ben, Gus, and the other residents of Ujamaa, the incident is still useful for its instructional value. For multiculturalism to ‘work,’ some groups of people must defer to other groups of people. Within each group, some persons are ‘correct’ (while others are ‘sell-outs’), and so on. Ben’s and Gus’s actions undermined multiculturalism on almost every level. They challenged a claim made by a representative of a favored group [!], they renewed the challenge with a flier, and (perhaps worst of all) they refused to confess to their crimes in front of a crowd that desperately needed reassurance. Because Ben and Gus were partially [?] right in what they had said (that is, Beethoven was not black), their challenge could not be dealt with in a rational or intellectual manner. Rather, the residents of Ujamaa restored consessus by demanding the literal expulsion of the two nonconformists. Ben and Gus had to go because the multicultural community requires (as the substitute for objective truth) widespread agreement on underlying ideological values. At the same time, their punishment would also serve as a warning and deterrent to other would-be contrarians. Incidentally, the question of whether Beethoven actually was black, around which much of this debate ostensibly had resolved, was never resolved or even addressed” (1388). “There was something wrong with a regime that punished people for speaking the truth” (3920).

“Much as with the Western Culture debate,* the details of the Beethoven incident gradually would fade, but as a putative racist episode it would provide the justification for additional ‘sensitivity training’ sessions, more multicultural workshops, and new regulations on conduct. Speaking at a ‘Rally Against Racism’ several weeks later, undergraduate Cheryl Taylor cited the Ujamaa episode as symptomatic of widespread oppression of blacks. The genesis of a new multicultural myth was well under way [!] (1396). [* Western Culture was ‘n verpligte kursus aan Stanford maar is vervang met ander waarin by uitstek ander kulture betrek word.]

Cheryl Taylor het gesê: “By now, y’all must have heard about the Ujamaa incident – the racially defaced Beethoven flyer … This is a big deal [!]; in the context of American society, these incidents are truly racist. They weren’t just isolated incidents committed out of ignorance; rather, they were deliberate actions committed in response to the Res[idential] Ed[ucation] focus on diversity. In effect, these individuals sent a message to Stanford, and all communities of color[:] ‘we’re sick of this cultural diversity bullshit that’s being shoved down our throats. Your cultures are not legitimate – they don’t mean shit to us – they have no place in this University – Niggers, we will put you back in your place.[‘] Well, they’ve been kicked out of the dorm and we are here today to say that no one is going to stand in our way as we fight for justice and respect” (1396).

“Ujamaa achieved a ‘unity’ of sorts by collectively expelling the two freshmen. But this unanimity comes at a high price, as sacapegoats are made of those (and there will always be some) who do not conform willingly” (1403). Dit herinner aan Wim de Villiers wat die US se studente en personeel aan verpligte indoktrinasie wil onderwerp en geen afwykende mening duld nie: “We want our students and staff members to develop a transformation competency. A compulsory, credit-bearing first-year module – a kind of Maties 101, which I want to expand to 201, 301 and 401 – is currently being developed. And we are also working on compulsory courses for members of faculty and other staff. The aim would be to sensitise students and staff to transformation” (Cape Times, Insight, 6.10.2015, p 9).

‘n Fundamentele verskil tussen die Beethoven- en die persgesig-insident is dat eersgenoemde dwaasheid deur studente en die persgesig-fiasko deur ‘n universiteitsbestuur gepleeg is. Wat baie duidelik is, is dat die US- en UV-bestuur weet wie die “favored group” is. Aan die US is daar ‘n rasgebaseerde kwotastelsel waarvolgens die getal swart studente vermeerder en die getal blanke studente gevolglik beperk word. Hierdie beleid is nie akademies nie maar suiwer polities gemotiveerd want die bewese akademiese rekord van swart studente is swak terwyl blanke studente akademies uitstekend vaar. Die “favored group” bepaal die US-bestuur se gedrag deurslaggewend. Dit is waarom die De Villiers-US luister na watter onderrigtaal Open Stellenbosch verlang en waarom die Adam Tas-verenging, wat aandring op Afrikaans as onderrigtaal, geïgnoreer word.

Die oordrewe reaksie in die Beethoven-voorval het vir swartes die gewenste resultate behaal. Dit is soortgelyk aan die gebruik van ‘n ander beproefde middel, geweld, waarmee swartes in Amerika en Suid-Afrika deurlopend die resultate behaal wat hulle verlang. Bohaai-opskop en geweld is twee middele waarmee blankes glad te dikwels geïntimideer en benadeel word. ‘n Ander middel is verswelging. Dit gebeur elke jaar oor Kersfees en Nuwejaar in bv Kampsbaai en op Durban se strandgebied. Dit is soos ‘n damwal wat breek. Daar is nie eens beurtruimte nie. Teen sulke suksesvolle demonstrasies is daar skynbaar geen verweer nie. Dit is immers die grondslag waarop die nuwe Suid-Afrika funksioneer.

Leon Lemmer: William Buckley, die grondlegger van Amerikaanse konserwatisme

In die Amerikaanse politiek is daar tradisioneel twee politieke partye. Die Demokratiese Party (DP) is in 1828 deur Andrew Jackson gestig, word met die kleur blou geassosieer en ‘n donkie word gebruik om die party te simboliseer. Die Republikeinse Party (RP) is in 1854 gestig met Abraham Lincoln wat van vroeg af die leiding geneem het. Die RP, ook bekend as die GOP (Grand Old Party), word met die kleur rooi geassosieer en met ‘n olifant gesimboliseer. Die DP se steun was aanvanklik in die suidelike state, maar deesdae is die party vir sy liberalisme (nou progressiwiteit genoem) en sy neiging tot sosialisme bekend. Die RP was die anti-slawerny-party, met sy steunbasis in die noordelike state. Deesdae is die RP egter vanweë sy konserwatisme en tradisionalisme bekend. Daaruit blyk dat politieke partye met verloop van tyd radikaal kan verander. Dink bv aan die Nasionale Party in Suid-Afrika wat ‘n pleitbesorger vir die blankes en by uitstek vir Afrikaners en apartheid was en in die ANC opgeneem is om op hierdie manier roemloos tot sy einde te kom.

Eintlik het die DP en RP rolle omgeruil. Hierdie fundamentele verandering word deur Dinesh D’Souza beskryf. Hy haal die historikus Eric Foner aan wat die Ku Klux Klan “the domestic terrorist arm of the Democratic Party” noem” (Dinesh D’Souza, Hillary’s America: The secret history of the Democratic Party, Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2016, 256p; Amazon Kindle $19,94, 241). “Blacks, who once voted overwhelmingly Republican, now vote overwhelmingly Democratic” (319). Vir blanke kiesers geld die teenoorgestelde. Deesdae is die middestede die nuwe plantasies waar swartes aangetref word.

“Under slavery, blacks had to work; today’s blacks don’t have to work to inhabit the progressive plantation” (366).

Stedelike kiesers is geneig om vir die DP te stem en plattelandse kiesers vir die RP. DP -ondersteuners gee voorkeur aan gesentraliseerde sentrale regering terwyl RP-ondersteuners politieke mag eerder na die individuele state probeer afwentel.

Na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het Amerika as die leidende wêreldmoondheid op die voorgrond getree. Hy wou sy invloed dwarsoor die aardbol laat geld en het daarom genoodsaak gevoel om internasionaal ‘n navolgingswaardige voorbeeld te stel. Dit het beteken dat sommige tradisionele Amerikaanse waardes versaak en internasionale waardes buitelands en al hoe meer binnelands aangehang is. Amerikaanse swartes en ander nie-blanke soldate het as gelykes (maar apart) saam met blankes in die oorlog geveg. Na hulle terugkeer na Amerika het veral die swartes militant op gelyke regte met blankes aangedring. Betogings, oproer, vandalisme en terreur, hoofsaaklik deur swartes gepleeg, het gevolg. Eufemisties word dit die Burgerregtebeweging genoem. Die gewelddadige taktiek wat aldaar in die jare vyftig en sestig asook sedertdien gebruik is, is spoedig plaaslik deur die ANC en PAC nagevolg.

Die DP het ontpop as by uitstek die liberalistiese, pro-burgerregte party. Baie RP-lede, daarenteen, het konserwatief geneig en weerstand teen gelyke regte vir swartes gebied. Uit swart en blanke liberalistiese geledere is gepoog om by blankes skuldgevoelens oor veral slawerny en rassediskriminasie te wek. Dit het verdeeldheid in RP-geledere veroorsaak en sommige RP-lede moreel verplig laat voel om burgerregte vir swartes te ondersteun. Daarby het dit nie gebly nie. Hoe meer steun swartes ontvang het, des te meer het hulle met nuwe eise vorendag gekom. Algemene stemreg, kleurblindheid, geen rassediskriminasie, gelyke geleenthede, ens, was volgens die swartes nie goed genoeg nie. Daar is uitgegaan van die veronderstelling, soos vervat in die Amerikaanse onafhanklikheidsverklaring van 1776, dat alle mense gelyk gebore word, wat Jean -Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) se idee was; dat daar geneties geen verskil is nie; dat swartes dieselfde talente as wittes het. In die praktyk was swartes en wittes egter nie gelyk nie. Blankes het die skuld vir hierdie ongelykheid gekry. Dit is nie genoeg as die “speelveld” diskriminasieloos gelyk gemaak word nie, want die swartes kon weens beweerde historiese benadeling (slawerny, rassediskriminasie) nie met die blankes meeding nie. Geregtigheid sou glo eers bewerkstellig word as swartes bo blankes bevoordeel word; as die speelveld ten gunste van swartes ongelyk gemaak word; dus as blankes benadeel word.

Dit is hier waar baie RP-lede ‘n streep getrek het. Gelyke regte vir swartes was vir hulle aanvaarbaar, maar nie oorkompensasie waarvolgens swartes bo blankes bevoordeel word nie. Die situasie is vererger deurdat ander Amerikaanse minderheidsgroepe (Indiane, Hispaniste, Asiate) op die rug van swart bevoordeling mettertyd ook daarin geslaag het om soortgelyke superieure menseregte, minderheidsregte genoem, te verwerf. Vroue het soortgelyke superieure regte verwerf, hoewel hulle glad nie ‘n minderheids- of etniese groep is nie, maar omdat hulle glo ook histories benadeel is. In al hierdie gevalle is blanke mans as die sondaars uitgewys. Die skurkstatus van blanke mans in die nuwe Suid-Afrika is aan die Amerikaanse voorbeeld te wyte. In Amerika het bevoordeling van almal behalwe wit mans sulke buitensporige afmetings aangeneem dat Hispaniste, waarvan baie blank is, verkies om hulle eerder op hulle minderheidsregte te beroep as om deel van die blanke meerderheid te wees.

Hoewel swartes in Suid-Afrika die verswelgende meerderheidsgroep is en nooit slawe was nie, is die Amerikaanse model van nie-blanke en veral swart bevoordeling sonder meer plaaslik toepaslik gemaak. In die propaganda van die ANC en ander terreurgroepe is rassediskriminasie as dié groot euwel in die ou Suid-Afrika uitgewys. In die nuwe Suid-Afrika is daar egter geen sprake van ‘n nie-rassige samelewing soos die ANC graag in sy propaganda beweer nie. Kleurbewustheid word ingevolge die ideologie van swart mag aangemoedig. Die ANC se bevoordelingsbeleid vir nie-wittes, veral swartes, bv transformasie, regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging, is by implikasie doelbewuste pogings om wittes sover moontlik te benadeel en sou glad nie sonder die apartheidsbeleid se rasseklassifikasie (blankes, bruines, swartes en Asiate) toegepas kon word nie. Dus, van owerheidsweë word etnisiteit en kleurbewustheid deesdae plaaslik vooropgestel. Dit is ironies en vals as die sogenaamde nie-rassigheid van die nuwe politieke bedeling aangeprys word.

Die politieke opset in die nuwe Suid-Afrika, in teenstelling met die ou Suid-Afrika, word in ANC- en liberalistiese propaganda geregtigheid (“justice”) genoem. Vir my lyk die doelbewuste benadeling van en diskriminasie jeens blankes nie net na ongeregtigheid nie, maar ook na dwaasheid omdat (moontlik) die talentvolste burgers aan bande gelê word in hulle bewese vermoë om die land te ontwikkel en voorspoediger te maak. In die stelsel van algemene stemreg is insgelyks grootskaalse ongeregtigheid en dwaasheid ingebou. Dit is absurd dat die stem van ‘n werklose, armlastige, ongeletterde plakker of van ‘n veroordeelde tronkvoël dieselfde gewig as dié van bv ‘n nyweraar of sakeleier dra. Net diegene wat ‘n bate vir die land is en inkomstebelasting betaal, behoort myns insiens stemreg te hê. In so ‘n opset sal blankes in groter mate tot hulle reg kom. Juis daarom is dit taboe, al sou die land dan ongetwyfeld voorspoediger wees en doeltreffender regeer word.

Dit was en is dikwels moeilik om duidelik tussen die DP en die RP te onderskei. Die mate waarin die RP ‘n konserwatiewe party geword het, word veral aan die invloed van ‘n enkele tydskrif, National Review (NR), gestig in 1955, en die stigter daarvan, William F Buckley (1925-2008), toegeskryf. Buckley se pa was ‘n oliebaron wat sy seun finansieel ondersteun het deur bv die publikasie van sy eerste boek en die stigting van NR moontlik te maak. Buckley het slegs nominale vergoeding vir sy jare lange NR-redakteurskap (1955-1990) ontvang. Hy het Amerika dekades lank deurreis om byeenkomste ter bevordering van konserwatisme toe te spreek sonder om optree- of reis- en verblyfgeld te ontvang. Vergelyk dit met bv Sarah Palin (Praag 6.03.2016) wat ‘n buitensporige bedrag betaal word as sy ‘n byeenkoms van bv die Tea Party toespreek.

Die Buckleys is van Ierse oorsprong en Rooms-Katoliek. Anders as bv John (Jack), Robert (Bobby) en Edward (Ted) Kennedy is baie Rooms-Katolieke tradisievas en konserwatief, bv oor egskeiding, geboortebeperking en aborsie. In navolging van sy pa was Buckley sedert sy prille jeug godsdienstig en polities konserwatief gesind. As kind was sy eerste taal Spaans toe hulle in Mexiko gewoon het en Frans toe hulle in Frankryk gebly het. Daarna was hy in Engeland en Amerika op skool. Aan Yale University het hy staatsleer, geskiedenis en ekonomie bestudeer. As redakteur van die Yale Daily News het hy die standpunt gehuldig dat Yale as private inrigting die reg het om “minorities” as studente uit te sluit: “discrimination of sorts [is] indispensable to the free society” (Lee Edwards, bron hier onder, Kindle 243).

Buckley het baie artikels en boeke gepubliseer. Die boeke sluit speurverhale en misdaadromans in. Van sy invloedrykste ondernemings was ‘n televisiebesprekingsprogram, Firing Line (1966-1999). Op 4 Oktober is die volgende boek oor hierdie program gepubliseer: Heather Hendershot, Open to debate: How William F Buckley put liberal America on the Firing Line (Broadside e-books: 432p, 2016; Amazon Kindle $14,81). Onlangs het daar ook ‘n omvattende boek verskyn oor Buckley se huldeblyke van belangrike persone waarmee hy eerstehands kennis gemaak het: A torch kept lit: Great lives of the twentieth century (New York: Crown Publishing, 2016, 338p; Amazon Kindle $13,67). Daarin skryf hy oor bv vyf Amerikaanse presidente: Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon en Reagan. Ook oor Winston Churchill, Barry Goldwater, Ayn Rand, prinses Diana, John Lennon, Elvis Presley, ens.

Buckley se boek, Happy days were here again: Reflections of a libertarian journalist (New York: Basic Books, 2008, 496p; Amazon Kindle $14,81) is ‘n versameling van sy tydskrifartikels. Miles gone by: A literary autobiography (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2004/2012, 594p; Amazon Kindle $11,39) is ongelukkig nie ‘n egte outobiografie nie maar weer eens bloot ‘n versameling van gepubliseerde artikels: “There would be no point in contriving an autobiography from scratch. Why? I have already written about the events and the people that have shaped my life; any new account would simply paraphrase these” (Kindle 71). Sedertdien is Carl T Bogus se volwaardige biografie gepubliseer: Buckley: William F Buckley Jr and the rise of American conservatism (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011, 417p; Amazon Kindle $11,39).

Uit ‘n politieke oogpunt is van Buckley se lesenswaardigste boeke seker die laaste twee wat hy voltooi het: Flying high: Remembering Barry Goldwater (New York: Basic Books, 2008, 226p; Amazon Kindle $13,67) en The Reagan I knew (New York: Basic Books, 2008, 308p; Amazon Kindle $11,39). Ek wil my egter toespits op Buckley se rol in die bevordering van konserwatisme in Amerika en beperk my aandag dus in die res van hierdie rubriek tot Lee Edwards se boek, William F Buckley Jr: The maker of a movement (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2014, 208p; Amazon Kindle $11,39), wat ook die voordeel het dat die teks na Bogus se biografie voltooi is.

Michael Barone het na Buckley se dood sy nalatenskap as “a coherent and respectable conservatism” beskryf (53). William Kristol het geskryf: “Before Buckley there was no American conservative movement … Buckley created conservatism as a political and intellectual movement” (73). Michael Kinsley het oor Buckley geskryf: “He united the fragments of American conservatism and paved the way for Goldwater and then Reagan” (73). Die aartsliberalis Christopher Hitchens het opgehaal dat Buckley enersyds Joseph MacCarthy gesteun en Francisco Franco geprys het, dat hy gekant teen die Civil Rights Act van 1964 was en ten gunste van die Viëtnamese oorlog. Andersyds was Buckley teen die John Birch Society, verregses en anti-semitisme (82). Hy het ekstremisme vermy en “respectable conservatism” voorgestaan (962). Buckley het Patrick Buchanan as ‘n “paleoconservative” beskou en sy anti-Israel-standpunt was vir Buckley onaanvaarbaar (962). As Rooms-Katoliek was Buckley ook teen Ayn Rand gekant.

“He saw it necessary to dissociate the conservative movement from the irresponsible Right” (892); soortgelyk aan die wyse waarop Donald Trump hom van die Ku Klux Klan distansieer. Edwards skryf: “There were disconnects between New Right leaders and Buckley” (1455). “Kevin Phillips … coined the phrase ‘The New Right'” (1466). Richard Viguerie het egter geskryf: “The New Right owes much of what we believe in and are fighting for to such outstanding men [ie Russell Kirk] and the catalyst who brought them together, William F Buckley” (1479). Soos sy konserwatief geworde mede-Rooms-Katoliek, Evelyn Waugh (1903-1966), was Buckley sterk teen die modernisering van die Rooms-Katolieke Kerk, The Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (1962-1965), gekant.

Uit die twee voorafgaande paragrawe is dit duidelik dat daar in Amerika, soos in Suid-Afrika, talle faksies en aksentverskille in tradisionalistiese en konserwatiewe geledere bestaan. Buckley se grootste strategiese probleem was om sommige van hierdie elemente saam te snoer maar in hierdie proses ook sekere elemente uit te sluit. “His synthesis of the disparate elements of conservatism … came to be called fusionism (a word coined by … Brent Bozell,* who did not think that any lasting correlation of freedom and virtue was possible)” (1020). Frank Meyer, daarenteen, het geargumenteer: “Freedom … was the indispensable condition for the pursuit of virtue” (1020); dus, gedwonge deug is nie werklik deug nie. Vryheid verwys hier na die libertyne wat individualisme voorgestaan en die minimum inperking van vryheid verlang het. Deug word met moraliteit geassosieer. Buckley het geskryf: “The United Nations is the most concentrated assault on moral reality in the history of free institutions” (1409).

[* Bozell is die eintlike outeur (“ghostwriter”) van Barry Goldwater se manifes, The conscience of a conservative (1960), ‘n teks wat my teleurgestel het. “Not everyone at National Review, however, welcomed the Goldwater candidacy. James Burnham had doubts about the senator’s intellectual capacity and regarded his ‘why not victory?’ policy to end the Cold War as simplistic” (1138). In die Goldwater-manifes word tereg genoem sommige soorte staatstoelae “reward people for not producing … I cannot conceive of a more absurd and self-defeating policy than one which subsidizes non-production” (Consience of a conservative, First Start Publishing, 2012, 88p; Amazon Kindle $1.13, 327). Ook: “We are all equal in the eyes of God but we are equal in no other respect” (530). Vir kommuniste “negotiations are simply an instrument of political warfare” (902); iets wat FW de Klerk blykbaar nooit begryp het nie.]

“Striving as ever for consensus, Buckley suggested in an essay titled ‘Notes toward an empirical definition of conservatism’ that what National Review had striven to do from the beginning was to achieve ‘a general consensus on the proper balance between freedom, order, justice and tradition'” (Edwards 1032). “Buckley admitted to himself that he was not a political philosopher but a popularizer of ideas … He concentrated on acting ‘as a broker and analyst of ideas, rather than as an originator of them'” (1115).

Naas godsdiens is Buckley se idees deur verskeie mense beïnvloed. Albert Jay Nock (1870-1945), “the ultimate individualist” (194), was teen die idee van ‘n welsynstaat gekant (181). Aanvanklik het Buckley homself eerder ‘n individualis as ‘n konserwatis beskou (451). Een van Nock se “wette” was: “Man tends always to satisfy his needs with the least possible exertion” (182). Dink bv aan die ANC-parlementslede wat buitensporige vergoeding ontvang maar dikwels nie eens aanwesig is wanneer daar gestem moet word nie. Buckley het Nock se “antistatism” onderskryf (182); dus dat die owerhede klein en nie-almagtig moet wees; dat die regering so min moontlik in die sake van individue moet inmeng. Buckley was van mening dat Amerika uit die Tweede Wêreldoorlog moet bly. Sy idee van “America First” word deesdae deur Donald Trump beaam. Dit herinner aan Barry Hertzog se “Suid-Afrika Eerste” wat in die ANC-kraal ontaard het in eiebelang, swart belange en Afrika-belange as hoogtste voorkeure.

Willmoore Hendall (1909-1967), ‘n politieke wetenskaplike aan Yale University, het Buckley beïnvloed toe hy daar ‘n student was. Hendall was sterk elitisties en anti-kommunisties (347) en teen die “open society” gekant. “All polities … have an orthodoxy they have a right to defend against anyone who would fundamentally change it” (323). Amerikaanse universiteitsdosente het toe al uitgemunt in hulle linksgesindheid. Hendall het gesê “he would rather be governed by the first two thousand names in the Boston telephone directory than the Harvard faculty” (347).

