Tag: Stephen Smith

Ek het al by verskeie geleenthede oor die massa-intog van inkommers in die Europese vasteland (bv Praag 3.02.2018) en Brittanje (bv Praag 15.05.2016) geskryf. In 2015 het hierdie verskynsel ‘n hoogtepunt bereik toe 1.256 miljoen migrante Europa binnegesypel het – 200 000 hiervan uit Afrika (Stephen Smith, bron hier onder, Kindle 405, 2992). Die meeste van hierdie inkommers was afkomstig uit Sirië, Irak en Afganistan (2041). Hulle het die oorlogstoestande in daardie lande as voorwendsel vir aanspraakmaking op vlugtelingstatus gebruik.

“Between the early 1970s and the late 1990s the number of asylum applications in the countries that now comprise the European Union increased twenty-fold – from about 15 000 per annum to more than 300 000. Since 2000, this three-decade-long upward trend has continued unabated: in 2014, the year before the ‘migration crisis’, the number of first-time asylum seekers in the EU was 562 700; in 2017, after the migratory peak, Eurostat put it at 650 000” (3364). “The right of asylum in the EU has become a game of chance … But … that right … has [also] become a fig leaf for economic migration” (3376).

In Brittanje word dikwels voorgegee dat die invloeiing van blanke hande-arbeiders uit Oos-Europa – ná hierdie lande se toetrede tot die Europese Unie – die rede vir die toenemende weerstand teen inkommers is. Dit is glo deels die rede waarom die meeste Britse kiesers ten gunste van EU-uittrede gestem het. “Polish migrants were the referendum’s target of choice: more than a million had moved to Great Britain in the five years following Poland’s entry into the EU in 2004” (229). Die Britse inwoners se onvergenoegdheid met die baie nieblanke migrante uit bv die Indiese subkontinent en die Karibiese eilande word skynheiligheidshalwe liefs verswyg.

Die verwagting is dat migrasiedruk uit die Midde-Ooste en Asië op Westerse lande gaan toeneem. Natuurlik ook uit veral Sentraal- en Suid-Amerika op die Verenigde State van Amerika. Maar daar is ook die Afrika-faktor. In 2016 was daar reeds 9 miljoen Afrikane in Europa, teenoor 900 000 in 1960 (417). Afrika word as die mees dinamiese kontinent beskryf; nie wat bv vindingrykheid en werkgierigheid betref nie, maar met verwysing na bevolkingsaanwas. Demografies gesproke kan Afrika op biljoenêrstatus aanspraak maak (3303), al is ekonomiese ellende een van sy prominentste kenmerke. Geografies is Afrika en Europa naby mekaar. Daar word veronderstel dat migrasie uit Afrika die volgende massavloed gaan wees wat Europa tref. Afrika sal op hierdie manier “the Mexico of Europe” word (276).

“Between 1975 and 2010, 10 million Mexicans migrated to America both legally and illegally. In all, including their children born in the United States, Mexican-Americans now form a community of some 30 million people, about 10 per cent of the US population. If Africans followed that example between now and 2050, the Afro-optimistic leitmotiv of ‘Africa Rising’ would, quite literally, become a reality … At the end of a sustained African migratory wave, Europe’s population would include some 150 to 200 million African-Europeans – counting immigrants and their children – compared with just 9 million today. In a little more than thirty years, between one-fifth and one-quarter of the population in Europe would be of African descent” (310). Dit is verbasend dat Donald Trump sulke kwaai teenstand ondervind as hy in werklikheid bloot die beleid van sy voorgangers voortsit – al is dit meer energiek – om Amerika se suidgrens (3 145 km – 2850) in groter mate teen inkommers te beveilig. “Only fifteen countries had built walls or wiremesh fences on their borders in 1990; by 2016 that number had jumped to seventy” (3221).

“In 1975, the population of America was three and a half times Mexico’s then 60 million inhabitants, while today it is still two and a half times larger, although the Mexican population has doubled. Even if we take into account all of Latin America, with its 600 million or so inhabitants, the migratory pressures on the United States are much weaker than those facing Europe. Today, the European Union (including the United Kingdom) has some 510 million inhabitants, while there are 1.3 billion people in neighbouring Africa. In thirty-five years, that asymmetry will have grown enormously – there will be an estimated 450 million Europeans and some 2.5 billion Africans. As the population of Europe continues to age, Africa’s demographic will continue to trend in the opposite direction. By 2050, two-thirds of Africans will be less than thirty years old. Put another way, for every European in their fifties, there will be three Africans, two of whom will be in the prime of life” (322).

Dit gaan ‘n suid-noord beweging van mense wees, dus die teenoorgestelde van die destydse “scramble for Africa” (275). Die ironiese verwagting is dat swart Afrikane op groot skaal hulle polities onafhanklike lande gaan verlaat om “n beter lewe” onder blanke politieke bewind te soek. Daar kan kwalik ‘n beter bewys wees dat blankes ‘n land beter tot voordeel van al sy inwoners regeer as ‘n swart politieke bewind, wat dikwels deur bv ondoeltreffendheid en korrupsie gekenmerk word. “In leaving their homelands by any means possible, rather than staying and expressing their dissatisfaction and trying to make things better, they [migrants] are saying something [important] about their societies: … that they are dysfunctional, and not only in terms of per capita GDP, employment opportunities or a social safety net. They also lack the capacity to generate hope … Are African immigrants qualified for life in the West? It seems to me they bring the problems of their own societies, but also the will to solve them in a more enabling environment” (2472). “I don’t exclude the possibility that this ‘better life’ that migrants so readily invoke may only be, in the words of the French demographer Michèle Tribalat, ‘a third-world lifestyle with a European standard of living’” (2489). Dalk is dit waarna gestreef word wanneer die ANC-regime nuwe huise aan mede-swartes oorhandig.

