demografie – praag.co.za

Leon Lemmer: Swart Afrika as vertreksaal vir emigrante

Ek het al by verskeie geleenthede oor die massa-intog van inkommers in die Europese vasteland (bv Praag 3.02.2018) en Brittanje (bv Praag 15.05.2016) geskryf. In 2015 het hierdie verskynsel ‘n hoogtepunt bereik toe 1.256 miljoen migrante Europa binnegesypel het – 200 000 hiervan uit Afrika (Stephen Smith, bron hier onder, Kindle 405, 2992). Die meeste van hierdie inkommers was afkomstig uit Sirië, Irak en Afganistan (2041). Hulle het die oorlogstoestande in daardie lande as voorwendsel vir aanspraakmaking op vlugtelingstatus gebruik.

“Between the early 1970s and the late 1990s the number of asylum applications in the countries that now comprise the European Union increased twenty-fold – from about 15 000 per annum to more than 300 000. Since 2000, this three-decade-long upward trend has continued unabated: in 2014, the year before the ‘migration crisis’, the number of first-time asylum seekers in the EU was 562 700; in 2017, after the migratory peak, Eurostat put it at 650 000” (3364). “The right of asylum in the EU has become a game of chance … But … that right … has [also] become a fig leaf for economic migration” (3376).

In Brittanje word dikwels voorgegee dat die invloeiing van blanke hande-arbeiders uit Oos-Europa – ná hierdie lande se toetrede tot die Europese Unie – die rede vir die toenemende weerstand teen inkommers is. Dit is glo deels die rede waarom die meeste Britse kiesers ten gunste van EU-uittrede gestem het. “Polish migrants were the referendum’s target of choice: more than a million had moved to Great Britain in the five years following Poland’s entry into the EU in 2004” (229). Die Britse inwoners se onvergenoegdheid met die baie nieblanke migrante uit bv die Indiese subkontinent en die Karibiese eilande word skynheiligheidshalwe liefs verswyg.

Die verwagting is dat migrasiedruk uit die Midde-Ooste en Asië op Westerse lande gaan toeneem. Natuurlik ook uit veral Sentraal- en Suid-Amerika op die Verenigde State van Amerika. Maar daar is ook die Afrika-faktor. In 2016 was daar reeds 9 miljoen Afrikane in Europa, teenoor 900 000 in 1960 (417). Afrika word as die mees dinamiese kontinent beskryf; nie wat bv vindingrykheid en werkgierigheid betref nie, maar met verwysing na bevolkingsaanwas. Demografies gesproke kan Afrika op biljoenêrstatus aanspraak maak (3303), al is ekonomiese ellende een van sy prominentste kenmerke. Geografies is Afrika en Europa naby mekaar. Daar word veronderstel dat migrasie uit Afrika die volgende massavloed gaan wees wat Europa tref. Afrika sal op hierdie manier “the Mexico of Europe” word (276).

“Between 1975 and 2010, 10 million Mexicans migrated to America both legally and illegally. In all, including their children born in the United States, Mexican-Americans now form a community of some 30 million people, about 10 per cent of the US population. If Africans followed that example between now and 2050, the Afro-optimistic leitmotiv of ‘Africa Rising’ would, quite literally, become a reality … At the end of a sustained African migratory wave, Europe’s population would include some 150 to 200 million African-Europeans – counting immigrants and their children – compared with just 9 million today. In a little more than thirty years, between one-fifth and one-quarter of the population in Europe would be of African descent” (310). Dit is verbasend dat Donald Trump sulke kwaai teenstand ondervind as hy in werklikheid bloot die beleid van sy voorgangers voortsit – al is dit meer energiek – om Amerika se suidgrens (3 145 km – 2850) in groter mate teen inkommers te beveilig. “Only fifteen countries had built walls or wiremesh fences on their borders in 1990; by 2016 that number had jumped to seventy” (3221).

“In 1975, the population of America was three and a half times Mexico’s then 60 million inhabitants, while today it is still two and a half times larger, although the Mexican population has doubled. Even if we take into account all of Latin America, with its 600 million or so inhabitants, the migratory pressures on the United States are much weaker than those facing Europe. Today, the European Union (including the United Kingdom) has some 510 million inhabitants, while there are 1.3 billion people in neighbouring Africa. In thirty-five years, that asymmetry will have grown enormously – there will be an estimated 450 million Europeans and some 2.5 billion Africans. As the population of Europe continues to age, Africa’s demographic will continue to trend in the opposite direction. By 2050, two-thirds of Africans will be less than thirty years old. Put another way, for every European in their fifties, there will be three Africans, two of whom will be in the prime of life” (322).

Dit gaan ‘n suid-noord beweging van mense wees, dus die teenoorgestelde van die destydse “scramble for Africa” (275). Die ironiese verwagting is dat swart Afrikane op groot skaal hulle polities onafhanklike lande gaan verlaat om “n beter lewe” onder blanke politieke bewind te soek. Daar kan kwalik ‘n beter bewys wees dat blankes ‘n land beter tot voordeel van al sy inwoners regeer as ‘n swart politieke bewind, wat dikwels deur bv ondoeltreffendheid en korrupsie gekenmerk word. “In leaving their homelands by any means possible, rather than staying and expressing their dissatisfaction and trying to make things better, they [migrants] are saying something [important] about their societies: … that they are dysfunctional, and not only in terms of per capita GDP, employment opportunities or a social safety net. They also lack the capacity to generate hope … Are African immigrants qualified for life in the West? It seems to me they bring the problems of their own societies, but also the will to solve them in a more enabling environment” (2472). “I don’t exclude the possibility that this ‘better life’ that migrants so readily invoke may only be, in the words of the French demographer Michèle Tribalat, ‘a third-world lifestyle with a European standard of living'” (2489). Dalk is dit waarna gestreef word wanneer die ANC-regime nuwe huise aan mede-swartes oorhandig.

Ek skryf na aanleiding van Stephen Smith (gebore in 1956) se boek, The scramble for Europe: Young Africa on its way to the Old Continent (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019, 200p; Amazon Kindle $13.79). Die teks is “an entirely updated and reworked version” (187) van die oorspronklike Franse uitgawe wat in 2018 gepubliseer is. Die outeur het in Europa grootgeword en Duits met sy ma gepraat. Daarna het hy as joernalis dekades in Afrika deurgebring, insluitende Frans-Afrika. Hy gebruik die frase “bush taxis” (1549, 1679), wat ‘n beter benaming as “minibustaxi’s” kan wees. Tans is hy ‘n dosent aan Duke University in Durham, Noord-Carolina. Wat die outeur beoog, is “to provide a factual basis on which others can come to an informed view” (253).

“I have made no a priori assumptions in favour of homogeneity or diversity as ideals, least of all as moral imperatives … Nor do I question whether the African migrants who feature in this book are fleeing violence and lawlessness, poverty or lack of opportunity, for a better life. Nor do I insist on a distinction between legal and unauthorized migration, or between economic migrants and people seeking asylum” (247). “Opponents of diversity are often accused of xenophobia and even racism, while its supporters are often suspected of wanting to dilute national identity” (2639). Hy onderskei tussen “‘upstream’ issues like entry requirements and border controls and ‘downstream’ concerns involving numerous, sometimes conflicting, models of social integration” (434). Stroomaf kan in hierdie konteks moeiliker as stroomop wees weens die “unbridgeable otherness” van die inkommers (1579). “The melting-pot theory of assimilation is outdated” (2925). ‘n Land wat hom vir migrasie oopstel, “will be defined by a multi-ethnic and multicultural mosaic” (2926).

“I endeavour to assess Africa’s importance as a reservoir of migrants, and as far as possible to predict both the magnitude and timing of this human flow from Africa to Europe” (253). “Africa, the island-continent of youth, is also the ‘lost land’ of failed adulthood where hundreds of millions of castaways are waiting for a life of fulfilment beyond their reach” (1568). Dit is waarom Afrika dikwels met ellende geassosieer word; ook “miserabilism” genoem (2093). Smith voorspel: “More than 100 million Africans are likely to cross the Mediterranean Sea over the next two generations” (259). Sy fokus is op swart Afrika, dus Afrika suid van die Sahara (275), en nie op Noord-Afrika met sy Arabiese bevolking nie. Hy beklemtoon veral drie sake: Die eksponensiële bevolkingsaanwas, die groot persentasie swart jeugdiges en die buitengewoon groot migrasiebegeerte. Migrasie in die wêreld in sy geheel “has increased from 92 million in 1960 to 258 million in 2017” (2003). “The United Nations … expects that between 2015 and 2050 some 91 million people from the world’s developing [poor] nations will move to the world’s wealthiest [white] countries” (2023). Die aanleiding hiertoe is “profound disbelief in the prospect of things taking a turn for the better within one’s lifetime … Large-scale migrations tend to originate from places where there is no hope” (2105).

In die boek word Suid-Afrika net sydelings betrek, waarskynlik omdat die nagloed van wat die blankes oor eeue hier tot stand gebring het, nog nie (heeltemal) uitgedoof is nie. Byvoorbeeld, Afrikalande se amptelike bevolkingstatistiek is hoogs onakkuraat, met Suid-Afrika wat darem die beste vaar (514) – ook wat die voorkoming van kindersterftes betref (811). Morten Jerven het ‘n hele boek, Poor numbers (2013, 208p), oor Afrika se onbetroubare (amptelike) statistiek geskryf (525). In hierdie beperkte sin is Suid-Afrika darem nog nie in alle opsigte ‘n tipiese Afrika-land nie, al is hy sedert 1994 ywerig op pad daarheen. Die grootskaalse emigrasie van die plaaslike blankes word glad nie in die boek genoem nie. Die “wêreldmening” is selde begaan oor die lot van blankes in Afrika. Veral sedert 1994 is daar Afrikanerdiaspora in bv Amerika, Brittanje, Australië en Nieu-Seeland. “To call yourself a member of a diaspora is to lay claim to the status of a castaway of history, a victim: you have ended up somewhere as a result of misfortune, if not worse – in any event against your will” (2135).

In Europa is daar sterk verskille van mening oor migrasie. “Poland, … propounds the concept of ‘ethnic homogeneity’. The threshold of tolerance was crossed long ago and a ‘Fortress Europe’ mentality is seen as the sine qua non for survival. For others, notably Germany, ‘welcoming’ people in need is a categorical imperative, and any attempt to question the unqualified acceptance of migrants is viewed as Fremdenfeindlichkeit or xenophobia” (440). Daar word gespekuleer “about the extent to which the warm welcome of migrants in Germany had anything to do with clearing the debts of the Nazi past” (3478). Maar Angela Merkel het spoedig tot beter insigte gekom. “Germany took in almost 1 million asylum seekers in 2015, but the following year rejected 91 per cent of the requests for protection” (559). “Merkel has since refrained from repeating her previous call that there should be no Obergrenze or ‘cap’ on immigration” (597). Sy het weens haar dwase uitlatings heelwat kiesers van haar politieke party vervreem (589).

Volgens Smith behoort migrante uit Afrika nie maklik weg te kom met ‘n pleidooi vir vlugtelingstatus nie, dus “to claim victimization as their permanent condition” (2161). “Only African migrants are locked up in their past, a perpetual ‘return to pain'” (2167). Daar word gepraat van swartes se “grievance identity … blacks who view life through the lens of victimization” (3159). “The worst response that one can foist on African migrants is what Hannah Arendt [1906-1975] called the ‘politics of pity'” (2495, 3182). “Europe should not consider ‘the’ African migrant and potential fellow citizen as someone who stands vaguely for an abstract humanity” (2674). “‘Pan-Africanists’ have a tendency to mark as racist any opposition outside of Africa to the arrival of African migrants” (2356), terwyl iedere sovereine land die reg het om te besluit of hy immigrante wil toelaat en, indien wel, hoeveel van hulle en aan watter vereistes hulle moet voldoen. “One doesn’t join a club by relaxing the rules” (2727).

Globalisering het “the free circulation of goods and capital” meegebring (2810), maar dit volg nie dat mense daarom ook vry is om hulle in enige land van hulle keuse te vestig nie. Die eerste deel van die volgende sin (toegepas op Afrikane) is myns insiens minder omstrede as die tweede deel (toegepas op Afrikaners): “When trying to formulate a ‘good’ immigration policy, irenic universalism inspired by a vague brotherhood of men is as prejudicial as nasionalistic or nativist egoism, or any cult of blood and soil” (2680). “In Nigeria, at the end of the oil boom, the overnight expulsion of several hundred thousand foreigners in two large waves – in 1983 and 1985 – was a brutal way of bringing down immigration levels” (2361). Dit het gebeur sonder dat daar sterk protes was. As ‘n Westerse land iets soortgelyks vir swart inkommers aandoen, sou daar ‘n helse bohaai gewees het.

Smith beskryf swart Afrika as ‘n vertreksaal vir migrante (2634). Sedert die verraad wat ‘n klein groepie Afrikaanssprekende blankes in 1990/94 gepleeg het, weet ons dat baie van ons plaaslike blankes (meer as ‘n miljoen), soos miljoene swartes, reeds deur daardie vertreksaal beweeg het. Namate ‘n mate van voorspoed in swart Afrika geskep word – sodat daar ‘n (middel)klas ontstaan wat nie bloot om oorlewing stry nie – ontstaan die begeerte na “‘n beter lewe” by hulle. “‘Bare life’, to use the term coined by the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben [born in 1942], doesn’t allow for adventure” (2110), maar matige voorspoed wel. Buitelandse finansiële hulp lewer ‘n bydrae hiertoe “by helping poor countries attain the threshold of prosperity, at which point their citizens have the means to leave and live elsewhere” (2172), dus, “development aid subsidizes migration” (2178).

