Kajsa Norman, ‘n Sweedse joernalis wat in Londen woon, het verlede jaar ‘n boek in Sweeds gepubliseer: Bron över Blood River (Brug oor Bloedrivier). Verlede maand is ‘n Engelse vertaling van die boek plaaslik gepubliseer met die titel: Into the laager: Afrikaners living on the edge (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2016, 230p, R240; Amazon Kindle $13,67). Die teks handel by uitstek oor Afrikaners en daar word veral gepoog om duidelikheid oor Afrikaner-identiteit te kry. Omdat Norman nie-Brits is, skryf sy openlik oor bv die Britse beleid van verskroeide aarde en die konsentrasiekampe gedurende die Anglo-Boere-oorlog (Kindle 750).
Norman was van Oktober 2011 tot Mei 2012 in Suid-Afrika en het verskeie plekke besoek en onderhoude gevoer. Sy het ook enkele dae in Maputo, Mosambiek, deurgebring. Voorheen het sy onder meer ‘n boek oor Zimbabwe gepubliseer. Maar die bibliografie in haar jongste boek lyk maar karig. Net ‘n enkele keer word na ‘n Afrikaanse teks verwys (709). Aanvanklik was ek nogal skepties oor wat ek in die boek sou aantref. Des te meer omdat haar teks deur ‘n Nelson Mandela-epigraaf voorafgegaan word.
In Swede “leading politicians … claim there is no such thing as Swedish culture” (22). Gelukkig is die outeur nie ‘n aanhanger van die mite van identiteitslose wêreldburgerskap nie. “We are all products of our history, culture and context” (22). Dit skemer egter deur dat Norman in die liberalistiese kamp is. Sy het saam met ‘n massa swartes aan ‘n optog in Johannesburg deelgeneem (1677). In Maputo het sy opgelet dat blankes uitsluitlik met blankes sosiaal verkeer. “The internationals advocating for the rights of the disadvantaged often live as segregated from them as possible” (3335). Sy dink dit behoort anders te wees. Desnieteenstaande lyk dit asof sy werklik gepoog het om so objektief moontlik oor Suid-Afrika en Afrikaners verslag te doen. Haar boek kan in bv Swede ‘n heilsame invloed hê. Norman was bv sterk aangewese op die Engelse weergawe van Hermann Giliomee se hoogaangeskrewe boek oor die Afrikaners. Maar sy verwys ook na werke van Rian Malan en Antjie Krog wat haar kon mislei.
Norman was aanvanklik in Johannesburg, “one of the most dangerous cities in the world” (80). Die tekens daarvan was oral waarneembaar.
“My experience of Johannesburg is that life happens indoors: you travel from one gated community to another” (3224).
Sy vertel van ‘n Suid-Afrikaner wat militêre diensplig gedoen het en stel dit blatant: “Mark used to kill black people” (103) en “Many adult white South Africans men have killed” (117). Een van die maniere was glo “using a knife to slit the throats of enemies” (117). Sulke stellings het my aanvanklik swak moed vir die boek gegee. Ook wanneer sy skryf Jan van Riebeeck se verversingstasie was “near what is today known as Cape Town” (201). Daar is nie werklik dieptegang in haar kennis nie. Om oor iets soos Afrikaner-identiteit en -kultuur te skryf, was vir haar as buitestander ‘n uiters ambisieuse onderneming. In die geheel gesien, het sy tog nie sleg gevaar nie. Ek het die indruk dat hoe langer sy die plaaslike omstandighede ervaar het, des te realistieser was die insigte waartoe sy gekom het, bv oor die nuwe Suid-Afrika en Afrikaners. Ek hou veral van die talle Afrikaanse woorde en uitdrukkings wat sy korrek weergee.