Die derde persoon wat Buckley beïnvloed het, was James Burnham (1905-1987), die “first among equals of the senior editors” (626) van die National Review, oor wie ek voorheen geskryf het (Praag 1 Oktober).* ‘n Ander invloed was Russell Kirk (1918-1994), wat die “assembly-line civilization” (626) of Amerikaanse “melting-pot” verwerp het. Buckley het ook “nation-building” afgewys (2165, 2212). Desnieteenstaande is nasiebou een van die pligte van Suid-Afrikaanse sportmanne. Kirk is die outeur van The conservative mind (1953), “a work that transformed public understanding of American conservatism” (636). “Kirk’s book gave the conservative movement its name” (705). Soos Burnham en andere aangetoon het, is “secular liberalism, the dominant ism in America … a watered-down version of Communist ideology” (684).

george-orwell
George Orwell

[* Burnham se boek, Suicide of the West (1964) bied ‘n uitstekende ontleding van liberalisme. Dit is ‘n toonbeeld van sy rype denke. In die praktiese politiek kon hy egter steeds ernstige oordeelsfoute begaan, bv “Burnham suggested Jimmy Carter as worthy of NR’s support” (1632). George Orwell het ‘n briljante opstel oor Burnham se twee vroeëre boeke gepubliseer: “James Burnham and the managerial revolution” (1946). Orwell toon aan dat Burnham in daardie tekste die elementêre fout begaan om sy standpunt deurlopend ooreenkomstig die huidige situasie aan te pas en daarby te veronderstel dat die huidige neiging sou voortduur. Die helderheid en insig waarmee Orwell skryf en sy ingeligtheid is treffend. In sy huldeblyk aan Orwell het Arthur Koestler geskryf: “His uncompromising intellectual honesty made him appear almost inhuman at times” (Frank S Pepper, Contemporary biographical quotations, London: Sphere Books, 1986, p 222). Ek volstaan met drie van die pêrels in Orwell se 1946-opstel. (1) “It is difficult to think of any politician who has lived to be eighty and still been regarded as a success. What we call a ‘great’ statesman normally means one who dies before his policy has had time to take effect.” (2) Orwell verwys na “the American tendency to admire size for its own sake and to feel that success constitutes justification.” (3) “Humanity is divided into two classes: the self-seeking, hypocritical minority, and the brainless mob whose destiny is always to be led or driven, as one gets a pig back to the sty by kicking it on the bottom or by rattling a stick inside a swill-bucket, according to the needs of the moment. And this beautiful pattern is to continue for ever … the division of humanity into rulers and ruled is unalterable. In their capabilities, as in their desires and needs, men are not equal. There is an “iron law of oligarchy.” David Lebedoff, wat soos ek ‘n bewonderaar van Orwell se skryfwerk is, het ‘n interessante boek geskryf: The same man: George Orwell and Evelyn Waugh in love and war (New York: Random House, 2008 288p; Amazon Kindle $15,95). Daarin is daar bv een van Orwell se beroemde stellings, wat ek graag met verwysing na bv Nelson Mandela onderskryf: “Saints should always be judged guilty until they are proved innocent” (Kindle 1652).]

“NR and its editor did not acquit themselves as well on the issue of civil rights in the 1950s and early 1960s, taking a states’ right position that equaled, in the eyes of most liberals and almost all black Americans, a stand in favor of segregation and therefore[?] racism.* In his articles, Buckley clearly rejected the politics of southern racists like Ross Barnett of Mississippi and George Wallace of Alabama, but he also argued that the federal enforcement of integration was worse than the temporary continuation of segregation. Consistent with conservative principles, he favored volutary gradual change” (986). Buckley se politiek was dus meer soos dié van Ian Smith in Rhodesië as FW de Klerk se revolusionêre dwaasheid dat alles meteens verander moet word. [* Outeur Edwards se politiek is links van Buckley s’n.]

Buckley het hom nie om die bos laat lei deur Martin Luther King jr se praatjies nie. Hy het geweet “two of King’s closest associates, Stanley Levinson and Hunter Pitts (Jack) O’Dell, were ranking members of the Communist Party” (1009). O’Dell het ook aktief met Jesse Jackson saamgewerk.

In 1965 het Buckley ‘n onsuksesvolle poging aangewend om die burgemeester van New York City te word en daaroor ‘n boek gepubliseer: The unmaking of a mayor (1966). “He proposed, several years before Governor Reagan offered his hard-nosed welfare-reform program in California, that all welfare recipients be required to do ‘street cleaning and general prettification work’ for the city. Here was the first conservative enunciation of the workfare principle, or as Buckley put it rather crudely, ‘No workee, no dolee'” (1249). Wat myns insiens hier bygevoeg moet word, is dat nie-betalers nie toegelaat moet word om te betoog en buurte op horings te neem as dienste onbevredigend of glad nie gelewer word nie. Geen betaling behoort eintlik vanselfsprekend geen dienste te beteken. Dit is immers wat in die geval van diensbetalers gedoen word. As ek nie vir my water of elektrisiteit betaal nie word dit afgesny.

Buckley het Bill Clinton se intreerede as president Orwelliaanse “doublespeak” genoem. “‘Tricky Dick [Nixon] would have been run out of town with wet towels’ … if he had been as deceitful as Clinton” (789). Metapolitiek is deur Buckley beoefen: “National Review was not founded to make practical politics. Our job is to think, and write” (846). Van George W Bush het Buckley gesê: “He’s conservative, but not a conservative” (2087).

Barry Goldwater
Barry Goldwater

Barry Goldwater, die Republikeinse Party se presidensiële kandidaat in 1964, was “the most influential loser in modern presidential politics” (2033), die wegbereider vir Ronald Reagan se presidentskap (1981-1989). “Buckley’s role in building the conservative movement was essential to Reagan’s success” (1929). Donald Trump as president is eintlik die bekroning van Buckley se lewenstaak, want die eerste keer in die geskiedenis word gesê dat die meerderheid lede van die Republikeinse Party hulle as konserwatief identifiseer. Buckley se “vision of ordered liberty shaped and molded and guided American conservatism from its infancy to its maturity” (2406).

Trump se oorwinning gee wêreldwyd stukrag aan konserwatiewe en regse groepe; ook in Suid-Afrika. Die vraag is of daar plaaslik iemand is wat soos Buckley hierdie groepe tot ‘n kragtige beweging kan saamsnoer.

“Buckley argued that if conservatives in politics wanted to be successful they had to steer a middle course between the ideal and the prudential” (1182). “Conservatism implies a certain submission to reality” (2225).

Sedert sy verkiesingsoorwinning is daar by Trump reeds heelwat tekens van hierdie goue middeweg, wat egter sy konserwatisme en mate van regsheid verwater.

Tot lof van Hendrik Verwoerd

Ter herdenking aan die sluipmoord op Hendrik Verwoerd (1901-1966, eerste minister 1958-1966) vyftig jaar gelede het Stephen Mitford Goodson die volgende boek self gepubliseer: Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd: South Africa’s greatest prime minister (2016, 144p, R190). Voorheen het Goodson boeke oor onder andere Adolf Hitler (2009), Jan Smuts (2012) en Ian Smith (2015) gepubliseer. Van 2003 tot 2012 was Goodson ‘n direkteur van die Suid-Afrikaanse Reserwe Bank, maar hy het bedank, enersyds omdat die ANC-regering deesdae die meerderheid direkteure aanstel en andersyds omdat Jode teen Goodson se direkteurskap kapsie gemaak het. Volgens inskrywings op Wikipedia en Metapedia het Goodson lof vir Hitler en ontken hy die Holocaust. Die Mitford in sy naam dui glo op verwantskap met Diana Mitford (1910-2003). Goodson word dus ook met Diana se man, Oswald Mosley (1896-1980), die leier van die Britse fasciste, geassosieer. Goodson woon tans in Pringlebaai, naby Bettysbaai waar Verwoerd se vakansiehuis is.

Goodson se finansiële en bankagtergrond word weerspieël in twee ander boeke wat hy gepubliseer het en vind ook neerslag in sy boek oor Verwoerd. Hy skryf van “the Rockefeller-Rothschild-Oppenheimer plan to set up an economic super-government over the southern portion of the [African] continent” waarvan in die Washington Observer Newsletter op 15 Januarie 1975 gewag gemaak is (p 87). Die saak wat Ethiopië en Liberië in 1960 by die Internasionale Strafhof in Den Haag teen Suid-Afrika oor Suidwes-Afrika aanhangig gemaak het, word toegeskryf aan die ondersteuning van internasionale bankiers, die Amerikaanse Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) en die Amerikaanse Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (60-61). Die CFR is ‘n dinkskrum waarin oor die Amerikaanse buitelandse beleid en internasionale betrekkinge besin word.

Na aanleiding van Piet Hoek se 1965-verslag oor die rol van internasionale en plaaslike geldmagte in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek, verwys Goodson na “the CIA instigated riot at Sharpeville in March 1960” (83). “On 25 January 1966 Dr Verwoerd referred to the [Hoek] report during his speech at the opening of parliament and fired another warning shot in Mr Oppenheimer’s direction when he said: ‘We shall fight the concentrations of power and monopolies which are present in our country and are a fundamental danger” (85). Die in 1968 hersiene Hoek-verslag is destyds uit Hoek se kluis gesteel (85). “Shortly after Dr Verwoerd’s assassination, his successor, Balthazar Johannes Vorster, warned Professor Hoek not to make his report public as it would cause him embarrassment, and eventually all circulation of the report was forbidden. This does not come as a surprise, as by this time Harry Oppenheimer had developed ‘cordial relations with Vorster'” (87).

Hoofstuk 6 handel oor “The international money power.” Aandag word aan bv die Anglo American Corporation, Harry Oppenheimer en Anton Rupert gegee. Aanvanklik het Oppenheimer nie polities verlinks geklink nie. In 1957 het Oppenheimer gesê: “Our growing industrial needs must make full use of Bantu labour, and we must not worry overmuch about the consequences, because the Native is, on the whole so uncivilized that the white man will remain on top for as long as we can see at the moment” (78). Oor die chaos wat in die Belgiese Kongo na onafhanklikheid in 1960 uitgebreek het, toe die mineraalryke Katanga-provinsie probeer wegbreek het, het Oppenheimer in 1961 gesê: “What the Congo does show is that primitive, uncivilised people cannot be trusted with the running of a modern state, and that independent democracy is the only possibility [rather: is only possible] if the electorate has reasonable standards of education and civilisation” (78).

In 1960 het Oppenheimer gesê: “What the South African government was trying to do in separating the black and white races was not necessarily immoral as partition had provided the answer to problems in many parts of the world” (78). Daar was bv lord Frederick Lugard (1858-1945), die goewerneur-generaal van Nigerië (1914-1919), se beleid van afsonderlike ontwikkeling: “Lugard’s policy was that the African’s peoples own social and political institutions, the product of centuries of accumulated experience and wisdom, should be preserved, strengthened and modernised in an evolutionary manner” (27). Een van Lugard se uitsprake was: “Never try to turn the African Black into an Oxford Blue” (27). Lugard se karakterisering van swartes is kenmerkend van die Britse koloniale era: “The typical African … is a happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking in self control, discipline and foresight, naturally courageous, and naturally courteous and polite, full of personal vanity, with little sense of veracity … in brief, the virtues and defects of this race-type are those of attractive children” (Wikipedia). Oor die kritiek op trekarbeid “Verwoerd pointed out that migrant labour in the urban and mining areas was similar to the 3 000 000 seasonal labourers from Italy who worked in France” (Goodson 28-29). Teen 1964 het Oppenheimer sy bogenoemde 1960-mening van “not necessarily immoral” radikaal verander: “Discrimination on grounds of race or colour is morally wrong and partition on grounds of race or colour is economically impossible” (83). SED Brown het Oppenheimer in 1966 beskryf as “the deadliest enemy of our national survival” (76).

Die boek word opgedra aan die nagedagtenis van SED (Sydney Eustace Denys) Brown (1910-1990), die redakteur van The South African Observer (1955-1990). Brown was bekend vir sy anti-semitisme en het gemeen dat ‘n Nuwe Wêreldorde onder Joodse beheer die denasionalisering van volke beoog. Hierdie idees word ook in Goodson se boek aangetref. “The international bankers needed to incorporate South Africa, with its treasure chest of minerals, into their planned New World Order whose principal objective is permanently to enslave mankind by means of perpetual debt and usury. Dr Verwoerd who had frequently declared that he would have nothing to do with such a satanic scheme, stood in their path and therefore had to be eliminated” (95). Die sluipmoord op Verwoerd word ingeklee as deel van ‘n staatskaping, soortgelyk aan wat deesdae oor die Guptas beweer word.

S Davidson word soos volg aangehaal: Nelson “Mandela’s entire development was guided by Jewish ‘handlers'” (63). Bewys hiervan word gevind in die feit dat naas swartes en ‘n enkele Indiër (Ahmed Kathrada) net Jode in 1963 in die klopjag op Lilliesleaf in hegtenis geneem is, naamlik Lionel Bernstein, Hilliard Festenstein, Arthur Goldreich, Denis Goldberg, Bob Hepple, James Kantor en Harold Wolpe (63). Hulle was kommuniste en wat Ivor Benson “soft-headed Western ‘liberals’ and ‘progressives'” genoem het (63). Benson skryf: “Certainly, it requires no great intelligence to see and understand that the South African Communist Party (SACP) with its team of highly trained revolutionary activists, all drawing orchestrated encouragement and support from the centres of high finance in the West, is on the ‘attack’ side of the conflict, while the ANC is nothing but the mindless human medium in which the ‘alien invader’ exercises his powerful techniques” (63). Met verwysing na die Guptas kan dit steeds die toestand van die ANC wees.

Goodson skryf: “The African National Congress (ANC) is and always has been a Jewish outfit masquerading as a liberation movement” (64). Hy beweer die kommunis Bram Fischer het die drie uur lange toespraak geskryf wat Nelson Mandela in 1964 aan die einde van die Rivonia-verhoor voorgelees het . Mandela word die “premier puppet of the international bankers” genoem (64). “Unaccountably, the prosecution laid charges of the lesser offence of sabotage against the defendants, and not treason” (64). Oor die vonnis van tronkstraf pleks van die doodstraf het Verwoerd in 1964 in die parlement gesê: “These people are criminals, Communist criminals … When it is said in these circles that they are glad that Mandela received a life-long sentence and not the death penalty, because he may later, like [Jomo] Kenyatta [1894-1978, Kenia’s head of state 1963-1978], become a leader of the future, then I say, God forbid it” (64-65). FW de Klerk het later heeltemal anders as Verwoerd oor Mandela geoordeel.

“The Rothschild’s local representative, Harry Oppenheimer, was an implacable foe of Dr Verwoerd and as far back as 1955 in a parliamentary debate had asserted that ‘when you have a man prepared to slow down his nation’s economic welfare on account of political theories, then you are dealing with an impractical fanatic” (95-96). John Vorster word as ‘n Vrymesselaar beskryf en sy vennoot in hulle Brakpanse prokureursfirma as die kommunis Julius Furst, die skoonpa van Joe Slovo (97). Die CIA het glo aan Vorster die eerste ministerskap belowe. Die Britse geheimediens, M16, was glo ook betrokke. “In the meantime the liberal press built up an entirely false image of Vorster as a hardened right winger” (98).

“While [Anton] Rupert was the driving force behind Dr Verwoerd’s assassination, it was Rothschild who was the architect” (100). Ter ondersteuning van hierdie stelling word na PJ Pretorius se boek, Volksverraad, 1996, p 161, verwys. Die “chain of command for the assassination of Dr Verwoerd” word soos volg weergegee: Rothschild, Oppenheimer, Rupert, Vorster, Tsafendas. “These conspirators were assisted by the CIA, M16, M-Apparatus of the Soviet Naval Espionage Service and rogue elements in the South African Department of Justice and the security police” (107).

“The principal beneficiaries of Dr Verwoerd’s assassination were the International Money Power, and in particular the Rothschild bankers, although they would have to wait 28 years before they could collect their prize” (113); dus, hulle moes wag tot 1994, toe die ANC aan die bewind gekom het. “Locally, Anton Rupert had carte blanche with which to expand his business empire as he desired, with far less hindrance from government interference” (113-114). “With his puppet, BJ Vorster, in the premiership, he [Harry Oppenheimer] was strategically well placed to oversee the dismantling of apartheid and South Africa’s incorporation into the plutocrats’ New World Order” (114).

“On 18 January 1989 President PW Botha suffered a ‘stroke,’ whereas it was in fact an attempted assassination caused by his tea being poisoned. Information provided to the author by his widow, Barbara Botha” (108). Dit is dalk onnodig om te skryf dat ek teleurgesteld met Goodson se boek is, want ek het dit gekoop onder die indruk dat dit ‘n nuwe biografie oor Verwoerd is terwyl dit vir die outeur blykbaar veeleerder gaan om sy hipoteses oor internasionale geldmagte en die sluipmoord op Verwoerd te publiseer. Daarmee gee ek nie te kenne dat daar geen waarheid in sommige van Goodson se bewerings steek nie.

Die voorwoord by die boek is deur Marthinus van Bart, ‘n joernalis en kenner van Afrikanerkultuur, geskryf. Ek vestig die aandag op ‘n enkele sin in die voorwoord. Manfred Nathan het in sy biografie oor Paul Kruger (1944) geskryf: Kruger “gave his people a soul” (8). Die vraag het by my opgekom: Kan dit nie dalk met reg gesê word dat FW de Klerk se onbesonne dade die teenoorgestelde gedoen het nie , naamlik om die Afrikaner se siel te (probeer) vernietig? De Klerk se jongste uitlatings toon dat daar by hom hoegenaamd geen berou is oor wat hy aangevang het nie (Netwerk 24, 19 November; Die Burger, 21 November, p 6). Hy het nie gelewer wat hy belowe het nie: ‘n voorspoedige, nie-kommunistiese, vreedsame land waarin daar nie rassediskriminasie is nie, geen blanke sy werk verloor nie en eiendomsreg, bv van plase, veilig is.

Die boek is glad nie ‘n volwaardige biografie oor Verwoerd nie. ‘n Mens sou graag meer fundamentele besinning en evaluering van Verwoerd se politieke idees wou hê, soos dié van Hermann Giliomee. In die bibliografie word Giliomee se werke glad nie genoem nie, bv Die Afrikaners (2004) en Die laaste Afrikanerleiers (2012). Volgens Verwoerd was daar net twee staatkundige moontlikhede vir Suid-Afrika: enersyds afsonderlike nasiestate vir gelyke etniese groepe en andersyds swart oorheersing in ‘n eenheidstaat. In sy 2012-boek verwys Giliomee na ‘n profetiese uitspraak van Verwoerd in 1963: “In ‘n gemeenskap waar die swart mense oorheers, sal dit die wit man wees teen wie gediskrimineer word” (p 85).

Dit is vir my duidelik dat Giliomee baie groter waardering vir Verwoerd met sy akademiese ingesteldheid het as vir prokureurs soos Hans Strijdom, John Vorster en FW de Klerk. Giliomee se 2012-boek was vir liberaliste te pro-Verwoerd om te verteer. Giliomee het ‘n verdere boekie gepubliseer: Die enigma van Hendrik Verwoerd (2012). Daarin skryf hy: “Myns insiens was hy [Piet Cillié] saam met HF Verwoerd en Van Wyk Louw die heel belangrikste Afrikaanse meningsvormers van die laaste helfte van die twintigste eeu” (Kindle 26). Onmiddelik na Verwoerd se dood het die verlinkse koerant, die Rand Daily Mail, Verwoerd beskryf as “the man who had refined the crude ideology of white supremacy into a sophisticated and rationalized philosophy of separate development” (1142).

Dat rasse-segregasie lank voor 1948 bestaan het, blyk uit wat Jan Smuts in 1917 gesê het: “We have realised that political ideas which apply to our white civilisation largely do not apply to the administration of native affairs. To apply the same institutions on an equal basis to white and black alike does not lead to the best results, and so a practice had grown up in South Africa of creating parallel institutions – giving the natives their own separate institutions on parallel lines with institutions for whites. It may be that on those parallel lines we may yet be able to solve a problem which may otherwise be insoluble … We have felt more and more that if we are to solve our native question it is useless to try and govern black and white in the same system, to subject them to the same institutions of government and legislation. They are different not only in colour but in mind and in political capacity and their political institutions should be different, while always proceeding on the basis of self-government … We have now legislation before the Parliament of the Union in which an attempt is made … to create all over South Africa, wherever there are any considerable native communities, independent self-governing institutions for them. Thus in South Africa you will have in the long run large areas cultivated by blacks, where they will look after themselves in all their forms of living and development, while in the rest of the country you will have white communities, which will govern themselves separately according to accepted European principles” (Goodson, 25-26).

Al het Smuts soms ver gedwaal, blyk uit hierdie aanhaling dat daar reste van ‘n egte Boer in hom behoue gebly het. Die eie gebiede en selfregering wat blankes tradisioneel vir swartes toegelaat het, word sedert 1994 egter glad nie deur swartes aan blankes gegun nie. By die Voortrekkers het Verwoerd ook ingesteldheid op rasse-segregasie gevind: “The Bantu were realising more and more that the old Voortrekker policy of granting their own areas to the different races was the right and best policy” (38). Daar is ook Theophilus Shepstone se Britse naturellebeleid in Natal (1853-1875): “The main focus of his policy was on maintaining tribal customs and not to enforce white civilisation … Separate racial development had been standard practice since the inception of Britian’s colonial era” (26-27).

In die res van hierdie rubriek wil ek eerder die politieke idees van Verwoerd belig pleks van oor Goodson se twyfelagtige spekulasies te skryf. In die inleiding staan daar bv: Verwoerd “viewed separate development as a temporary phase, whose aim was neither to dominate nor to discriminate, and stated on numerous occasions that human dignity is achieved by coexistence and not by living together” (12). Wanneer die beleid van afsonderlike ontwikkeling volvoer is, sal daar ‘n reeks gelyke, onafhanklike state bestaan.

In 1950 het Verwoerd gesê: “In a multi-racial society where power must eventually be transferred into the hands of the numerically stronger Bantu, not only the White, but also the Coloured and Indian will go under. Over time even the Bantu masses will not benefit because on the strength of what happened elsewhere in Africa, it must be taken into consideration that South Africa will develop into an autocracy or dictatorship. On account of their lack of ability to manage a complicated administration, the country will moreover administratively and economically be destroyed and for everyone – White and Coloured – end in chaos” (4).

Let op hierdie profetiese woorde van Verwoerd: “Britain should be careful about the immigration of non-Whites on such a large scale; Britain was a proud nation who had rendered great services to the world, but if Britain wanted to remain proud of its nationhood it should stop allowing non-Whites in by the thousand; they were making a bastard race of themselves and this would one day be the source of many difficulties for the British people” (44).

Oor Ian Smith se rassebeleid van “partnership” in Rhodesië het Verwoerd tereg gewaarsku dat dit op ‘n tragedie afstuur: “I say unequivocally that we believe that majority rule there, which means a Black government ruling over the Whites, will lead to destruction and chaos” (69).

In 1960 het Verwoerd gesê: “May the white man, may the White nations of the world, also Britain, not lose their intellectual hold or in any other way. If they abdicate on our behalf and surrender, then in the long run the flood of coloured people will not only overwhelm us, but in the years to come will reach their lands, and eventually overwhelm them too” (115).