Ek skryf na aanleiding van Stephen Smith (gebore in 1956) se boek, The scramble for Europe: Young Africa on its way to the Old Continent (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019, 200p; Amazon Kindle $13.79). Die teks is “an entirely updated and reworked version” (187) van die oorspronklike Franse uitgawe wat in 2018 gepubliseer is. Die outeur het in Europa grootgeword en Duits met sy ma gepraat. Daarna het hy as joernalis dekades in Afrika deurgebring, insluitende Frans-Afrika. Hy gebruik die frase “bush taxis” (1549, 1679), wat ‘n beter benaming as “minibustaxi’s” kan wees. Tans is hy ‘n dosent aan Duke University in Durham, Noord-Carolina. Wat die outeur beoog, is “to provide a factual basis on which others can come to an informed view” (253).

“I have made no a priori assumptions in favour of homogeneity or diversity as ideals, least of all as moral imperatives … Nor do I question whether the African migrants who feature in this book are fleeing violence and lawlessness, poverty or lack of opportunity, for a better life. Nor do I insist on a distinction between legal and unauthorized migration, or between economic migrants and people seeking asylum” (247). “Opponents of diversity are often accused of xenophobia and even racism, while its supporters are often suspected of wanting to dilute national identity” (2639). Hy onderskei tussen “‘upstream’ issues like entry requirements and border controls and ‘downstream’ concerns involving numerous, sometimes conflicting, models of social integration” (434). Stroomaf kan in hierdie konteks moeiliker as stroomop wees weens die “unbridgeable otherness” van die inkommers (1579). “The melting-pot theory of assimilation is outdated” (2925). ‘n Land wat hom vir migrasie oopstel, “will be defined by a multi-ethnic and multicultural mosaic” (2926).

“I endeavour to assess Africa’s importance as a reservoir of migrants, and as far as possible to predict both the magnitude and timing of this human flow from Africa to Europe” (253). “Africa, the island-continent of youth, is also the ‘lost land’ of failed adulthood where hundreds of millions of castaways are waiting for a life of fulfilment beyond their reach” (1568). Dit is waarom Afrika dikwels met ellende geassosieer word; ook “miserabilism” genoem (2093). Smith voorspel: “More than 100 million Africans are likely to cross the Mediterranean Sea over the next two generations” (259). Sy fokus is op swart Afrika, dus Afrika suid van die Sahara (275), en nie op Noord-Afrika met sy Arabiese bevolking nie. Hy beklemtoon veral drie sake: Die eksponensiële bevolkingsaanwas, die groot persentasie swart jeugdiges en die buitengewoon groot migrasiebegeerte. Migrasie in die wêreld in sy geheel “has increased from 92 million in 1960 to 258 million in 2017” (2003). “The United Nations … expects that between 2015 and 2050 some 91 million people from the world’s developing [poor] nations will move to the world’s wealthiest [white] countries” (2023). Die aanleiding hiertoe is “profound disbelief in the prospect of things taking a turn for the better within one’s lifetime … Large-scale migrations tend to originate from places where there is no hope” (2105).

In die boek word Suid-Afrika net sydelings betrek, waarskynlik omdat die nagloed van wat die blankes oor eeue hier tot stand gebring het, nog nie (heeltemal) uitgedoof is nie. Byvoorbeeld, Afrikalande se amptelike bevolkingstatistiek is hoogs onakkuraat, met Suid-Afrika wat darem die beste vaar (514) – ook wat die voorkoming van kindersterftes betref (811). Morten Jerven het ‘n hele boek, Poor numbers (2013, 208p), oor Afrika se onbetroubare (amptelike) statistiek geskryf (525). In hierdie beperkte sin is Suid-Afrika darem nog nie in alle opsigte ‘n tipiese Afrika-land nie, al is hy sedert 1994 ywerig op pad daarheen. Die grootskaalse emigrasie van die plaaslike blankes word glad nie in die boek genoem nie. Die “wêreldmening” is selde begaan oor die lot van blankes in Afrika. Veral sedert 1994 is daar Afrikanerdiaspora in bv Amerika, Brittanje, Australië en Nieu-Seeland. “To call yourself a member of a diaspora is to lay claim to the status of a castaway of history, a victim: you have ended up somewhere as a result of misfortune, if not worse – in any event against your will” (2135).

In Europa is daar sterk verskille van mening oor migrasie. “Poland, … propounds the concept of ‘ethnic homogeneity’. The threshold of tolerance was crossed long ago and a ‘Fortress Europe’ mentality is seen as the sine qua non for survival. For others, notably Germany, ‘welcoming’ people in need is a categorical imperative, and any attempt to question the unqualified acceptance of migrants is viewed as Fremdenfeindlichkeit or xenophobia” (440). Daar word gespekuleer “about the extent to which the warm welcome of migrants in Germany had anything to do with clearing the debts of the Nazi past” (3478). Maar Angela Merkel het spoedig tot beter insigte gekom. “Germany took in almost 1 million asylum seekers in 2015, but the following year rejected 91 per cent of the requests for protection” (559). “Merkel has since refrained from repeating her previous call that there should be no Obergrenze or ‘cap’ on immigration” (597). Sy het weens haar dwase uitlatings heelwat kiesers van haar politieke party vervreem (589).

Volgens Smith behoort migrante uit Afrika nie maklik weg te kom met ‘n pleidooi vir vlugtelingstatus nie, dus “to claim victimization as their permanent condition” (2161). “Only African migrants are locked up in their past, a perpetual ‘return to pain’” (2167). Daar word gepraat van swartes se “grievance identity … blacks who view life through the lens of victimization” (3159). “The worst response that one can foist on African migrants is what Hannah Arendt [1906-1975] called the ‘politics of pity’” (2495, 3182). “Europe should not consider ‘the’ African migrant and potential fellow citizen as someone who stands vaguely for an abstract humanity” (2674). “‘Pan-Africanists’ have a tendency to mark as racist any opposition outside of Africa to the arrival of African migrants” (2356), terwyl iedere sovereine land die reg het om te besluit of hy immigrante wil toelaat en, indien wel, hoeveel van hulle en aan watter vereistes hulle moet voldoen. “One doesn’t join a club by relaxing the rules” (2727).