Hedendaagse telekommunikasiemedia (veral televisie en die internet, dus televisietoestelle, rekenaars en veral slimselfone) maak dit vir Afrikane moontlik om via ‘n skerm ‘n idee te vorm van hoe mense in ‘n ontwikkelde samelewing lewe. Hulle doen “screen-shopping” (3309) met die oog op migrasie. “The ubiquity of satellite television and increasing internet access sharpens the contrast on the world’s poorest continent between lived experience and what is ‘seen on the screen'” (2035). Hierdie soort “globalization favours the ‘Americanization’ of the continent, even in its non-English-speaking parts. America soft power – in particular its youth culture and Black America’s protest culture – is in tune with African modernity” (2082). Dit wek by Afrikane die begeerte om deel van die Weste te wees. Hulle voorsien nie die moontlikheid dat lande in swart Afrika (gou of ooit) die Westerse ontwikkelingsvlak gaan bereik nie, gevolglik verkies hulle die migrasie-opsie. Telekommunikasie stimuleer migrasie ook in ‘n ander opsig. Nadat die migrant in ‘n vreemde land aangekom het, kan hy danksy telekommunikasie (bv ‘n slimfoon) goeie kontak met sy agtergeblewe familie en vriende in sy geboorteland behou (2167). Sodanige virtuele geborgenheid bring mee dat die migrant groter weerstand kan bied teen assimilasie en integrasie in sy nuwe omgewing.

Om die invloei van inkommers aan bande te lê, bestee Europese lande deesdae baie geld om toestande in Afrikalande te verbeter. Weens ondoeltreffendheid en korrupsie bereik buitelandse hulp slegs in geringe mate sy doel in Afrika. Maar die ironie is dat hoe doeltreffender Europese geld in Afrika aangewend word, hoe meer die getal vermoënde Afrikane wat uit Afrika wil ontsnap. Dit gebeur bv op groot skaal met swart studente wat met studiebeurse in Westerse lande studeer. Ná 1994 het die nuwe Suid-Afrika ruim hiertoe bygedra deurdat suiwer rassisties eerder geleerde swart Afrikane as blanke Suid-Afrikaners bv as dosente aan die plaaslike universiteite en as staatsamptenare aanstel is. Jonathan Jansen het omtrent gevrek van die lekkerkry toe hy as dekaan van die fakulteit opvoedkunde aan die Universiteit Pretoria (UP) ‘n Nigeriër as dosent in “chemistry education” aangestel het; nie omdat hy akademies die beste kandidaat was nie – die Nigeriër was bv nie Afrikaans magtig nie – maar om politieke redes, want Jansen wou die institusionele kultuur (dus historiese blankheid) van UP vernietig (Knowledge in the blood, 2009, p 223).

Daar is ‘n opsig waarin buitelandse geld wel die intog van migrante in Europa aan bande lê. “In 2010 [Muammar] Gaddafi [Libya’s head of state, 1969-2011] demanded the EU pay an annual rent of 5 billion euros to prevent migrants from crossing the Mediterranean. Without it, he treatened, ‘tomorrow, Europe will no longer be European’. On 18 March 2016, following the record influx of migrants the previous year, the EU agreed to pay Turkey some 6 billion euros in two tranches to close the routes in the Aegean, a move that should keep an estimated 3 million Syrians stranded on Turkish soil. Based on this ‘model’ of cash for kettling, the EU has, since 2016, negotiated ‘immigration conventions’ with five African countries – Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Senegal – to stand to gain from containing would-be migrants in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel” (2536). Sulke ooreenkomste met verskillende Afrikalande is nodig omdat “African migration resembles a fountain with multiple overflow basins” (2645). Anders as die Amerikaanse mure en heinings aan sy grens met Meksiko, het Europa nou hierdie “wall of money” (2541). Eintlik is dit ‘n geval van “blackmailing Europe” (3339).

Slegs ‘n klein persentasie van die onwettige immigrante word gedeporteer. “Their repatriation is a major logistical and financial challenge, and even an impossibility when their home countries refuse to readmit them” (3381). “Great Britain alone would have to spend 9 billion euros to repatriate all its illegal immigrants in a process that would last anywhere from fifteen to thirty years. By comparison, the 6 billion euros paid to Turkey in 2016 and 2018 to prevent some 3 million migrants from reaching European soil seems like a good deal, a bargain price in fact, especially given that there is no bad press of human rights violations” (2832). “More than 90 million euros were approved in April [2017] to help Libya deal with its migratory problems. But we know there is no oversight to safeguard how this money is spent. At the end of July, 46 million euros were disbursed to create a Libyan coast guard. Yet they are trained to bring migrants back to Libya” (2844).

Die manier waarop die foto van die stokkiesdraaier Hector Pieterson sedert 1976 in propaganda teen die NP-regering en Afrikaans misbruik word, is goed bekend. Op ‘n soortgelyke manier is die foto van die 3-jarige Siriër, Alan Kurdi, misbruik om stemming ten gunste van die migrasie van vlugtelinge te bevorder. Die foto toon sy lyk op ‘n Turkse strand op 2 September 2015. Die boot waarin sy gesin die Middellandse See wou oorsteek, het omgeslaan en hy het verdrink. Andersins is die konteks van die gebeure doelbewus verswyg. Alan se pa het ‘n gevestigde betrekking gehad sedert sy gesin hulle in Turkye hervestig het. Hulle was nie na Europa oppad nie, maar na Kanada. Die gevaar van verdrinking van migrante in die Middellandse See word ook oordryf. In 2015 “the risk of dying for a migrant crossing the Mediterranean was 0.37% … The likelihood of dying in childbirth for a woman in South Sudan … was 1.7 per cent. In other word, South Sudanese mothers giving birth were four and a half times more likely to die than a migrant crossing the Mediterranean, which has been variously described as an ‘open-air cemetery’, ‘the shame of Europe’, even the locus of ‘a silent genocide'” (2553).

Teen 2017 “the likelihood of a migrant perishing had risen to 1.88 per cent – five times higher than it was [in 2015]” (2566). “The risk became higher because the humanitarian response became more efficient. Rescue boats were getting closer and closer to Libyan territorial water, and if there was a danger of drowning, they didn’t hesitate to enter to help those in trouble. Smugglers exploited this window by packing growing numbers of migrants onto ever more precarious craft – especially the 9-metre long inflatable boats from China, which at times held up to 130 persons, a number several times their capacity. In exchange for a reduction in the cost of the journey, one of the passengers would be put in charge of ‘navigating’ and making the emergency call to rescue authorities once the craft reached international waters. To accomplish this, the navigator was provided with a compass and a mobile satellite telephone. In the past, another passenger would also have travelled at a reduced rate by acting as ‘Captain’, and would be in charge of running the outboard motor. However, as the price of outboard motors began to climb sharply (in the summer of 2017, it was more than 8 000 euros in Libya), ensuring that the motor did not disappear once the rescuers arrived became an issue. The smugglers were then likely to take the motor with them in another boat once the craft carrying the migrants reached the edge of territorial waters, leaving its occupants helpless and adift – pending the arrival of a rescue ship” (2571).

“In the first six months of 2017, humanitarian aid workers rescued and transported to Italy almost three-quarters of all migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean – some 93 000 people. In fact, they became so efficient that the smugglers began purchasing even less seaworthy craft than before and an increasing number of Italians and other Europeans started blaming the aid workers for running a kind of Mediterranean Uber, on call to ferry new migrants to Europe” (2577). “In 2018, Italy had struck a deal with Libyan warlords and equipped the country’s coast guard, in a bid to curb the rate of migrant departures. Since then, the new government has prohibited humanitarian rescue ships from entering Italian ports” (2589). Die migrasiedruk het toe na Malta en Spanje verskuif.

Hierdie soort mensverskuiwings geskied in drie stadia:

(a) Voor die vertrek (emigrasie): Dit behels dikwels ‘n trek uit die platteland na ‘n stad. “Between 1960 and 2000, Africa’s urban population surged by 8.7 times, by 2050 it will have quadrupled again” (904). Geld vir die uittog word bymekaar gemaak, bv met behulp van familielede. “The initial sum ranges between 2 000 and 3 000 US dollars” (2116). Daar word ook gekies tussen wettige en onwettige emigrasie.

(b) Die tog (migrasie): Die roete kan deur verskeie lande gaan. Die migrante is uitgelewer aan die genade van tussengangers, bv agente; eintlik menssmokkelaars. Migrasie het ‘n groot en lonende bedryf in Afrika (en elders) geword. As die migrant se geld opraak, kan dit, totdat familielede nog geld stuur, aanhouding of selfs slawerny meebring. “The criminal logistics of the trans-Saharan migration are rarely brought to the attention of the European public” (2518). Daar is bv “bribing the police at various check-points so the human cargo can pass” (2518). In Libië is daar “torture centres for migrants who have run out of money … to extort ransom from family members to secure their release” (2523). As ‘n alternatief is daar “slave markets” waar die migrante wat nie geld het nie, opgeveil word (2523).

(c) Die aankoms (immigrasie): Die eindroete uit Afrika wat die meeste gebruik word, is van Libië na Italië, bv die eiland Lampedusa, wat slegs 113 km van die Tunisiese kus is. Daarna volg die stryd om uit te kom by die land wat as bestemming begeer word, bv Duitsland. “The presence of ‘relatives’ in the broadest sense greatly reduces the uncertainty and cost of settling in a European country” (2133). Die inkommers vorm “foreign enclaves” (2150). Byvoorbeeld: “In northwestern Germany, Eschweiler, a small town with 55 000 inhabitants, has become a rallying point for several hundred Togolese” (2138). Dit is hier waar Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) se “narcissism of minor differences” ‘n rol speel (2698), veral as die (kulturele) verskille heelwat groter blyk te wees as wat aanvanklik veronderstel is. Maar Smith skryf: “Small discrepancies might be even more troublesome than the stark differences. In any event, the hosts’ quality of life is changed, because more and more foreigners – strangers, indeed – have become their neighbours. Some of them – usually in the poor neighbourhoods that are mostly effected – might inveigh against having been ‘invaded’. … The arrival of foreigners can be destalilizing, their presence unsettling” (2703).

Dayo Olopade beweer in sy boek, The bright continent (2014), dat ‘today, African diaspora maps are reverse models of colonialism” (2727). Smith skryf egter: “Yet colonialism lasted only about eighty years [1885-1960s – South Africa excluded] south of the Sahara. The ‘colonial imprint’ cannot overwrite the longer history of the continent before and since colonialism” (2733). Eintlik kan daar nie geredeneer word dat Europa weens migrasie uit Afrika nou (presies) dieselfde aangedoen word as wat Afrika tydens imperialisme en kolonialisme ondervind het nie. Kolonialisme “was driven by a small, influential minority who inspired a new imperial imaginary fostered by a revolution in communications – ‘high-speed rotary presses, automatic paper folders, linotype machines, news photography, railroads, and telephones’ … The poor and disenfranchised European masses read the ‘penny papers’ but left in droves for the Americas, and not for Africa” (282). Veral sedert 1994 besef baie blanke Suid-Afrikaners dat die Amerikas ‘n beter opsie sou gewees het. “In 1930, the number of European citizens from the major colonial powers – Great Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium – living in Africa was fewer than 2 million, about 2 per cent of their total population and less than 1 per cent of Africa’s population at the time” (282). Daar was nooit enige sprake van blankes wat met hulle getalle die swartes verswelg het nie.

Die stormloop van Afrika deur koloniale moondhede word soos volg verduidelik. “In 1885, at the conclusion of the Conference of Berlin, which established the rules for the colonial partition of sub-Saharan Africa, Europe’s scientific prowess, industrialization and modern armies made it the most developed continent in the world. It counted some 275 million inhabitants, not including Russia. Africa, with six and a half times the surface area, had only 100 million inhabitants, and was the least developed continent in the world” (288). Hieruit kan twee gevolgtrekkings gemaak word. Eerstens het die Europeërs substansiële redes gehad om hulleself meerderwaardig in vergelyking met Afrikane te ag. Tweedens kon die inheemses oneindig baie tot hulle eie voordeel leer uit die positiewe voorbeeld wat die Europeërs in woord en daad gestel het. Deesdae word egter by voorkeur geredeneer dat geen ras of etnisiteit/kultuur meerderwaardig bo ‘n ander is nie en dat imperialisme en kolonialisme eerder vreeslik sleg as enigsins goed was; insluitende die “spesiale soort” kolonialisme waaraan Suid-Afrika, volgens die ANC, glo van 1910 tot 1990/94 onderhewig was.

Die bevolking van Afrika suid van die Sahara het van 230 miljoen in 1960 – dus aan die begin van die era van politieke onafhanklikheid – tot 1 biljoen in 2015 gestyg (305). Hierdie demografiese versnelling is grootliks moontlik gemaak deur bv die intensiewe, wetenskaplike landboubedrywighede (dus verbeterde voedselproduksie) en gesondheidsdienste wat tydens kolonialisme daargestel is. “The … emphasis on development and public health would prompt the greatest demographic boom in human history” (622). “If current trends continue, it [Africa’s population] will have increased by a factor of 17 between 1930 and 2050. By comparison, the equivalent multiplier for the United Kingdom, whose population was about 45 million in 1930 and will be an estimated 77 million in 2050, is a mere 1.7, or ten times less” (628). Maar as ‘n mens die hedendaagse propaganda (bv van die ANC) glo, sou jy dink dat swartes tydens kolonialisme op groot skaal deur blanke “koloniste/setlaars” uitgeroei is.

Die buitensporige bevolkingsaanwas in Afrika het ongetwyfeld die volgende tot gevolg: “There will never be enough for everyone” (737). “The sheer number of people makes the well-being of each one impossible given the available resources” (922). In Suid-Afrika voer geen politieke party ‘n veldtog ten gunste van geboortebeperking nie omdat dit glo nie polities korrek sou wees nie. Dit is gebaseer op “the myth in Africa that persistently high fertility rates are a form of wealth rather than a guarantee of poverty for all” (3316). “The continent has only itself to blame for its pertinacious indifference to large-scale family planning. National campaigns to promote birth control, as in Bangladesh (‘A small family is a happy family’) or Jamaica (‘Two is better than too many’), have barely been tried in any country south of the Sahara” (2815).