In 1961 het Verwoerd aan bruin raadslede gesê: “What happens if the whites lose their hold on a unitary state? Who runs the country? Not the Coloureds, but the Bantu. I do not wish to insult the Bantu as a group, because I must also seek justice for them. The fact is that the experience in Africa proves that if the Bantu obtains authority over a country, it will lead necessarily to a dictatorship of a small group of politically interested parties amongst them. The Bantu masses will be subject to them and will perhaps suffer far more than the suffering that they are alleged to experience under a white government.

“As far as the other groups are concerned they will without a doubt be pushed backwards, perhaps quickly, perhaps step by step. The Coloureds should not think that they will be the last to be excluded from the rule of, participation in and benefits of such a mixed society. They can easily be the first. Which group will be respected the least by a Bantu dictatorship and be the least needed? Will it not be the Coloureds? The Whites’ prestige and help might still be retained because of the usefulness of his knowledge” (115-116).

In 1966 by geleentheid van sy laaste Republiekdagviering het Verwoerd gesê: “As far as the Bantu are concerned will it be to their advantage if they become the dominant group, but in that process lose their separate national identities, and probably their languages and customs and suffer as a result of their incapacity – which we know is the case – to lead, manage and develop the phase of western civilisation which this country has reached in respect of industrialisation and other things?

“Would it be right in respect of their own masses? The few who obtain power might be satisfied, but for all we know they may be prodigals. For a large extent the masses would become unemployed and experience difficulty as we have seen in the rest of Africa. Would it be morally right to create the appearance of freedom, but in reality to cause living conditions similar to slavery [?]” (116).

In die nuwe Suid-Afrika is die naam van die Verwoerd-gebou op die kampus van die Universiteit Stellenbosch (US) verander omdat die neo-US eerder mense soos Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki en Desmond Tutu met akademies waardelose eredoktorsgrade vereer en geboue eerder na ANC-aktiviste soos Russel Botman vernoem. Seker die aanstootlikste gebeurtenis in Wim de Villiers se minagting van die nalatenskap van die oud-Matie Verwoerd was die openbare skouspel wat hy gemaak het van die verwydering van die gedenkplaat in die voorportaal van wat eens die HF Verwoerd-gebou was.

Goodson skryf: “On 27 May 2015 the plaque in the foyer dedicated to Dr Verwoerd was removed, without consulting the alumni, in an act of cultural vandalism. The author protested to the rector, Prof Wim de Villiers, who replied in a letter that the plaque was ‘a symbol of institutionalised oppression and suffering’ and that the objective was to create ‘a welcoming campus culture for all our students'” (117). Die verbanning van Verwoerd van die US-kampus was een van Wim de Villiers se eerste projekte nadat hy op 1 April 2015 die US-rektor geword het. Blykbaar wou hy demonstreer hoe verlinks sy politiek is en daarmee die guns van swartes wen.

Leon Lemmer: ‘n Sweedse siening van Afrikaners

Kajsa Norman, ‘n Sweedse joernalis wat in Londen woon, het verlede jaar ‘n boek in Sweeds gepubliseer: Bron över Blood River (Brug oor Bloedrivier). Verlede maand is ‘n Engelse vertaling van die boek plaaslik gepubliseer met die titel: Into the laager: Afrikaners living on the edge (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2016, 230p, R240; Amazon Kindle $13,67). Die teks handel by uitstek oor Afrikaners en daar word veral gepoog om duidelikheid oor Afrikaner-identiteit te kry. Omdat Norman nie-Brits is, skryf sy openlik oor bv die Britse beleid van verskroeide aarde en die konsentrasiekampe gedurende die Anglo-Boere-oorlog (Kindle 750).

Norman was van Oktober 2011 tot Mei 2012 in Suid-Afrika en het verskeie plekke besoek en onderhoude gevoer. Sy het ook enkele dae in Maputo, Mosambiek, deurgebring. Voorheen het sy onder meer ‘n boek oor Zimbabwe gepubliseer. Maar die bibliografie in haar jongste boek lyk maar karig. Net ‘n enkele keer word na ‘n Afrikaanse teks verwys (709). Aanvanklik was ek nogal skepties oor wat ek in die boek sou aantref. Des te meer omdat haar teks deur ‘n Nelson Mandela-epigraaf voorafgegaan word.

bronoverblood_enIn Swede “leading politicians … claim there is no such thing as Swedish culture” (22). Gelukkig is die outeur nie ‘n aanhanger van die mite van identiteitslose wêreldburgerskap nie. “We are all products of our history, culture and context” (22). Dit skemer egter deur dat Norman in die liberalistiese kamp is. Sy het saam met ‘n massa swartes aan ‘n optog in Johannesburg deelgeneem (1677). In Maputo het sy opgelet dat blankes uitsluitlik met blankes sosiaal verkeer. “The internationals advocating for the rights of the disadvantaged often live as segregated from them as possible” (3335). Sy dink dit behoort anders te wees. Desnieteenstaande lyk dit asof sy werklik gepoog het om so objektief moontlik oor Suid-Afrika en Afrikaners verslag te doen. Haar boek kan in bv Swede ‘n heilsame invloed hê. Norman was bv sterk aangewese op die Engelse weergawe van Hermann Giliomee se hoogaangeskrewe boek oor die Afrikaners. Maar sy verwys ook na werke van Rian Malan en Antjie Krog wat haar kon mislei.

Norman was aanvanklik in Johannesburg, “one of the most dangerous cities in the world” (80). Die tekens daarvan was oral waarneembaar.

“My experience of Johannesburg is that life happens indoors: you travel from one gated community to another” (3224).

Sy vertel van ‘n Suid-Afrikaner wat militêre diensplig gedoen het en stel dit blatant: “Mark used to kill black people” (103) en “Many adult white South Africans men have killed” (117). Een van die maniere was glo “using a knife to slit the throats of enemies” (117). Sulke stellings het my aanvanklik swak moed vir die boek gegee. Ook wanneer sy skryf Jan van Riebeeck se verversingstasie was “near what is today known as Cape Town” (201). Daar is nie werklik dieptegang in haar kennis nie. Om oor iets soos Afrikaner-identiteit en -kultuur te skryf, was vir haar as buitestander ‘n uiters ambisieuse onderneming. In die geheel gesien, het sy tog nie sleg gevaar nie. Ek het die indruk dat hoe langer sy die plaaslike omstandighede ervaar het, des te realistieser was die insigte waartoe sy gekom het, bv oor die nuwe Suid-Afrika en Afrikaners. Ek hou veral van die talle Afrikaanse woorde en uitdrukkings wat sy korrek weergee.

Norman haal Rian Malan soos volg aan: “The enemy came to power, but no vengeance was taken – were even willing to forgive us, provided that we fell to our knees and said sorry” (138). Sy voeg by:”Convincing black South Africans to forgive white South Africans turned out to be easier than expected. Persuading the white population to forgive themselves was, and continues to be, much more difficult” (124). In werklikheid word wraakgevoelens steeds deur baie swartes gekoester: “This non-violent transition left many [blacks] without a sense of closure” (3733). In die boek is daar geen goeie woord oor apartheid nie, gevolglik dink Norman dat blankes skuldgevoelens móét hê. Suid-Afrika het ‘n “legacy of violence” (145) maar soos in Amerika is dit myns insiens by uitstek swartes wat hulle hieraan skuldig maak. ‘n Gewilde verskoning is om gewelddadigheid by swartes aan ‘n reaksie teen apartheid toe te skryf, maar dit verklaar nie die voortgesette buitensporige gewelddadigheid sedert 1994 nie. ‘n Land wat gewelddenaars tot helde verhef, moet met voortgesette geweld vir lief neem.

In navolging van Rian Malan word die vroeë blanke inwoners van Suid-Afrika as veral “lower-working-class” uitgebeeld (206). Tydens die Britse bewind is hulle van owerheidsweë as “white barbarians – ignorant, unkempt and violent” beskou (237). Oor die trekboere skryf Norman: “While most settlers were deterred by the brutality of the frontier, for some it created an almost perverse allure” (229). Dit is hierdie “wilderness of their own hearts” (229) of “dark of heart” (237) wat Malan beklemtoon. Die bloedvergieting wat in die destydse grensgebiede voorgekom het, word darem aan albei kante toegeskryf (244).

Soos by die Slawemuseum in Kaapstad is daar by Norman die neiging om slawerny aan die Kaap eerder aan die Hollanders as die Britte toe te dig. Sy gee selfs voor dat daardie slawerny in 1652 ‘n aanvang geneem het (213). Tydens die Britse bewind “everyone was now a British subject and, as such, deemed to be equal before the law. However, for the first two decades of British occupation, not only did the Dutch colonists reject any form of status leveling, but the laws themselves were not well suited to support the cultural differences of the Khoikhoi” (258). “Differences in culture is a problem,” soos ‘n hedendaagse Afrikaner dit stel (403). ‘n Ander een se standpunt is: “Black African culture is so radically different … I get along better with Asians” (3356). Dit was myns insiens egter by uitstek die Britte eerder as die Hollanders wat hulleself destyds kultureel hoër as die inheemse bevolking geag het.

Oor die Voortrekkers skryf Norman: “The black man would be kept subordinate” (280), asof die Britte nie presies dieselfde gedoen het nie. Later erken sy egter: “Both the Afrikaners and the British were determined to preserve white dominance” (1330). Nêrens word die Britte se beleid van rassesegregasie as die voorganger van apartheid genoem nie. Maar sy weet dat rassesegregasie nie in 1948 deur die Nasionale Party uitgevind is nie. “In 1941, employers were required by law to segregate work, recreation and eating areas, and new suburbs were built specifically for non-white people. Even beaches were segregated … In 1946, ‘white areas’ and ‘Asian areas’ were created as separate from one another, and Asian residents were no longer allowed to buy property in designated ‘white’ areas” (1354). “Apartheid was an ideology born of the will to survive or, put differently, the fear of extinction” (1836). Oor die Groot Trek: “Indigenous populations occupied much of the land they [the Voortrekkers] traversed” (280), maar later erken Norman: “In the 1830s much of the fertile land of Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal lay depopulated after … Shaka and Mzilikazi … caused the extermination of some three million people” (288). Die uitmoring van Voortrekkers by Weenen word ook realisties beskryf (308).

‘n Hedendaagse Afrikaner beweer: “The relationship between farmers and their farm workers has deteriorated in recent years. Jacques believes that this is because of all the unfulfilled promises the government has given the poor” (419). “Jacques also feels that government officials aren’t doing their jobs and that they are discriminating against the Afrikaners” (427).

Norman het Orania aan die begin en teen die einde van haar verblyf in Suid-Afrika besoek. Sy noem dat selfstandigheid (“self-reliance”) die kerndeug van Orania is (510). Die huidige leier, Carel Boshoff IV, merk tereg op: “A people is one generation deep. If one generation rejects itself, you are lost” (533, 3675). Uitgaande van die veronderstelling dat ‘n geslag oor drie dekades strek, is daar myns insiens hierdie ontstellende waarheid: Daar is oorvloediglik rede om te twyfel of die huidige geslag Afrikaners sterk genoeg gemotiveerd is om die voortbestaan van hulle kultuur en taal asook dié van die blankedom in Suid-Afrika te verseker. “Orania is a radical response to this perceived threat of assimilation and cultural dilution” (541). Norman skryf: “When I have asked Afrikaner leaders about the key to understanding their people, the answer has always been the same: survival” (3653). Hermann Giliomee het gesê: “There are six per cent Afrikaners in South Africa. We built our entire identity around language and a sense of history” (3661). “Within a few generations, Afrikaners could be absorbed into English-speaking white culture” (3668). Giliomee noem dit “cultural dilution” (3675). Daarom skryf Norman: “Afrikaans is a language with a troubled future” (3683).

Al skryf Norman, “Many things about Orania feel staged” (554), doen sy eintlik verbasend positief verslag oor Orania, bv “There seems to be growing respect – even admiration – for what Orania is trying to accomplish” (3091) en “Orania serves as a potential stepping stone to the realities of a new South Africa” (3753). Dit hang saam met: “Part of the Afrikaner intellectual elite are trying … to save Afrikanerdom by renovating Afrikaner cultural identity” (3746). Boshoff sê: Orania “is not just about race. It’s a cultural marker; it’s about historic division” (590). ‘n Orania-inwoner, Dawid, sê: “It has nothing to do with hating black people. It’s about preserving our own” (1538). Nog ‘n inwoner, Schalk Albertyn sê: “There is widespread racism against white people” (3498). Waarom vestig mense hulle in Orania? Veral weens die misdaad-epidemie in die nuwe Suid-Afrika. “Fear has been the primary motivator for most who have relocated here” (612). ‘n Ander rede is weerstand teen assimilasie (634). Die Orania-skool se “postcard perfection” het Norman beïndruk (649). Die leerlinge “are almost nauseatingly happy, well adjusted and well behaved” (649). Vergelyk dit met die toestand waarin Suid-Afrikaanse staatskole en universiteite verval het.

Tydens ‘n besoek aan die Transkei kom Norman ‘n huishulp teë wat ‘n besondere onvermoë het om huiswerk te doen en teen 5 namiddag vas aan die slaap is (767). Volgens ‘n blanke boer het swartes “it better before, you know. And most of them will tell you so. At least back then they would get their pensions on time and things worked” (791). Die strande sien deesdae anders daar uit: “They are everywhere: crowding the place, playing their music. But you mustn’t let it get to you. You must just go early. They are lazy. They won’t be there before 11 am. They love to sleep” (791). Hierdie boer kan nie op sy werkers vertrou nie, bv “that evening none of his workers arrive” (807). Hy het gevolglik opgehou om melkkoeie aan te hou. Baie boere word op hulle plase vermoor. Norman skryf: “The gruesome circumstances under which many farmers are tortured before being murdered makes it difficult to rule out the element of retaliation” (838).

Norman is bekend met die “land-grabs” in Zimbabwe. Oor Suid-Afrika skryf sy: “There are increasing signs that this is where things are heading … while the South African government keeps its white commercial farmers at arm’s length, many other African nations regard their skills as a valuable asset with which to combat food scarcity” (902). Die volgende Afrika-lande verwelkom blanke Suid-Afrikaanse boere: Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Kongo, Mosambiek, Namibië, Sierra Leone, Somalië, Uganda en Zambië. Norman noem hierdie boere “modern Voortrekkers” (910).

Sy vertel van hoe baie arm blankes daar in die 1930’s was en hoe hulle in eie woongebiede, soos Epping (nou Ruyterwacht) naby Kaapstad, gevestig is. Ook van die streng toesig, uitgeoefen deur maatskaplike werkers, waaraan hulle onderhewig was. Op hierdie manier is hierdie blankes opgehef. “After the fall of apartheid, life in these suburbs changed drastically. State subsidies for the white residents were cancelled and social aid withdrawn. Unable to afford their cost of living, many residents dispersed to caravan parks or squatter camps … Coloured people began moving in” (1039). “‘The government won’t recognise disability in whites’ … There are about 400 white squatter camps in South Africa … approximately 600 000 of South Africa’s 3 million Afrikaners live below the poverty line. In 2008 that figure was 420 000” (2409).

“There is a prevailing conviction among the majority that all white people are wealthy – a misconception largely shared by the ANC leadership. Confronted with a statement that there had been a 30 per cent increase in white people being counted as among the poorest of the poor, former president Mbeki replied that he found it ‘very encouraging’ that income disparity between white and black was now levelling out” (2417). Koerante stel myns insiens nie daarin belang om oor arm blankes verslag te doen nie; veral nie Naspers se Media24-publikasies nie. Op vele terreine wreek die swart regering hom op die blankes, veral die Afrikaners. By die massa-inligtingsmedia is daar skynbaar geen begeerte om hieroor ondersoek in te stel en oor die bevindings verslag te doen nie.

Norman noem dat die militêre of geweldsarm van die ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in 1961 gestig is met “none other than Nelson Mandela” as sy hoof (1981). “In 18 months the group carried out some two hundred acts of sabotage” (1988). Dit behoort nuus vir die Swede te wees. Maar selfs in Suid-Afrika dink baie mense dat Mandela ‘n vredeliewende mens was wat met jare lange tronkstraf onmenslik veronreg is. “Between 1976 and 1983 the ANC carried out 362 acts of violence” (2004). Daar was mededinging en wrywing tussen bv die ANC en Inkatha. “The ‘black-on-black’ struggle claimed thousands of lives, almost three times as many as those taken by the security forces. However, international media downplayed, or even ignored, this side of the ANC” (2011). “Black-on-black violence during the freedom struggle was almost completely ignored by international media outlets” (2035).

Die Aftrikaner-Broederbond het in 1986 voorgestel: “Power-sharing should be done in such a way that no one group could dominate another. A negotiated settlement focusing on minority rights was deemed to be the way forward” (2177). In 1986, volgens Jan Bosman, die huidige hoofsekretaris van die Afrikanerbond, “80 per cent of Afrikaners weren’t ready” vir magsdeling (2694). Ek voeg by: Wat begin het as beloofde magsdeling het teen 1994 algehele magsoorgawe geword, met swartes wat al die ander etniese groepe oorheers. Daar is sedertdien geen sprake van groepregte, bv minderheidsregte, nie. Die nie-wit meerderheid het egter sedert 1996 die grondwetlike reg om onbepaald teen die blanke minderheid te diskrimineer. Mense soos Tim du Plessis dink blykbaar dat tydens hierdie politieke oorgang “the media had evolved into a moral compass for Afrikaners” (2196). Die buitensporige onreg wat blankes, veral Afrikaners, in die nuwe politieke bedeling aangedoen word, skeel diesulkes min.

“Although the elite had started to realise that change was inevitable, the average Afrikaner was far from ready to hand over power. Many feared recrimination, discrimination and retaliation, and support for right-wing parties began to rise again. According to a poll conducted in 1988, only one per cent of Afrikaners and three per cent of [white] English-speakers wanted to see Mandela in power. A mere three per cent of Afrikaners said they found majority control acceptable” (2235).

In die 1992-referendum “a surprising 69 per cent of the electorate voted Yes despite the fact that only 15 per cent of the white population believed that they would be better off in a so-called new South Africa … few [white people] expected the handover of power to be quite so unconditional” (2251).

In 1996 het FW de Klerk die Nasionale Party aan die regering van nasionale eenheid onttrek, “leaving the white community without any formal political power” (2266). “Under the lead of President FW de Klerk, they [white South Africans] laid down their arms and walked into an uncertain future” (3725). Daar is myns insiens geen moontlikheid dat die uitslag van die 1992-referendum ten gunste van magsdeling op ‘n etiese manier as ‘n mandaat vir magsoorgawe vertolk kon word nie, maar dit is presies wat De Klerk gedoen het. Dit is myns insiens moeilik, indien nie onmoontlik nie, om groter verraad as dit in die politiek van enige land op te spoor.

[ Ek het onlangs ‘n skrikwekkende boek gelees, Tim Marshall se Shadowplay: The inside story of the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic (Bookbaby, 2002, 225p; Amazon Kindle $5,69). Daarin word aangetoon hoe Westerse regerings, veral Amerika, Brittanje en Duitsland, op hoogs onetiese wyse saamgespan het om Korsovo, die oorspronklike tuisland van die Ortodoks-christelike Serwiërs, aan Albaniese Moslems te oorhandig, die Serwiërs en sigeuners uit Korsovo te verdryf en die Serwiese staatshoof, Milosevic, tot ‘n val te bring. Geld is kwistig agteraf aan vyande van die Milosevic-regering uitgedeel. Wat daar gebeur het, is nie uniek in die internasionale, insluitende Westerse, politiek nie. Dit is ingeoefende standaardpraktyk. Dit lyk hoogs waarskynlik dat iets soortgelyks ter vernietiging van die blanke bewind in Suid-Afrika gebeur het, maar daardie inligting is nog nie opgediep en gepubliseer nie.]

In Norman se boek is daar ‘n hele hoofstuk oor transformasie, bv regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging. Dit is ‘n onderwerp wat glad te min aandag in die openbare diskoers kry. Die vorme wat transformasie aanneem, is myns insiens die uitdrukking van fanatieke rassisme wat blankes doelbewus veronreg en benadeel. Tydens apartheid het baie teoloë hulle hoogs sensitief voorgedoen vir enige onreg teen swartes. Deesdae swyg hulle oor die onreg wat sienderoë ten koste van blankes gepleeg word. Regstellende aksie het in Amerika ten behoewe van die swart minderheid ontstaan maar word in Suid-Afrika misbruik om die swart meerderheid te bevoordeel. Toe regstellende aksie in 1961 in Amerika ingestel is, is dit as ‘n tydelike maatreël beskou (2481), maar sedertdien is dit uitgebrei na ander minderheidsgroepe en selfs na ‘n meerderheidsgroep, naamlik vroue.

In 1998 het die ANC-regering gekom met die rasgebaseerde beleid dat poste op alle vlakke die demografie moet weerspieël (2488). Barloworld “offer newly qualified black accountants roughly 20 per cent more money than their white colleagues. In addition to this, they receive an entry-level BMW and greater prospects for promotion. Even so, ‘after a few months, they are mercilessly head-hunted'”(2551). Blankes is myns insiens nooit op rasgronde dermate bevoordeel nie. Swartes word deesdae bevoordeel en blankes word uit poste gestoot of geweer en word verplig om entrepreneurs te word.

“If a company has 15 per cent white employees it’s a big problem, but if a company has a hundred per cent black employees it’s not a problem” (2543).

In 2003 het swart ekonomiese bemagtiging gekom, “which required a certain percentage of ownership, management and control of any company to be in black hands” (2512). Swartes hoef nie te presteer om in die voordele van blanke maatskappye te deel nie. Al vereiste is dat hulle swart moet wees. “It makes no sense to add people who don’t create value” (2551). By sportspanne gebeur dieselfde. Die beste spelers mag nie gekies word nie. Spanne word volgens raskwotas saamgestel. Waarop dit volgens Makhenkesi Stofile, ‘n vorige minister van sport, neerkom is “to sacrifice winning in the name of transformation” (2526). Gert van der Westhuizen, Beeld se sportredakteur, het myns insiens intussen ontpop as een van die grootste voorstanders van raskwotas in sport. By sport het dit nie gebly. Wim de Villiers, die rektor van die Universiteit Stellenbosch, pas anti-blanke transformasie toe by studente-toelating, beurstoekennings, personeelaanstellings, ens. Sy hoogheilige viserektor, die teoloog Nico Koopman, opper geen beswaar teen die opsigtelike onreg wat teen blankes gepleeg word nie.

“Founded on a platform of non-racialism, the ANC doesn’t seem to see the inherent contradiction in using race-based affirmative action and empowerment policies to achieve transformation. Race is now used to promote the previously disadvantaged and disadvantage the previously advantaged, which means that your race still largely determines your opportunities in life” (2573). “The previously disadvantaged include all non-whites, women and the disabled. This means that close to 95 per cent of the population, with black people at the top,* are entitled to preferential treatment in hiring, promotion, university admissions and the award of government contracts. The flipside of this is that if you are a white male,** and hence part of the five per cent considered the most ‘previously advantaged’, your chances of being accepted to university, finding a job or being promoted are that much slimmer. As a result, many have ended up leaving the country” (2587).