Globalisering het “the free circulation of goods and capital” meegebring (2810), maar dit volg nie dat mense daarom ook vry is om hulle in enige land van hulle keuse te vestig nie. Die eerste deel van die volgende sin (toegepas op Afrikane) is myns insiens minder omstrede as die tweede deel (toegepas op Afrikaners): “When trying to formulate a ‘good’ immigration policy, irenic universalism inspired by a vague brotherhood of men is as prejudicial as nasionalistic or nativist egoism, or any cult of blood and soil” (2680). “In Nigeria, at the end of the oil boom, the overnight expulsion of several hundred thousand foreigners in two large waves – in 1983 and 1985 – was a brutal way of bringing down immigration levels” (2361). Dit het gebeur sonder dat daar sterk protes was. As ‘n Westerse land iets soortgelyks vir swart inkommers aandoen, sou daar ‘n helse bohaai gewees het.

Smith beskryf swart Afrika as ‘n vertreksaal vir migrante (2634). Sedert die verraad wat ‘n klein groepie Afrikaanssprekende blankes in 1990/94 gepleeg het, weet ons dat baie van ons plaaslike blankes (meer as ‘n miljoen), soos miljoene swartes, reeds deur daardie vertreksaal beweeg het. Namate ‘n mate van voorspoed in swart Afrika geskep word – sodat daar ‘n (middel)klas ontstaan wat nie bloot om oorlewing stry nie – ontstaan die begeerte na “‘n beter lewe” by hulle. “‘Bare life’, to use the term coined by the Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben [born in 1942], doesn’t allow for adventure” (2110), maar matige voorspoed wel. Buitelandse finansiële hulp lewer ‘n bydrae hiertoe “by helping poor countries attain the threshold of prosperity, at which point their citizens have the means to leave and live elsewhere” (2172), dus, “development aid subsidizes migration” (2178).

Hedendaagse telekommunikasiemedia (veral televisie en die internet, dus televisietoestelle, rekenaars en veral slimselfone) maak dit vir Afrikane moontlik om via ‘n skerm ‘n idee te vorm van hoe mense in ‘n ontwikkelde samelewing lewe. Hulle doen “screen-shopping” (3309) met die oog op migrasie. “The ubiquity of satellite television and increasing internet access sharpens the contrast on the world’s poorest continent between lived experience and what is ‘seen on the screen’” (2035). Hierdie soort “globalization favours the ‘Americanization’ of the continent, even in its non-English-speaking parts. America soft power – in particular its youth culture and Black America’s protest culture – is in tune with African modernity” (2082). Dit wek by Afrikane die begeerte om deel van die Weste te wees. Hulle voorsien nie die moontlikheid dat lande in swart Afrika (gou of ooit) die Westerse ontwikkelingsvlak gaan bereik nie, gevolglik verkies hulle die migrasie-opsie. Telekommunikasie stimuleer migrasie ook in ‘n ander opsig. Nadat die migrant in ‘n vreemde land aangekom het, kan hy danksy telekommunikasie (bv ‘n slimfoon) goeie kontak met sy agtergeblewe familie en vriende in sy geboorteland behou (2167). Sodanige virtuele geborgenheid bring mee dat die migrant groter weerstand kan bied teen assimilasie en integrasie in sy nuwe omgewing.

Om die invloei van inkommers aan bande te lê, bestee Europese lande deesdae baie geld om toestande in Afrikalande te verbeter. Weens ondoeltreffendheid en korrupsie bereik buitelandse hulp slegs in geringe mate sy doel in Afrika. Maar die ironie is dat hoe doeltreffender Europese geld in Afrika aangewend word, hoe meer die getal vermoënde Afrikane wat uit Afrika wil ontsnap. Dit gebeur bv op groot skaal met swart studente wat met studiebeurse in Westerse lande studeer. Ná 1994 het die nuwe Suid-Afrika ruim hiertoe bygedra deurdat suiwer rassisties eerder geleerde swart Afrikane as blanke Suid-Afrikaners bv as dosente aan die plaaslike universiteite en as staatsamptenare aanstel is. Jonathan Jansen het omtrent gevrek van die lekkerkry toe hy as dekaan van die fakulteit opvoedkunde aan die Universiteit Pretoria (UP) ‘n Nigeriër as dosent in “chemistry education” aangestel het; nie omdat hy akademies die beste kandidaat was nie – die Nigeriër was bv nie Afrikaans magtig nie – maar om politieke redes, want Jansen wou die institusionele kultuur (dus historiese blankheid) van UP vernietig (Knowledge in the blood, 2009, p 223).

Daar is ‘n opsig waarin buitelandse geld wel die intog van migrante in Europa aan bande lê. “In 2010 [Muammar] Gaddafi [Libya’s head of state, 1969-2011] demanded the EU pay an annual rent of 5 billion euros to prevent migrants from crossing the Mediterranean. Without it, he treatened, ‘tomorrow, Europe will no longer be European’. On 18 March 2016, following the record influx of migrants the previous year, the EU agreed to pay Turkey some 6 billion euros in two tranches to close the routes in the Aegean, a move that should keep an estimated 3 million Syrians stranded on Turkish soil. Based on this ‘model’ of cash for kettling, the EU has, since 2016, negotiated ‘immigration conventions’ with five African countries – Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Senegal – to stand to gain from containing would-be migrants in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel” (2536). Sulke ooreenkomste met verskillende Afrikalande is nodig omdat “African migration resembles a fountain with multiple overflow basins” (2645). Anders as die Amerikaanse mure en heinings aan sy grens met Meksiko, het Europa nou hierdie “wall of money” (2541). Eintlik is dit ‘n geval van “blackmailing Europe” (3339).