Daar is ook die instroming van miljoene (onwettige) immigrante wat die demografiese situasie vererger. Verder is dit die ANC se ideaal om die landsgrense vir hulle broers en susters, asook hulle kleingoed, heeltemal oop te stel. Volgens ‘n VN-projeksie: “3.36 billion people in sub-Saharan Africa in 2100” (1030). “Between now and 2100, three out of every four newborns in the world will be born in sub-Saharan Africa” (816). “Africa’s population has increased at a rate never before seen in human history, and without a ‘Green Revolution’ to accompany it and offer [of] a measure of food security” (1004).

Die wêreld se voedselbehoeftes “are set to increase by 70 per cent between now and 2050 … Africa will need to have quintupled its agricultural production to quarantee its food security” (1122). Desnieteenstaande beoog die dwase ANC-regering waaragtig om die produktiefste plase, dié van blankes, sonder vergoeding te onteien. Dink aan die gemors waarin Zimbabwe is weens die sogenaamde herbeslaglegging/”repossession” (1167) van blankes se plase. “Zimbabwe has jumped from 700 000 inhabitants in 1900 to more than 16 million in 2017” (1180), terwyl Suid-Afrika ongeërg – so koel soos ‘n Coke – baie van die verhongerde en werklose Zimbabwiërs absorbeer. Weens die eksponensiële bevolksaanwas sal daar nooit genoeg behuising, skole, hospitale, ens, in Suid-frika wees nie; dus waarskynlik ook nooit die stabiliteit van rus en vrede nie.

Op hierdie manier sal voorspoed in Suid-Afrika ná 1994 ‘n ontwykende ideaal bly. Onrealistiese verwagtinge word doelbewus deur die ANC by die gepeupel geskep, bv dat alle inwoners geregtig op lopende water en spoeltoilette is. Dít is swart Afrika-vreemd: “In 2006, Lagos had some 15 million inhabitants, but just 0.4 per cent of the city’s toilets were connected to a central sewage system” (881). In Niger “80 per cent of state schools do not have drinking water and three-quarters have no toilets” (2226). “Only 18 per cent of the world’s population has access to safe drinking water and to a proper sewage system” (2243). Daar word van te min Suid-Afrikaners verwag om te veel vir te baie (ondankbare) armlastiges/parasiterendes te doen.

Ons moet deesdae dikwels aanhoor hoe wonderlik dit is dat Suid-Afrika sedert 1994 ‘n demokrasie is, bv een mens, een stem. Waarmee eintlik gespog word, is dat ons nou ‘n swart pleks van ‘n blanke regering het. In werklikheid het ons in vele opsigte ‘n skyndemokrasie (bv Praag 2.11.2019). In ‘n land soos Suid-Afrika, soos in die res van Afrika, hou demokrasie, in die sin van algemene stemreg, wesenlike gevare in – “the democratic handicap” (1462) – bv: “In low-income societies democracy is dangerous” (1456). Dink aan die vrygewigheid waarmee die ANC-regering, in ruil vir stemme, bv staatstoelaes en huise uitdeel. Maar Smith verskaf op ‘n vindingryke manier ‘n rede waarom daar in swart Afrika eintlik nie iets soos meerderheidsregering (kan) bestaan nie.

“For Africa as a whole, 41 per cent of the population is under fifteen,” maar dit sluit Noord-Afrika in waar die bevolkingsgroei heelwat laer is as in swart Afrika (566). “With the voting age at eighteen or older in fifty-three of fifty-four African countries, the continent’s collective future will scarcely be determined by the majority of its citizens: at any moment you choose to look at it, half the continent’s population is too young to vote. And by the time this half op the population accedes to voting age, another half of the population without the right to vote has been born. The upshot is that democracy appears more an age-based privilege than a majoritarian right” (351). Africa’s exceptionally young demographic profile lessens the chances of sustainable democracy” (1456).

“A ‘youth bulge’ more than doubled the likelihood that a country would experience a civil war” (1422). “The likelihood that Africa’s frustrated youth will fill the ranks of armed ‘anti-system’ groups is … high” (1486). “The tension between old and young is the mother not of all conflict, but of instability. It is this tension that actualizes itself across the ‘politics of resentment'” (1958). Soos Auguste Comte (1798-1857) dit gestel het: “Demography is destiny” (1450). Dit ondersteun my hipotese dat ‘n verdere revolusie, ná die “onderhandelde” een van 1990/94, Suid-Afrika se voorland kan wees. Hierdie keer kan dit ‘n revolusie deur die jeugdige, werklose gepeupel, met die moontlike bystand van inkommers, wees. “The young yearn for equality and – propelled by constant disappointment and mounting frustration – threaten to bring the old order down on the heads of their elders” (369). Inkommers sonder lojaliteit teenoor Suid-Afrika kan die land se ondergang (help) bewerkstellig as hulle ‘n substansiële massa word. Byvoorbeeld, die Ivoorkus het toegelaat dat 1.3 miljoen migrante hulle van 1976 tot 1980 in daardie land vestig terwyl daar net 7 miljoen inheemse inwoners was. “In 1998, there were 16 million people living in the Ivory Coast, of which 26 per cent were officially classified as ‘foreigners'” (2372). Die latere “venomous quarrel about the concept of ‘Ivority’ … led to civil war” (2378).

Daar is al gespekuleer dat Europa voorheen nie so ‘n groot probleem met inkomende swart migrante gehad het nie omdat hulle ná 1994 eerder op Suid-Afrika toegesak het. “In 2000, Jeremy Harding wondered whether ‘the power of attraction’ that South Africa exercised on the rest of the continent was not the reason ‘why, finally, there are so few sub-Saharan hands clinging to the portcullis’ of fortress Europe. Since then, the post-apartheid ‘rainbow nation’ has lost much of its attactiveness” (2391), onder meer weens inheemse swartes se sporadiese, bykans deurlopende, geweld teen inkommers. Die rede waarom die nuwe Suid-Afrika aanvanklik ‘n aantreklike opsie vir swart inkommers was, is omdat onder die leiding van blankes oor eeue die mees ontwikkelde land in Afrika opgebou is. Daar was dus baie om te geniet, te aas en af te breek. Smith stel hierdie getal inkommers op tussen 2 en 3 miljoen (2402).

Hoe graag Afrikane uit Afrika wil ontsnap, blyk uit die volgende. Volgens Gallup-opnames (2013 tot 2016) “overall 31 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africans intend to migrate, against a worldwide average of 14 per cent” (579). “In Togo, which has almost 8 million inhabitants, one adult in three entered the US goverment lottery for a residence permit – even though the ‘visa lottery’ contains just 55 000 green cards for the entire world, offered to ‘diversity candidates’ from countries with low immigration rates to the United States. In neighbouring Ghana, 6 per cent of the population – 1.7 million people out of 28 million – applied for the programme in 2015 alone, and that proportion was even surpassed in Liberia (8 per cent), Sierra Leone (8 per cent) and the Republic of Congo (10 per cent). Across the whole continent, according to a 2016 Gallup Institute survey, 42 per cent of all Africans aged fifteen to twenty-four, and 32 per cent of university graduates, said they wanted to emigrate” (386). “It is estimated that between one-third and one-half of all African university degree holders have either left their country or did not return after studying abroad, prefering to work instead in a developed country” (3125).

Met verwysing na Nigerië, Senegal, Ghana en Kenia is bevind: “At least four in ten respondents in each country declared their intention to migrate, if they had the means and the opportunity, including a staggering three-quarters of those surveyed in Ghana (75 per cent) and Nigeria (74 per cent)” (399). ‘n Mens sou dink die meeste swartes in hierdie lande verwelkom dit steeds dat hulle van die “koloniale juk”, dus blanke politieke beheer, ontslae geraak het. “Africa needs to realize that the massive departure of its most dynamic citizens – often its best-educated – represents a net loss for the continent” (2668). Maar “the educated elite does not believe in Africa’s future. They are running away” (3136).

“In 1997, the then Washington Post Africa correspondent, Keith Richburg, in his book, Out of America: A black man confronts Africa [Kindle $9.44], raised a hue and cry when he congratulated himself on the deportation of his African ancestors to the New World, where, despite discrimination and other hardships, they managed to succeed. To greater consternation, he wondered how quickly an African slave ship docked in a West African port would fill up with volunteers for a voyage to America. Twenty years later, Africans are routinely piling into frail skiffs at their own risk to cross the Mediterranean” (399). Geweld is een van die dinge wat endemies aan swart Afrika is. Richburg kon nie verstaan waarom die panga-seisoen/”machete season” (1082) nie tot ‘n einde kom nie.

Wat slawerny betref, word die rol wat Amerika en blankes daarin gespeel het, in propaganda meesal erg skeefgetrek. “It is estimated that about 12 million Africans were taken to the New World [the Americas] [but] … the … United States received fewer than 5 per cent of those sold into slavery” (645). Die ongevalle tydens die reise van slawe oor die Altantiese Oseaan, dus onder blanke beheer, was ook aansienlik minder as by slawerny onder die beheer van swartes en Arabiere. “The long-term death rate during the Middle Passage [ie between Africa and the Americas] was around 10 per cent, while the trek across the Sahara and towards the Mediterranean was the deadliest, costing the lives of one-fifth of those in captivity” (650). In die eerste dekade van hierdie eeu “‘more black Africans arrived in this country [USA] on their own than were imported directly to North America during the more than three centuries of the slave trade’, or around 400 000 Africans” (3236). Dit lyk dus nie asof Amerikaanse swartes werklik sleg daaraan toe is nie.

Hoe die tradisionele Britse aard weens massa-immigrasie verander het, blyk bv duidelik uit die verkiesing van ‘n Moslem, Sadiq Khan, as burgemeester van Londen in 2016. “More than half of the city’s inhabitants are either first or second-generation immigrants” (218). In 1950 het Brittanje 25 000 nieblanke immigrante gehad (236). “By 2001, nearly 8 per cent of the UK’s population were immigrants, some 4.6 million people, a figure that had risen to 13.6 per cent by 2015” (241).

Multikulturaliteit weens massa-immigrasie is nie net kenmerkend van Londen en Brittanje, veral Engeland, nie. “Spain had few immigrants until the end of the twentieth century: in 1990, they accounted for 0.9 per cent of its population. Twenty years later, 14 per cent of its population … were born outside the country, a number that included some 800 000 Moroccans” (3440). “From 2000 onwards, half of the children born in Brussels had immigrant parents, and Muslims represented one out of four inhabitants under the age of twenty-five” (477). “Genoa, Italy, has become more ‘African’ than many French or British port cities” (2757). In 2015 “40 per cent of the children born in France had one parent or grandparent of foreign origin” (3478). In Jean Raspail se roman, The camp of the saints (1973) en Michel Houellebecq se roman, Submission (2015 – Praag 20.10.2019), “the reader is plunged into a world where Charles Martel [688-741] will have been roundly defeated in the battle of Tours [732]” (2792); verwysende na die veldslag waarin die intog van Moslems uit die Iberiese Skiereiland na die res van Europa gestuit is. Renaud Camus, in sy boek, The great replacement (2011), “believes that Muslim immigrants are about to colonize France” (2998).

In Japan, anders as in baie Westerse land, word die klem geplaas op “national cohesion and ethnic and cultural uniformity” (2938). In 2015 was slegs 1.5% van die Japannese bevolking in die buiteland gebore (247, 2938). Die land is dus ‘n “monochromatic country” (3165) met ‘n “policy of isolation – sakoku” wat demografie betref (3245). “In that same year, refugee status was granted to just twenty-seven people in Japan … In 2017, the African diaspora in Japan accounted for 0.01 per cent of the total population” (2945). Soos in Europa word die getal en persentasie Japannese bejaardes al hoe meer, maar anders as sommige meningsvormers in Europa word daar nie geredeneer dat die invloei van veral jeugdige inkommers noodsaaklik is om die werk te doen nie. Daar word gereken dat outomatisering, veral robotika (3286), asook kunsmatige intelligensie, dit moontlik sal maak om al die nodige werk met al hoe minder werkers te doen.

Ten slotte: Waar bevind Afrikaners hulle in hierdie verswelgende migrasie van swartes? “This is an Africa that rejects ‘white material’ in the manner of a body rejecting a hostile organism: Europeans, that is to say, and the complicated objects they have introduced on the continent … The anti-white sentiment … is suffocating” (1662). “Like Africa itself … whites in Africa have changed – from colonials to expatriates to foreign residents, though they seldom see themselves as immigrants: ‘parasites in paradise’, as the Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o bluntly characterized the Europeans in [Karen Blixen’s] Out of Africa [1937, Kindle $5.64]. In the 1920s, Kenya, one of a handful of so-called ‘settlement colonies’ in sub-Saharan Africa, had around 2.5 million people and some 40 000 whites, or 1.6 per cent of the population. Today, Kenya has almost 50 million people, and about 70 000 whites, or 0.14 per cent. What is striking is how marginal the numbers of Eurpeans were and are, more than ever, today. Has the continent finally become the ‘Africa of Africans’? The paradox is this: during the course of the last century, which has seen the presence of Europeans go from marginal to insignificant, the other ‘white material’ – not persons but the objects that represent their modernity – has multiplied and has been widely adopted. Whether these are industrial commodities or the new-fangled objects of a twenty-first-century digital lifestyle, what matters is that they are not locally produced. They come from outside, nourishing the ‘cargo-cult’ of Africa’s modernity – the local belief that salvation will arrive in the hold of a ship [or aeroplane]” (1679).

“In 2014, Africans spent 10 per cent of their income on their cellular phones … Africa, the continent of oral tradition” (1835). “Africans are more than ever submerged by ‘white material’, but still have only limited access to its trade secrets. As long as this situation lasts, modernity to them will remain ‘Western’, and indeed a white condition” (1697). Dit is ‘n voorbeeld van Afrika se “notness”; ook van sy “lack of institutional capacity” (1704). Sulke lande word deur bv die Verenigde Nasies as onafhanklik erken, maar dit word genoem “‘negative sovereignty’, as opposed to the actual ‘positive’ capacity of the state to administer its territory. A colourful piece of bunting, a few rhyming phrases set to music, a few embassies abroad and a national football team have often been enough to constitute a state” (1717). “The euphoria of independence has long since abated, as has the ability of most sub-Saharan states to hasten the pace of their countries’ development” (1722).