Ek voeg by: ‘n Mens sou dink dat ANC-leiers in landsbelang die insig sou hê om daardie etniese groep, die blankes, wat hulleself meer as enige ander as voortreflike landsburgers bewys het (“the essential population of South Africa” – 3048), te koester en hulle eerder te bevoordeel as benadeel, maar Thabo Mbeki het gesê hulle kan maar gerus die land verlaat. Wat ook glad nie besef word nie is dat regstellende aksie in Amerika ingestel is om swartes te bevoordeel, wat sowat 12% van die bevolking is. Onbekwame swartes in poste sal in Amerika nie sulke vernietigende gevolge hê soos in Suid-Afrika met meer as 80% van die bevolking wat (onregmatig) op bevoordeling aanspraak maak nie.

[* Dit herinner aan wat George Orwell in Animal farm geskryf het: Almal is gelyk maar party is meer gelyk as ander. ** Blanke mans word op ‘n wraaksugtige manier vir benadeling uitgesonder omdat hulle hulleself as uitstekende uitroeiers van terroriste bewys het.]

Wynand Boshoff, die broer van Carel Boshoff IV, wys tereg daarop dat die herskryfde geskiedenis wat deesdae aan skoolkinders opgedring word, “Afrikaner-unfriendly” is (3134). “They have reduced all of Western civilisation to slave owners and oppressors … even vilifying Afrikaner achievements” (3134). Die historikus Fransjohan Pretorius voeg by: “The struggle history of today is purposefully partial” (3156). Dit is ‘n geval van “historians rewriting history with a lot of emotion … they do not come up with a balanced portrayal” (3164). “There is a lot of vengeance in what today’s historians say, and do, and write” (3172).

In die boek word daar dikwels na Bloedrivier verwys. Aan die ander kant van hierdie rivier het die ANC-regering die Ncome-museum opgerig as teenhanger vir die Bloedrivier-monument en -museum. Miljoene rande staatsgeld word aan die Ncome-museum bestee. “Afrikaners receive nothing, not even a grant for their museum” (3425). Het diegene wat oorloop van ‘n sug na geregtigheid, bv bevrydingsteoloë, soos Desmond Tutu, en meningsvormers, soos Max du Preez, al iets hieroor gesê of geskryf? ‘n Brug is oor die rivier gebou wat die twee museumterreine verbind. Norman skryf tereg: “The first guest across any bridge is assimilation” (3783). ‘n Ander opsie word in die opskrif van hoofstuk 14 verskaf: “Good fences make good neighbours” (1813).

Leon Lemmer: Oswald Spengler oor die Amerikaners en die blankedom

Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) was ‘n Duitse historikus wat veral bekendheid verwerf het vanweë sy boek wat in Engels bekend staan as The decline of the West, volume 1: Form and actuality, 1918, volume 2, Perspectives of world history, 1922 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926, 1928). ‘n Latere boek van hom, wat glad nie so bekend is nie, is in 1933 in Duits gepubliseer en daarna in Engels as The hour of decision (London: Allen & Unwin, 1934). In hierdie rubriek beperk ek my aandag tot hierdie werk.

Selfs in Charles Francis Atkinson se vertaling kom Spengler se ritmies-wiegende skryfstyl na vore sodat sy werke steeds met genot gelees kan word. Wat deurgaans in gedagte gehou moet word, is dat Spengler hierdie teks voltooi het toe die opkoms van Adolf Hitler en Nasionale Sosialisme pas begin het. Waarom hierdie boek relatief onbekend is, is seker omdat Spengler ‘n (nasionalisties-Duitse)* perspektief op ander lande soos Amerika, Brittanje, Frankryk en selfs Duitsland bied wat nie altyd vleiend is nie. Die boek is deur die Nazi’s verbied. Ek gebruik die elektroniese weergawe in die Timeless Wisdom Collection (2016; Amazon Kindle $1,13) wat Spengler se genoemde twee werke bevat, asook nog een van sy hoofwerke, Prussianism and socialism (1919), wat gebaseer is op aantekeninge wat nie in sy hoofwerk neerslag gevind het nie. Om teen betaling van skaars ‘n dollar met ‘n groot gees soos Spengler as ‘t ware te kan wandel, is sekerlik ‘n winskoop.

[* “Germany is the key country” (23781). “It is of Germany that I am speaking here. Germany … whose existence is, in the most alarming sense of the word, at stake” (23806). Daarmee loop hy op ‘n merkwaardige manier die Tweede Wêreldoorlog vooruit. Later skryf Spengler van “the greatest of all dangers, the coloured menace … it will require every bit of ‘race’ that is still available among white nations to deal with it. Germany, of all countries, is not an island … It is but a small spot in a great, fermenting world, though undoubtedly a spot in a decisive position. But it alone has Prussianism as a fact within itself. With this treasure of exemplary Being it may become the ‘educator’ of the ‘white’ world, and perhaps its saviour” (26314). “What is needed is not a pure race, but a strong one, which has a nation within it” (26509). Die teenoorgestelde is tans besig om te gebeur. Angela Merkel word klaarblyklik deur ‘n oormaat van historiese skuldgevoelens gedryf wanneer sy miljoene immigrante uit die Derde Wêreld in Duitsland toelaat. Duitsland kan mettertyd die sleutel blyk te wees van die ondergang van die blanke beskawing in Europa; die teenoorgestelde van waarop Spengler gehoop het.]

“It is the task of the historical expert (in the true sense) to understand the facts of his time and through them to envisage, interpret, and delineate the future” (23701). Dit is wat Spengler inderdaad doen wanneer hy skryf: “The national revolution of 1933 was a mighty phenomenon” (23709). “There are already signs, in the dictatorial tendencies of our time, of this Caesarism, which is destined to assume the unlimited mastery over the ruins of historical tradition” (14272). Hy kom met hierdie raak voorspelling: “We stand, it may be, close before a second world war” (23773). Maar Spengler is nie altyd beskeie nie: “I see further than others” (23756). “I write not for a few months ahead or for next year, but for the future” (23765).

“All … nations of the world have inherited a character from their past” (23748). Sy fokus is op die blankes wêreldwyd: “To see the immensity of the danger which looms over this mass of peoples” (23790). Traditioneel was “the world powers … without exception European powers” (24114). “Today the form of the world is being remoulded from its foundations … The age is mighty, but all the more diminutive are the people in it” (23987). Die tydsgees “detests every kind of greatness, everything that towers, rules, is superior; and construction means for it only the pulling-down of all the products of civilization, of the State, of society, to the level of little people, above which its pitiful emotionalism cannot soar to understand” (23932). “The primeval barbarism … is awake again” (23995).

Oor die Britte skryf Spengler profeties: “The island England … has never quite regarded herself as part of Europe” (24083) en “England gained her wealth by battles and not by bookkeeping and speculation” (24330). Hy skryf van “France, whose capital is in process of becoming a historic sight, like Vienna and Florence, and like Athens in Roman times” (24711). Klemens Metternich (1773-1859) word soos volg aangehaal: “My private belief is that the old Europe is at the beginning of its end … The new Europe … is still in the state of becoming; between end and beginning there will be chaos” (24106). Maar ek beperk my aandag in hierdie rubriek aanvanklik tot wat hy oor die Amerikaners en Amerika skryf. Om Amerikaansheid te verwoord, is sekerlik nie maklik nie, maar Spengler slaag in uitnemende mate daarin.

“Is the United States a power with a future? … dollars must not be taken to represent the spiritual strength and depth of the people to whom they belong; neither must sport be confused with race-soundness nor business intelligence with spirit and mind. What is ‘hundred per cent Americanism’? A mass existence standardized to a low average level, a primitive pose, or a promise for the future? All we know is that so far there is neither a real nation nor a real State … The American does not talk of State or Mother Country like the Englishman, but of ‘this country’. Actually what it amounts to is a boundless field and a population of trappers, drifting from town to town in the dollar-hunt, unscrupulous and dissolute; for the law is only for those who are not cunning or powerful enough to ignore it” (24610).

“Life is organized exclusively from the economic side and consequently lacks depth, all the more because it contains nothing of that element of historic tragedy, of great destiny, that has widened and chastened the soul of Western peoples through the centuries. Their religion, originally a strict form of Puritanism, has become a sort of obligatory entertainment, and the War was a novel sport. And there is the same dictatorship there as in Russia (it does not matter that it is imposed by society instead of a party), affecting everything – flirtation and church-going, shoes and lipstick, dances and novels á la mode, thought, food, and recreation – that in the Western world is left to the option of individuals. There is one standardized type of American, and, above all, American woman, in body, clothes, and mind” (24617).

“There is an almost Russian form of State socialism or State capitalism, represented by the mass of trusts, which, like the Russian economic administrations, systematically standardize and control every detail of production and marketing. These are the real lords of the land in both cases. It is the Faustian [ie Western] will-to-power, but translated from organic growth to soulless mechanization. Dollar-imperialism, which pervades the whole of [the] America[s] down to Santiago and Buenos Aires and seeks to undermine and eliminate West-European (and, above all, English) trade, entirely analogous in its control of economic trends by political power to Bolshevik imperialism. The Bolshevik motto: ‘Asia for Asiatics’, too, corresponds in principle to the present-day conception of the Monroe Doctrine* for Latin America – namely, all America for the economic power of the United States. This is the ultimate meaning of the founding of ‘independent’ republics like Cuba and Panama, of the intervention in Nicaragua and the overthrow by the might of the dollar of unaccommodating presidents right down to the extreme South” (24630).

[* “The Americas for Americans.” Die Monroe-leerstelling: “Declaration by US president James Monroe [1758-1831, president 1817-1825] in 1823 that the USA would not tolerate any European nation trying to establish a colony in the Americas, and that any attempt to do so would be regarded as a threat to US peace and security. At the same time, several European countries were proposing to intervene in former Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin and South America, and Russia was attempting to extend its Alaskan territories into Oregon country. In return for the cessation of such European ambitions, the USA would not intervene in European affairs” (Collins World Encyclopedia, 2003, p 622). In sy hoedanigheid as die Amerikaanse ambassadeur in Parys het Monroe in 1803 die aankoop van die Franse Louisiana-kolonie vir $15 miljoen suksesvol onderhandel. Hierdie Louisiana-kolonie het uit die volgende agt hedendaagse Amerikaanse state bestaan: Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, Suid- en Noord-Dakota. Alaska, die grootste VSA-staat, is in 1867 vir $7,2 miljoen van Rusland gekoop. Die aankoop van al hierdie state is in ooreenstemming met die Monroe-leerstelling, wat ook deels verklaar waarom Amerika aanvanklik huiwerig was om by die twee wêreldoorloë betrokke te raak.]

“The United States has … become a leading element in international politics … Is the ‘Yankee’* equal to this difficult task? Does he stand for an indestructible kind of life or is he only a fashion in physical, mental, and moral clothing? And, moreover, how many inhabitants of the country are there who inwardly do not belong to this ruling Anglo-Saxon type? Quite apart from the Negroes, the immigrants during the twenty years before the [First World] War included – with only a small portion of Germans, English, and Scandinavians – no less than fifteen million Poles, Russians, Czechs, Balkan Slavs, Eastern Jews, Greeks, inhabitants of Asia Minor, Spaniards, and Italians. The greater part of these have not been incorporated in Americanism, but form an alien, foreign-thinking, and very prolific proletariat” (24645). Sedert die jare sestig word voorkeur aan immigrante uit die Derde Wêreld, insluitende Moslems, gegee wat uiteraard nog moeiliker, indien ooit, in die tradisionele Anglo-Saksiese sin veramerikaans. [* Yankee is die tradisionele naam vir die Amerikaanse Noorderlinge en Dixie vir die Suiderlinge.]

“In the ‘Land of Liberty’ there is only the resolve of free men to help themselves – the revolver in the hip-pocket is an American invention – but this form of defence is as freely available for those in possession as for the rest. Only a short time ago the farmers in Iowa besieged a few towns and threatened them with starvation if they did not buy their products at a decent price. Not many years since, anyone using the word ‘revolution’ in connection with this country would have been called an idiot. Today such ideas are quite in order. What will the masses of the unemployed do – I repeat, the majority are not ‘hundred per cent Americans’ – when their sources of relief are exhausted and there is no State support because there is no organized State with exact and honest statistics and control of those in want? Will they fall back on their fists and their common economic interests with the underworld? And will the intellectually primitive upper class, obsessed as it is by the thought of money, reveal all at once, in face of this danger, dormant moral forces that will lead to the real construction of a State and to spiritual preparedness to sacrifice possessions and blood to it, instead of regarding war as a means of gaining wealth as hitherto? Or will the special economic interests of individual areas still pull the most weight and, as once before in 1861, lead to the disintegration of the country into separate states?(24659).

Spengler se weersin in geldgierigheid kan onder meer biografies verklaar word. Hy het jare lank danksy ‘n klein erfporsie in beskeie omstandighede en met groot toewyding navorsing gedoen en boeke geskryf. Telkens het hy professorate wat hom aangebied is geweier omdat hy sy roeping wou vervul: om ‘n filosofie van die geskiedenis daar te stel wat nie bloot versigtig-vertolkend te werk gaan nie maar so getrou moontlik die toekoms probeer voorspel. Hy het die Amerikaanse samelewing as geestelik vlak beskou, dat hulle bv nie tragedie ken nie, omdat hulle nie in dieselfde mate as die Europeërs ‘n eeue oue tradisie van geakkumuleerde ervaring en kulturele dieptegang het nie.

Daar is eienskappe in die Amerikaanse samelewing wat bewonderingswaardig is. Die VSA het egter ook kenmerke wat ‘n mens negatief en selfs sinies kan stem. Wat onder meer nodig is, is om tussen die Amerikaanse regering en Amerikaners te onderskei. Daar is Amerikaanse individue wat die sout van die aarde is. Toegepas op die nuwe Suid-Afrika moet duidelik tussen die ANC-regering en Suid-Afrikaners, veral die blankes en by uitstek die Afrikaners, onderskei word. Byvoorbeeld, wanneer gesê word Suid-Afrika het sus of so gesê of gestem in die Verenigde Nasies, weerspieël dit dikwels nie die gesonde mening van Afrikaners nie. Wat veel eerder telkens bevestig word, is dat die Suid-Afrikaanse blankes, insluitende die Afrikaners, sedert 1994 onverdiend onder ondoeltreffende vreemde oorheersing gebuk gaan en dat Afrikaners hulle vir verandering/transformasie moet beywer pleks van gedwee in onderdanigheid te berus.

Vir Spengler het dit nie net om die Amerikaners gegaan nie, maar eerder om die blankedom. Daarom moet ek in aansluiting by die derde paragraaf hier bo verder hierop uitbrei. Hy begin die eerste en inleidende deel van sy boek, The hour of decision, met hierdie akkurate toekomsvisie: “Is there today a man among the White races who has eyes to see what is going on around him on the face of the globe? To see the immensity of the danger which looms over this mass of peoples?” (23790). Daar volg hierdie steeds aktuele waarheid: “Not a statesman, not a party, hardly even a political thinker is today in a safe enough position to speak the truth” (23971). Deesdae neem dit dikwels die vorm van politieke korrektheid aan. Ek kies vervolgens hoofsaaklik aanhalings waarin steeds aktuele betekenis ingelees kan word.

Die tweede deel van die boek handel oor “World powers and world wars.” “Peace … is the continuation of war with different means” (24189). Dink aan bv die ras- en kultuuroorlog wat wêreldwyd teen die blankes gevoer word. “Die nasie” in die 1789-sin van die woord word ‘n wensbeeld genoem (24225). Spengler se siening van gelykheid is naatloos toepasbaar op die nuwe Suid-Afrika: “Equality” beteken “substitution of quantity for the detested quality, and of number for the coveted talent” (24242). “What matters numbers? It only tyrannized over the past century, which bowed the knee to quantity. A man means a great deal as opposed to a mass of slavish souls, pacifists and world-improvers” (24511). Politieke “representatives … have no intention whatever of ‘serving the people’; they intend to make the people serve them” (24242). “The white world is governed primarily by idiots – if it is governed at all, which one is entitled to doubt” (25957). Die volgende is toepasbaar op die ANC: “The substitution of party for State” (24439).

Die derde deel van die boek het as onderwerp “The white world-revolution.” Naas die dreigende wêreldoorlog is daar “the far more dangerous second part of this revolution … the whites in general are under attack by the collective mass of the ‘coloured’ population of the earth, which is slowly becoming conscious of its community” (24785). “The hatred … is piling up among all the coloured populations of the world against the whole white civilization” (25236). “Nothing is a better welder than hate” (25489). “Mob-rule” word as “the worst thing of all” genoem (24820). Met watter soort meningsvormers (dink aan bv die anti-tradisie-dogmas van Max du Preez) het ons deesdae te make? “It is no longer the thrifty deep wisdom of old peasant families, which remains true as long as the stock to which it belongs endures, but the mere intelligence of the day, of the daily papers, ephemeral literature, and national assemblies, the bloodless intellect whose criticism gnaws away everything that is left standing of the genuine – that is, the naturally grown – Culture” (24868).

Spengler keer terug na die kwessie van gelykheid. Hierdie keer is hy meer uitgesproke. “Society rests upon the inequality of men. That is a natural fact … ‘Equal rights’ are contrary to nature, are an indication of the departure from type of ageing societies, are the beginning of their irrevocable decline. It is a piece of intellectual stupidity to want to substitute something else for the social structure that has grown up through the centuries and is fortified by tradition” (24922).

Ons word deesdae alewig aan menswaardigheid herinner, maar so iets moet met eerbare substansie verdien word. “Everything that we call duty, the basis of all genuine rights, the original substance of every sort of dignity, may be traced back to honour” (24893). In talle beroepe is daar mense wat eer verdien. “Those who have it not, those who ‘see no point in’ maintaining the decencies vis-à-vis themselves as well as others, are ‘vulgar.’ This is the opposite of nobility, according to the code of every true society … all instinct for superior living and feeling has been lost and the public manners of all ‘classes’ and ‘parties’ are equally debased” (24900). Dit is wat ek voorheen die brutalisering van die samelewing genoem het.

“A mushy desire for revenge for some bad luck that has spoilt their lives, the absence of any instinct of honour and duty, and an unlimited thirst for money without work and for rights without responsibilities bring them together. It is from this befogged milieu that the heroes of the moment of all popular movements and Radical parties arise. Here the word ‘Liberty’ takes on the bloody significance that it has in the declining ages. What is meant is: liberation from all the bonds of civilization, from every kind of form and custom, from all the people whose mode of life they feel in their dull fury to be superior. Pride and quietly borne poverty, silent fulfilment of duty, renunciation for the sake of a task or conviction, greatness in enduring one’s fate, loyalty, honour, responsibility, achievement: all this is a constant reproach to the ‘humiliated and insulted.’ For, once more be it said, the opposite of noble is not poor, but vulgar” (24937). “The place of class was to be taken by that which has no class” (25146).

“The ideal of class war is, as we all know, an overthrow. Not the construction of anything new, but the destruction of what exists. It is an aim without a future. It is the will-to-nothing” (25480). “The work-shy rabble were in power, and not the working class” (25223). Dit is ‘n “fool’s paradise of all the poor and wretched, who more and more came to be identified with ‘the worker'” (25464). Dit gaan om “happiness of the many, which consists in happily doing nothing … and perpetual peace in which to enjoy it, free from the anxiety and responsibility; but also, and primarily, with typical revolutionary bad taste, the opprtunity of gloating over the unhappiness of the few, of the once mighty, the wise, the aristocratic, and the rich” (25489).

“Hardly a party now dares to suggest that it represents any other section of the nation but the ‘worker.’ Whether from cowardice or from hope of successes at the poll, they treat him almost without exception as a privileged class. In all countries they have succeeded in demoralizing him, turning him into a most exacting, discontented, and therefore unhappy creature,* putting him in the melting-pot with the rabble of the streets to produce a like-minded unit, a ‘class,’ to breed from him the type of the proletarian in spirit – which by the mere fact of its existence guarantees revolutionary success, which despises industriousness and achievement as a betrayal of the ‘cause,’ and whose highest ambition it is to become a leader of the masses and pillar of the Revolution” (25580). “Thus the ‘worker,’ who according to the Marxian doctrine is the only one who works, has become … the one who works the least” (25655). “‘The worker’ has become a pensioner of society and of the nation” (25707). “There is work for which only a few men of superior rank are competent, and other work which is valuable only in terms of duration and volume. Whichever it is, one is born to it. That is fate. It cannot be altered either by Rationalist or by sentimental-romantic equality-talk” (25748). [* Deesdae ‘n slagoffer, benadeelde, gemarginaliseerde, agtergestelde, ens, genoem.]

“The bad manners of all parliaments, the general tendency to connive at a rather shady business transaction if it promises to bring in money without work, jazz and Negro dances as the spiritual outlet in all circles of society, women painted like prostitutes, the efforts of writers to win popularity by ridiculing in their novels and plays the correctness of well-bred people, and the bad taste shown even by the nobility and old princely families in throwing off every kind of social restraint and time-honoured custom: all of these go to prove that it is now the vulgar mob that gives the tone” (24961). Wat hulle doen is “unchaining the hatred that burns to destroy, the envy of everything that is not available to all, that is prominent and must be pulled down. Not only tradition and custom, but every kind of refinement – beauty, grace, taste in dress, easy good manners, elegance of speech, control of one’s limbs, education and self-discipline – irritate the vulgar soul till its blood boils. A finely formed face, the light and dainty step of a slim foot on the pavement, are contradictions of democracy … even the delight in a well-kept garden of flowers and rare fruits are things to be burnt, smashed, or stamped out. [High] Culture, because of its superiority, is the enemy. Its creations cannot be understood or unwardly assimilated; because they are not available for all they must be annihilated” (24967).

“It occurs to no one to educate the masses to the level of true culture … the structure of society is to be levelled down to the standard of the populace. General equality is to reign, everything is to be equally vulgar … Superiority, manners, taste, and every description of inward rank are crimes. Ethical, religious, national ideas, marriage for the sake of children,* the family, State authority: all these are old-fashioned and reactionary”(24974). “In all such times there is a priest-rabble which drags the dignity and faith of the church through the mud of party politics, allies itself with the revolutionary forces, and, by senstimental talk about loving one’s neighbour and helping the poor, eggs on the underworld to set about destroying the social order – that order with which the church is irrevocably and fatally bound up” (25344). [* Dit moet nie verbaas nie as die NG Kerk by monde van ontbybelde teoloë soos André Bartlett en Chris Jones eerdaags verskoning vra omdat Moedernatuur so harteloos is deur nie selfdegeslag-huweliksmaats met selfverwekte kinders te seën nie. “Ontbybelde” omdat hulle beter as die Bybel weet.]