Slegs ‘n klein persentasie van die onwettige immigrante word gedeporteer. “Their repatriation is a major logistical and financial challenge, and even an impossibility when their home countries refuse to readmit them” (3381). “Great Britain alone would have to spend 9 billion euros to repatriate all its illegal immigrants in a process that would last anywhere from fifteen to thirty years. By comparison, the 6 billion euros paid to Turkey in 2016 and 2018 to prevent some 3 million migrants from reaching European soil seems like a good deal, a bargain price in fact, especially given that there is no bad press of human rights violations” (2832). “More than 90 million euros were approved in April [2017] to help Libya deal with its migratory problems. But we know there is no oversight to safeguard how this money is spent. At the end of July, 46 million euros were disbursed to create a Libyan coast guard. Yet they are trained to bring migrants back to Libya” (2844).

Die manier waarop die foto van die stokkiesdraaier Hector Pieterson sedert 1976 in propaganda teen die NP-regering en Afrikaans misbruik word, is goed bekend. Op ‘n soortgelyke manier is die foto van die 3-jarige Siriër, Alan Kurdi, misbruik om stemming ten gunste van die migrasie van vlugtelinge te bevorder. Die foto toon sy lyk op ‘n Turkse strand op 2 September 2015. Die boot waarin sy gesin die Middellandse See wou oorsteek, het omgeslaan en hy het verdrink. Andersins is die konteks van die gebeure doelbewus verswyg. Alan se pa het ‘n gevestigde betrekking gehad sedert sy gesin hulle in Turkye hervestig het. Hulle was nie na Europa oppad nie, maar na Kanada. Die gevaar van verdrinking van migrante in die Middellandse See word ook oordryf. In 2015 “the risk of dying for a migrant crossing the Mediterranean was 0.37% … The likelihood of dying in childbirth for a woman in South Sudan … was 1.7 per cent. In other word, South Sudanese mothers giving birth were four and a half times more likely to die than a migrant crossing the Mediterranean, which has been variously described as an ‘open-air cemetery’, ‘the shame of Europe’, even the locus of ‘a silent genocide’” (2553).

Teen 2017 “the likelihood of a migrant perishing had risen to 1.88 per cent – five times higher than it was [in 2015]” (2566). “The risk became higher because the humanitarian response became more efficient. Rescue boats were getting closer and closer to Libyan territorial water, and if there was a danger of drowning, they didn’t hesitate to enter to help those in trouble. Smugglers exploited this window by packing growing numbers of migrants onto ever more precarious craft – especially the 9-metre long inflatable boats from China, which at times held up to 130 persons, a number several times their capacity. In exchange for a reduction in the cost of the journey, one of the passengers would be put in charge of ‘navigating’ and making the emergency call to rescue authorities once the craft reached international waters. To accomplish this, the navigator was provided with a compass and a mobile satellite telephone. In the past, another passenger would also have travelled at a reduced rate by acting as ‘Captain’, and would be in charge of running the outboard motor. However, as the price of outboard motors began to climb sharply (in the summer of 2017, it was more than 8 000 euros in Libya), ensuring that the motor did not disappear once the rescuers arrived became an issue. The smugglers were then likely to take the motor with them in another boat once the craft carrying the migrants reached the edge of territorial waters, leaving its occupants helpless and adift – pending the arrival of a rescue ship” (2571).

“In the first six months of 2017, humanitarian aid workers rescued and transported to Italy almost three-quarters of all migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean – some 93 000 people. In fact, they became so efficient that the smugglers began purchasing even less seaworthy craft than before and an increasing number of Italians and other Europeans started blaming the aid workers for running a kind of Mediterranean Uber, on call to ferry new migrants to Europe” (2577). “In 2018, Italy had struck a deal with Libyan warlords and equipped the country’s coast guard, in a bid to curb the rate of migrant departures. Since then, the new government has prohibited humanitarian rescue ships from entering Italian ports” (2589). Die migrasiedruk het toe na Malta en Spanje verskuif.

Hierdie soort mensverskuiwings geskied in drie stadia:

(a) Voor die vertrek (emigrasie): Dit behels dikwels ‘n trek uit die platteland na ‘n stad. “Between 1960 and 2000, Africa’s urban population surged by 8.7 times, by 2050 it will have quadrupled again” (904). Geld vir die uittog word bymekaar gemaak, bv met behulp van familielede. “The initial sum ranges between 2 000 and 3 000 US dollars” (2116). Daar word ook gekies tussen wettige en onwettige emigrasie.

(b) Die tog (migrasie): Die roete kan deur verskeie lande gaan. Die migrante is uitgelewer aan die genade van tussengangers, bv agente; eintlik menssmokkelaars. Migrasie het ‘n groot en lonende bedryf in Afrika (en elders) geword. As die migrant se geld opraak, kan dit, totdat familielede nog geld stuur, aanhouding of selfs slawerny meebring. “The criminal logistics of the trans-Saharan migration are rarely brought to the attention of the European public” (2518). Daar is bv “bribing the police at various check-points so the human cargo can pass” (2518). In Libië is daar “torture centres for migrants who have run out of money … to extort ransom from family members to secure their release” (2523). As ‘n alternatief is daar “slave markets” waar die migrante wat nie geld het nie, opgeveil word (2523).

(c) Die aankoms (immigrasie): Die eindroete uit Afrika wat die meeste gebruik word, is van Libië na Italië, bv die eiland Lampedusa, wat slegs 113 km van die Tunisiese kus is. Daarna volg die stryd om uit te kom by die land wat as bestemming begeer word, bv Duitsland. “The presence of ‘relatives’ in the broadest sense greatly reduces the uncertainty and cost of settling in a European country” (2133). Die inkommers vorm “foreign enclaves” (2150). Byvoorbeeld: “In northwestern Germany, Eschweiler, a small town with 55 000 inhabitants, has become a rallying point for several hundred Togolese” (2138). Dit is hier waar Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) se “narcissism of minor differences” ‘n rol speel (2698), veral as die (kulturele) verskille heelwat groter blyk te wees as wat aanvanklik veronderstel is. Maar Smith skryf: “Small discrepancies might be even more troublesome than the stark differences. In any event, the hosts’ quality of life is changed, because more and more foreigners – strangers, indeed – have become their neighbours. Some of them – usually in the poor neighbourhoods that are mostly effected – might inveigh against having been ‘invaded’. … The arrival of foreigners can be destalilizing, their presence unsettling” (2703).