Weens owerheidsondoeltreffendheid is die privatisering van bv onderwys en hospitaaldienste Afrika se voorland. “In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 71 per cent of schools are private institutions; in Uganda, out of 5 600 secondary schools, nearly 4 000 are private; in Lagos State in Nigeria, three students out of four are enrolled in private schools; and even in the shanty towns around Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, four out of ten students attend private schools, despite the endemic poverty of the slums” (1750). Die daarstelling en instandhouding van ‘n funksionele staatskoolstelsel vereis doeltreffende regering, soos vóór 1994 in Suid-Afrika. Sedertdien het die meeste plaaslike openbare skole disfunksioneel geword en neem private skole al hoe meer hulle plek in. Die plaaslike staatsuniversiteite is besig om dieselfde gang te gaan. Hulle wend geen poging aan om akademies en ideologies onafhanklik van die ANC-regime te funksioneer nie, selfs al is daar ‘n voortgesette reële inkrimping van hulle regeringsubsidies.

In Suid-Afrika se Grondwet (1996, artikel 18) staan: “Everyone has the right of freedom of association.” Christopher Heath Wellman en Phillip Cole skryf (in Debating the ethics of immigration: Is there a right to exclude, 2011): “Freedom of association must also imply the freedom not to associate” (2715). Dit is presies wat die ANC-regime en sy howe ontken, gevolglik mag Afrikaans bv nie die enigste of selfs hoofonderrigtaal aan ‘n universiteit wees nie en word so iets al hoe minder in die plaaslike skole toegelaat; om van uitsluiting op grond van ras en etnisiteit/kultuur nie te praat nie.

Gestel daar word gepoog om ongelykheid in die wêreld te verminder of uit te skakel, dan kan in die konteks van migrasie gesê word: “A concern for greater international equality should not be confused with a vision of open borders as the royal road to achieving that goal. It is not inconsistent to favour worldwide social justice and oppose the free movement of persons” (2715). Maar die verderflike ANC-regime het dit al herhaaldelik gestel dat sy ideaal is om Suid-Afrika se grense af te skaf en die land vir veral die swartes in die res van Afrika oop te gooi. Dan sal die ANC ongetwyfeld slaag in die ideaal wat hy in sy era van terrorisme gekoester het, naamlik om Suid-Afrika tot in die grond af te breek.

Iets wat die ANC-kamerade nie besef nie, is dat “a welfare state without borders is unsustainable” (3339). “It is one thing to invite foreigners into a society to share its riches; but it is an entirely different thing to share with them the capacity of a society to create those riches – if that were easy, development aid would not be the failure it is, and African migrants would not be fleeing their countries in the first place. A developed state with a reliable social safety net cannot practise an open-door policy” (3346).

Die plaaslike blankes, veral die Afrikaners, is dalk nader aan hierdie eindstadium as wat (algemeen) besef word. Dit herinner aan die behoudende Franse nasionalis, Maurice Barrès (1862-1923), wat in sy boek, Under the eyes of the barbarians (1888), geskryf het: “I defend my cemetery. I have abandoned all other positions” (2727), wat ‘n mens laat dink aan die toegewings wat FW de Klerk en sy onderhandelaars in 1990/94 gemaak het, wat op die lange duur die uitwissing van die Afrikanerdom en Afrikaans tot gevolg kan hê.

“In 1900, one quarter of the world’s population was European; today, Europeans make up 7 per cent; in 2050, they will account for 4.5 per cent of the global population, and nearly one-third of them will be more than sixty-five years old” (2971). As die toekoms van blankes in Europa en elders buite Afrika, bv Amerika, demografies duister lyk, hoe groot is die duisternis dan nie vir blankes in Afrika nie?

Tog moet Afrikaners poog om onuitroeibaar te wees. Die beste manier om dit te doen, is om jou ongetransformeerde identiteit te behou, bv om nie te hibridiseer nie – nie wat kultuur of taal of jouself betref nie – en selfbeskikking in ‘n eie tuisland as ideaal te bly koester. Hiervoor is kompromislose nasionalisme nodig. Hierdie dinge moet eerder in ons hart en gees en die werklikheid as in die kuberruimte gegrondves wees.

James Burnham oor die inkrimping van die Weste

Elkeen kan self besluit of die volgende aanhaling ‘n hipotetiese beskrywing is of ‘n situasie uitbeeld wat werklik êrens op die aardbol bestaan:

“Suppose I believe that men of a certain color, size or shape, or in some other way physically marked off as a group, are in point of fact distinctly inferior, on average, to other men in their ability to create and maintain a civilized society. I might still think that this inferior group and its members should be equal in certain respects to all other men: equal as moral beings and equal before the law, let us say. And I might still judge it proper that exceptional members of the inferior group should be free to rise to whatever social level might be consonant with their talents. But it would be imprudent, and manifestly dangerous both for society and for the inferior group itself, if as a group – no matter how large, no matter if it were a sizable majority of mankind – it were granted the same share as superior groups in running things: if, in other words, the inferior group were granted political equality. By the hypothesis of its inferiority, it could not be expected to run things as well, and it might run them very badly indeed.

“Of course, even if I share the liberal belief that in objective fact all groups are equal in civilizing potential, it still does not follow that I must accept liberalism’s political conclusion. I might continue to want my group to have more than its arithmetic share in running things, simply because it is my group, or because that’s the way it’s been for a long time and things might get worse if big changes were made” (James Burnham, Suicide of the West: An essay on the meaning and destiny of liberalism, New York: Encounter Books, 1964/2014, 406p; Amazon Kindle $11,39, 1591).

James Burnham (1905-1987) was aanvanklik ‘n aanhanger van Leon Trotski (1879-1940) maar is vroeg in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog ontnugter deur Josef Stalin (1879-1953) se imperialistiese ingesteldheid. Reeds in 1940 het Burnham teen kommunisme en mettertyd ook teen sosialisme gedraai. Van 1929 af het hy wysbegeerte aan New York University doseer maar hom al hoe meer in ekonomiese sake geïnteresseer. Sy bekendste boek, The managerial revolution: What is happening in the world (1941), karteer die verloop en moontlike toekoms van kapitalisme. In ‘n ander boek, The struggle for the world (1947), het hy, anders as wat tans dikwels gedoen word, nie wêreldmagsbalans bepleit nie, maar die vestiging van die oppergesag van die Weste teen die bedreiging van kommunisme; ‘n wêreldwye magsblok van nasiestate, maar nie ‘n wêreldregering nie. Burnham was in 1955 ‘n stigtingsredakteur van die hoogaangeskrewe meningstydskrif, National Review, “die bybel van Amerikaanse konserwatisme.” Hy het algaande ontluik as ‘n gerespekteerde openbare intellektueel. In hierdie hoedanigheid het hy regsgesindes soos Samuel Francis (1947-2005) beïnvloed.

In hierdie rubriek beperk ek my aandag tot Burnham se 1964-boek waaruit die bostaande aanhaling kom. In die vroeë jare sestig het swartes met hulle sogenaamde burgerregtebeweging grootskaalse chaos in Amerika gesaai. Dit is teen hierdie agtergrond dat Burnham se ontleding van die liberalisme en die evolusie daarvan verstaan kan word. Hy kon geen werklik bevredigende boek oor die liberalisme opspoor nie. Met sy kenmerkende insig en toewyding het hy ‘n teks gelewer wat steeds as van die bestes, in die sin van duidelik en gesaghebbend, oor die liberalisme beskou word.

Volgens Roger Kimball se inleiding “Burnham promises ‘the definitive analysis of the pathology of liberalism.’ At the center of that pathology is an awful failure of understanding … ‘the will to survive'” (385). “In his view, the primary function of liberalism was to ‘permit Western civilization to be reconciled to dissolution'” (400). Volgens Burnham “the primary issue before Western civilization today, and before its member nations, is survival” (385). Kimball meld Burnham se intellektuele integriteit en sy weersin in totalitêre regering, veral kommunisme. Hy het die Weste beskou as “a precious heritage to be defended” en kommunisme as “a murderous tyranny to be defeated” (313). “Appeasement was merely a prelude to capitulation” (326), soos ons in 1990/94 ervaar het. Burnham het vryheid en demokratiese realisme beklemtoon; nie demokratiese despotisme nie: “the tendency of democracies to barter freedom for equality” (169). Hy het geen erg aan politieke korrektheid gehad nie en skryf bv: “African nations were really ‘half-formed pseudo nations'” (176). Volgens hom kom demokrasie in die praktyk neer op regering deur ‘n minderheid. “The primary object of every élite, or ruling class, is to maintain its own power and privilege” (305).

Burnham se tema is die inkrimping van die Weste. “In AD 1914 the domain of Western civilization was, or very nearly was, the world. True enough, in many regions the Western dominance was only external; the local societies had not been Westernized, or only superficially so; the peoples were subjects rather than citizens of the West. But, still, the West held the power” (464). “With the end of the Second World War, the rate of Western disintegration quickened” (500). George Orwell (1903-1950) het beweer dat Burnham met mag gepreokkupeerd was (275). Maar Afrikaners weet deesdae hoe onontbeerlik politieke mag is en hoe katastrofaal dit is as sodanige mag verkwansel word.

“Over the past two generations Western civilization has been in a period of very rapid decline, recession or ebb within the world power structure. I refer here to the geographic or what might be called ‘extensive’ aspects only. I ignore* the question whether this decline is a good thing or a bad thing either for the world as a whole or for Western civilization itself; whether the decline in extensive power may be accompanied by a moral improvement like the moral rejuvenation of a man on his deathbed” (485). “It is not self-evident that in shrinking quantitatively the West is morally deteriorating” (569). Hou in gedagte dat Burnham se boek oorspronklik in 1964 gepubliseer is. As die Weste tydens kolonialisme moreel werklik sleg gevaar het, soos ons deesdae moet aanhoor, was daar ‘n moontlikheid van morele herlewing toe hulle na hulle tradisionele geografiese gebiede terugbeweeg het. Maar veral na 1964 is die Westerse lande deur miljoene immigrante uit die Derde Wêreld sowel kultureel as moreel gerysmier. Kolonialisme word deesdae graag veroordeel, maar die weerslag daarvan in die vorm van nie-Westerse inkommers word grootliks verswyg of selfs geprys, veral in liberalistiese geledere. [* Dit is ‘n voorbeeld van Burnham se “spare and neutral” formulerings (562) waarvoor hy bekend was.]

“What we mean by ‘Western civilization’ may be defined in terms of the continuous development through space and time of an observable social formation that begins (or is revived – the distinction is irrelevant to the present purpose) about the year AD 700 in the center of western Europe; in terms of certain distinctive institutions; in terms of certain distinctive beliefs and values, including certain ideas concerning the nature of reality and of man” (493). Westerlinge het ‘n wêreld- en lewensbeskouing wat verskil van dié van nie-Westerlinge. Vir Westerlinge is hulle eie benadering en siening beter as dié van andere.

Die “shrinking of the West [since 1914] comprises two phenomena that are in at least one respect different in content: (a) the ending of Western domination over a non-Western society; (b) the ending of Western domination within a society and region that have been integrally part of Western civilization” (506). Nigerië is ‘n voorbeeld van (a) en Suid-Afrika en Algerië is seker die prominentste voorbeelde in Afrika van (b); maar daar is ook Rhodesië/Zimbabwe en Suidwes-Afrika/Namibië. “There are many Westerners who find this distinction to be a proper criterion for moral judgment: the ending of Western rule over a non-Western society (‘liberation’ or ‘decolonization,’ as it is usually called), they deem right and good; but they are less happy, even grieved, at the collapse of Western rule within a plainly Western area” (513). In die geval van Suid-Afrika was die politieke bevryding van swartes in 1994 terselfdertyd die politieke kastrasie of verslawing van blankes. Dit is hierdie belangrike onderskeid wat die blanke mikro-geeste in die NP-onderhandelingspan nooit werklik besef het nie. “Over the past two generations Western civilization has undergone a rapid and major contraction – it still continues – in quantitative terms of the relative amount of area and population it dominates” (520). “We are therefore compelled to think it probable that the West, in shrinking, is also dying” (555).

“Even today, when the Western domination has been cut to less than half of what it was in 1914, Western economic resources – real and available resources – and Western military power are still far superior to those of the non-Western regions. The disparity has lessened – though not nearly so much as masochistic columnists would lead us to think – but it is large enough to define a different order of dimension” (592). Dit toon dat om aan Westerse eienskappe reg te laat geskied, dit kwalitatief beoordeel moet word en nie bloot kwantitatief nie. Desnieteenstaande kan gesê word dat die fundamentele verskil tussen die ou en die nuwe Suid-Afrika is dat eersgenoemde aan kwalitatiewe maatstawwe gekenmerk is en dat die plaaslike samelewing sedert 1994 deur kwantitatiewe oorwegings oorheers word, vandaar die minagting vir gehalte, bv meriete; nie-wit groepverwantskap word hoër as persoonlike verdienstelikheid geag.

Teen die einde van die eerste hoofstuk skryf Burnham: “We must therefore conclude that the primary causes of the contraction of the West – not the sole causes, but the sufficient and determining causes – have been internal and non-quantitative: involving either structural changes or intellectual, moral and spiritual factors. In one way or another the process involves what we rather loosely call, by a kind of metaphor, ‘the will to survive.’ The community of Western nations has possessed the material means to maintain and even to extend still further its overwhelming predominance, and to beat off any challenger. It has not made use of those means, while its position, instead of being maintained or extended, has drastically shrunk. The will to make use of the means at hand has evidently been lacking” (613). In Suid-Afrika het iets soortgelyks in die jare negentig gebeur. Die blanke bewind het oor uitstekende veiligheidsmagte (weermag en polisiediens) beskik, maar hierdie magte is aan bande gelê en doelbewus deur die Nasionale Party-regering geneutraliseer ter wille van grondwetlike “onderhandelings” met terreurgroepe, wat geblyk het ‘n rookskerm te wees, nie vir die beloofde magsdeling nie, maar vir verraderlike magsoorgawe.