Volgens Spengler word “a ripe Culture” aan eiendom gekenmerk. “Let it for once be said outright, though it is a slap in the face for the vulgarity of the age: property is not a vice, but a gift, and a gift such as few possess. For it, too, is the product of long training through generations of distinction” (24990). “I am speaking of property-owning in so far as it implies the tradition of a Culture. It signifies inward superiority, it marks a distinction from whole classes of people” (25006). Watter mense ly aan eiendom- en rykdomjaloesie? “The Marxists, who declare the possesion of any sort of wealth to be criminal and immoral and war upon everything that has this superiority in things of high culture and any who surpass others in the ability to acquire, maintain, and worthily use property, and that from envy of such ability, which they themselves completely lack” (25039). “Marxism is indeed a religion, not in the sense of its founder, but in that which his revolutionary following has imparted to it. Like any church it has its saints, apostles, martyrs, fathers, bible and mission. Like any church it has dogmas, heresy-tribunals, an orthodoxy and a scholasticism, and above all, a popular moral – or rather two, for believers and unbelievers” (25395). “Property means above all responsibility, care and work” (25063). “The desire for other people’s property … was developed into a world outlook and produced appropriate politics from below” (25070). “From this time onward it has been ‘modern’ and superior to see the world from below” (25284), deesdae “voetsoolvlak” genoem. Hieroor skryf Spengler: “To regard the world from below is mean” (25418).

Die laaste deel van die boek handel oor: “The coloured world-revolution.” Die Westerse beskawing word deur twee revolusies bedreig. “The one comes from below, the other from without: class war and race war. The one now lies to a large extent behind us, although its decisive blows – in the Anglo-American zone, for instance – are probably still to come” (26322). “The other first became definite in the [First] World War, and it is rapidly acquiring direction and form … both will fight side by side, possibly as allies: it will be the severest crisis through which the white peoples will have to pass in common – whether united or not – if they intend to have any future” (26322). Hy voorsien klaarblyklik die chaos van bv die Amerikaanse burgerregtebeweging van die jare vyftig en sestig.

Die nie-wittes se revolusie het tydens die Eerste Wêreldoorlog begin toe sommige van hulle as soldate eerstehands ervaar het hoe Westerlinge oorlog voer en gesien het dat blankes nie onoorwinlik is nie. “It was not Germany that lost the World War; the West lost it when it lost the respect of the coloured races” (26399). Die Russies-Japannese Oorlog (1904-1905) “destroyed the aureole of invincibility which surrounded Europe” (26377). “For centuries it was possible to make a systematic defense … [for example] the Roman Empire was an enclosed area with frontiers that could be guarded. The position of the present Imperium of the white nations, which embraces the whole globe and includes the coloured races, is far more difficult. White humanity has scattered itself to all quarters in its ungovernable urge to infinite distance over both Americas, South Africa, Australia and innumerable strategic points between. The Yellow-Brown-Black-Red menace lurks within the field of the white power” (26367).

Die Eerste Wêreldoorlog “was a defeat of the white races, and the Peace of 1918 was the first great triumph of the coloured world: symbolized by the fact that today it is allowed to have a say in the disputes of the white states among themselves in the Geneva League of Nations which is nothing but a miserable symbol of shameful things. That Germans abroad should be ill-treated by coloured people at the orders of English and French was not a surprisingly novel procedure. This method began in the Liberal Revolution of the eighteenth century: in 1775 the English enrolled men of Indian race to attack, burn, and scalp the American republicans, and it should not be forgotten how the Jacobins [the republicans of the French Revolution] mobilized the Negroes of Haiti for the ‘Rights of Man'” (26392).

“The hare may perhaps deceive the fox, but human beings can not deceive each other. The coloured man sees through the white man when he talks about ‘humanity’ and everlasting peace. He scents the other’s unfitness and lack of will to defend himself … We cannot permit ourselves to be tired. Danger is knocking at the door. The coloured race are not pacifists. They do not cling to a life whose length is its sole value. They take up the sword when we lay it down.* Once they feared the white man; now they despise him … they … look down upon the whites as on a thing of yesterday” (26618). [* Is dit nie presies wat in 1990 in Suid-Afrika gebeur het nie?]

Leon Lemmer: Samuel Huntington oor die botsing van beskawings

In die Amerikaanse politieke liberatuur kom ‘n mens dikwels verwysings na Samuel P Huntington (1927-2008) teë. As politieke wetenskaplike het hy groot aansien geniet. Hy het ‘n rol in die administrasie van Jimmy Carter (president 1977-1981) gespeel, maar dit beteken glad nie dat hy hom met die Carter-bewind se buitelandse beleid teenoor Afrika en Carter se persoonlike vyandigheid jeens die blanke bewind in Suid-Afrika vereenselwig het nie. Huntington was hoogs skepties oor die spoed waarteen daar na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog onafhanklikheid aan kolonies toegestaan is. Hy het daarop gewys dat politieke stabiliteit en ekonomiese en sosiale voorspoed nie noodwendig op onafhanklikheid volg nie. Ook dat demokrasie in sulke lande dikwels inplof en sulke samelewings in geweld en chaos kan verval.

Volgens Huntington moet demokrasie en algemene stemreg liefs geleidelik ingevoer word. Dit is in ooreenstelling met die tradisionele oortuiging van baie blanke Suid-Afrikaners. Dit was ook die beleid van bv Ian Smith (eerste minister 1964-1979) in Rhodesië. ‘n Mens sou dink dat iemand soos FW de Klerk die sinvolheid van so ‘n benadering kon insien. Pleks daarvan het De Klerk verkondig dat hy alles meteens wou regtrek. Die gevolge van hierdie dwaasheid behoort deesdae vir enigeen duidelik te wees.

In die jare tagtig het Huntington as konsultant vir PW Botha (uitvoerende staatshoof 1978-1989) se Nasionale Party-regering opgetree. Huntington het begrip vir die apartheidsbeleid gehad. Volgens hom was apartheid nie só sleg, soos ANC-gesindes graag beweer, dat dit nodeloos was om dit aan te pas nie. Huntington was ten gunste van die hervorming van apartheid en het gewaarsku dat dit nie eensklaps afgeskaf moet word nie. Desnieteenstaande was dit presies wat De Klerk gedoen het. Huntington het ook aanbeveel dat die blanke bewind nie moet skroom om teen terroriste op te tree nie. Desnieteenstaande het De Klerk tydens die proses van magsoorgawe en in reaksie op eise van die ANC in groot mate die doeltreffende funksionering van die staat se veiligheidsmagte (weermag en polisie) aan bande gelê. Anders as in 2 Korintiërs 12:9 word krag in die politiek nie in swakheid volbring nie.

Huntington het bekend geword veral vanweë sy artikel, “The clash of civilizations?”, wat in 1993 in die tydskrif Foreign Affairs gepubliseer is. Die titel van die artikel is ontleen aan ‘n frase wat die kenner van Midde-Oosterse aangeleenthede, Bernard Lewis (hy was op 31 Mei ‘n eeu oud!), gebruik het (Huntington, 2013-boek hier onder, Kindle 247). Die artikel behels besinning oor hoe die wêreldorde na verwagting na afloop van die Koue Oorlog sal ontplooi. Die kernidee is dat ekonomiese sake en politieke verskille voortaan ‘n mindere rol in internasionale konflik sal speel; dat kultuur- en beskawingsverskille van deurslaggewende belang gaan wees. Die teks is gebaseer op bevindings waartoe ‘n span navorsers van die Harvard-universiteit gekom het.

Die vorige Suid-Afrikaanse politieke bedeling was in 1993 dalk nog nie sover heen dat nie gered kon word wat daar toe nog te redde was nie. Sedertdien het dit baie duidelik geword dat gewigtige sake soos taal (spesifiek Afrikaans), kultuur en beskawing glad nie ‘n hoë prioriteit by die De Klerk-regering en sy onderhandelingspan geniet het nie. “Language is, of course, central to culture” (1206). ‘n Inskiklike, naïewe gees het die onderhandelings oorheers: Ons is mos almal (basies eenderse) Suid-Afrikaners wat lekker gaan saamwerk met die oog op ‘n mooi toekoms. Hierdie gees sou na ydele verwagting in die nuwe Suid-Afrika vergestalt word en nie soseer die letter van die Grondwet nie. Die ANC was mos propvol goeie ouens wat met die blanke inwoners se toekoms vertrou kon word. Die kamerade was mos nie magshonger en op eiebelang en die belang van swartes ingestel nie. Die ANC-leierskorps was glo vryheidsvegters in die tradisie van die Boere toe hulle in hulle Vryheidsoorloë en Rebellie betrokke was. In die ANC-kraal is misdadigers mos so skaars soos hoendertande. Daar is veronderstel dat hierdie mense moreel ‘n onbesproke rekord het, die hoë grond beklee, ens. As dit maar so was, sou die ontgogeling nie so groot gewees het nie!

In sy 1993-artikel het Huntington die opkoms van Moslem-mag en die bedreiging wat dit vir die Weste inhou, korrek voorspel. “In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people” (1161). Hy het tereg ook voorsien dat die Oekraïne die gevaar loop om in twee te verdeel: ‘n Westersgeoriënteerde westelike helfte en ‘n Russiese oostelike helfte. In sy laaste boek, Who are we? (2004), het Huntington gewaarsku teen die gevolge van die instroming van wettige en onwettige Hispanistiese immigrante wat reeds die grootste minderheidsgroep in Amerika geword het en die gevaar inhou dat die land sowel kultureel as taalgewys in twee verdeel word. Reeds in 1993 het hy die gevare voorsien wat die instroming van immigrante in Wes-Europa inhou: “West European peoples and states now see a cultural threat from the South [and Middle East] replacing the ideological threat [communism] from the East” (1150). Sulke weloorwoë en skynbaar geldige menings het Huntington hoogs ongewild in linkse geledere gemaak. Let bv op die trant van die hoof-Wikipedia-inskrywing oor Huntington.

Oor die begrippe “kultuur” en “beskawing” is al baie gepubliseer. Raymond Williams skryf: “Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language” (Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society, London: Fontana, 1976, p 76). Volgens Williams beskryf “civilization … an achieved state or condition of organized social life” (48). Volgens Johann Herder (1744-1803) verwys sowel kultuur as beskawing na “the historical self-development of humanity” (79). Oor kultuur word daar in die Engelse literatuur gewoonlik na die werk van Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) en TS Eliot (1888-1965) verwys. Dit is onprakties en eintlik onnodig om hier in besonderhede daaroor te skryf.

Vir die doeleindes van hierdie rubriek volstaan ek met die volgende definisies. “Culture … the way of life of a particular society or group of people, including patterns of thought, beliefs, behaviour, customs, traditions, rituals, dress, and language, as well as art, music, and literature” [laasgenoemde drie word dikwels “hoë kultuur” genoem] (Collins World Encyclopedia, 2003, p 247). “Civilization … highly developed human society with structured division of labour” (204). Dit gaan in hierdie rubriek om leefwyse, dus kultuur in die algemeen, wat in sy ontwikkelde vorme, oor tyd en plek heen, beskawing genoem word.

George Reisman systap die onderwerp van hierdie rubriek, die botsing van beskawings, deur Westerse (insluitende Europese) beskawing as die hoogste vorm van beskawing te beskou omdat dit kumulatief uit vorige beskawings ontwikkel het en in daardie sin nie-etnies is (Education and the racist road to barbarism, Laguna Hills: TJS Books, 2014, 13p; Amazon Kindle $3,41). Die Trinidadse skrywer, VS Naipaul, sluit hierby aan: “Western civilization is the ‘universal civilization’ that ‘fits all men'” (Huntington 374). Huntington spreek Naipaul direk teë: “For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization” (517).

Maar die standpunt van Reisman en Naipaul maak dit des te meer dwaas as daar teen eurosentriese onderrig beswaar geopper word. ‘n Pleidooi vir die afrikanisering van die onderwys, of dat onderrig op minder ontwikkelde beskawings toegespits moet wees, kan impliseer dat “a culture limited to the level of making dugout canoes is to be presented as the equivalent of one capable of launching space ships” (Reisman, Kindle 201). “The intellectual substance of Western civilization is nothing other than the highest level of knowledge attained anywhere on earth, in virtually every aspect of every field, and if the purpose of education is to impart knowledge, then its purpose is to impart Western civilization” (218). Vir verdere inligting lees: “George Reisman: Tot lof van Westerse beskawing” (Praag 21.11.2015).

Seker die maklikste toegang tot Huntington se 1993-artikel en kommentaar daarop is The clash of civilizations? The debate, edited by James F Hoge (New York: Foreign Affairs Publishing, 2nd edition, 2010, 134p; Amazon Kindle $5,69) of The clash of civilizations? The debate: 20th anniversary edition, edited by Gideon Rose (New York: Foreign Affairs Publishing, 2013, 93p; Amazon Kindle $8,57). In albei publikasies word Huntington se teks volledig weergegee, gevolg deur die kommentaar van sewe outeurs. Daarna antwoord Huntington hulle onder die opskrif: “If not civilizations, what? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World”. Al hierdie materiaal is gedurende 1993 in Foreign Affairs gepubliseer. In die 2010-boek volg hierna kommentaar deur drie ander outeurs wat na 1993 in Foreign Affairs gepubliseer is. In die 2013-boek is laasgenoemde drie kommentare weggelaat. In hulle plek is daar ‘n artikel deur Richard Betts oor “grand theories of the post-Cold War era” (77), gevolg deur huldeblyke vir Huntington deur Stephen Rose, Eliot Cohen, Henry Rosovsky en Zbigniew Brzezinski. (Die eerste uitgawe van bogenoemde 2010-boek het beslag gekry toe Huntington nog gelewe het.) My verwysings is na die Kindle-weergawe van die 2013-boek tensy anders vermeld.

Die kern van Huntington se beroemde 1993-artikel het hy soos volg verwoord: “The fundamental source of conflict in this [post-Cold War] new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics” (88). “The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations” (353). Hy wys op die ideologiese konflik tussen fascisme, kommunisme en liberale demokrasie wat ‘n oorheersende rol in die geskiedenis van die 20ste eeu gespeel het maar nou verby is. Ideologie was identiteitsbepalend (99) maar voortaan sal kultuur/beskawing na verwagting daardie rol vervul; nie net plaaslik nie, maar ook internasionaal. Die hoofverdelingslyn is tussen Westerse en nie-Westerse beskawings (104). Dit is ‘n geval van “the West versus the rest” (353). “Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American” (120).

Kultuur en beskawing word deur Huntington vertolk (min of meer) in ooreenstemming met wat hier bo geskryf is. “A civilization is … the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people” (115). “Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization”(126). Daardie “possibly” kan daarop dui dat Afrika ‘n randverskynsel in lotsbepalende wêreld- en beskawingsaangeleenthede is.

Hierdie lys van agt beskawings is kwaai gekritiseer, onder meer omdat sommige van hulle eerder godsdienste as beskawings is. Maar dit dui ook op die mate van ineengestrengeldheid van religie en beskawing. “Differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion” (132). “Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people” (169). “As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged” (205). “The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology” (220). Die pasgenoemde verskille (132) “are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies” (137).

Die agtvoudige onderskeid van beskawings is noodwendig op drastiese veralgemening gebaseer maar is myns insiens sinvol en selfs briljant. Daar is sekerlik iets eiesoortigs aan bv Suid- en Sentraal-Amerikaanse beskawing as dit met Noord-Amerikaanse beskawing gekontrasteer word. Tereg is opgemerk: “Huntington goes where only the brave would venture” (620). Breë kwasstrepe kan uiteraard nie reg aan fyner besonderhede laat geskied nie. Richard Betts skryf: “Simple visions, however powerful, do not hold up as reliable predictors of particular developments. Visions are vital for clarifying thinking about the forces that drive international relations, the main directions to expect events to take, and one’s basic faith in matters of politics, but they cannot account for many specifics in the actual complexity of political life” (1411).

Huntington skryf: “The world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these inceasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations” (137). Dít kan as weerstand teen gelykmakende internasionalisering vertolk word. “Cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable en hence less easily compomised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians” (164). Ek voeg by: Kultureel kan Afrikaners nie swart Afrikane word nie.

“Cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences” (180). Dink aan die groot mate waarin blankes in die ou Suid-Afrika teen die “swart gevaar” saamgestaan het. Hierdie swart gevaar het intussen die swart werklikheid geword. “As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion” (195). Linkse idealiste, soos Max du Preez, poog egter om die onderskeid tussen “ons” en “hulle” af te breek.

“The clash of civilizations … occurs at two levels. At the microlevel, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values” (200). HDS Greenway se “‘kin-country’ syndrome is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions” (289). “A world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others” (311).

Suid-Afrika met sy Westerse en nie-Westerse bevolkingsgroepe is ‘n sprekende voorbeeld van dubbele standaarde. Ter bevoordeling van swartes en ter benadeling van blankes word blankes in vele opsigte met ‘n ander maat as swartes gemeet.

Aan die einde van sy 1993-artikel som Huntington sy standpunt in die volgende drie paragrawe op.

“This article does not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization will not conflict with and even fight each other. This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between ‘the West and the Rest’; the elites in some torn non-Western countries [Turkey, Mexico, Russia] will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states” [several Middle Eastern states, China, North Korea] (491).

“In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its European and North American components; to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confusian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions” (502).

“In the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others” (512).

In sy inleiding som Hoge die sewe 1993-kommentare op Huntington se artikel soos volg in vyf stellings op: “Conflicts are most likely to break out between nations and groups within a civilization; the enduring nature of citizenship is national; civilizations are absorptive sponges rather than clashing billiard balls; fears of fundamentalist movements are exaggerated and the tenacity of modernity and secularism within civilizations are underestimated; and contrary to realist predictions, most states are not perpetually at war with each other” (2010, Kindle 42). Die kommentare is nie in dieselfde gesaghebbende liga as Huntington se wetenskaplike artikel nie en berus veral op aksentverskille en soms op wanvoorstellings. Ruimte ontbreek om in besonderhede daarop te reageer.

In sy repliek wyk Huntington geensins van sy standpunt af nie. Hy vra wat sy kritici in die plek van sy botsing van beskawings voorstel en vind geen antwoord daarop nie. Hy gee daarom eerder groter duidelikheid oor wat hy bedoel het. Hy het verplig gevoel om daarna ter verdere verduideliking ‘n hele boek oor hierdie onderwerp te publiseer: The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order (1996). Die 9/11-gebeure het veroorsaak dat daarna veel groter waarde aan Huntington se werk geheg is.

Sedert 1990/94 voel dit vir die Afrikaner asof iets diep binne-in hom van die rak geval het; asof sy diepste wese, sy siel, versteur is en hy in onvrede verkeer. In die ou Suid-Afrika het die klem op Europese beskawing geval. In die nuwe Suid-Afrika het verwysings na beskawing uit die openbare diskoers verdwyn. Ek pleit reeds lank dat Van Riebeeck-dag, 6 April, as Beskawingsdag heringestel moet word. Dit strek tot Huntington se eer dat kultuur en beskawing ‘n sentrale plek in sy denke ingeneem het, dat hy mense nie gelyk en eenders verklaar het nie, dat ‘n enkele wêreldkultuur en -taal nie sy ideaal was nie en dat identiteitsloosheid vir hom uit die bose was.

Leon Lemmer: Die oorsprong van ‘misdade teen die mensdom’ en ‘volksmoord’

Ek het die eerste keer van die Oekraïne se gespletenheid tussen die Ooste en die Weste kennis geneem toe ek Anna Reid se boek, Borderland: A journey through the history of Ukraine (London: Phoenix, 1998, 258p), gelees het. Die Dnieper-rivier loop van noord na suid deur die land, met die hoofstad Kiev aan die rivieroewer. Oos van die Dnieper word die bevolking toenemend Russies en Ortodoks-christelik. Wes van die Dnieper is die bevolking oorwegend Oekraïnies en Rooms-Katoliek. Hoofstuk 4 van Reid se boek handel oor Lviv, die hoofstad van Galisië, die westelikste provinsie. “Lviv was ruled by Austria from the first partition of Poland in 1773 until the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1918, christening the city Lemberg … With the rebirth of Poland the city went back to its ancient Polish name of Lwów, and in 1945 it fell, for the first time in its history, to the Russians, who deported the Polish population and renamed it Lvov. It only became Lviv in 1991, with Ukrainian independence” (p 71). Lviv is een van die hoofonderwerpe in hierdie rubriek. Die naam beteken Stad van die Leeus. Ek gebruik deurgaans die stad se huidige naam.

Dit is moontlik om ooreenkomste tussen die Oekraïners/Oekraïens en Afrikaners/Afrikaans in te lees. “Ethnically and socially, nineteenth-century Galicia was an unbalanced, unhappy place. Poles owned the land; Jews the shops and inns. Ukrainians – 40 per cent of the province’s population … – laboured out of sight in cottages and fields” (72). “Galicia was a byword for rural poverty” (73). “Ukrainian itself had turned into a peasant tongue, the language in which one addressed the servants, if one spoke it at all. In the cities, it was hardly heard. For a long time even Ukrainophiles expected it to die out completely” (76). “The man who contributed more than any other single individual to the creation of a Ukrainian sense of national identity, was Taras Shevchenko [1814-1861] … he single-handedly turned Ukrainian into a literary language [and] remains Ukraine’s greatest hero” (77). “The Ukrainian language plays a starring role in the Ukrainian’s sense of national identity, making it a delicate political as well as cultural issue” (85).

Die huidige situasie in Lviv word beskryf in Tarik Cyril Amar se boek, The paradox of Ukrainian’s Lviv: A borderland city between Stalinists, Nazis, and Nationalists (Cornell University Press, 2015, 369p; Amazon Kindle $19,39). Lviv is in groter mate Oekraïnies as enige ander stad en word beskou as ‘n simbool van die Oekraïners se nasionale identiteit en nasionalisme. In November 1918 was daar ‘n kortstondige “West Ukrainian People’s Republic” (Sands, bron hier onder, Kindle 1121, 2292, 2479). Die bevolking van Lviv is tans ‘n driekwart miljoen.

‘n Ander hoofonderwerp in hierdie rubriek is volksmoord (“genocide”). In hierdie verband is daar bv Maria Pritchard se boek, Genocide: A history from Carthage to Darfur (London: RW Press, 2013, 63p; Amazon Kindle $2,27). Wanneer deesdae van volksmoord gepraat word, word gewoonlik aan die Holocaust of Shoah* gedink, die uitwissing van miljoene Jode deur die Nazi’s, of aan Hernán Cortés (1485-1547) se uitroeiing van die Asteke, of die jag op die Australiese inboorlinge, asook op die Amerikaanse Indiane. Volksmoord word hiermee eksklusief aan blankes toegeskryf. Maar Pritchard skryf: “Although the image of European Imperialists massacring indigenous people is a familiar one, it is not the full picture. Europeans have massacred each other and non-Europeans have also committed genocide on their neighbours” (Kindle 78). In Suidelike Afrika in die 19de eeu was daar die Mfecane (in Nguni) of Difaqane (in Sotho), die grootskaalse uitwissing van swartes deur swartes. [* “Holocaust” is afgelei van twee Griekse woorde: “whole” + “burnt”. “Shoah” is die Hebreeuse woord vir katastrofe of warrelwind. Sands beskryf dit as “killing on an industrial scale” (4648).]