Dayo Olopade beweer in sy boek, The bright continent (2014), dat ‘today, African diaspora maps are reverse models of colonialism” (2727). Smith skryf egter: “Yet colonialism lasted only about eighty years [1885-1960s – South Africa excluded] south of the Sahara. The ‘colonial imprint’ cannot overwrite the longer history of the continent before and since colonialism” (2733). Eintlik kan daar nie geredeneer word dat Europa weens migrasie uit Afrika nou (presies) dieselfde aangedoen word as wat Afrika tydens imperialisme en kolonialisme ondervind het nie. Kolonialisme “was driven by a small, influential minority who inspired a new imperial imaginary fostered by a revolution in communications – ‘high-speed rotary presses, automatic paper folders, linotype machines, news photography, railroads, and telephones’ … The poor and disenfranchised European masses read the ‘penny papers’ but left in droves for the Americas, and not for Africa” (282). Veral sedert 1994 besef baie blanke Suid-Afrikaners dat die Amerikas ‘n beter opsie sou gewees het. “In 1930, the number of European citizens from the major colonial powers – Great Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium – living in Africa was fewer than 2 million, about 2 per cent of their total population and less than 1 per cent of Africa’s population at the time” (282). Daar was nooit enige sprake van blankes wat met hulle getalle die swartes verswelg het nie.

Die stormloop van Afrika deur koloniale moondhede word soos volg verduidelik. “In 1885, at the conclusion of the Conference of Berlin, which established the rules for the colonial partition of sub-Saharan Africa, Europe’s scientific prowess, industrialization and modern armies made it the most developed continent in the world. It counted some 275 million inhabitants, not including Russia. Africa, with six and a half times the surface area, had only 100 million inhabitants, and was the least developed continent in the world” (288). Hieruit kan twee gevolgtrekkings gemaak word. Eerstens het die Europeërs substansiële redes gehad om hulleself meerderwaardig in vergelyking met Afrikane te ag. Tweedens kon die inheemses oneindig baie tot hulle eie voordeel leer uit die positiewe voorbeeld wat die Europeërs in woord en daad gestel het. Deesdae word egter by voorkeur geredeneer dat geen ras of etnisiteit/kultuur meerderwaardig bo ‘n ander is nie en dat imperialisme en kolonialisme eerder vreeslik sleg as enigsins goed was; insluitende die “spesiale soort” kolonialisme waaraan Suid-Afrika, volgens die ANC, glo van 1910 tot 1990/94 onderhewig was.

Die bevolking van Afrika suid van die Sahara het van 230 miljoen in 1960 – dus aan die begin van die era van politieke onafhanklikheid – tot 1 biljoen in 2015 gestyg (305). Hierdie demografiese versnelling is grootliks moontlik gemaak deur bv die intensiewe, wetenskaplike landboubedrywighede (dus verbeterde voedselproduksie) en gesondheidsdienste wat tydens kolonialisme daargestel is. “The … emphasis on development and public health would prompt the greatest demographic boom in human history” (622). “If current trends continue, it [Africa’s population] will have increased by a factor of 17 between 1930 and 2050. By comparison, the equivalent multiplier for the United Kingdom, whose population was about 45 million in 1930 and will be an estimated 77 million in 2050, is a mere 1.7, or ten times less” (628). Maar as ‘n mens die hedendaagse propaganda (bv van die ANC) glo, sou jy dink dat swartes tydens kolonialisme op groot skaal deur blanke “koloniste/setlaars” uitgeroei is.

Die buitensporige bevolkingsaanwas in Afrika het ongetwyfeld die volgende tot gevolg: “There will never be enough for everyone” (737). “The sheer number of people makes the well-being of each one impossible given the available resources” (922). In Suid-Afrika voer geen politieke party ‘n veldtog ten gunste van geboortebeperking nie omdat dit glo nie polities korrek sou wees nie. Dit is gebaseer op “the myth in Africa that persistently high fertility rates are a form of wealth rather than a guarantee of poverty for all” (3316). “The continent has only itself to blame for its pertinacious indifference to large-scale family planning. National campaigns to promote birth control, as in Bangladesh (‘A small family is a happy family’) or Jamaica (‘Two is better than too many’), have barely been tried in any country south of the Sahara” (2815).

Daar is ook die instroming van miljoene (onwettige) immigrante wat die demografiese situasie vererger. Verder is dit die ANC se ideaal om die landsgrense vir hulle broers en susters, asook hulle kleingoed, heeltemal oop te stel. Volgens ‘n VN-projeksie: “3.36 billion people in sub-Saharan Africa in 2100” (1030). “Between now and 2100, three out of every four newborns in the world will be born in sub-Saharan Africa” (816). “Africa’s population has increased at a rate never before seen in human history, and without a ‘Green Revolution’ to accompany it and offer [of] a measure of food security” (1004).

Die wêreld se voedselbehoeftes “are set to increase by 70 per cent between now and 2050 … Africa will need to have quintupled its agricultural production to quarantee its food security” (1122). Desnieteenstaande beoog die dwase ANC-regering waaragtig om die produktiefste plase, dié van blankes, sonder vergoeding te onteien. Dink aan die gemors waarin Zimbabwe is weens die sogenaamde herbeslaglegging/”repossession” (1167) van blankes se plase. “Zimbabwe has jumped from 700 000 inhabitants in 1900 to more than 16 million in 2017” (1180), terwyl Suid-Afrika ongeërg – so koel soos ‘n Coke – baie van die verhongerde en werklose Zimbabwiërs absorbeer. Weens die eksponensiële bevolksaanwas sal daar nooit genoeg behuising, skole, hospitale, ens, in Suid-frika wees nie; dus waarskynlik ook nooit die stabiliteit van rus en vrede nie.