“This book is a set of variations on a single and simple underlying thesis: that what Americans call ‘liberalism’ is the ideology of Western suicide … liberalism has come to be the typical verbal systematization of the process of Western contraction and withdrawal; that liberalism motivates and justifies the contraction, and reconciles us to it” (642). Ook die ondergang van die blanke bewind in Suid-Afrika kan aan die geestelike kanker van liberalisme toegeskryf word. Die gelykverklaring en kwantifisering van mense en die ignorering van kwalitatiewe oorwegings is onderliggend aan liberalisme; ook die kweek van onregverdigbare skuldgevoelens en die toepassing van ‘n onfeilbare resep om Westerse beskawing te vernietig, naamlik ongekwalifiseerde algemene stemreg in ‘n eenheidstaat sonder groepregte vir die etniese minderheidsgroep wat die uitnemendste prestasierekord het.

In die res van die boek kontrasteer Burnham polities links en regs deur die terme ‘liberalisme’ en ‘konserwatisme’ te gebruik. Maar dit is ook nodig om tussen die oorspronklike 18de eeuse liberalisme van die Verligting en sy hedendaagse variasie te onderskei. Tradisionele liberalisme was nie naasteby so beskawingsvernietigend soos neo-liberalisme nie. Burnham skryf “from some time in the 1930s [neo-liberalism] has been the prevailing American public doctrine, or ideology *… a substantial majority of those who control or influence public opinion is liberal” (722). “They speak the same ideological language as their progressive confrères from other continents” (779). Later noem hy liberalisme ‘n sindroom (928). [* “An ideology the primary function of which is not to state truths but to adjust attitudes” (2185).]

Burnham onderskei tussen “liberty – national independence and self-government” en “freedom of the individual” (2826). Aanvanklik was die hiërargie van liberalistiese waardes: “Freedom, Liberty, Justice, Peace” (2842). Deesdae is dit: “Peace, Justice, Freedom, Liberty” (2851). Dit toon in hoe ‘n groot mate tradisionele liberalisme en neo-liberalisme verskil, bv “the … shift of stress from national sovereignty to internationalism” (2851). Hedendaagse konserwatiewes kan geneig wees om die volgende hiërargie te verkies: “Liberty, Freedom, Peace, Justice” (2859). “Nearly all liberals – and most non-liberals also, for that matter – invoke the name of Freedom the way a drill sergeant invokes his favorite obscenity. It takes closer study to find out just what they mean by that term” (2911).

“All liberals agree, without debate, that racial segregation in any school system is wrong and that government ought to prevent it” (807). “‘In our day,’ it seems to a liberal, ‘nobody but a madman, fascist or crackpot would really question whether democracy is better than aristocracy and dictatorship, whether there ought to be universal education and universal suffrage, whether all races and creeds deserve equal treatment, whether government has a duty to the unemployed, ill and aged, whether we ought to have a progressive income tax, whether trade unions are a good thing, or peace better than war'” (828). Hierdie lysie toon hoeveel liberalistiese leerstellings deesdae sonder meer as korrek aanvaar word pleks van oor alternatiewe te besin.

Later voeg Burnham ander kenmerkende liberalistiese leerstelling soos die volgende by: “We have a duty to mankind; that is to men in general. The United Nations … is a step in the right direction … Wealthy nations … have a duty to aid the less privileged portions of mankind … Corporal punishment … is wrong. All nations and peoples … have a right to political independence when a majority op the population wants it … There are no significant differences in intellectual, moral or civilizing capacity among human races and ethnic types” (858). Volgens liberaliste kan alle mense deur opvoeding verbeter en nader aan volmaaktheid omvorm word (1017). Daar word aan vooruitgang geglo (1084), vandaar die benaming “progressiewes” vir liberaliste. Gelykverklaring is deel van liberalistiese geregtigheid (1317). “My present objective, then, is to exhibit modern liberalism as a more or less systematic set of ideas, theories and beliefs about society” (958).

Liberaliste beklemtoon “the errors and injustices of the past … Thus liberalism is anti-traditional. I rather think that the attitude toward tradition furnishes the most accurate single shibboleth* for distinguishing liberals from conservatives, and still more broadly, the Left from the Right” (1152), vandaar liberaliste se pleidooie vir verandering (1159) of hervorming (1174), oftewel transformasie. “The conservative, in contrast, tends to stress continuity rather than change, and what might be called ‘renewal’ rather than reform – especially drastic and rapid reform – or revolution” (3172). Die liberaliste in die Americans for Democratic Action “are at pains to protest that our real ‘enemies’ are not wicked people or nations or creeds, and certainly not the Soviet Union or communism, but hunger and racial discrimination; the real war is the ‘war against want'” (1261). [* Sjibbolet … (1) Wagwoord, herkenningswoord aan die uitspraak waarvan ‘n mens vreemdelinge herken; vgl Rigters 12:4-6 … (2) Uiting of handeling wat aandui of iemand tot ‘n bepaalde klas, groep of party behoort of nie” (HAT).]

“What liberalism notices as the evils of society – crime, delinquency, war, hunger, unemployment, communism (if this is judged an evil), urban blight, etc – are the results of ignorance and faulty social institutions or arrangements. The effective method for getting rid of the evils is therefore to eliminate the ignorance (by education) and to reform the institutions. It follows as a corollary that we have no rational basis for ‘blaming’ criminals for their crimes, teen-agers for their muggings and rumbles, soldiers for wars, the poor of India or Egypt for their hunger, the non-working for their joblessness, the city dwellers for the decay of their city, or the Communist Party for communism. They cannot be blamed for being ignorant, for not having been given a proper education; nor for the faulty institutions into which they were born. Since no one is to blame – except society, with her shady past – there is no ground for a retributive theory of punishment, for ‘vengeance,’ as liberals call it. Our aim in the treatment of delinquents, criminals, soldiers and communists must be to educate, or re-educate, them into good, that is liberal, citizens; and meanwhile to improve the bad conditions – slums, poverty, lack of schoolrooms, lack of democracy – that produced them. These conceptions lead quite naturally to what we may describe as a ‘permissive’ attitude toward erring members of the community – particularly when they belong to racial, religious, caste or economic groups less privileged than the general average (ie suffering more, as liberalism would explain it, from the faulty arrangements) – and to a ‘social service’ mentality” (1339).

Burnham het ‘n verweer teen hierdie liberalistiese dogmas. “If ignorance and bad social arrangements explain crime, war, hunger, racial riots, urban blight and so on, and thereby relieve the individual mugger, soldier, jobless adult, berserk Negro and unwed mother of direct responsibility for their behavior and its consequences, then the well-to-do citizen who gets mugged, the generals, landlords, merchants, bankers and even white segregationists ought also, by the same logic, to be relieved of their burden of personal guilt: they too, in their own manner, are merely unfortunate products of the bad conditions into which they were born and the inadequate education they received” (1367).

Dit behoort duidelik te wees waar die aandrang vandaan kom dat blanke Suid-Afrikaners heropgevoed moet word. Ook dat regeringsmag gesentraliseer moet word, maar “there is no reason why democratic centralization should stop with the single nation. Modern liberal doctrine tends naturally toward internationalist conceptions and the ideal of a democratic world order based through one mode or another on the majority will of all mankind” (1487). “To the liberal it has become self-evident that ‘national sovereignty is an outworn concept’ … Any form of isolationism and regionalism is obsolete. The nation that would save itself must subordinate its immediate interests to the maintenance of a peaceful, stable and just world” (1494). Die stemme wat deesdae opklink dat Suid-Afrika moet verafrika, is eintlik ‘n pleidooi vir ‘n halfwegstasie tot pad na algehele internasionalisering. “Patriotism and nationalism … are non-rational and discriminatory” (1583).

Ek het hiermee in Burnham se boek gevorder tot by die heel eerste aanhaling in hierdie rubriek. Dit sou ‘n onbegonne taak wees om al die interessanthede wat die outeur kwytraak in hierdie rubriek te noem. Hy meld bv: “Unqualified, universal franchise – especially where the electorate includes sizable proportions of uneducated or propertyless persons, or cohesive subgroups – tends to degenerate into semi-anarchy or into forms of despotism (Caesarism, Bonapartism) that manipulate the democratic formula for anti-democratic ends” (2322). Ook: “Whether or not sub-groups of humanity defined by physical or physiological attributes differ congenitally and innately in civilizing potential, they do differ in their actual civilizing ability at the present time and are likely to continue so to differ for as long in the future as is of practical concern” (2347). Verder: “Human beings … are hierarchical and segregating and discriminating animals … There is always apartheid” (2527). “The attempt to get rid of all discriminations, all apartheid, is illusory” (2534). Om (sinvol) te kan lewe, is dit noodsaaklik dat ons ons onderskeidingsvermoëns nie net behou nie maar ook verskerp.

Ek het onlangs gelees van ‘n skoolkind wat by die skool in groot moeilikheid beland het omdat sy die wens uitgespreek het dat apartheid moet terugkeer. Daar is skynbaar geen begrip meer vir die moontlike voordele van apartheid of die nadele van gedwonge rasse-integrasie nie. Burnham skryf: “This expanded freedom for the Negro is obtained only at the cost of a decreased freedom for white children and their parents” (2953). “In the United States, the spread and stricter enforcement of anti-discrimination laws and regulations, both State and Federal, are progressively limiting my freedom to hire whom I choose, to decide whom to sell to or buy from, to associate with whom I please, to choose my neighbors, and so on, as well as to determine what sort of school I want my children to attend” (2968).

Liberaliste se “main enemy is to the Right” (3552). Eintlik is daar “no enemy to the Left” (3552). Dit is so omdat liberaliste en kommuniste in groot mate soortgelyke ideale het. Byvoorbeeld, in Suid-Afrika het hulle hulle kragte teen die blanke bewind saamgesnoer. Daar is selektiewe moraliteit. Volgens die liberaliste moes sanksies teen Suid-Afrika ingestel word maar nie teen kommunistiese Kuba nie (3645). “The poor and oppressed … gain an immunity from the moral condemnation that is reserved for the powerful and privileged” (3652). In die praktyk is daar dikwels eerder ‘n graad- as ‘n aardverskil tussen liberalisme en kommunisme. “Liberalism is infected with communism in the quite precise sense that communism and liberalism share most of their basic axioms and principles, and many of their values and sentiments … Liberals and communists are, most of the time, against the same things and persons … What communism does is to carry the liberal principles to their logical and practical extreme” (4881). “Communists seem not much more than liberals with guts” (3743). “The communist and liberal programs agree on most of their negative or destructive proposals. From the communist point of view, the liberal program is the communist program at a preliminary stage in the dialectical unfolding of the revolution” (4762).

Burnham kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat liberalisme negatief en destruktief is (4700) en beter in opposisie as in regering funksioneer. “Liberalism is not equipped to meet and overcome the actual challenges confronting Western civilization in our time” (4694). “Liberalism is better out of power than in power; better at changing than preserving; better at destroying than building” (4727). “The crucial present challenges are, I believe, three: first, the jungle now spreading within our own society, in particular in our great cities; second, the explosive population growth and political activization within the world’s backward areas, principally the equatorial and sub-equatorial latitudes occupied by non-white masses; third, the drive of the communist enterprise for a monopoly of world power” (4776). Sedert 1964 het die bedreiging van kommunisme internasionaal afgeneem maar in Suid-Afrika is dit nog springlewendig in die ANC.

Burnham haal ‘n Amerikaner aan wat skryf “we [are] civil righting our civilization to death … [we] are told that as culturally handicapped victims of society the criminals had every justification for committing their crimes … the increasing savagery of the savages among us … We’re in more danger than the pioneers ever were. When night fell, they closed the gates of the stockade. They knew the savages were outside. Nowadays when night falls, we know we’ve got them roaming around inside with us. What’s worse, they’re armed, and we’re not” (4790). Burnham skryf: “In the parks of our great cities, exactly as in all jungles, honest men may no longer move at night; when the sun goes down they must stay near the fires, while the beasts prowl” (4832).

“The familiar one-man, one-vote principle … implies, by simple arithmetic, the subjugation of the West: the members of Western civilization are a small minority … The economic egalitarianism of the liberal ideology implies … the reduction of Westerners to hunger and poverty *… liberals … dream [that] the one-man, one-vote principle to achieve freedom, peace and justice, and economic egalitarianism means plenty for all. But that is ideological fantasy” (4846). “In the soul of liberalism, and in the Western civilization that liberalism has permeated, this logic works like a spiritual worm, corrupting the will of the West to survive as a distinctive historical entity, easing the dissolution of the West into the distinctionless human mass” (4853).

[* Burnham redeneer soos volg: “‘Equality’ … becomes a less simple notion when submitted to the gloss of the dialectic. If I have a thousand dollars and you have none, equality means that you gain five hundred dollars and I lose five hundred. If I have ten acres and you are landless, five are taken from me, by the principle of equality, and you get five. But the real relation is still more disturbing. If I have enough to eat and you are starving, equality may mean that we both go hungry” (3995). Die ANC-regering wat aan ons opgedring is, beoog presies dit: die verdeling van plase in die besit van blankes in die helfte, sodat swartes die helfte (gratis) bekom.]

Watter teenmaatreëls kan getref word? “There would have to be a rejection, in particular, of the quantitative reduction of human beings to Common Man; and the reassertion of qualitative distinctions. Quite specifically, there would have to be reasserted the pre-liberal conviction that Western civilization, thus Western man, is both different from and superior in quality to other civilizations and non-civilizations … And there would have to be a renewed willingness, legitimized by that conviction, to use superior power and the threat of power to defend the West against all challenges and challengers” (4860). “Negroes have incorporated force among their methods,” gevolglik “direct counter-force must be brought into the game” (4949). Byvoorbeeld, teen die huidige plaaslike studente-onrus behoort daar streng opgetree te word.