Een van die grusaamste voorbeelde van volksmoord is die Turke se uitroeiing van die Armeniërs. ‘n Gesaghebbende boek hieroor is Peter Balakian se The burning Tigris: The Armenian genocide and America’s response (New York: HarperCollins, 2007, 528p; Amazon Kindle $13,52). Die uitmoring het in vier stadia van 1877 tot 1922 plaasgevind. Daar word beweer dat die Turke met die Armeniese volksmoord aan die Nazi’s die bloudruk vir die Joodse volksmoord verskaf het” (Kindle 140). Meer as ‘n miljoen Armeniërs, tweederdes van hierdie etniese groep, het omgekom. Deesdae is Armenië ‘n klein landjie van minder as 30 000 vierkante kilometer en ‘n bevolking van skaars 3 miljoen, met 8 miljoen Armeniërs wat in ander lande woon. Maar sedert 1991 het die Armeniërs darem ten minste ‘n onafhanklike nasiestaat.

Die Amerikaanse ambassadeur in Turkye, Henry Morgenthau (1856-1946), skryf in sy boek oor die Armeense volksmoord, Ambassador Morgenthau’s story (2015, 478p; Amazon Kindle $2,27), van “the murder of a nation” en “the greatest crime of all ages” (Sands 2292). Toe Morganthau in 1919 oor die uitmoring van Jode in 1918 in Lviv verslag gedoen het, het hy verkies om die term “pogrom” te vermy (All in a life-time, 2015, 482p; Amazon Kindle $1,13). “Pogrom (Russian ‘destruction’) unprovoked violent attack on an ethnic group, particularly Jews, carried out with official sanction” (Collins World Encyclopedia, 2003, p 736).

Die Armeense volksmoord word deels aan religieuse verskille gewyt. Die Turke is Moslems en die Armeniërs is christene wat daarop roem dat hulle sedert 301 ‘n christelike staat gehad het; die eerste in die wêreld. ‘n Ander rede vir hierdie volksmoord is etnies. Daar was die slagspreuk: “Turkey belongs only to the Turks” (Balakian 3110). Dit herinner aan wat die PAC se Robert Sobukwe (1924-1978) gesê het: “We aim, politically, at government of the Africans by the Africans for the Africans” (Allister Sparks, The sword and the pen: Six decades on the political frontier, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2016, 626p, R300; Amazon Kindle $13,67, 2114).

Nog meer ontstellend is Irwin Staub, ‘n sosiale sielkundige, se mening: Gewelddadigheid wat as ‘n “continuum of destruction” progressief oor dekades en selfs eeue plaasgevind het, “creates a readiness in the culture” (Balakian 2136, 2831). “‘People learn,’ Staub explains, ‘by doing, by participation.’ People are changed by their participation in destructive and harmful behavior, and the victims are further devalued through this process” (2835). Die Armeense volksmoord was ‘n geval van “devaluing a subgroup, an ethnic minority in this case, in part in order to raise the sinking self-esteem of the majority group – the Turks” (2835).

Die vlaag gewelddadigheid wat Suid-Afrika sedert 1994 teister, bv die plaasmoorde en studente-oproer, kan as ‘n voortsetting van die voorafgaande polities gemotiveerde vandalisme en terrorisme van die ANC en PAC beskou word. Deur geweld polities suksesvol te pleeg, het veral die ANC deur voorbeeldstelling ‘n nuwe geslag geweldenaars geskep wat op ‘n soortgelyke manier sukses wil behaal. Wat in Suid-Afrika plaasvind, bv polities, het dikwels sy oorsprong in Amerika. John D Skrentny het die stryd om menseregte van veral vier etniese minderheidsgroepe (Asiate, Indiane, Hispaniste en swartes) deeglik nagevors (The minority rights revolution, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 2004, 496p; Amazon Kindle $32,49). Hy kom tot gevolgtrekkings soos: “African Americans … were the only minority group involved in the urban violence” (2195) en “only blacks had rioted” (2466). Amerikaanse swartes onderskei hulleself van ander minderheidsgroepe weens hulle gewelddadigheid (2168, 2560, 2660). Dit het daartoe gelei dat swartes in groter mate as enige ander Amerikaanse groep bevoordeel word;* ‘n geval van “the wheel that squeeks the loudest gets the grease” (1838; ook 4526). Die buitensporige toegeeflikheid jeens swartes se onsosiale gedrag kan enersyds toegeskryf word aan skuldgevoelens wat by blankes oor die destydse slawerny, rasse-segregasie en -diskriminasie gewek is. Andersyds dien ‘n paaibeleid as ‘n soort versekeringspolis teen verdere geweldpleging.

[* “The demand shifted from equal rights for individuals to special rights (affirmative action and similar measures) for blacks and other groups. Such claims run directly counter to the underlying principles that have been the basis of American political unity; they reject the idea of a ‘color-blind’ society of equal individuals and instead promote a ‘color-conscious’ society with government-sanctioned privileges for some groups. In a parallel movement, intellectuals and politicians began to push the ideology of ‘multiculturalism,’ and to insist on the rewriting of American political, social, and literary history from the viewpoint of non-European groups. At the extreme, this movement tends to elevate obscure leaders of minority groups to a level of importance equal to that of the Founding Fathers. Both the demands for special group rights and for multiculturalism encourages a clash of civilizations within the United States and encourage what Arthur M Schlesinger, Jr, terms ‘the disuniting of America'” (Samuel P Huntington, The clash of civilizations? The debate: 20th anniversary edition, edited by Gideon Rose, New York: Foreign Affairs Publishing, 2013, 93p; Amazon Kindle $8,57, 1120).]

“Rassis” en “apartheid” het standaardskelwoorde in sowel Suid-Afrika as Amerika geword. In hierdie woordestryd het Amerikaanse swartes ook “genocide” ingespan: “The charge was that American treatment of African Americans violated the convention – it was genocide” (508). Die “convention” waarna hier verwys word, is die Verenigde Nasies se Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. “In 1948 the UN General Assembly defined genocide as ‘acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.’ The acts in question are listed as killing, or causing serious physical or mental injury to members of a group, deliberately exposing a group to conditions likely to cause death, preventing births within a group and forcibly removing the group’s children” (Pritchard 34).

Die Hispaniste voel sterk oor taalregte; dat Engels nie hulle moedertaal Spaans moet verswelg nie. In hierdie konteks word daar van “cultural genocide” gepraat (Skrentny 3121). Is dit nie wat sedert 1994 in Suid-Afrika met Afrikaners en Afrikaans gebeur nie? “A resolution by forty-nine Scandinavian professors in 1962 declared that ‘the extermination of a language, of a culture, and of a people are all one and the same thing'” (2800). Die Hispaniste het die reg op moedertaalonderrig verwerf.

Ek wil vandag hoofsaaklik oor ‘n nuwe boek skryf wat oor Lviv en die oorsprong van die woord “genocide” handel, asook oor die oorsprong van die frase “crimes against humanity.” Dit is Philippe Sands se East West Street: On the origins of genocide and crimes against humanity (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2016, 448p; Amazon Kindle $11,13). Sands (gebore in 1960) is ‘n professor in internasionale reg aan University College London. Die boektitel sinspeel op Lviv wat beskryf word as “the epicentre of the fault lines that divided east from west” (Kindle 152). In die vlaag van oordrewe reaksie teen blankes en apartheid word die woord “genocide” en die frase “crimes against humanity” dikwels gehoor. Die veldtog teen blankes en veral Afrikaners neem deesdae sulke afmetings aan dat daar soms die neiging is om hierdie woord en hierdie frase op veral Afrikaners en apartheid van toepassing te maak. Dit is egter moontlik dat die skoene van hierdie woord en frase eerder swart as wit voete pas.

Naas Lviv is daar vier hoofkarakters in Sands se boek. Hersch Lauterpacht (1897-1960), ‘n hoogleraar in internasionale reg, is in Zólkiew (later Zhovkva), 15 myle wes van Lviv, gebore en het van 1911 tot 1919 in Lviv gewoon en daar in die regte studeer. Rafael Lemkin (1900-1959) is in die huidige Belarus gebore en het in 1921 na Lviv verhuis en daar tot 1926 in die regte studeer. Hans Frank (1900-1946) was ‘n Duitse regsgeleerde en vyf jaar lank die Nazi-governeur-generaal van Duitsbesette Poland, wat Lviv en omstreke ingesluit het. Leon Buchholz (1904-1997), Philippe Sands se oupa aan moederskant, is in Lviv gebore. Die stad Lviv is ‘n gemeenskaplike element by hierdie vier karakters. Terselfdertyd het Sands ‘n familiebelang by hierdie onderwerp. Familiesake word in hierdie rubriek meesal uitgelaat en dus ook baie van die verdere inligting oor Buchholz.

Dit is merkwaardig dat sowel die frase “crimes against humanity” (Lauterpacht se skepping) as die woord “genocide” (Lemkin se skepping) hierdie verwantskap met Lviv het en dat hierdie twee begrippe of beginsels hulle weg in internasionale reg tydens die Nuremberg-verhoor (1945/6) van twee dosyn top-Nazi’s gevind het. Hans Frank is toe ter dood veroordeel. Familielede van sowel Lauterpacht as Lemkin (en ook van Buchholz) is tydens die Nazi-bewind vermoor. In daardie sin kan gesê word dat die regsbeginsels “misdade teen die mensdom” en “volksmoord” as ‘n soort vergelding of wraak in Joodse geledere ontstaan het. Die kernverskil tussen misdade teen die mensdom en volksmoord is dat eersgenoemde op die grootskaalse doodmaak van individue en laasgenoemde op die uitroeiing van groepe mense betrekking het (139). “How could the law help to prevent mass killing? Protect the individual, says Lauterpacht. Protect the group, says Lemkin” (4425). Die Nuremberg-verhoor is “the moment in which it was said our modern system of internasional justice came into being” (118). Lauterpacht word as “a father of the modern human rights movement” beskou (84). Volgens hom “the well-being of an individual is the ultimate object of all law” (1393; ook 998).

Reeds in sy jeug het Lauterpacht diskriminasie en die vervolging van Jode eerstehands ervaar. “International law offered few constraints on the majority’s treatment of minorities and no rights for individuals” (1146). “The modern law of human rights was born on the anvil of Lwów [Lviv] and its environs” (1175). Na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog, tydens die onderhandelings in 1919 in Versailles, het die Joodse afvaardiging op “greater autonomy, language and cultural rights and principles of self-government” aangedring (1189). Met bv die Iere in gedagte “Britain objected to any depletion of sovereignty – the right to treat others as it wished – or international oversight” (1189). Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), die Amerikaanse president (1913-1921), was egter sterk ten gunste van “‘rigid protection’ for minorities” (1197).

By Versailles is daar ingestem tot onafhanklikheid vir Pole op voorwaarde dat die regte van minderheidsgroepe beskerm word. Artikel 93 van die Versailles-verdrag “required Poland to sign a second treaty [the Little Treaty of Versailles (1203)], to protect ‘inhabitants’ who differed from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion.* The Allies would be entitled to ‘protect’ these minorities, a further humiliation in the eyes of Poland because lopsided obligations were imposed: rights were given to some groups, but not all, and the victorious powers would escape equivalent obligations for their own minorities” (1203). Byvoorbeeld, vrees vir regte vir swartes was in die agterkoppe van die Amerikaners. “The Polish Minorities Treaty went further: it made the rights of such minorities into ‘obligations of international concern’, to be protected at the League of Nations. Any disputes could go to the Permanent Court of International Justice, newly created in The Hague” (1210) in 1922 (1342). Na die magsoorname van Adolf Hitler in Duitsland in 1933 “Poland signed a non-aggression pact with Germany and cast aside the 1919 Minorities Treaty” (1379). [* Ook “birth, nationality” en “minorities could run their own schools” (1203).]

In 1919 het Lauterpacht in Wene verder in die regte studeer. Een van sy dosente was Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) wat gehelp het om die nuwe Oostenrykse grondwet te formuleer. Oostenryk was die eerste land wat ‘n grondwethof gekry het. Die gevolg: “individuals had inalienable constitutional rights, and they could go to a court to enforce those rights. This was a different model from that which protected minority rights, as in Poland. The two key distinctions – between groups and individuals, between national and international enforcement – influenced Lauterpacht’s thinking. In Austria, the individual was placed at the heart of the legal order” (1259). Anti-Semitisme in Wene het Lauterpacht oortuig van “the ‘vital necessity’ of rights for individuals” (1274).

In 1923 het Lauterpacht uitgewyk na Engeland en in 1938 hoogleraar in internasionale reg aan Cambridge University geword. Hy het oorweging geskenk aan “a ‘revolutionary’ possibility of developing the rules so as to place more limits on the supposedly ‘eternal and inalienable’ powers of the state” (1349). “Individuals should ‘possess international rights'” (1364). Later word dit deel van “the fundamental rights of man” (1672). Gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het Lauterpacht gedink dat “ending ‘international lawlessness'” noodsaaklik was (1615). Nege Europese regerings het in 1942 byeengekom “expressing a common desire to use the criminal law to punish those ‘guity’ of and ‘responsible’ for atrocities. Perpetrators would be ‘sought for, handed over to justice and judged’, an idea that became an official aim of the war. The nine governments established a commission on war crimes to collect information on atrocities and perpetrators, a body that would become the United Nations War Crimes Commission” (1622).

Intussen het Lauterpacht “a draft of his International Bill of Rights of Man” geformuleer (1746). In 1945 het hy ‘n boek daaroor gepubliseer (1796). Sy doel was “an end to the ‘omnipotence of the State'” (1796). “The gist of his thinking was captured in a single sentence: ‘The community of nations has in the past claimed and successfully asserted the right to intercede on behalf of the violated rights of man trampled upon by the State in a manner calculated to shock the moral sense of mankind'” (4404; ook 4432). Misdade teen die mensdom is “acts so egregious that others were entitled to act in a protective capacity” (4411). Die idee was “to limit the potent force of tribalism, not reinforce it” (4418). Sands noem dit “a rational, enlightened view, and also an idealistic one” (4418). Die verskyning van die boek het mettertyd gelei tot die aanvaarding van die Verenigde Nasies se Handves “by which governments agreed to introduce a new commitment to ‘fundamental human rights’, to respect the ‘dignity and worth of the human person'” (1789).

Die tweede hoofkarakter in Sands se boek, Rafael Lemkin, het reeds in 1933 ‘n pamflet gepubliseer “proposing new international rules to prohibit ‘barbarity’ and ‘vandalism’ … he imagined new rules to protect ‘the life of the peoples’; to prevent ‘barbarity’, the destruction of groups, and to prevent ‘vandalism’, attacks on culture and heritage” (2500). Hy het onder meer gebruik gemaak van die Romeen Vespasian V Pella (1897-1960) se idee van “universal jurisdiction” wat toepaslik sou wees op bv “piracy, slavery, trading in women and children, and drug trafficking” (2508).

Gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het Lemkin deurlopend amptelike Nazi-dokumente, soos staatskoerante, dekrete en ordinasies, versamel (2645, 2652), “looking for patterns of German behaviour” (2652). “Lemkin’s work identified the wholesale destruction of the nations over which the Germans took control as an overall aim” (2659). Hy het verskynsels soos “Germanized” (2659), “denationalization” en “dehumanization” waargeneem. Die doel daarvan was “to kill the nation ‘in a spiritual and cultural sense’: Lemkin identified decrees from early 1941 pointing to the ‘complete destruction’ of the Jews in gradual steps” (2666).

In 1944 is Lemkin se boek, Axis rule in occupied Europe, in Amerika gepubliseer, “with the aim of protecting groups, for which he invented a word for a new crime, ‘genocide’, the destruction of groups” (1760). “Attacks upon national, religious and ethnic groups should be made international crimes” (2221). Lemkin is onder meer deur die Armeense volksmoord beïnvloed (2292, 2738). Hy het geredeneer: Dit is ‘n misdaad, naamlik moord, as iemand een mens vermoor, “but not a crime for that man to have struck down one million men” (2372). In hoofstuk 9 kom hy met sy nuwe woord vorendag, “genocide”, ‘n kombinasie van die Griekse woord “genos” (stam of ras) en die Latynse woord “cide” (moor) (2888). Dit gaan oor “extermination”, “physical” en “cultural” (2888). “Genocide concerned acts ‘directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of national groups'” (2888). Volgens Lemkin “new conceptions require new terms” (2896). “A new word was accompanied by a new idea, a global treaty to protect against perpetrators before any court in the world. Countries would no longer be free to treat citizens as they wished” (2914). Voorheen het hy die Duitse woord “Völkermord” gebruik (2896). “The ‘extermination of nations and ethnic groups’ required the intelligentsia to be killed off, culture to be destroyed, wealth transferred” (2896). Nóg die woord “volksmoord” nóg die letterlike betekenis van “genocide” is omvattend genoeg om aan die dui dat bv religieuse groepe (en dus nie net stamme, volke of rasse nie) by hierdie soort misdaad ingesluit word.

Lauterpacht was nie entoesiasties oor Lemkin se idees nie. Hy noem “‘genocide’ a new term for the physical destruction of nations and ethnic groups” (1767). “Lauterpacht was concerned that the protection of groups would undermine the protection of individuals. It should not be the primary focus of the law” (1767). “He worried that emphasis on genocide would reinforce latent instincts of tribalism, perhaps enhancing the sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, pitting one group against another” (4292).

Lemkin wou ‘n hiërargie daarstel wat volksmoord die ergste misdaad sou maak. Aan Franklin Roosevelt (1882-1945, die Amerikaanse president 1933-1945) het hy in ‘n skrywe voorgestel “outlaw mass killing … make it a crime, the ‘crime of crimes'” (2839). “Not opposed to individual rights, he [Lemkin] nevertheless believed that an excessive focus on individuals was naive, that it ignored the reality of conflict and violence: individuals were targeted because they were members of a particular group, not because of their individual qualities. For Lemkin, the law must reflect true motive and real intent, the forces that explained why certain individuals – from certain targeted groups – were killed. For Lemkin, the focus on groups was the practical approach” (4418).

Die derde hoofkarakter in Sands se boek, Hans Frank, “expressed strong objections to universal jurisdiction” (3341). Hy het hom ten gunste van “non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign states” uitgespreek (3348). “There would be no individual rights in the new Germany, so he announced a total opposition to the ‘individualistic, liberalistic atomizing tendencies of the egoism of the individual.’ (‘Complete equality, absolute submission, absolute loss of individuality,’ the writer Friedrich Reck [1884-1945] recorded in his diary …)” (3355). “Community takes precedence over the individualistic … tendencies” (3251). Frank het die Duitsbesette Pole soos ‘n kolonie bestuur, “its inhabitants the ‘slaves of the Greater German World Empire'” (3376). Frank se standpunt was “that law was nothing more than ‘that which is useful and necessary for the German nation'” (2811). Volgens Lemkin was dit “‘a cynical denial of international law’ … Frank’s conception subordinated the individual to the state and was designed ‘to subordinate all the world under Germany'” (2811). In sy dagboek het Frank verder gegaan: “‘We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and wherever it is possible’ … to maintain the structure of the Reich” (3426). Frank het die bynaam “Butcher of Warsaw” gekry (4043).

Vir die Nuremberg-verhoor het vier lande (Amerika, Brittanje, Frankryk en Rusland) elk twee regters en ‘n aanklaer benoem (1817). Lauterpacht het voorgestel dat die frase “War Crimes” (1837) en “Crimes Against Humanity” vir “atrocities against individual civilians” (1844) gebruik word. “‘Genocide’ … had been added at a late stage at the insistence of the Americans over strong British objections” (1896). “Genocide” is gedefinieer as “extermination of racial and religious groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial, or religious groups” (3035). Die Nuremberg-aanklagte sou geldig wees “whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated” (1866). “International law was not only ‘between States’ but ‘also the law of mankind'” (1874). “This was the first time in human history that the leaders of a state were put on trial before an international court for crimes against humanity and genocide, two new crimes” (4224).

Robert Jackson (1892-1954), die Amerikaanse hoofaanklaer, het gesê “the ‘real complaining party’ … was not the Allies but ‘civilization’ itself” (4376). Hartley Shawcross (1902-2003) was die Britse hoofaanklaer. “Lauterpacht prompted Shawcross to pre-empt the arguments of the defendants, the prospect that they’d assert that because states couldn’t commit crimes under international law, it followed that the individuals who served them also couldn’t be guilty of crime. A state could be criminal, Shawcross told the tribunal, and so it was imperative to repress its crimes by means ‘more drastic and more effective than in the case of individuals’. Individuals who acted on behalf of such a state were ‘directly responsible’ and should have punishments heaped upon them … ‘The state is not an abstract entity … Its rights and duties are the rights and duties of men’, its actions those of politicians who should ‘not be able to seek immunity behind the intangible personality of the state’. These were radical words, embracing the idea of individual responsibility, placing ‘fundamental human rights’ and ‘fundamental human duties’ at the heart of a new international system” (4439).

Lauterpacht was in groter en vaster mate deel van die Britse vervolgingspan as wat Lemkin van die Amerikaanse span was. “Genocide was referred to on the first day by the French and Soviet prosecutors, much to his [Lemkin’s] satisfaction. The Americans and the British followed, but they avoided any mention of the word” (4526). Lemkin het aan die Amerikaanse vervolgingspan geskryf dat “lesser terms – like ‘mass murder’ or ‘mass extermination’ – were inadequate, because they were incapable of conveying the vital element of racial motivation and the desire to destroy entire cultures” (5065). “The charge of genocide had to be part of a broader trial strategy, to show the defendants as enemies of mankind, a ‘specially dangerous crime’, one that went beyond crimes against humanity” (5073). Lemkin “faced political objections in the United States and in Britain, arising respectively from historic American treatment of blacks and British colonial practices” (5080). Desnieteenstaande “the word ‘genocide’ made its way back into the proceedings” (5087).

Jackson het nie die woord “genocide” in sy finale Nuremberg-pleidooi gebruik nie, maar Shawcross het dit wel gedoen. Lemkin wou hê dat volksmoord wat voor die uitbreking van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog deur die Nazi’s gepleeg is ook veroordeel moet word, maar die mandaat van die Nuremberg-verhoor was tot oorlogsmisdade beperk (5284). Die Franse vervolgingspan “invoked ‘genocide’ as a catch-all to cover all the crimes, from concentration camps to enslavement. The Soviet prosecutor Rudenko characterized the SS [“Schutzstaffel” die Nazi-Duitse Beskermingskorps] as a genocidal entity, so that anyone associated with the organization was complicit in genocide” (5413).