Norman haal Rian Malan soos volg aan: “The enemy came to power, but no vengeance was taken – were even willing to forgive us, provided that we fell to our knees and said sorry” (138). Sy voeg by:”Convincing black South Africans to forgive white South Africans turned out to be easier than expected. Persuading the white population to forgive themselves was, and continues to be, much more difficult” (124). In werklikheid word wraakgevoelens steeds deur baie swartes gekoester: “This non-violent transition left many [blacks] without a sense of closure” (3733). In die boek is daar geen goeie woord oor apartheid nie, gevolglik dink Norman dat blankes skuldgevoelens móét hê. Suid-Afrika het ‘n “legacy of violence” (145) maar soos in Amerika is dit myns insiens by uitstek swartes wat hulle hieraan skuldig maak. ‘n Gewilde verskoning is om gewelddadigheid by swartes aan ‘n reaksie teen apartheid toe te skryf, maar dit verklaar nie die voortgesette buitensporige gewelddadigheid sedert 1994 nie. ‘n Land wat gewelddenaars tot helde verhef, moet met voortgesette geweld vir lief neem.
In navolging van Rian Malan word die vroeë blanke inwoners van Suid-Afrika as veral “lower-working-class” uitgebeeld (206). Tydens die Britse bewind is hulle van owerheidsweë as “white barbarians – ignorant, unkempt and violent” beskou (237). Oor die trekboere skryf Norman: “While most settlers were deterred by the brutality of the frontier, for some it created an almost perverse allure” (229). Dit is hierdie “wilderness of their own hearts” (229) of “dark of heart” (237) wat Malan beklemtoon. Die bloedvergieting wat in die destydse grensgebiede voorgekom het, word darem aan albei kante toegeskryf (244).
Soos by die Slawemuseum in Kaapstad is daar by Norman die neiging om slawerny aan die Kaap eerder aan die Hollanders as die Britte toe te dig. Sy gee selfs voor dat daardie slawerny in 1652 ‘n aanvang geneem het (213). Tydens die Britse bewind “everyone was now a British subject and, as such, deemed to be equal before the law. However, for the first two decades of British occupation, not only did the Dutch colonists reject any form of status leveling, but the laws themselves were not well suited to support the cultural differences of the Khoikhoi” (258). “Differences in culture is a problem,” soos ‘n hedendaagse Afrikaner dit stel (403). ‘n Ander een se standpunt is: “Black African culture is so radically different … I get along better with Asians” (3356). Dit was myns insiens egter by uitstek die Britte eerder as die Hollanders wat hulleself destyds kultureel hoër as die inheemse bevolking geag het.
Oor die Voortrekkers skryf Norman: “The black man would be kept subordinate” (280), asof die Britte nie presies dieselfde gedoen het nie. Later erken sy egter: “Both the Afrikaners and the British were determined to preserve white dominance” (1330). Nêrens word die Britte se beleid van rassesegregasie as die voorganger van apartheid genoem nie. Maar sy weet dat rassesegregasie nie in 1948 deur die Nasionale Party uitgevind is nie. “In 1941, employers were required by law to segregate work, recreation and eating areas, and new suburbs were built specifically for non-white people. Even beaches were segregated … In 1946, ‘white areas’ and ‘Asian areas’ were created as separate from one another, and Asian residents were no longer allowed to buy property in designated ‘white’ areas” (1354). “Apartheid was an ideology born of the will to survive or, put differently, the fear of extinction” (1836). Oor die Groot Trek: “Indigenous populations occupied much of the land they [the Voortrekkers] traversed” (280), maar later erken Norman: “In the 1830s much of the fertile land of Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal lay depopulated after … Shaka and Mzilikazi … caused the extermination of some three million people” (288). Die uitmoring van Voortrekkers by Weenen word ook realisties beskryf (308).
‘n Hedendaagse Afrikaner beweer: “The relationship between farmers and their farm workers has deteriorated in recent years. Jacques believes that this is because of all the unfulfilled promises the government has given the poor” (419). “Jacques also feels that government officials aren’t doing their jobs and that they are discriminating against the Afrikaners” (427).