“Liberalism is the ideology of Western suicide … all of this book is merely an amplification of this sentence” (5010). In Suid-Afrika het die liberaliste in die Nasionale Party en die kommuniste in die ANC suksesvol saamgespan om die blanke bewind te beëindig. Niemand kan met reg beweer dat beskawing sedert 1994 plaaslik ‘n hupstoot gekry het nie. Vernietiging en verval is aan die orde van die dag.

SA: 56 miljoen siele

Daar woon na raming 56 miljoen siele in Suid-Afrika waarvan 51% vroulik is, volgens die halfjaarlikse berekeninge van Statistiek Suid-Afrika, en hulle sit nie stil nie.

Vir die tydperk 2011-2016, het ongeveer 247 437 mense gemigreer vanaf die Oos-Kaap uitwaarts, maar die uitvloei van Limpopo van byna 305 030 mense, was nog groter.

Gedurende dieselfde tydperk, het Gauteng en die Wes-Kaap ‘n geraamde invloei van immigrante van ongeveer 1 216 258 en 363 114 onderskeidelik ervaar.

By dié aankondiging tydens ‘n mediakonferensie in Pretoria Donderdag, het die statistikus-generaal, Pali Lehohla, gesê migrasie is ‘n belangrike demografiese proses wat die ouderdomsprofiel en verspreiding van provinsiale bevolkings raak.

Die grootste deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse bevolking (24%) woon in Gauteng, sowat 13,5 miljoen mense. KwaZulu-Natal is die provinsie met die tweede grootste bevolking van 11,1 miljoen mense (19,9%).

Die Noord-Kaap bly steeds die provinsie met die kleinste deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse bevolking, net oor die 2%.

Sowat ‘n derde van die bevolking is tussen die ouderdomme van 15 jaar en jonger en ongeveer 8% is 60 jaar of ouer.

Van diegene jonger as 15 jaar, woon ongeveer 23% in KwaZulu-Natal en 20,4% in Gauteng.

Die grootste persentasie van mense van 60 jaar en ouer woon in Gauteng, te wete 26%, en dié groep gaan waarskynlik groter word met die verloop van tyd.

Oor Lothrop Stoddard se boek: The rising tide of color

‘n Scenario is ‘n voorstelling van vorige of toekomstige gebeure. Verbeelding en fiksie kan ‘n groot rol speel. ‘n Speurder kan bv verskillende scenario’s oorweeg wanneer hy probeer vasstel watter gebeure ‘n moord voorafgegaan het. ‘n Gewilde soort scenario probeer bepaal wat in die toekoms gaan gebeur. Ons weet in meerdere of mindere mate wat voorheen gebeur het. Sommige gebeure kan vorentoe herhaal word, maar dit is moeilik om te voorspel watter dit gaan wees en nog moeiliker om te antisipeer watter nuwe situasies kan opduik. Hoe breër die onderwerp van ‘n toekomsscenario en hoe langer en verder die toekoms in die tydperk, hoe moeiliker is dit om korrek te voorspel. Dit is ‘n riskante speletjie omdat dit vroeër of later sal blyk in hoeverre die voorspellings in die kol was.

Ek verwys na twee geskiedkundiges wat hulle aan hierdie spel gewaag het. Arthur Keppel-Jones (1909-1996) het in 1947 die verloop van die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis vyf of ses dekades die toekoms in voorspel en klaaglik misluk, onder meer weens sy vooroordeel jeens Afrikaners (Praag 16.03.2014). Lothrop Stoddard (1883-1950) het in 1920 die hele wêreldbevolking in sy scenario betrek en in baie opsigte uitnemend in sy voorspellings geslaag. Ek verwys na sy boek, The rising tide of color against white world-supremacy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920, 163p; Amazon Kindle $0). Anders as wat die boektitel in die terminologie van daardie tyd te kenne gee, het dit vir Stoddard nie soseer om blanke meerderwaardigheid gegaan nie, maar veeleerder om blanke selfbehoud. Hou asseblief deurgaans in gedagte dat die teks wat ek hier aanbied bykans ‘n eeu oud is. Byvoorbeeld, die outeur beklemtoon ras/etnisiteit, terwyl die neiging deesdae is om liewer kulturele eiesoortigheid/anderheid te benadruk en daarmee die maklike/gewilde beskuldiging van “rassisme” te probeer voorkom.

Die voorwoord by Stoddard se boek is deur ‘n mede-Amerikaner, Madison Grant (1865-1937), geskryf. Grant is veral bekend as die outeur van die boek, The passing of the great race (1916). Sy idees was sterk dierkundig geöriënteerd. Stoddard het sommige van hulle oorgeneem, bv deur die Europeërs in Nordiese, Alpynse en Mediterreense groepe te verdeel. Stoddard is verkwalik omdat hy aansluiting by sommige van Grant se idees gevind het. In werklikheid was hy meer gematig as Grant. Met Grant kan egter kwalik fout gevind word as hy skryf dat blankes “[should] shake off the shackles of an inveterate altruism [ubuntu], discard the vain phantom of internationalism [wêreldburgerskap], and reassert the pride of race and the right of merit to rule” (Kindle 273). Hy voorsien dat nie-wittes sal kom as “beggars at our gates, pleading for admittance to share our prosperity. If we continue to allow them to enter they will in time drive us out of our own land by mere force of breeding” (280). Stoddard formuleer dit soos volg: “The real enemy of the dove of peace is not the eagle of pride or the vulture of greed, but the stork!” (3052).

Voor die Eerste Wêreldoorlog (1914-1918) was die invloed van blankes oral oorheersend. In Oos-Asië het China, Japan en Siam/Thailand blanke dominansie vrygespring. In Wes-Asië het dit net Afghanistan, Persië en Turkye gegeld. In Afrika was daar twee taamlik onafhanklike gebiede, Abessinië en Liberië, en in die Weste net Haïti. In 1914 was 90% van die wêreld polities wit en 40% van die wêreldbevolking was blank (327). Teen 1920 was die verhouding reeds nader aan een blanke teenoor twee nie-blankes (334). Stoddard onderskei tussen wit, geel, bruin, swart en rooi mense. “Whites tend to double in eighty years, yellows and browns in sixty years, blacks in forty years” (351). Dit is die teenwoordigheid van blankes wat, naas “natuurlike” aanwas, veroorsaak het dat nie-blankes so vinnig vermeerder omdat bv hongersnood, siektes en stamgevegte minder (jeugdige) lewens as voorheen geëis het.

Die eerste aanduiding dat blanke mag aan die kwyn was, was die Russies-Japannese oorlog (1904-1905), toe die Japannese die Russe uit Korea en Mantsjoerye verdryf het. Die onderlinge stryd tussen blanke nasies in die daaropvolgende wêreldoorlog het die mag van blankes verder verswak. Stoddard noem die Eerste Wêreldoorlog “white race-suicide. It was essentially a civil war between closely related white stocks” (2126). Om mag te behou, moet die heersers se beskawing gerespekteer en hulle mag gevrees word. Stoddard onderskei tussen koloniale gebiede wat polities bloot deur blankes beheer is en dié waar blankes hulle in beduidende getalle gevestig het. Blanke politieke beheer kon oornag opgehef word. Blanke nedersettings kon egter nie sonder meer aan die inheemses afgestaan word nie.

Die Japannese, Chinese en Koreane word as geel nasies geklassifiseer. Die Japannese het in groter mate en gouer as die Chinese en Koreane aspekte van Westerse kultuur (dus hulle maniere van dink/idees en doen/metodes) tot eie voordeel oorgeneem en aangepas. Daarom kon die Japannese eerste die Westerse dominansie uitdaag en rassegelykheid propageer (722), terwyl China se krag in sy groot bevolking gevestig was: “the world’s greatest reservoir of intelligent man-power” (2708). Let op hierdie profetiese woorde: “Whenever that day comes, she [China] may wrest the control of the world’s markets” (2771). Dit sal ‘n geval wees van “changing the trade map of the world” (2785). Die Japannese het hulleself meerderwaardig geag en gesorg dat Chinese en Koreaanse immigrante hulle nie in Japan vestig nie (587, 3387). Oor een saak was daar in geel geledere spoedig konsensus: “Asia for the Asiatics” (621).

Die Indiërs, Arabiere en Turke word as bruin mense en terselfdetyd as Asiate beskou. Hulle word veral in Suid-Asië, die Midde-Ooste en Noord-Afrika aangetref en onderskei hulle deur hulle Islamitiese godsdiens, maar in Indië se geval is Hindoeïsme oorheersend. Islam funksioneer as skakel tussen Asië en Afrika, waar hierdie godsdiens besig is om suidwaarts uit te brei.

Swart mense word oorwegend in sub-Sahara-Afrika aangetref. “The key-note of black history … has been isolation. Cut off from the Mediterranean by die desert which he had no means of crossing, and bounded elsewhere by oseans which he had no skill in navigating, the black man vegetated in savage obscurity, his habitat being well named the ‘Dark Continent’. Until the white tide began breaking on its sea-fronts four centuries ago, the black world’s only external stimuli had come from brown men landing on its eastern coasts or ascending the valley of the Nile … Advancing from the east and trickling across the desert from the north, Arab or Arabized adventurers conquered black Africa to the equator” (1193). Swartes “have never passed the boundaries of their own habitats as conquerors, and never exercised the smallest influence over peoples not black” (1331). Afrika mag dalk die wieg van die mensdom wees, in die sin dat die mens daar ontstaan het, maar Afrika is nie die wieg van beskawing (hoë, verfynde, ontwikkelde kultuur) nie.

Al waar blankes hulle in Afrika in beduidende getalle gevestig het, is in die verre noorde (bv Algerië – die inheemse Berbers word soms as oorspronklik blank beskou; 1250 en Praag 24.02.2014) en verre suide. “The continent’s northern and southern extremities were climatically ‘white man’s country'” (1203). “In Africa, unlike Asia, the European has taken root” (1206). “The crux of the African problem therefore resolves itself into the question whether the white man, through consolidated racial holds north and south, will be able to perpetuate his present political control over the intermediate continental mass which climate debars him from populating. This is a matter of great importance, for Africa is a land of enormous potential wealth, the natural source of Europe’s tropical raw materials and foodstuffs. Whether Europe is to retain possession depends, in the last analysis, on the character of the inhabitants” (1206). In Suid-Afrika “in many sections the whites are outnumbered ten to one … the South African whites feeling obliged to protect their ascendancy by elaborate legal regulations and social taboos” (1298). Reeds in 1915 is daar in Njassaland/Malawi deur ‘n predikant onder Amerikaanse invloed propaganda versprei “that Africa belonged to the black man, that the white man was an intruder, and that he ought to be killed off until he grew discouraged and abandoned the country” (1307).

“Here, then, is the African problem’s present status: To begin with, we have a rapidly growing black population, increasingly restive under white tutelage and continually excited by Pan-Islamic propaganda with the further complication of another anti-white propaganda spread by negro radicals from America” (1318). “Black unrest may grow and cause much trouble. Nevertheless, the white man must stand fast in Africa. No black ‘renaissance’ impends [anders as Thabo Mbeki se wensdenkery], and Africa, if abandoned by the whites, would merely fall beneath the onset of the browns. And that would be a great calamity” (1342). “The white man has every reason for keeping a firm hold on Africa … to north and south the white man has struck deep roots into the soil. Both extremities of the continent are ‘white man’s country,’ where strong white peoples should ultimately arise. Two of the chief white Powers, Britain and France, are pledged to the hilt in this racial task and will spare no effort to safeguard the heritage of their pioneering children” (1349). “The real danger to white control of Africa lies, not in brown attack or black revolt, but in possible white weakness through chronic discord within the white world itself” (1355).

Kom ons besin oor wat in die vorige twee paragrawe staan. Die moontlikheid is steeds daar dat Islamiete Afrika en selfs die hele wêreld kan oorheers. Stoddard se voorspelling dat die karakter van die inwoners Afrika se lot gaan bepaal, blyk korrek te wees. Frankryk en Brittanje het egter nie volgehou om die blanke pioniers in Afrika te onderskraag nie. Dit was vir hierdie koloniale lande belangriker om die guns van nie-wittes te wen, terwyl wêreldwye blanke solidariteit van deurslaggewende belang vir blanke oorlewing is (2326). Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) het die blanke Algeryne in 1962 aan die Islamiete uitverkoop. Blanke moondhede het daarna eerder mense soos Desmond Tutu en Allan Boesak se propaganda oor Suid-Afrika gesluk en alles moontlik gedoen om die blanke bewind plaaslik te beëindig. Stoddard se oproep was dat die blankes vas moet staan; dat wit swakheid die blankes se ondergang sou beteken. Daarom hierdie retoriese vraag: Het FW de Klerk en sy groepie blanke meelopers enige blyke gegee dat hulle vas sou staan, of het hulle sonder slag of stoot en daarby mandaatloos heeltemal boedel oorgegee? Ek dink hulle het hulle as swakkelinge by uitnemendheid bewys. In die politieke oorgang het ongeëwenaarde onnoselheid ongetwyfeld ook ‘n rol gespeel.

Die Indiane van die Amerikas is Stoddard se rooi mense. In veral Meksiko en Peru het hulle daarin geslaag om beskawings te vestig. Die Spanjaarde en Portugese het daarna hibriede bevolkings in Suid- en Sentraal-Amerika laat ontstaan. Hulle “trampled the fine flowers of culture under foot” (1423). Die swart slawe wat uit Afrika afkomstig was, het ook met die Indiane gemeng. Die blankes het mettertyd die politieke beheer in Suid- en Sentraal Amerika aan dié met gemengde bloed en al hoe meer ook aan die swartes afgestaan. “The near-whites’ supremacy is now threatened” (1485). “An ‘Indianista’ movement is to-day on foot throughout mongrel-ruled America” (1573). Argentinië, Uruguay en in mindere mate Chile het egter oorwegend blank gebly. Die weskus van die Amerikas word al hoe meer deur geel mense uit Asië ingeneem. Dit word die “Yellow Peril” genoem (1734).