Lauterpacht het argumente in konsepvorm aan die Britse vervolgingspan voorgelê waarvolgens “‘crimes against humanity’ … was a starting point to vindicate ‘the rights of man’, to offer protection against the ‘cruelty and barbarity of his own State’ … the fundamental rights of man trumped national laws, a new approach to serve the interests of individuals, not states” (5130). Sy oogmerk was “to create ‘a most valuable precedent for any future International Criminal Court'” (5123). Lauterpacht het veral Frank uitgesonder as ‘n “‘direct agent’ of the ‘crimes of extermination'” (5144); “the foulest crimes that ever sullied the record of a nation” (5159). “Lauterpacht thought that ‘if one emphasises too much that it is a crime to kill a whole people, it may weaken the conviction that it is already a crime to kill one individual'” (5501). In sy pleidooi in die hof het Shawcross al Lauterpacht se verwysings na Frank en sy emosionale taalgebruik uitgelaat, maar “Lauterpacht’s ideas on crimes against humanity and the rights of the individual were firmly entrenched in the proceedings, colouring the entire case” (5356).

Frank het in sy verweer aangevoer: “Germany’s guilt had been erased ‘by the conduct of our war-time enemies towards our nation and its soldiers’. Such conduct had been entirely excluded from the trial, he was saying, a lopsided justice. Mass crimes ‘of the most frightful sort’ had been committed against Germans” (5434).

“Ninety-four witnesses had appeared, thirty-three for the prosecution and sixty-one for the defence” (5556). “Of the twenty-one defendants present, three were acquitted” (5618). “Several … were found to have committed crimes against humanity, but none were found guilty of genocide” (5626). “Twelve defendants were sentenced to death with no right of appeal. They included Frank” (5671).

Lemkin was teleurgesteld met die beperkte mate van erkenning wat volksmoord tydens die Nuremberg-verhoor ontvang het. In 1946 het die Algemene Vergadering van die Verenigde Nasies egter bekragtig: “Genocide is a crime under international law” (5724). “On 9 December 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [die teks is hier bo in die 10de paragraaf deels aangehaal], the first human rights treaty of the modern era” (5724). “In the years after the Nuremberg judgement, the word genocide gained traction in political circles and in public discussion as the ‘crime of crimes’, elevating the protection of groups above that of individuals” (5772).

Lauterpacht se werk “inspired the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by die UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948” (5731), dus net ‘n dag na “genocide” amptelik deur die VN erken is. Hierop het gevolg “the European Convention on Human Rights, which was signed in 1950 … that created the first international human rights court to which individuals would have access” (5738).

As hierdie onderwerp in sy geheel oorweeg word, kan gesê word dat die regsbeginsels van “misdade teen die mensdom” en “volksmoord” gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog en daarna vorm aangeneem het en deesdae internasionaal erken word. Die direkte aanleiding was die uitwissing van miljoene Jode deur die Nazi’s. Wat as gevolg daarvan gebeur het, is die toenemende globalisering van aangeleenthede. Die tradisionele onafhanklikheid van state word ondergrawe deur hulle internasionaal verantwoordbaar te hou. Inmenging in die huishoudelike sake van state is tot ‘n internasionale reg verhef. Dit kom neer op die inperking van die vryheid en dus regte van sowel state as individue. Wat veral problematies is, is dat regte in die praktyk beklemtoon word en hulle dikwels nie met verantwoordelikhede gebalanseer word nie.

Internasionalisering verwater die identiteit van groepe (bv volke/nasies, state) en individue. Wat nodig is, is sowel individuele regte as groepsregte, albei gebalanseer met verantwoordelikhede. In die nuwe Suid-Afrika word (na bewering) net individuele regte grondwetlik erken. Afrikaners het geen grondwetlike groepsregte nie. Anders as bv Amerikaanse swartes het Afrikaners geen minderheidsregte nie. Afrikanerbelange word gevolglik ondergeploeg deur die belange van die swart meerderheid, wat op grond van hulle getalle in die praktyk handel asof hulle ongebreideld hulle groepsbelange kan afdwing. In werklikheid het nie-wittes, anders as wittes, groepsregte ingevolge hulle bevoordeling weens bv regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging. Regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging funksioneer terselfdertyd as groepsbenadeling van blankes. Wanneer menseregte opgehaal word, is dit dikwels ter bevordering van die belange van swartes. Blankes behoort geaktiveer te word om in groter mate plaaslik en internasionaal op hulle menseregte aan te dring. Enersyds kan blanke of Afrikaner-individue gevalle van misdade teen die mensdom wat hulle raak, identifiseer en sake daaroor aanhangig maak. Andersyds kan namens Afrikaners klagtes oor volksmoord gelê word, met die duidelike verstandhouding dat volksmoord nie net liggaamlike uitroeiing behels nie omdat dit ook kultuurvernietiging, bv die uitroeiing van Afrikaans, insluit. Internasionalisering kan dus voordele inhou; deesdae selfs vir Afrikaners.

My standpunt is dat die ANC-regering streng gesproke onwettig is omdat die blanke kiesers nooit die politieke magsoordrag aan swartes goedgekeur het nie. Dit is vir my ook duidelik dat die voortreflike moraliteit wat die ANC vir homself opeis, vals is, onder meer omdat daar in sy leierskorps mense is wat myns insiens misdadigers is. Die jongste is dat die ANC-regering Suid-Afrika aan die jurisdiksie van die Internasionale Strafhof, wat sedert 2002 funksioneer, wil onttrek, onder meer onder die bedenklike voorwendsel dat misdadigers uit Afrikalande teen uitlewering beskerm moet word. So maklik sal die ANC nie aan die tentakels van internasionalisering ontsnap nie. Lees bv Ruan Coetzee se artikel oor die Internasionale Strafhof (LitNet, 25 deser).

Leon Lemmer: Allister Sparks se outobiografie

Die berugste Afrikaanse koerant is seker Max du Preez se Vrye Weekblad (1988-1994), wat ‘n geweeklaag teen die blanke politieke bewind was, dikwels uitgedruk in bedenklike Afrikaans. Die skandaligste plaaslike Engelse koerant was die Rand Daily Mail (RDM, 1902-1985), wat later op die internet herleef het. Die RDM was in berugtheid ‘n kortkop voor die Daily Dispatch, met Donald Woods (1933-2001) as redakteur, wat in die volksmond as die Daily Disgrace bekend gestaan het. Ek skryf vandag oor Allister Sparks (10.03.1933-19.09.2016), ‘n joernalis wat aan albei laasgenoemde koerante verbonde was. Ek doen dit na aanleiding van Sparks se outobiografie, The sword and the pen: Six decades on the political frontier (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2016, 626p, R300; Amazon Kindle $13,67).

the_sword_and_the_pen_by_allister_sparksSparks sou homself ongetwyfeld narsisties op die skouer geklop het by die gedagte dat hy net-net betyds sy lewensbeskrywing voltooi het. By hom het beskeidenheid met verloop van tyd al hoe skaarser geword, gevoed deur bv Nelson Mandela se opmerking (weergegee op die voorkant van die boek): “One of South Africa’s eminent journalists, whose outspoken views have served the cause of democracy in this country magnificently.” “Democracy” is hier misbruik as ‘n eufemisme vir swart mag. Vroeg in die boek spog Sparks reeds onbeskaamd: “my reportage played a role in transforming my country” (Kindle 159). Later word dit opgegradeer tot: Sy joernalistiek “contributed significantly to the transition” (8539).

Die woord “frontier” in die newetitel van die boek sinspeel op Sparks se geboorte in Cathcart, naby die destydse oosgrens van die Kaapkolonie. Maar Sparks vertolk daardie destydse situasie uit die oogpunt van die swartes, dus getrou aan sy eenogigheid: “The encounter on that frontier was violent and tragic, and indeed laden with dreadful misfortunes, for the native Xhosa people” (37). “The isiXhosa-speaking Thembu tribe … was to give us Nelson Mandela” (236). Sparks beskryf bv die dood van die Xhosa-opperhoof Hintsa in besonderhede en bestempel dit as ‘n “war crime” (90). Hy sal hom egter nie verknies oor die dood van talle blankes, insluitende Britse setlaars van 1820 af, wat deur swartes uitgemoor is nie. Sommige van daardie 1820-setlaars is Sparks se voorgeslagte: “My own family members … They had all been 1820 Settlers, on both my father’s and my mother’s side” (218).

Die 19de-eeuse Oosgrens dien as aanloop tot dié 20ste eeuse onderwerp waarby Sparks die graagste wou uitkom: “the frontier of my birthland transmuted into the struggle of liberty against the racist crime of apartheid” (147). Later verwys hy na “the twin evils of racism and nationalist zealotry” (425). Oor die ou Suid-Afrika skryf Sparks: “I was not stirred by the sound of its national anthem, nor by the sight of its flag” (2721). “Patriotism was a sentiment I had never experienced until I was there in the amphitheatre of the Union Buildings in Pretoria, watching Nelson Mandela being sworn in as the first President of a democratic South Africa” (1384). Hy noem daardie gebeurtenis “one of the emotional highlights of my life” (8314). “I felt a surge of emotion. Of national pride for the first time in my life. And with that a personal sense that all those many thousands of words I had written over the years had played a role and at last been justified” (8342).

Sparks het sy eerste skoolonderrig aan ‘n plaasskool ontvang en daarna het sy ma hom tuis saam met ‘n ander familielid onderrig (764). Hy verduidelik nie waarom sy ouers nie ook die swart kinders op die plaas by hierdie onderrig betrek het nie. Later het hy in Cathcart en Queenstown op skool. Waar kom Sparks se anti-Afrikanergesindheid vandaan? “My parents, I must confess, nurtured strong anti-Afrikaner prejudices … Both spoke fluent isiXhosa … but neither spoke a word of Afrikaans” (806). Polities was hierdie Sparks klaarblyklik uit pas met ander blankes: “The whites of the Eastern Cape have always been – and remain – among the most politically conservative” (881; ook 1143). Dus, sedert 1820 word ook die Engelssprekende blankes in die Oos-Kaap vanweë hulle ervaring met die swartes tot realisme gelouter.

Een van Sparks se groot sielkundige probleme was dat hy geen naskoolse kwalifikasie verwerf het nie. Daarom skryf hy in sy hoedanigheid as selfgemaakte euwel: “Journalism became my education and my intellectual salvation even as my country transformed from a racist police state to a non-racial democracy” (159). Sparks het ‘n jaar lank (1962-1963) aan die Universiteit Harvard studeer met ‘n Nieman-studiebeurs, wat “combating racism” as doel het (2985). Hierdie beurs word uitsluitlik aan linkse Suid-Afrikaanse joernaliste toegeken, bv Ton Vosloo, Tim du Plessis en Henry Jeffreys. In die polities linkse opset van Harvard het Sparks kennis gemaak met WJ Cash se boek, The mind of the South (1941), waarvan sy kortbegrip is: “a vivid portrait of that colourful but cruelly bigoted region” (201). Hy vind ooreenkomste tussen rasse-segregasie in die Suidelike Amerikaanse state en apartheid in Suid-Afrika: “All those similarities between the Southerners and the Afrikaner Nationalists of my own country struck me” (3146). Hy het uiteraard die Suidelike state van Amerika besoek en moeite gedoen om “the great man,” Martin Luther King, jr, te ontmoet (3065).

Die blankes in die Suidelike state wat nie Sparks se politieke oortuigings onderskryf nie, word soos volg deur Cash beskryf: “A vague race lumped together indiscriminately as the poor whites – very often, in fact, as the ‘white trash.’ These people belonged, in the main, to a physically inferior type, having sprung for the most part from the convict servants, redemptioners, and debtors of Virginia and Georgia, with a sprinkling of the most unsuccessful sort of European peasants and farm labourers and the dregs of the European town slums” (3134). Sparks sou geen bron aanhaal wat nie-blankes op ‘n soortgelyke manier slegsê nie.

Sparks het homself afgevra waarom blanke Suiderlinge hulle in bv die jare sestig in groter mate as Suid-Afrikaanse blankes tot geweld teen swartes gewend het. Sy gevolgtrekking was dat private indiwidue dit in Amerika gedoen het omdat die staat homself van sodanige geweld weerhou het. In Suid-Afrika is dit egter glo die Nasionale Party-regering wat die geweld en onderdrukking namens die blankes (sekerlik spesifiek die Afrikaners) pleeg het (3158).

Hendrik Verwoerd en diesulkes het (myns insiens tereg) geredeneer “that racial equality, one-man-one-vote, would lead to chaos and anarchy and the collapse of all civilised society. Above all – and this was the toughest nut to crack – it would lead to the demise of the Afrikaner volk. It would mean national suicide for the Afrikaner” (3267). Die nasionale selfmoord van Afrikaners is presies wat Sparks begeer het. Sparks het ‘n verslag oor sy Harvard-jaar opgestel en beweer sy dosent het dit as “the equivalent of an MA thesis” bestempel (3279). Daarmee het Sparks seker gehoop om ‘n bietjie van sy gevoel van akademiese minderwaardigheid af te skud. Dwarsdeur sy outobiografie is daar stellings wat nie gekontroleer kan word nie omdat die betrokke mense dood is. Sparks deel ook kwistig komplimente aan homself uit oor bv wat hy lank voor gewone sterwelinge voorsien het, hoewel dit op nabaat kan berus.

Sparks vertel dat hy op skool goed in die vak geskiedenis gevaar het. “The groaning wagons of the Great Trek, the repetitiveness of the battles, the treachery of the tribal chiefs, the heroism of the white settlers and the meddlesomeness of the missionaries and the Colonial Office in London who didn’t understand the true nature of the natives. It was biased and it was boring … what a travesty had been committed by the South African education system” (207). “I got a distinction for history in matric … Yet there were gaps, unforgivable great holes, in the subject matter we were taught about our own country” (870). Hy spreek egter geen kritiek uit teen die soort pro-swart en anti-blanke geskiedenis wat deesdae aan plaaslike skoliere opgedis word nie.

Na matriek het Sparks in 1951 as ‘n koerantverslaggewer by die Daily Representative in Queenstown begin werk. Daarna het hy twee jaar in Londen deurgebring; ‘n tyd “that liberated me from the narrow vision of farm and small-town life, especially in a prejudice-ridden country such as South Africa. True personal freedom requires liberation from one’s own prejudices as well as from the diminution of the freedom of others to whom those predudices are directed” (1293). “As I was soon to realise, Britain was by no means free of racism at this time. When it began to dismantle its empire, dark-skinned immigrants from countries such as Pakistan and the West Indies began arriving in numbers, and notices declaring ‘No Coloureds’ began springing up on the walls of boarding houses and bed-and-breakfast establishments” (1390). Sparks het as ‘n arbeider, kelner en klerk gewerk en nie ‘n joernalis in Fleet Street geword soos hy gehoop het nie.

Hy het per skip na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer en in Kaapstad aan wal gegaan. “From that moment on my awareness of the injustices of my country seemed to grow by the day. What had been familiar before now appeared obscene” (1477). “Apartheid was making every job colour-coded” (1489). Hy opper egter nêrens enige beswaar teen hoe daar deesdae teen blankes gediskrimineer word nie. Vervolgens het hy as joernalis by The Chronicle in Bulawayo gaan werk. “The whites of Southern Rhodesia, nearly all migrants from Britain, were too stubborn and every bit as racist as the Afrikaners of South Africa, whom they condescendingly despised in a parallel strand of intra-ethnic prejudice” (1519). “I didn’t believe there was any material difference between the English whites of Rhodesia and the Afrikaners of South Africa when it came to resisting black political advancement” (1634). Die Afrikaners word dus deur hom as rassiste uitgesonder; nie die Engelssprekende Suid-Afrikaners nie.

Oor sy belewing van Suid-Rhodesië skryf Sparks: “I had not really been happy in Bulawayo” (1647). “For me it was a social desert. In the year I spent in Southern Rhodesia I made no friends of my own age. I never had a single date” (1548). Maar daar was tog baie swartes waarmee hy kon sosialiseer. As hy werklik polities so oorverlig was, waarom het hy nie tjommies met hulle gemaak nie? Ian Smith word beskryf as “Rhodesia’s nemesis” (1595). “Smith was never a great orator, nor a great intellect” en Sparks kla oor “the ugly intonation of his flat vowels” (1600).

Kenmerkend van Sparks se boek is dat hy byvoeglike naamwoorde invoeg om diegene af te kraak wat polities met hom verskil en ander byvoeglike naamwoorde gebruik om diegene op te hemel wat soos hy oor die politiek dink. Byvoorbeeld, Julius Nyerere van Tanzanië word beskryf as “one of the most thoughtful, perceptive politicians I have ever met” (2927). Nyerere het ingevolge sy sosialistiese beleid genaamd Ujamaa derduisende mense verskuif en groot hongersnood en baie sterftes veroorsaak. Dit verhoed Sparks nie om Nyerere te komplimenteer nie: “When he realised it [Ujamaa] wasn’t working as he had intended he dropped the programme – something Verwoerd could never bring himself to do” (2933).

Die Nieu-Seelander en integrasionis, Garfield Todd (1908-2002), wat tydens Sparks se Rhodesiese verblyf die eerste minister was, was Sparks se held, asook “his doughty daughter, Judith” (1600). Later noem hy haar ‘n “feisty … daughter” (2893). “I knew all about [Garfield] Todd, of course, and admired him greatly. Indeed I think he was arguably the most progressive and imaginative white leader ever to step onto an African political stage” (1606). Garfield het Joshua Nkomo se terroriste aktief ondersteun (2893). Judith (gebore in 1943), is in opdrag van Robert Mugabe deur ‘n swart soldaat verkrag en het ontpop as ‘n kritikus van die Mugabe-bewind. Toe Sparks later Rhodesië tydens Ian Smith se bewind besoek het, was sy waarneming van die swartes: “They saw the token reforms as a weakening of the white regime’s resolve and that more pressure was now needed to achieve full equality” (2899). Uit wat in Rhodesië gebeur het, het mense soos FW de Klerk nooit werklik ‘n les geleer nie. Hendrik Verwoerd het tereg geredeneer: “Any reform would simply invite more pressure” (2904).

Sparks het na Oos-Londen verhuis en by die Daily Dispatch as joernalis gaan werk. Hy noem die koerant “a venerable institution” (1683). “The paper still flew only the Union Jack from its flagpole” (1689). Die Nasionale Party-regering was dus oor landsvlae nie so onverdraagsaam soos die ANC-regering wat glad nie die openbare vertoning van die vorige landsvlag duld nie. In sy dekking van internasionale nuus was daar by die koerant “a bias towards British affairs” (1700). Sparks het in hierdie tyd sy eerste vrou, Mary Rowe, ‘n kind van Britse immigrante uit Cornwall, ontmoet en in 1957 met haar getrou. Dit was ook die begin van hulle vriendskap met ‘n mislukte student in die regte en mede-joernalis, Donald Woods, en sy vrou, Wendy.

Hierna het Sparks 18 maande lank by Reuter in Londen gewerk. Hierdie nuusagentskap het “an obsession with accuracy and objectivity” wat vir ‘n obsessiewe, instinktiewe mens soos Sparks problematies was. “I believe the latter [objectivity] is not strictly achievable since every individual views events through an inbuilt cultural and personal prism … the most one can realistically hope for is fairness” (1808; ook 4760). Sy ironiese raad aan joernaliste is: “Don’t become a propagandist” (4760); iets wat hy egter self deurentyd gedoen het; ook in sy outobiografie. In die laaste paragraaf hier onder kom ek weer by Sparks se “fairness” uit.

Hy skryf van “the violence being used to suppress protests against apartheid” (5283). Dit dring nie tot hom deur dat geweld nodig was om voorafgaande geweld te bekamp nie. Ons beleef dit tans opnuut: grootskaalse geweld word op universiteitskampusse gepleeg maar dit mag skynbaar nie met geweld bestry word nie, gevolglik is daar voortslepende en toenemende wetteloosheid. “Apartheid South Africa was effectively a police state” (5637), maar Sparks opper geen beswaar teen die militêre range wat polisielede in die nuwe Suid-Afrika het nie.

Hierna het Sparks by die Rand Daily Mail gaan werk en kennis met ‘n geesgenoot, Laurence Gandar (1915-1998), gemaak, wat die RDM-redakteur van 1957 tot 1965 was. Die RDM sou “the most liberal paper in the country” word (1925). Sparks loop oor van lof vir hierdie koerant. Volgens hom was dit “the best team of journalists ever assembled in South Africa” (1925). Hy beskou Gandar as sy “intellectual father” (1930); dalk eerder sy ideologie-pa. “He was a role model … He was the greatest editor I ever worked for, perhaps the greatest South Africa has ever seen” (1930). “Perhaps” omdat Sparks blykbaar ook aanspraak op daardie grootsheid wou maak. “By his example he [Gandar] … transformed the entire South African press, which in turn contributed to the remarkable transformation of the country from the outrage of apartheid to the hopefulness of a non-racial democracy” (1936).

Al was Sparks aanvanklik jingoïsties Britsgesind het hy dit teen “the Eurocentric outlook” (1993). Toe Suid-Afrika in 1961 ‘n republiek buite die Statebond geword het, was Sparks al dermate geafrikaniseer en sy voorkeure in so ‘n mate verswart dat hy kon skryf: “The ending of the relationship with the Royal Family meant nothing to me” (2715). As joernalis het Sparks verkies om alles primêr uit die oogpunt van swartes te sien. Die wet op grondbesit van 1913 het hy beskryf as die “‘original sin’ of South African racism” (2018), waarmee hy darem erken dat rassisme voor 1948 bestaan het. Hy kla ook oor “how deeply racist the Rand Daily Mail‘s predominantly white readership was” (2091). Hierdie gaping tussen wat die RDM aangebied het en die oortuigings van sy lesers sou uiteindelik tot die ondergang van die koerant lei.

Die RDM het besluit om die woord “native” met “African” te vervang (4784). (Later het alle nie-wittes “blacks” geword, 4766, 4778). Dit het ‘n groot daling in sirkulasie veroorsaak. Sparks pak die skuld hiervoor op veral Afrikaners. Die woord “African … seemingly containing an implication that black people had a proprietary right to the continent, that it was theirs and that white South Africans were outsiders, non-Africans. It was a hypocritical attitude, since whites had long taken pride in regarding themselves as ‘Europeans'” (2097).

Sparks skaar hom aan die kant van die ANC en die PAC se Robert Sobukwe (1924-1978). “The ANC itself had always been committed to the ideal of non-racialism rooted in its 1955 Freedom Charter” (2103). Sobukwe was volgens Sparks “at pains to stress that the concept [African] was not racist” (2108). Sobukwe word soos volg aangehaal: “We aim, politically, at government of the Africans by the Africans for the Africans, with everybody who owes his only loyalty to Africa and who is prepared to accept the democratic rule of an African majority being regarded as an African” (2114). Dit is te dik vir ‘n daalder vir seker die meeste blankes en sekerlik vir die meeste Afrikaners, maar Sparks het geen probleem met hierdie soort “nie-rassigheid” nie.

Sparks erken: “The Africanists resented the influence that the white communists seemed able to exercise on the ANC” (2114). As wit kommuniste probleme het om as Afrikane te kwalifiseer, watter kans het nie-kommunistiese Afrikaners? Sparks ontken dat daar iets soos swart rassisme bestaan. Hy skryf selfs Steve “Biko was no black racist” (4754). “I empathised with the broad objectives of the Black Consciousness Movement” (4772).