Op hierdie manier sal voorspoed in Suid-Afrika ná 1994 ‘n ontwykende ideaal bly. Onrealistiese verwagtinge word doelbewus deur die ANC by die gepeupel geskep, bv dat alle inwoners geregtig op lopende water en spoeltoilette is. Dít is swart Afrika-vreemd: “In 2006, Lagos had some 15 million inhabitants, but just 0.4 per cent of the city’s toilets were connected to a central sewage system” (881). In Niger “80 per cent of state schools do not have drinking water and three-quarters have no toilets” (2226). “Only 18 per cent of the world’s population has access to safe drinking water and to a proper sewage system” (2243). Daar word van te min Suid-Afrikaners verwag om te veel vir te baie (ondankbare) armlastiges/parasiterendes te doen.

Ons moet deesdae dikwels aanhoor hoe wonderlik dit is dat Suid-Afrika sedert 1994 ‘n demokrasie is, bv een mens, een stem. Waarmee eintlik gespog word, is dat ons nou ‘n swart pleks van ‘n blanke regering het. In werklikheid het ons in vele opsigte ‘n skyndemokrasie (bv Praag 2.11.2019). In ‘n land soos Suid-Afrika, soos in die res van Afrika, hou demokrasie, in die sin van algemene stemreg, wesenlike gevare in – “the democratic handicap” (1462) – bv: “In low-income societies democracy is dangerous” (1456). Dink aan die vrygewigheid waarmee die ANC-regering, in ruil vir stemme, bv staatstoelaes en huise uitdeel. Maar Smith verskaf op ‘n vindingryke manier ‘n rede waarom daar in swart Afrika eintlik nie iets soos meerderheidsregering (kan) bestaan nie.

“For Africa as a whole, 41 per cent of the population is under fifteen,” maar dit sluit Noord-Afrika in waar die bevolkingsgroei heelwat laer is as in swart Afrika (566). “With the voting age at eighteen or older in fifty-three of fifty-four African countries, the continent’s collective future will scarcely be determined by the majority of its citizens: at any moment you choose to look at it, half the continent’s population is too young to vote. And by the time this half op the population accedes to voting age, another half of the population without the right to vote has been born. The upshot is that democracy appears more an age-based privilege than a majoritarian right” (351). Africa’s exceptionally young demographic profile lessens the chances of sustainable democracy” (1456).

“A ‘youth bulge’ more than doubled the likelihood that a country would experience a civil war” (1422). “The likelihood that Africa’s frustrated youth will fill the ranks of armed ‘anti-system’ groups is … high” (1486). “The tension between old and young is the mother not of all conflict, but of instability. It is this tension that actualizes itself across the ‘politics of resentment’” (1958). Soos Auguste Comte (1798-1857) dit gestel het: “Demography is destiny” (1450). Dit ondersteun my hipotese dat ‘n verdere revolusie, ná die “onderhandelde” een van 1990/94, Suid-Afrika se voorland kan wees. Hierdie keer kan dit ‘n revolusie deur die jeugdige, werklose gepeupel, met die moontlike bystand van inkommers, wees. “The young yearn for equality and – propelled by constant disappointment and mounting frustration – threaten to bring the old order down on the heads of their elders” (369). Inkommers sonder lojaliteit teenoor Suid-Afrika kan die land se ondergang (help) bewerkstellig as hulle ‘n substansiële massa word. Byvoorbeeld, die Ivoorkus het toegelaat dat 1.3 miljoen migrante hulle van 1976 tot 1980 in daardie land vestig terwyl daar net 7 miljoen inheemse inwoners was. “In 1998, there were 16 million people living in the Ivory Coast, of which 26 per cent were officially classified as ‘foreigners’” (2372). Die latere “venomous quarrel about the concept of ‘Ivority’ … led to civil war” (2378).

Daar is al gespekuleer dat Europa voorheen nie so ‘n groot probleem met inkomende swart migrante gehad het nie omdat hulle ná 1994 eerder op Suid-Afrika toegesak het. “In 2000, Jeremy Harding wondered whether ‘the power of attraction’ that South Africa exercised on the rest of the continent was not the reason ‘why, finally, there are so few sub-Saharan hands clinging to the portcullis’ of fortress Europe. Since then, the post-apartheid ‘rainbow nation’ has lost much of its attactiveness” (2391), onder meer weens inheemse swartes se sporadiese, bykans deurlopende, geweld teen inkommers. Die rede waarom die nuwe Suid-Afrika aanvanklik ‘n aantreklike opsie vir swart inkommers was, is omdat onder die leiding van blankes oor eeue die mees ontwikkelde land in Afrika opgebou is. Daar was dus baie om te geniet, te aas en af te breek. Smith stel hierdie getal inkommers op tussen 2 en 3 miljoen (2402).

Hoe graag Afrikane uit Afrika wil ontsnap, blyk uit die volgende. Volgens Gallup-opnames (2013 tot 2016) “overall 31 per cent of Sub-Saharan Africans intend to migrate, against a worldwide average of 14 per cent” (579). “In Togo, which has almost 8 million inhabitants, one adult in three entered the US goverment lottery for a residence permit – even though the ‘visa lottery’ contains just 55 000 green cards for the entire world, offered to ‘diversity candidates’ from countries with low immigration rates to the United States. In neighbouring Ghana, 6 per cent of the population – 1.7 million people out of 28 million – applied for the programme in 2015 alone, and that proportion was even surpassed in Liberia (8 per cent), Sierra Leone (8 per cent) and the Republic of Congo (10 per cent). Across the whole continent, according to a 2016 Gallup Institute survey, 42 per cent of all Africans aged fifteen to twenty-four, and 32 per cent of university graduates, said they wanted to emigrate” (386). “It is estimated that between one-third and one-half of all African university degree holders have either left their country or did not return after studying abroad, prefering to work instead in a developed country” (3125).