Stoddard toon aan dat die blankes eeue gelede deur die geel mense al hoe meer weswaarts uit Sentraal-Asië gedryf is. Die bruin mense uit die suide, bv Midde-Ooste, het die blankes later ook verder weswaarts en noordwaarts (bv in Spanje) gedryf. Blankheid het dus grootliks sinoniem met (Wes-) Europeesheid geword. Uit Wes-Europa het blankes die wêreld verken, gekoloniseer, kultureel beïnvloed en selfs beskaaf, veral in Noord-Amerika. Sowel Stoddard as Grant beskou Noord-Europeërs as oorspronklik die eintlike of ideale blankes.

Wat ons deesdae al hoe meer dwarsoor die wêreld, insluitende in die nuwe Suid-Afrika, aantref, is “the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the destruction of the ‘classes’ by social war” (2540). Daar is ‘n “fanatical determination to enforce levelling, proletarian equality; the very existence of superior … values is a crime” (2553). Die proletariaat is die massa, die gepeupel, wat “demokraties” ‘n tirannie van die meerderheid (in die woorde van John Stuart Mill,1806-1873) bedryf, weens die valse aksioma dat almal gelyk is. Die resultaat is ‘n “rebarbarized” (2564) wêreld. In die hedendaagse wêreld is kommunisme in hierdie opsigte hoog in die mode. Dit is ironies dat die oorgawe van politieke beheer aan die massa, demokrasie genoem, wêreldwyd veral deur Amerika in die naam van menseregte gepropageer word. Omdat die massa oral al hoe meer nie-wit word, ontneem die wittes by implikasie hulleself van politieke beheer, met Suid-Afrika as ‘n klassieke en onvergeefbare tragiese geval.

Hierbo het ek verwys na Stoddard se onderskeid tussen koloniale politieke beheer (“outer dikes” genoem – 2581) en blanke nedersetting/”settlement” (“inner dikes” genoem – 2585). Hy het Suid-Afrika as ‘n tussengeval beskou, want “whites have settled in large numbers without displacing the native populations” (2578). Anders as in bv Noord-Amerika en Australië was die calvinistiese Boere nie daarop ingestel om die inheemses uit te roei nie. Dit is ironies dat veral die Afrikaners dikwels as “rassiste” gebrandmerk word, terwyl dit juis hulle is wat in hierdie opsig histories ‘n veel beter rekord as die blanke Amerikaners en Australiërs het. Die mees basiese mensereg, die reg op lewe (wat ‘n voorveronderstelling vir die benutting van alle ander regte is), is deur die Afrikaners aan ander etniese groepe gegun. Juis dit kan Afrikaners se uitwissing verseël, want ‘n etniese groep se voortbestaan is verseker slegs as hy met beduidende getalle en as ‘n meerderheid ‘n eie grondgebied beset. Dit kan ‘n klassieke geval wees van “consider humanity and forget the nation” (2985). Nog ‘n ironie is dat alhoewel Afrikaners nie-wit etniese groepe eeue lank die reg op lewe gegun het, daar al hoe meer aanduidings is dat daar (baie) swartes is wat nie noodwendig die reg op lewe aan blankes, veral Afrikaners, gun nie (vergelyk bv plaasmoorde).

“The white man, however conciliatory in Asia, must stand like flint in Africa and Latin America” (2829). In Suid-Afrika is die blanke kiesers in die 1992-referendum mislei en het FW de Klerk en sy derderangse span onderhandelaars voor swart mag geswig. Dit gaan lynreg in teen Stoddard se raad: “Fight to a finish rather than yield to a finish” (3445). “Immigration is incomparably the greatest external problem which faces the white world” (2846). Dink aan die na-koloniale instroming van immigrante uit die Derde Wêreld na Europa en ander gebiede wat eens grootliks homogeen blank was. Dink aan die Amerikaners wat doelbewus en selfs by voorkeur sulke immigrante toelaat. Stoddard skryf van “the dangerous fallacy in that short-sighted idealism which seeks to make America the haven of refuge for the poor and oppressed of all lands” (2981). Volgens een waarnemer: “Our ‘melting-pot’ … would not give us in a thousand years what enthusiasts expect of it – a fusing of all our various racial elements into a new type which shall be the true American” (2998). “If America is not true to her own [white] race-soul, she will inevitably lose it” (3013).

Stoddard skryf: “Immigration restriction is a species of segregation on a large scale” (2935). Die ANC-regering wil te graag die teenoorgestelde van die vorige politieke bedeling doen. Ter bevoordeling van veral swartes het die ANC alle Suid-Afrikaners gelyk verklaar. Maar net mede-swartes word broers en susters genoem en vir ekstra bevoordeling uitgesonder. Party Suid-Afrikaners is dus Orwelliaans meer gelyk as ander. Om etniese/rassistiese redes is swart inkommers meer welkom as ander nie-wittes en sekerlik as wittes. Nie net geboortes nie maar ook die miljoene swart inkommers sal sorg dat die Suid-Afrikaanse bevolking al hoe meer oorweldigend swart en die getal wittes toenemend onbeduidend word.

Akademie ‘transformeer’, skryf Wannie Carstens

Prof. Wannie Carstens van die Potchefstroom-kampus

deur Wannie Carstens

Die SA Akademie is ook gebonde aan die tyd waarin ons vandag leef en daarom is daar druk op ons om aan te pas by die tydvak. Ons kan nie voortgaan soos aan die begin van die 1990’s nie. Die land het bloot te veel verander sedert 1994.

As liggaam transformeer ons, maar nie net in die betekenis waarin die ANC-regering van die dag die woord “transformeer” beskou nie, naamlik verander die rassesamestelling van die organisasie om die demografie van die land te weerspieël. Die Akademie moet beslis ook in hierdie verband verander en dit word volgens ‘n plan gedoen – as ons dit nie doen nie, gaan ons onsself as liggaam irrelevant maak vir die Afrikaanse gemeenskap omdat die Afrikaanse gemeenskap nie net wit is nie, ook nog nooit was nie. Ons wil hê dat die Akademie uiteindelik die demografie van die Afrikaanse gemeenskap sal verteenwoordig. Ons vra daarom Akademielede se steun en ondersteuning op hierdie pad.

Ons transformeer ook in ons denke, d.w.s. ons kyk na die wyse waarop ons die Akademie posisioneer in hierdie land, na ons eie manier van doen as liggaam. Doen ons die regte dinge op die regte manier en op die regte tyd? Dit is kernvrae waaroor die lede van die SA Akademie asook die Raad konstant moet besin. Hoe kan ons te werk gaan om bydraes van gehalte te lewer daar waar ons is? Hoe kan ons ons unieke Afrikaanse kundigheid aanwend in die beste belang van hierdie ‘wye en droewe land’, aldus N.P. van Wyk Louw?

My beroep is daarom die volgende: dat werkgemeenskappe sal besin oor wat hulle in werkgemeenskapsverband, maar ook in individuele en persoonlike verband, kan doen om hierdie land waarvoor ons almal so lief is, te laat werk sodat ons kan weet ons het ‘n unieke bydrae gemaak. Ek weet van talle lede van die SA Akademie wat enorme bydraes maak tot die welsyn en welvaart van die land, maar kom ons besin opnuut oor hoe ons dit dan nog beter kan doen.

Die volgende keer gee ek terugvoer oor internasionalisering en waar ons tans daarmee staan.

SA Akademie gaan transformeer

Die SA Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns het hulself tot transformasie verbind, berig Martiens van Bart in Beeld. Die Akademie is in 1910 gestig om die Afrikaanse taal, literatuur, kuns en wetenskap te bevorder.

Die Akademie wil egter van sy wit en Afrikaanse beeld ontslae raak om demografie te weerspieël en met die internasionale asook politieke tydsgewrig in pas te wees.

Prof. Wannie Carstens, voorsitter van die Akademie, lig die 953 lede van die organisasie oor dié beleidswending in die voorwoord van die jongste uitgawe van die Akademie se Nuusbrief in.

Carstens skryf die Akademie is gebonde aan die huidige tydvak en verkeer onder druk om aan te pas.

“Daar kan nie voortgegaan word soos aan die begin van die 1990’s nie, aangesien die land sedert 1994 bloot te veel verander het.

“As liggaam transformeer ons, maar nie net in die betekenis waarin die ANC-regering van die dag die woord ‘transformeer’ beskou nie, naamlik verander die rassesamestelling van die organisasie om die demografie van die land te weerspieël.

“Die Akademie moet beslis ook in dié verband verander en dit word volgens ’n plan gedoen.

“As ons dit nie doen nie, gaan ons onsself as liggaam irrelevant maak vir die Afrikaanse gemeenskap omdat die Afrikaanse gemeenskap nie net wit is nie, ook nog nooit was nie.

“Ons wil hê dat die Akademie uit- eindelik die demografie van die Afrikaanse gemeenskap sal verteenwoordig.”

Hoeveel kinders? Hoe Westerlinge demografies kwyn

Het Moslems meer kinders as ander? ‘n Antwoord hierop kan verkry word deur die “Total Fertility Rate” (TFR) van die verskillende groepe te vergelyk. Die TFR van ‘n volk is die gemiddelde aantal kinders van alle vroue in die volk. Getroude vroue en ongetroude vroue wat nie kinders het nie word ook saam met die ander getel wat wel kinders het om die gemiddeld te bereken. ‘n TFR van 2.1 is die benaderde grens waar ‘n volk se getal mense net konstant sal bly. As dit kleiner is sal die getal mense mettertyd afneem. Daar word beweer dat ‘n TFR van 1.5-1.4 ‘n volk se getalle met ‘n derde sal laat afneem oor elke geslag, as alle ander faktore dieselfde bly. Wat nog van kleiner waardes!

Om nou Moslems met ander te vergelyk, word Engeland en Nederland as voorbeelde geneem. In Engeland is die verskille seker die grootste wat ‘n mens kan kry, maar dit neem daar ook darem af. Die inligting wat beskikbaar is vir ontleding, is van vroue wat van Moslemlande afkomstig is en nou in Engeland of Nederland woon. Benaderd is hierdie vroue ook almal Moslems (behalwe dié wat in Indië gebore is). Hulle is die “Elders gebore” vroue in die volgende tabelle en word vergelyk met die Engelse of Nederlandse vroue, die “tuisgebore” vroue van die tabelle.

Engeland en Wallis

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TFR van vrouens in Engeland en Wallis

	Tuisgebore	Elders gebore		Verskil tussen tuisgebore en elders gebore
Jaar		Indië	Pakistan en Bangladesh	Indië	Pakistan en Bangladesh
1971	2.3	4.3	9.3	2.0	7.0
1981	1.7	3.1	6.5	1.4	4.8
1991	1.8	2.6	5.0	0.8	3.2
1996	1.67	2.21	4.9	0.54	3.23

In Indië is die Moslems 13% van die getal mense in hul land en in Pakistan en Bangladesh is die Moslems 97% en 83% van die totale getalle in die onderskeie lande. Die “Pakistan en Bangladesh” mense is 3% van die totaal in Engeland en Wallis.

Nederland

TFR van vrouens in Nederland

	Tuis gebore	Elders gebore		Verskil tussen tuisgebore en elders gebore
Jaar		Morokko	Turkye	Morokko	Turkye
1990	1.55	4.90	3.15	3.35	1.60
1995	1.47	3.37	2.46	1.90	0.99
2000	1.65	3.22	2.18	1.57	0.53
2005	1.68	2.87	1.88	1.19	0.20

In Morokko en Turkye is die Moslems onderskeidelik 99% en 99.8% van elke land se totaal.

In Nederland is die Moslems 7% van die totale getal mense.

Die “tuis gebore” kolom sal ook benaderd die waardes vir Christene wees, hoewel die TFR waardes van Christene gewoonlik effens hoër is as dié van ongelowiges.

Verandering van TFR in verskillende lande

In bygaande figuur word die verandering van TFR gegee, vir alle mense in die onderskeie lande, vir (1) ‘n gemiddelde waarde vir Nederland en Engeland en (2) vir Turkye en (3) vir Pakistan. Dit gee ‘n aanduiding van Moslemlande teenoor Westerse lande.

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Die wêreld TFR = 2.6, met ander woorde die wêreldbevolking het nog ‘n effense toename in tempo van vermeerdering. Afrilande het ‘n relatiewe hoë TFR, hoër as Suid Afrika s’n wat huidig 2.43 is, volgens die VSA se CIA gegewens. Hier volg die TFR van ‘n aantal lande: Indië—2.72, Sjina—1.79, Kanada—1.53; Oostenryk—1.42; Duitsland—1.41; Spanje—1.32; Italië—1.31; Japan—1.22. Almal, behalwe Indië is kleiner as die vervangingsgetal, sommige baie klein!

In Suid-Afrika lyk die TFR grafiek soos hieronder:

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Besinning

Uit die grafiek blyk dat die Blankes in Suid-Afrika se TFR-waardes al voor 1998 onder die vervangingsmerk van 2.1 was. In 2005 word dit gegee as 1.7. Die Christengedeelte van die Blankes sal ook maar benaderd dieselfde wees, 1.7 of miskien al 1.6.

Gaan die jong Boertjies iets daaraan doen?

набор для рисования топкарго развод

Volkstaat: drome teenoor ekonomiese werklikhede

Ek wil graag reageer op Anton Barnard, Ilse Salzwedel, Leonie en Dan Roodt se skrywes.

Reeds sedert 1984 is ek betrokke by die volkstaat-idee toe ek ‘n artikel in die destydse Vaderland gepubliseer het wat gepleit het dat partisie van die land die enigste standhoudende politieke oplossing vir Suid-Afrika is.