In die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek was daar net twee moontlikhede: rasseskeiding of integrasie (2166). Hendrik Verwoerd (1901-1966) het profeties gesê: “The end of apartheid … will be the end of the white man in South Africa” (2556). Sparks, daarenteen, het integrasie verkies: “Full racial integration was the only possible future for South Africa” (2574). “I was aware that a large number of my fellow English-speakers, perhaps a majority, quietly approved of the basics of apartheid while at the same time looking down upon the Afrikaners as being too rough, too unsubtle. There was an element of hypocrisy about some that I found contemptible” (2733). Hy erken ook dat Engelssprekende blankes wat uit Afrika, bv Kenia, gevlug het, voorkeur aan rasseskeiding gee (2250).

Verwoerd se standpunt word soos volg deur Sparks verwoord: “Multiracialism was the current vogue, but be assured that in time, as individual groups began to feel their national and cultural identities coming under the threat of being swamped by the influx of alien elements, there would be a reaction against it. Humanity would revert to a recognition of the need to protect their cultural identities in their own homeland areas” (2587). Al hoe meer tekens hiervan is deesdae oral in die Westerse wêreld waarneembaar. Sparks se vertolking is: “Afrikaner angst, the fear of cultural swamping and the loss of volksidentiteit … lay at the heart of their racist responses to the black majority” (2593). Johann Herder (1744-1803) “believed that culture, heritage and language were what defined a volk “(9132) maar Sparks misgun dit vir Afrikaners. Selfs teenoor die voortbestaan van behoudende, konserwatiewe Engelssprekendes was hy onsimpatiek gesind. Hy verwys na “the identity crisis of the white Afrikaners and the connivance of the English-speaking South Africans” (9121).

Sparks skryf: Jacob “Zuma had had no formal schooling” (8772). “Jacob never went to school” (8778). Ook: Zuma was “too lacking in understanding even if he had the will” (9040). Daarteenoor gee Sparks talle kere tereg te kenne dat Verwoerd intelligent was (2126, 2215, 2568, 4022, 4414, 4426, 4432, 4449). Toe Sparks ‘n jaar of wat gelede in die openbare pers Verwoerd intelligent genoem het, het dit so ‘n groot bohaai veroorsaak dat hy verplig gevoel het om sy stelling terug te trek en verskoning te vra. Selfs die verligste blanke moet dus op swart aandrang vernederend om verskoning vra, al het hy die waarheid kwytgeraak, want niks goeds mag van die blanke politieke bewind en veral apartheid gesê word nie. Sparks is in die laaste jare van sy leeftyd toegelaat om weekliks ‘n rubriek op Netwerk24 en in bv Die Burger te publiseer. Dit toon dat Naspers/Media24, soos die Nasionale Party, sedert 1990/94 ongetwyfeld polities ‘n U-draai gemaak het. Sedert Sparks se dood het daardie Afrikaanse nuusdiens telkens aanleidings gevind om hom postuum lof toe te swaai.

Die RDM het die spreekbuis van die Progressiewe Party geword. Die eerste leier van die party, Jan Steytler, het geredeneer: “We don’t need laws to keep our identity” (2845). ‘n Soortgelyke redenasie is aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch gebruik deur diegene wat vyandig teenoor Afrikaans was. Steytler: “No man must ask me to give him special protection just because he is white … I am not prepared to subsidise inefficiency” (2851). Deesdae is dit swartes wat spesiale beskerming geniet en is ondoeltreffendheid aan die orde van die dag. In ‘n helder oomblik het Sparks gepraat van “the centralising of inefficiency” (8486). Steytler: “Come with me into a future of prosperity by helping me to release the vast human potential of our country … South Africa can produce work and prosperity for all” (2857). Sparks eet dit alles vir soetkoek op. Hy erken nie dat Steytler verkeerd bewys is nie.

Omtrent al wat ‘n prominente linkse is se naam kom in Sparks se teks voor, by uitstek liberaliste en kommuniste; mense by wie daar onderling eerder ‘n graad- as ‘n aardverskil is. Sigmund Freud het na hierdie verskynsel as “the narcissism of minor differences” verwys (7437). Sparks: “I had long regarded myself as a liberal in the classical Lockean sense, which meant being instinctively on the side of the underdog in our racist society” (7818), wat van hom ‘n nuttige handlanger van kommuniste gemaak het. In die nuwe Suid-Afrika was hy egter nie bereid om vir die nuwe onderdruktes, die benadeelde blankes, in die bres te tree nie.

Mary Benson word beskryf as “the most indefatigable lobbyist and activist ever to have taken up the anti-apartheid cause” (3703). Winnie Mandela word beskryf as ‘n “tall, confident woman of striking beauty;” iemand met “elegance and charm” (7030). Hierdie mense het onder meer die vrylating van Nelson Mandela begeer. As hy vroeër vrygelaat is “we might have had more than just one all-too-brief term of his remarkable talents” (4071).

Na sy eerste vrou se dood het Sparks met Sue Matthey, van Switserse oorsprong, getrou. Die ingeperkte Beyers Naudé is uitgesoek om die huweliksband te lê (4855). Kort hierna was Sparks drie jaar lank die redakteur van die Sunday Express (4962) en daarna van die Rand Daily Mail (1977-1981), wat glo “the country’s greatest newspaper” was (6323). Na sy ontslag as RDM-redakteur het hy as die plaaslike korrespondent van koerante in Amerika, Brittanje en Nederland opgetree. “I felt a sense of satisfaction that my work was helping to build foreign pressure on South Africa to end apartheid – perhaps every bit as important as whatever domestic influence I’d had while editing the Rand Daily Mail” (7755). Later word hy selfs meer voorbarig met sy selfoorskatting: “I felt my coverage had played a role in the transformation, because I believed international pressure from the US, Britain and the Netherlands, where most of my reports had appeared, had contributed significantly [!] to the transition” (8539). Hy was ongetwyfeld sy eie held. Ierdere verering, erkenning of bekroning wat hom te beurt geval het, word in sy outobiografie geboekstaaf.

Na sy uittrede by die RDM het Sparks die Institute for the Advancement of Journalism gestig met ‘n tipiese nie-rassige doel: om opleiding aan swart joernaliste te verskaf. Na die dood van sy tweede vrou het Sparks met Jenny Gandar, die weduwee-skoondogter van Laurence, getrou maar hulle het na nege jaar geskei. Sparks het vier kinders waaronder “Michael and Andrew, both now living in England” (9176). Hulle het klaarblyklik nie genoeg waardering vir al die harde werk wat hulle pa verrig het om ‘n utopie hier aan die suidpunt van Afrika tot stand te bring nie.

“That sublime feeling of triumph, of having the dream of a lifetime come true against all the odds, stayed with me throughout Nelson Mandela’s term of office, and a bit beyond as Thabo Mbeki seemed to carry the baton for a while. But, as with all dreams, there comes an awakening to reality” (8358). Maar toe was die onherstelbare skade reeds gedaan. Sparks gee vir die blankes, veral die Afrikaners, die skuld vir hierdie mislukking en nie vir homself of die swartes nie. “Remoulding three centuries of racial domination and exploitation, and the shattering of black family life through generation upon generation of migrant labour, was never going to be a quick fix. Nor was there going to be any swift reincarnation of more such great souls as Nelson Mandela. So decline was inevitable” (8358). ‘n Mens kan bv vra: Wat het van Mbeki se “African Renaissance” (8380) geword?

Maar moenie dink Sparks het tot inkeer gekom nie. “In the interests of fairness let me note that despite Mbeki’s errors of judgment and Zuma’s multiple defects, South Africa is still a much better place than it was under apartheid … It is not headed towards becoming a failed state … It is not another Zimbabwe in the making” (9076). Tot sy dood het Sparks in sy politieke onredbaarheid volhard.

Leon Lemmer: Hinton Rowan Helper se strewe na ‘n nasiestaat

Uitvinders is mense wat dinge skep wat nie bestaan het nie. Ontdekkers is mense wat dinge opspoor en ervaar wat voorheen nie in eie geledere bekend was nie. Sowel die uitvinders as die ontdekkers was hoofsaaklik blankes. In hierdie rubriek beperk ek die aandag tot ontdekkers van geografiese gebiede, hoewel ruimteliggame deesdae ook verken word.

Die Skot David Livingstone (1813-1873) het veral die Zambezi-rivier en Oos-Afrika verken en die oorsprong van die Nylrivier probeer vasstel (Tim Jeal, Livingstone, Yale University Press, 2013, 456p; Amazon Kindle $16,82). Die Wallieser Henry Morton Stanley (John Rowlands, 1841-1904) het ‘n meer veeleisende taak aangepak deur die loop van die Kongo-rivier en sy omgewing in Sentraal-Afrika te verken. Sy manhaftigheid is werklik indrukwekkend (Tim Jeal, Stanley: The impossible life of Africa’s greatest explorer, London: Faber and Faber, 2008, 570p; Amazon Kindle $11,39). Die volgende waarneming van Stanley kan in verband met die FW de Klerk-strategie van 1990/4 gebring word: “Once Africans had made overt threats of violence, they would treat as weakness any subsequent attempts to placate them” (p 172).

Dit is seker veral ontdekkingsreise in Afrika wat Suid-Afrikaners interesseer maar daar was baie ander, soos die buitengewone ervarings van die Engelsman Samuel Hearne (1745-1792) in Noord-Kanada op soek na onder meer ‘n noordwestelike skeepsdeurgang vanaf die Atlantiese na die Stille Oseaan (Ken McGoogan, Ancient Mariner: The Arctic adventures of Samuel Hearne (Carrol & Graf, 2003, 336p). Vanweë minder pakys het hierdie deurgang eers in die huidige eeu bruikbaar geword.

Maar ek wil oor Afrika-ontdekkers (eintlik -verkenners) skryf. Van die interessantste tekste en daarby waarheidsgetrou is die Skot Mungo Park (1771-1805) se verslae oor sy ekspedisies in die omgewing van die Nigerrivier in Wes-Afrika (Travels in the interior districts of Africa, Ware: Wordsworth, 2002, 390p; Amazon Kindle $1,13). Een van sy waarnemings was: “Loss of time is an object of no great importance in the eyes of a Negro. If he has anything of consequence to perform, it is a matter of indifference to him whether he does it to-day or to-morrow, or a month or two hence; so long as he can spend the present moment with any degree of comfort he gives himself very little concern about the future” (p 298). In Helper se 1868-boek (bron hier onder) is daar hierdie aanhaling: “Regardless of the past as reckless of the future, the present alone influences their actions” (Kindle 2738).

Oor sy swart vriend Karfa skryf Park: “Observing the improved state of our manufactures [die artikels wat Park uit Engeland saamgebring het],* and our manifest superiority in the arts of civilised life, he would sometimes appear pensive, and exclaim with an involuntary sigh … ‘Black men are nothing.’ At other times he would ask me, with great seriousness, what could possibly have induced me, who was no trader, to think of exploring so miserable a country as Africa? He meant by this, to signify that, after what I must have witnessed in my own country, nothing in Africa could, in his opinion, deserve a moment’s attention. I have preserved these little traits of character in this worthy Negro, not only from regard to the man, but also because they appear to me to demonstrate that he possessed a mind above his condition; and to such of my readers as love to contemplate human nature in all its varieties, and to trace progress from rudeness to refinement, I hope the account I have given of this poor African will not be unacceptable” (333-334). [* “All the articles of value which the Moors and the people of Jinnie bring to Sego, are made by us. If you speak of a good gun, who made it? – the white people” (371).]

Dit is verstaanbaar dat Park oor sy verblyf in Afrika geskryf het: “I … felt a painful longing for the manifold blessings of civilised society” (300). Maar hy het tereg teen veralgemening gewaarsku. In die konteks van raspolitiek word veralgemening deesdae stereotipering genoem. Maar stereotipering geskied nie oorsaakloos nie. Daar is seker ten minste ‘n element van waarheid in. Daar is seker ook ‘n mate van nawerking van die verlede in die hede. Lesers moet maar self besluit in hoeverre die inligting in die aanhalings steeds geldig is. Daar moet egter in gedagte gehou word dat meer as twee eeue sedert Park se dood verloop het. Maar groot kulturele verskille tussen blankes en swartes bestaan sekerlik steeds.

Daar is ‘n boek waarin die menings van talle Afrika-ontdekkingsreisigers byeengebring is: Hinton Rowan Helper (1829-1909) se The negroes in Negroland; The negroes in America; and, Negroes generally; also, The several races of white men (New York: GW Carleton, 1868, 255p; Amazon Kindle $1,13). Met Negroland word Afrika bedoel. Helper het ook twee ander boeke oor hierdie onderwerp gepubliseer: The impending crisis of the South: How to meet it (1857, 106p; Amazon Kindle $11,34) en Nojoque: A question for a continent (1867, 484p; Amazon Kindle $10,25). Daar is ook ‘n omvattende boek oor Helper beskikbaar: David Brown, Southern outcast: Hinton Rowan Helper and the impending crisis of the South (LSU Press, 2006, 333p; Amazon Kindle $18,23).

Helper was ‘n Amerikaanse Suiderling wat eerder om ekonomiese as morele redes teen slawerny gekant was. Hy het gedink dat as blanke werkers gebruik word die Suidelike state vinniger sou industrialiseer en ontwikkel en hulle agterstand teen die Noordelike state kon inhaal. Hy wou hê dat die swart slawe vrygestel en gerepatrieer word. Sy oogmerk vir Amerika was ‘n nasiestaat vir blankes: “The ultimate whitening up of all the Southern States” (1868-boek, Kindle 4419). Op daardie stadium was daar 30 miljoen blankes in Amerika teenoor 4 miljoen swartes. In die Suidelike state was Helper ‘n uitgeworpene omdat die meeste slawe-eienaars teen die vrystelling van die slawe gekant was omdat hulle swartes as goedkoop arbeiders wou behou. Daar is ook gemeen dat Helper as ondersteuner van Abraham Lincoln die Noorde teen die Suide gehelp het. Helper is verwerp deur pro-swart gesindes en diegene wat die slawe wou vrystel weens sy onsimpatieke, rassistiese houding jeens swartes.

Ek beperk my aandag tot Helper se 1868-boek, waarin ook inligting uit sy twee ander genoemde boeke aangehaal of herhaal word. Ek wou veral kennis neem van wat Afrika-ontdekkingsreisigers geskryf het. Baie van die destydse gebruike van swartes is grusaam, wat die teks onaangename leesstof maak. Daar is ook baie uitlatings wat aan Penny Sparrow herinner. Ek gaan egter nie opmerkings herhaal wat deesdae as rassisties geëtiketteer (kon) word nie. Al die outeurs is sekerlik nie so waarheidsgetrou soos Park nie. Tog kristalliseer daar ‘n redelike mate van konsensus.

Een van die dinge wat opval, is dat daar destyds gemeen is dat die getal swartes in Afrika besig was om te verminder, bv weens siektes en natuurrampe soos droogte. Die enigste plek waar die swartes glo meer geword het, was as die slawe van blankes in die Amerikas (2595). Dit blyk ook dat slawerny in Afrika bestaan het lank voordat met die transatlantiese slawehandel begin is en slawerny voortgeduur het lank nadat slawerny in die Westerse wêreld afgeskaf is. “The intercourse which the natives have had with white men does not seem to have much ameliorated their condition” (692). In Afrika is na bewering tradisioneel net sowat ‘n kwart van die swart bevolking nie deur hulle medeswartes verslaaf nie (541, 560, 1745). “Slavery in Africa as a national institution … seems to have existed always” (655).

“The most horrible topic connected with slavery is slave-hunting; and this is earned on, not only for the purpose of supplying the foreign market, but, in a far more extensive degree, for supplying the wants of domestic slavery” (590). “The liability to fall into a condition of servitude is not so frightful in Africa as it is where there is a higher appreciation of personal liberty; nor does the same odium attach to the term slave as is attached to it among civilized men. The African sees very little difference between the authority exercised over him by one whom he acknowledges as his master and the petty tyranny which is exercised by most African chiefs over their subjects; and so long as he is worked moderately, and treated kindly, he has but little cause for dissatisfaction, and not infrequently by his own choice places himself in this condition” (570).

Reeds in 1868 het Helper tereg verwys na “the gross error of inferring or supposing that color is the only differences – and that a very trivial difference – between the whites and the blacks” (70). In 2016 moet ons steeds aanhoor dat velkleur die enigste rede is waarom blankes rassesegregasie of apartheid toegepas het. Verskille in wêreld- en lewensbeskouing, in lewenswyse, oftewel kulturele verskille, word geïgnoreer. ‘n Sendeling moes die volgende redenasie aanhoor: “Me go to church, and you no pay me” (2213). “All missionaries praise the African for his strict observance of the Sabbath. He would have three hundred and sixty-five Sabbaths in the year, if possible, and he would as scrupulously observe them all” (2223).

“Gratitude with the African is not even a sense of prospective favor. He looks upon a benefit as the weakness of his benefactor and his own strength; consequently he will not recognize even the hand that feeds him” (1297). Swartes het ‘n “long list of wants without stint or shame” (1315). “Whatsoever is seen is surely demanded … The love of acquiring property stifles every sense of shame; and no compunction is felt in asking for the cloak from off the back” (1325). “True to his natural instincts, the king commenced begging, and being much struck with my Highland costume, he demanded it as a proof of friendship” (1344). “They never make a present without expecting to receive three times as much in return” (1335). “The more they receive the more they desire, but in return they will do nothing” (2156). “When they can no longer ask, they begin to borrow, with the firm resolution of never repaying; and, what is worst of all, when they make a present, they hold it a deadly offence not to receive at least double the value in return” (1362). “It often came about that our house was like a shop where there are customers in abundance, except that in our case they were customers who wished to have everything for nothing” (1371).

“Africa from the earliest ages has been the most conspicuous theatre of crime and of wrong; where social life has lost the traces of primitive simplicity, without rising to order, principle, or refinement; where fraud and violence are formed into national systems, and man trembles at the sight of his fellow-man” (1407). “Everything that comes in their way, which they cannot appropriate on the spot to their own use, is destroyed, that it may not be of advantage to others” (1438). “Their destructiveness is prominent; a slave never breaks a thing without an instinctive laugh of pleasure” (2291).

Meer as een outeur gebruik die voorbeelde van ‘n perd en ‘n donkie om die beduidende verskille tussen etniese groepe aan te dui; dat hulle nie saam in dieselfde tuig kan trek nie. “It is the grand error of equalizing that which is unequal” (2632). Dit herinner aan wat in Deuteronomium 22:10 staan: “Jy mag nie ‘n bees en ‘n donkie saam voor ‘n ploeg inspan nie” (3643). William Mungen het in 1867 gesê: “As soon as they admit that the races are of different origins they can no longer claim that all races are equal, any more than they can claim that the horse and the ass are equal” (3136). John Quincy Adams (1767-1848) het in 1843 geskryf: “It is only as immortal beings that all mankind can, in a sense, be said to be born equal” (2917). Senator Thurman van Ohio het in 1868 gesê: “Of all the delusions I have ever known, the idea of political equality between the black and white races seems to me the greatest … It is impossible that the race to which we belong can submit to negro domination; it is impossible that … the negro can compete with the white man in the business, much less the politics, of the country” (3057). Hiermee het ek reeds met die kommentaar van Amerikaners oor swartes in Amerika begin.

Soos uit die boektitel blyk, haal Helper ook outeurs aan wat oor Amerikaanse swartes geskryf het. Sowel Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) as Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) het gelyke saambestaan met swartes verwerp en verkies dat bevryde slawe gerepatrieer word. Soos Jefferson dit in 1824 gestel het: “Send the whole of that population from among us, and establish them, under our patronage and protection, as a separate, free, and independant people, in some country and climate friendly to human life and happiness” (2898). Lincoln het in 1858 gesê: “I do not understand the Declaration of Independence [1776] to mean that all men are created equal in all respects. Certainly the negro is not our equal in color – perhaps not in many other respects … I did not at any time say I was in favor of negro suffrage … I am not in favor of negro citizenship … I am not, and never have been, in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with whites … there is a physical difference between the black and white races, which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality” (2935).

Montgomery Blair het in 1863 gesê: “An election would be a mockery in a community wherein there could be no other than black and white parties. In such communities, reason and experience show that one or the other race must be the dominent race, and that democracy is impossible” (2989). “The instinct of self-preservation … revolts at hybridism” (3006).

SS Cox het geskryf: “The white and black races thrive best apart; that a commingling of these races is a detriment to both; that it does not elevate the black, and it only depresses the white; that the history of this continent, especially in Hispano-America, shows that stable, civil order and government are impossible with such a population … It is an absurdity to say that two races, so dissimilar as black and white, of different origin, of unequal capacity, can succeed in the same society when placed in competition” (3092). Een van Fisher se raswette lui: “He may not lay a finger on one of those three wonderful boxes, the ballot-box, the jury-box, and the cartridge-box, which contain the instruments and weapons by which freemen defend their rights. They are for the white race only” (3256).

Samuel T Glover het in 1860 geskryf: “If you legislate to give the Africans place, position, and employment which would otherwise belong to white men, you depreciate white men – you invidiously stigmatize their race” (3529). Richard Grant White het in 1865 geskryf: “I believe that the greatness or abjectness of every people is due primarily, if not solely, to one cause – race” (3879). Theodore Parker het hierdie pluimpie vir blankes gegun: “The Caucassian differs from all other races; he is humane, he is civilized, and progresses” (3916).

In 1867 skryf Helper van ‘n verskynsel wat aan die nuwe Suid-Afrika kan herinner: “The negroes here … have hitherto been afforded opportunities, for both an education and for an easy and comfortable livelihood, far superior to the opportunities which were generally enjoyed by the poorer classes of white people … this cruel and flagitious discrimination in favor of the blacks as against the whites” (4042). “The poor whites were thus crowded away from the many desirable employments and places to which they alone should have been heartily welcomed” (4059).

Die volgende aanhaling herinner aan die U-draai wat die Nasionale Party van 1990 af gemaak het: Na die Amerikaanse Burgeroorlog (1861-1865) het die Republikeinse Party “Lucifer-like fallen from the white heights of Republicanism into the black depths of Radicalism” (4202). In daardie na-oorlogse situasie word van die Amerikaanse blankes verwag om hulle bekke te hou en gedwee alles te aanvaar wat na hulle kant toe kom. Max du Preez gee deesdae soortgelyke raad aan Suid-Afrikaanse blankes. “Endure the wrong, and pass the whole matter by in silence, and without action, rather than subject themselves to the insult, expense, and loss of time which they well knew they would be but too likely to incur by making complaint” (4227).

Helper skryf: “We insist upon it that it is pre-eminently our duty to be just and kind to our own race, and that the poor and distressed of the white race are those who, here, there, and everywhere, have the highest claims upon us, whether for service, for food, for clothing, for education, or for whatever other thing” (4336). Is dit voorstelbaar dat ‘n gedrukte Afrikaanse hoofstroomkoerant ‘n pleidooi ten bate van arm blankes sou lewer of selfs maar net hulle toestand in ‘n hoofartikel sou belig? Ek dink nie so nie. Dit sou nie polities korrek wees nie.