Met verwysing na Nigerië, Senegal, Ghana en Kenia is bevind: “At least four in ten respondents in each country declared their intention to migrate, if they had the means and the opportunity, including a staggering three-quarters of those surveyed in Ghana (75 per cent) and Nigeria (74 per cent)” (399). ‘n Mens sou dink die meeste swartes in hierdie lande verwelkom dit steeds dat hulle van die “koloniale juk”, dus blanke politieke beheer, ontslae geraak het. “Africa needs to realize that the massive departure of its most dynamic citizens – often its best-educated – represents a net loss for the continent” (2668). Maar “the educated elite does not believe in Africa’s future. They are running away” (3136).

“In 1997, the then Washington Post Africa correspondent, Keith Richburg, in his book, Out of America: A black man confronts Africa [Kindle $9.44], raised a hue and cry when he congratulated himself on the deportation of his African ancestors to the New World, where, despite discrimination and other hardships, they managed to succeed. To greater consternation, he wondered how quickly an African slave ship docked in a West African port would fill up with volunteers for a voyage to America. Twenty years later, Africans are routinely piling into frail skiffs at their own risk to cross the Mediterranean” (399). Geweld is een van die dinge wat endemies aan swart Afrika is. Richburg kon nie verstaan waarom die panga-seisoen/”machete season” (1082) nie tot ‘n einde kom nie.

Wat slawerny betref, word die rol wat Amerika en blankes daarin gespeel het, in propaganda meesal erg skeefgetrek. “It is estimated that about 12 million Africans were taken to the New World [the Americas] [but] … the … United States received fewer than 5 per cent of those sold into slavery” (645). Die ongevalle tydens die reise van slawe oor die Altantiese Oseaan, dus onder blanke beheer, was ook aansienlik minder as by slawerny onder die beheer van swartes en Arabiere. “The long-term death rate during the Middle Passage [ie between Africa and the Americas] was around 10 per cent, while the trek across the Sahara and towards the Mediterranean was the deadliest, costing the lives of one-fifth of those in captivity” (650). In die eerste dekade van hierdie eeu “‘more black Africans arrived in this country [USA] on their own than were imported directly to North America during the more than three centuries of the slave trade’, or around 400 000 Africans” (3236). Dit lyk dus nie asof Amerikaanse swartes werklik sleg daaraan toe is nie.

Hoe die tradisionele Britse aard weens massa-immigrasie verander het, blyk bv duidelik uit die verkiesing van ‘n Moslem, Sadiq Khan, as burgemeester van Londen in 2016. “More than half of the city’s inhabitants are either first or second-generation immigrants” (218). In 1950 het Brittanje 25 000 nieblanke immigrante gehad (236). “By 2001, nearly 8 per cent of the UK’s population were immigrants, some 4.6 million people, a figure that had risen to 13.6 per cent by 2015” (241).

Multikulturaliteit weens massa-immigrasie is nie net kenmerkend van Londen en Brittanje, veral Engeland, nie. “Spain had few immigrants until the end of the twentieth century: in 1990, they accounted for 0.9 per cent of its population. Twenty years later, 14 per cent of its population … were born outside the country, a number that included some 800 000 Moroccans” (3440). “From 2000 onwards, half of the children born in Brussels had immigrant parents, and Muslims represented one out of four inhabitants under the age of twenty-five” (477). “Genoa, Italy, has become more ‘African’ than many French or British port cities” (2757). In 2015 “40 per cent of the children born in France had one parent or grandparent of foreign origin” (3478). In Jean Raspail se roman, The camp of the saints (1973) en Michel Houellebecq se roman, Submission (2015 – Praag 20.10.2019), “the reader is plunged into a world where Charles Martel [688-741] will have been roundly defeated in the battle of Tours [732]” (2792); verwysende na die veldslag waarin die intog van Moslems uit die Iberiese Skiereiland na die res van Europa gestuit is. Renaud Camus, in sy boek, The great replacement (2011), “believes that Muslim immigrants are about to colonize France” (2998).

In Japan, anders as in baie Westerse land, word die klem geplaas op “national cohesion and ethnic and cultural uniformity” (2938). In 2015 was slegs 1.5% van die Japannese bevolking in die buiteland gebore (247, 2938). Die land is dus ‘n “monochromatic country” (3165) met ‘n “policy of isolation – sakoku” wat demografie betref (3245). “In that same year, refugee status was granted to just twenty-seven people in Japan … In 2017, the African diaspora in Japan accounted for 0.01 per cent of the total population” (2945). Soos in Europa word die getal en persentasie Japannese bejaardes al hoe meer, maar anders as sommige meningsvormers in Europa word daar nie geredeneer dat die invloei van veral jeugdige inkommers noodsaaklik is om die werk te doen nie. Daar word gereken dat outomatisering, veral robotika (3286), asook kunsmatige intelligensie, dit moontlik sal maak om al die nodige werk met al hoe minder werkers te doen.