‘n Groot maar ekonomies-beskeie grondgebied, wat vanaf Saldanha in die suide tot by die Verwoerddam in die Noorde strek en wat dan met die Oranjerivier tot by Oranjemund strek moes van Suid-Afrika afskei. Prof Carel Boshoff was ook ‘n groot voorstaander van daardie grondgebied. My entoesiasme het gespruit uit my voorkennis van die natuurlike hulpbronne van die gebied, soos byvoorbeeld die massiewe Koedoe-gasvelde aan die weskus en die enorme reserwes van mangaan en ystererts by Sishen. Ek was indirek betrokke by ‘n lewensvatbaarheidstudie vir ‘n groot nuwe staalfabriek by Saldanha, wat duisende werksgeleenthede vir jong Afrikaners sou skep. Daardie fabriek het sedertdien gerealiseer, maar is weens verstek buite die bereik van Afrikanerdom. Die Koedoe-gas sou as energiebron al langs die weskus gelei word en aan ‘n energie honger Weskaap verkoop word. Die aardgas sou ook na die Verwoerddam gelei word waar dit as energiebron kon dien vir ‘n gasturbinekragstasie asook ‘n nuwe chemiese bedryf soos Sasol en sy telge. Die hoofoorweging is dat ekonomiese ontwikkeling van megaprojekte die dryfveer agter die nuwe groot demografiese verskuiwing vir ‘n volkstaat moes wees wat op streeksontwikkeling sou berus.

Hierdie natuurlike hulpbronne sou duisende werksgeleenthede aan daardie Afrikaners kon verskaf wat deur Azanië verstoot sou word. Dit sou die stimulus wees vir volkstaatstigting. Binne tien jaar kon die nuwe ekonomies selfstandige staat sterker presteer as Botswana. Partisie sou aan Afrikaners die keuse bied om óf in Azanië agter te bly of na ‘n snel groeiende Afrikanerland te trek.

Maar Afrikaners sou dan ‘n keuse hê. Vandag is hul enigste ander keuse egter om die land te verlaat.

Tydens die onderhandelinge sou die internasionale gemeenskap die onafhanklikheid van Afrikanerland kon borg as deel van die oorkoepelende nasionale skikking. Daardie gebied, met sy hulpbronne sou gesien word as erfporsie en assuransiepolis vir die Afrikanervolk. Hoewel kleurlinge aanvanklik in die meerderheid sou wees, sou Afrikaners, wat as burgers van Afrikanerland wou registreer, amptelike stemreg in daardie gebied kon bekom en sodoende die meerderheid uitmaak. Andersins sou hul stemreg in ieder geval vermors wees tydens die vyfjaarlikse demografiese sensus wat as verkiesings bekend staan. Die nie-stemmende Afrikaners se getalle is meer as genoeg daarvoor. ‘n Voorbeeld is dat die stemmetal van inwoners van Soshanguwe, wat buite die distriksgrense van Pretoria woon, die Hoofstad regeer en tans besluit wat Pretorianers mag doen en en nie mag doen nie. In vandag se politieke klimaat sou meer as ‘n miljoen Afrikaners hul stemreg in Afrikanerland kon uitoefen, waar hulle ookal binne en buite Suid-Afrika sou woon.

Maar hierdie toekomsbeelde sal vandag as verouderde denke beskou word, aangesien die staatkundige strukture wat meelopend met ander grondwetlike skikkings bereik kon word, alles verlore is en nie in internasionaal erkende reg van die Afrikanervolk grondwetlik vasgelê nie is nie. Die Noordkaap as streek is dus nou daarmee heen.

Met die nuwerwetse denke het Orania die plek ingeneem van die Afrikanerland omdat dit binne die gebied geleë is, maar sonder enige noemenswaardige ekonomiese bedrywigheid van sy eie. Moderne denke is dat mense deur hul sug na vryheid uiteindelik gedwing sal word om van voor af te begin. Daardie aanvaarding neem ek met ‘n knippie sout. Vandag trek mense agter werk aan. Ek het bewondering vir Orania se leierskorps en wat reeds bereik is, maar ander streke in Suid- Afrika, Zambië, Mosambiek en die DRK bied veel beter ekonomiese vooruitsigte as Orania. Desondanks moderne denke is ek van mening dat ‘n ideologiese dryfkrag nie ‘n ekonomies gestremde gebied genoegsaam kan stimuleer om dit na staatstatus te lei nie. Vandag sou dit juridies bykans onmoontlik wees om inwonerstatus van Orania van buite te bekom om sy stemgetalle op te stoot.

Dit bring my na die vier rubrieke wat ek aanvanklik na verwys het. Ilse Salzwedel lyk na die tipiese liberale bloeiende hart wat op retoriek staatmaak. Haar morele standpunte is werklikheidsvreemd. Sy is deel van die koor wat skree dat ons, as vermoorafwagtendes, moet kniel en dankbaar wees dat ons nog leef. Die onheile van apartheid is die stut vir haar betoog. Ilse, ek het nuus vir jou: die rede waarom jy en ek nog leef is nie vanweë die vergewensgesindheid van die swart volke nie. Nee, dit is omdat slegs ‘n klein persentasie van hulle vandag beter daaraan toe is as onder apartheid. Jy leef omdat hulle geen rede het om jou by te kom nie, anders as om jou goed te steel, wat nog altyd in die aard van swart volke was en die rede was vir die Groot Trek en daarna.

Leonie se stuk weerspieël haar woede teenoor ‘n wankelende swart regering, Dit dien as dryfveer om onder swart oorheersing weg te kom. ‘n Volkstaat is dus ‘n nuttige ontsnappingsroete daarvoor. Die meeste van ons stem waarskynlik met haar sentimente saam, maar dit bring ons nie nader aan ‘n oplossing nie.

Dan Roodt het verskeie artikels oor die volkstaatbegrip geskryf en ek stem grootliks met sy uitgangspunte saam, behalwe waar hy in die slaggat trap om ‘n gebied te identifiseer. Vir drie jaar was ek ‘n voltydse lid van die Volkstaatraad, waar ons met kaarte en voorleggings van tientalle afgevaardigdes geworstel het. Dieselfde redes geld vir al daardie kaarte as Orania waarom hulle nie ‘n politieke oplossing vir die Afrikanervolk kan wees nie, maar ‘n proefneming (om Carel IV aan te haal). Soos hierbo genoem, is die ekonomiese trekkragte gans te swak om mense te oorreed om spekulatief na ‘n vreemde gebied te laat trek. Verder vereenselwig ek my met Dan se standpunte.

Wat dan nou?

Dit bring my na Anton Barnard se jongste stuk. Anton, ek stem heelhartig met jou goed beredeneerde standpunt saam dat ons selfbeskikking as uitgangspunt moet neem en nie grondgebied nie. Daarvoor benodig ons amptelike strukture met dinamiese jong leiers wat die Afrikanervolk sal kan besiel deur suksesvolle leiding. Daarvoor het ons ook nie ANC goedkeuring nodig nie. Benewens jyself, Dan Roodt en Danie Goosen, is ek is ook beïndruk met Kallie Kriel, Dirk Herman en Flip Buys. Tydens laasjaar se Gelofteviering by Bloedrivier, wat ek en my familie met meer as drieduisend ander volksgenote bygewoon het, het Flip Buys ‘n staande ovasie ontvang na sy inspirerende voordrag. Flip was nie sinies nie en het niemand gekritiseer nie. Hy het ook nie moedeloos oor die huidige politieke moeras gekla waarin Afrikaners hulself tans bevind nie. Hou op om drome te droom. Vat liewer die graaf en begin self spit. Hy het goeie voorbeelde van suksesvolle aksies opgenoem.

Solidariteit doen reeds veel van dit wat Anton voorstaan, maar sonder die legitimiteit van ‘n volk se seën. Etlike ander organisasies kan met Afriforum en Solidariteit saamspan en oor ‘n klompie jare ‘n verkiesing reël. Gesien teen die agtergrond van die huidige opwelling van weerstand teen die aanstuwende swart golf, is die volgende grondwetlike stap baie klein en straks nader as wat ons dink.

My oplossing vir Afrikanerselfbeskikking is om na die konstituering van die AO die grense te trek waar driehonderd duisend plus Afrikaners reeds woon en waar hulle reeds ekonomies bedrywig is. Die punt is dat ekonomiese realiteite nie deur drome vervang kan word nie, maar deur drome versterk moet word. Gee die mense van Pretoria weer hoop sodat hulle deur middel van die grondwetlike hof en ander regsaksies, die juk van Soshanguve kan afwerp. Anton se AO is die beginpunt vir bevryding van die Afrikanervolk, wat tans ook die Boerevolk insluit. ‘n Gebied oos van die Pietersburg snelweg en wat aansluit by Irene-Verwoerdburg in die suide en Pretoria se noordelike voorstede en verder strek na Hartebeespoortdam sal ‘n uitstekende stadstaat kan vorm.

Histories is dit alles Afrikanergrond. Dit sluit geen lokasies in nie en die Afrikanermeerderheid is steeds meer as 64%. Die minderheid is grootliks nasionaliteite van oorsese oorsprong met ‘n klein getal kleurlinge en baie min inheemse swartes. In daardie gebied sal die polisiestasies deur Afrikaners beman word, bygestaan deur Anton se sekuriteitsmaatskappye. Die gebied is groter as verskeie state wat in die VN verfteenwoordig is, soos byv. Luxembourg. Toekomstige uitbreiding sal waarskynlik ooswaarts strek, sal Kleinfontein insluit en uiteindelik net duskant Witbank eindig.

Wat eerste gedoen moet word is om die AO te legitimeer en om Soshanguve se oorheersing van Pretoria deur regsaksies te beëindig. Sonder die getallelas van Soshanguve kan Afrikaners die stadsraad by die stembus oorneem sodat die stadsraad sy samewerking vir Afrikaners se selfbeskikking kan gee. Helaas, omdat dit bots met die DA se ideologie, sal dit sonder die DA gedoen moet word. Afrikaners, wat waarskynlik 90% van die DA se plaalike stembasis uitmaak, sal moet besin oor daardie party. Op nasionale vlak kan hulle vir die DA stem, maar in plaaslike verkiesings sal hulle aan hulself moet begin dink en vir die VF+ stem.

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Rusland se bevolking styg

Rusland se bevolking sal hierdie jaar vir die eerste keer sedert die val van die Sowjet-unie ‘n styging toon.

“Ons kan met vertroue sê die Russiese bevolking het hierdie jaar gegroei,” het die land se premier, Wladimir Poetin, tydens die regering se jaarafsluitingstoespraak op staatstelevisie gesê.

Volgens Poetin sou statistiek wat die groei bevestig, later bekend gemaak word.

Sy woordvoerder, Dmitri Peskof, het bevestig dat die land se bevolking dié jaar gegroei het.

Poetin het in 2006 Rusland se kwynende bevolking sedert die einde van kommunisme, as die land se grootse probleem bestempel.

Die daling in bevolkingsaanwas word hoofsaaklik aan emigrasie toegeskryf, maar faktore soos alkoholisme, stres en swak gesondheidsorg het ook al die skuld gekry.

Die premier het ‘n plan aangekondig wat bevolkingsaanwas sal aanwakker deur ‘n hoër geboortesyfer, ‘n beter migrasiebeleid daar te stel en Russe se lewensverwagting te verbeter.

Rusland se lewensverwagting het na “byna 69” jaar gestyg in 2009, het Poetin gesê.

Tatjana Golikova, die land se minister van gesondheid, het in 2008 gesê die land se gemiddelde lewensverwagting is 67.8.

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W?reld word gryser

‘n Krisis wat kom?

Die wêreld se bevolking van mense wat ouer as 65 is gaan teen die middel van die eeu verdriedubbel na een uit elke ses mense en dit gaan regerings in ontwikkelde lande laat bars om hulle ouer mense te onderhou.

Die aantal senior burgers het alreeds met 23% vermeerder vanaf 2000 na 516 miljoen volgens die VSA se sensusberaminge wat Dinsdag vrygestel is. Dit is meer as dubbel die algemene bevolkingsgroei.

As die mees snelgroeiende ouderdomsgroep is seniors nou net onder 8% van die wêreld se 6,8 miljard mense. Maar demograwe waarsku dat die grootste verskuiwing nog voorlê. 'n Komende golf afgetredendes van die 'baby-boomers' en China se Rooi Wag-generasie gaan lande se pensioenfondse uitput en mediese sorg onbetaalbaar maak.

Die gryste burgers leef in Duitsland, Italië, Japan en Monaco waar meer as 20% van die bevolking 65 en ouer is. In die VSA is dit 13%.

"Die 2020's gaan vir die grootste deel van die ontwikkelde wêreld 'n era van fiskale krisis wees, stagnasie van ekonomiese groei en lelike politieke gevegte oor besnoeiings in ouderdomstoelae,"sê Richard Jackson, direkteur van Global Aging Initiative in Washington, wat deel vorm van die Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Hy sê ontluikende lande soos China gaan 'n werklike ouderdomskrisis beleef. Die huidige verhouding is 16 oumense vir elke 100 werkers, maar dit gaan teen 2025 verdubbel en dan weer verdubbel teen 2050 na 61 oumense vir elke 100 werkers vanweë die Chinese se gesinsbeplanningsbeleid van een kind per egpaar.

Sonder 'n pensioenstelsel gaan miljoene ouer Chinese in armoede verval wat skokgolwe deur die wêreld kan stuur namate dit sosiale en politieke onrus meebring omdat China so 'n belangrike ekonomie is.

Net 5% van Afrika se bevolking gaan teen 2050 ouer as 65 wees en suider-Afrika is die tuiste van die wêreld se jongste bevolking. In Oeganda is die gemiddelde ouderdom slegs 15 jaar.

In Europa sal 29% van die bevolking teen 2050 ouer as 65 wees en in Oostenryk en Rusland het owerhede stappe geneem om kinderlose egpare aan te moedig dmv uitbetalings, gratis skoolboeke en belastingtoegewings om kinders te kry.

In Suid-Amerika sal 18% van die bevolking teen 2050 senior burgers wees vanweë 'n afplatting in geboortes in Meksiko en Brasilië. Kuba het onlangs hulle aftreeouderdom met vyf jaar verleng, om pensioenuitbetalings uit te stel.

Die VSA se sensusburo se navorsing is onafhanklik van die VN se agentskap se navorsing wat demografie en bevolkingsgroei betref.