Ten slotte: Waar bevind Afrikaners hulle in hierdie verswelgende migrasie van swartes? “This is an Africa that rejects ‘white material’ in the manner of a body rejecting a hostile organism: Europeans, that is to say, and the complicated objects they have introduced on the continent … The anti-white sentiment … is suffocating” (1662). “Like Africa itself … whites in Africa have changed – from colonials to expatriates to foreign residents, though they seldom see themselves as immigrants: ‘parasites in paradise’, as the Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong’o bluntly characterized the Europeans in [Karen Blixen’s] Out of Africa [1937, Kindle $5.64]. In the 1920s, Kenya, one of a handful of so-called ‘settlement colonies’ in sub-Saharan Africa, had around 2.5 million people and some 40 000 whites, or 1.6 per cent of the population. Today, Kenya has almost 50 million people, and about 70 000 whites, or 0.14 per cent. What is striking is how marginal the numbers of Eurpeans were and are, more than ever, today. Has the continent finally become the ‘Africa of Africans’? The paradox is this: during the course of the last century, which has seen the presence of Europeans go from marginal to insignificant, the other ‘white material’ – not persons but the objects that represent their modernity – has multiplied and has been widely adopted. Whether these are industrial commodities or the new-fangled objects of a twenty-first-century digital lifestyle, what matters is that they are not locally produced. They come from outside, nourishing the ‘cargo-cult’ of Africa’s modernity – the local belief that salvation will arrive in the hold of a ship [or aeroplane]” (1679).

“In 2014, Africans spent 10 per cent of their income on their cellular phones … Africa, the continent of oral tradition” (1835). “Africans are more than ever submerged by ‘white material’, but still have only limited access to its trade secrets. As long as this situation lasts, modernity to them will remain ‘Western’, and indeed a white condition” (1697). Dit is ‘n voorbeeld van Afrika se “notness”; ook van sy “lack of institutional capacity” (1704). Sulke lande word deur bv die Verenigde Nasies as onafhanklik erken, maar dit word genoem “‘negative sovereignty’, as opposed to the actual ‘positive’ capacity of the state to administer its territory. A colourful piece of bunting, a few rhyming phrases set to music, a few embassies abroad and a national football team have often been enough to constitute a state” (1717). “The euphoria of independence has long since abated, as has the ability of most sub-Saharan states to hasten the pace of their countries’ development” (1722).

Weens owerheidsondoeltreffendheid is die privatisering van bv onderwys en hospitaaldienste Afrika se voorland. “In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 71 per cent of schools are private institutions; in Uganda, out of 5 600 secondary schools, nearly 4 000 are private; in Lagos State in Nigeria, three students out of four are enrolled in private schools; and even in the shanty towns around Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, four out of ten students attend private schools, despite the endemic poverty of the slums” (1750). Die daarstelling en instandhouding van ‘n funksionele staatskoolstelsel vereis doeltreffende regering, soos vóór 1994 in Suid-Afrika. Sedertdien het die meeste plaaslike openbare skole disfunksioneel geword en neem private skole al hoe meer hulle plek in. Die plaaslike staatsuniversiteite is besig om dieselfde gang te gaan. Hulle wend geen poging aan om akademies en ideologies onafhanklik van die ANC-regime te funksioneer nie, selfs al is daar ‘n voortgesette reële inkrimping van hulle regeringsubsidies.

In Suid-Afrika se Grondwet (1996, artikel 18) staan: “Everyone has the right of freedom of association.” Christopher Heath Wellman en Phillip Cole skryf (in Debating the ethics of immigration: Is there a right to exclude, 2011): “Freedom of association must also imply the freedom not to associate” (2715). Dit is presies wat die ANC-regime en sy howe ontken, gevolglik mag Afrikaans bv nie die enigste of selfs hoofonderrigtaal aan ‘n universiteit wees nie en word so iets al hoe minder in die plaaslike skole toegelaat; om van uitsluiting op grond van ras en etnisiteit/kultuur nie te praat nie.

Gestel daar word gepoog om ongelykheid in die wêreld te verminder of uit te skakel, dan kan in die konteks van migrasie gesê word: “A concern for greater international equality should not be confused with a vision of open borders as the royal road to achieving that goal. It is not inconsistent to favour worldwide social justice and oppose the free movement of persons” (2715). Maar die verderflike ANC-regime het dit al herhaaldelik gestel dat sy ideaal is om Suid-Afrika se grense af te skaf en die land vir veral die swartes in die res van Afrika oop te gooi. Dan sal die ANC ongetwyfeld slaag in die ideaal wat hy in sy era van terrorisme gekoester het, naamlik om Suid-Afrika tot in die grond af te breek.

Iets wat die ANC-kamerade nie besef nie, is dat “a welfare state without borders is unsustainable” (3339). “It is one thing to invite foreigners into a society to share its riches; but it is an entirely different thing to share with them the capacity of a society to create those riches – if that were easy, development aid would not be the failure it is, and African migrants would not be fleeing their countries in the first place. A developed state with a reliable social safety net cannot practise an open-door policy” (3346).

Die plaaslike blankes, veral die Afrikaners, is dalk nader aan hierdie eindstadium as wat (algemeen) besef word. Dit herinner aan die behoudende Franse nasionalis, Maurice Barrès (1862-1923), wat in sy boek, Under the eyes of the barbarians (1888), geskryf het: “I defend my cemetery. I have abandoned all other positions” (2727), wat ‘n mens laat dink aan die toegewings wat FW de Klerk en sy onderhandelaars in 1990/94 gemaak het, wat op die lange duur die uitwissing van die Afrikanerdom en Afrikaans tot gevolg kan hê.

“In 1900, one quarter of the world’s population was European; today, Europeans make up 7 per cent; in 2050, they will account for 4.5 per cent of the global population, and nearly one-third of them will be more than sixty-five years old” (2971). As die toekoms van blankes in Europa en elders buite Afrika, bv Amerika, demografies duister lyk, hoe groot is die duisternis dan nie vir blankes in Afrika nie?

Tog moet Afrikaners poog om onuitroeibaar te wees. Die beste manier om dit te doen, is om jou ongetransformeerde identiteit te behou, bv om nie te hibridiseer nie – nie wat kultuur of taal of jouself betref nie – en selfbeskikking in ‘n eie tuisland as ideaal te bly koester. Hiervoor is kompromislose nasionalisme nodig. Hierdie dinge moet eerder in ons hart en gees en die werklikheid as in die kuberruimte gegrondves wees.