Norman het Orania aan die begin en teen die einde van haar verblyf in Suid-Afrika besoek. Sy noem dat selfstandigheid (“self-reliance”) die kerndeug van Orania is (510). Die huidige leier, Carel Boshoff IV, merk tereg op: “A people is one generation deep. If one generation rejects itself, you are lost” (533, 3675). Uitgaande van die veronderstelling dat ‘n geslag oor drie dekades strek, is daar myns insiens hierdie ontstellende waarheid: Daar is oorvloediglik rede om te twyfel of die huidige geslag Afrikaners sterk genoeg gemotiveerd is om die voortbestaan van hulle kultuur en taal asook dié van die blankedom in Suid-Afrika te verseker. “Orania is a radical response to this perceived threat of assimilation and cultural dilution” (541). Norman skryf: “When I have asked Afrikaner leaders about the key to understanding their people, the answer has always been the same: survival” (3653). Hermann Giliomee het gesê: “There are six per cent Afrikaners in South Africa. We built our entire identity around language and a sense of history” (3661). “Within a few generations, Afrikaners could be absorbed into English-speaking white culture” (3668). Giliomee noem dit “cultural dilution” (3675). Daarom skryf Norman: “Afrikaans is a language with a troubled future” (3683).
Al skryf Norman, “Many things about Orania feel staged” (554), doen sy eintlik verbasend positief verslag oor Orania, bv “There seems to be growing respect – even admiration – for what Orania is trying to accomplish” (3091) en “Orania serves as a potential stepping stone to the realities of a new South Africa” (3753). Dit hang saam met: “Part of the Afrikaner intellectual elite are trying … to save Afrikanerdom by renovating Afrikaner cultural identity” (3746). Boshoff sê: Orania “is not just about race. It’s a cultural marker; it’s about historic division” (590). ‘n Orania-inwoner, Dawid, sê: “It has nothing to do with hating black people. It’s about preserving our own” (1538). Nog ‘n inwoner, Schalk Albertyn sê: “There is widespread racism against white people” (3498). Waarom vestig mense hulle in Orania? Veral weens die misdaad-epidemie in die nuwe Suid-Afrika. “Fear has been the primary motivator for most who have relocated here” (612). ‘n Ander rede is weerstand teen assimilasie (634). Die Orania-skool se “postcard perfection” het Norman beïndruk (649). Die leerlinge “are almost nauseatingly happy, well adjusted and well behaved” (649). Vergelyk dit met die toestand waarin Suid-Afrikaanse staatskole en universiteite verval het.
Tydens ‘n besoek aan die Transkei kom Norman ‘n huishulp teë wat ‘n besondere onvermoë het om huiswerk te doen en teen 5 namiddag vas aan die slaap is (767). Volgens ‘n blanke boer het swartes “it better before, you know. And most of them will tell you so. At least back then they would get their pensions on time and things worked” (791). Die strande sien deesdae anders daar uit: “They are everywhere: crowding the place, playing their music. But you mustn’t let it get to you. You must just go early. They are lazy. They won’t be there before 11 am. They love to sleep” (791). Hierdie boer kan nie op sy werkers vertrou nie, bv “that evening none of his workers arrive” (807). Hy het gevolglik opgehou om melkkoeie aan te hou. Baie boere word op hulle plase vermoor. Norman skryf: “The gruesome circumstances under which many farmers are tortured before being murdered makes it difficult to rule out the element of retaliation” (838).
Norman is bekend met die “land-grabs” in Zimbabwe. Oor Suid-Afrika skryf sy: “There are increasing signs that this is where things are heading … while the South African government keeps its white commercial farmers at arm’s length, many other African nations regard their skills as a valuable asset with which to combat food scarcity” (902). Die volgende Afrika-lande verwelkom blanke Suid-Afrikaanse boere: Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Kongo, Mosambiek, Namibië, Sierra Leone, Somalië, Uganda en Zambië. Norman noem hierdie boere “modern Voortrekkers” (910).
Sy vertel van hoe baie arm blankes daar in die 1930’s was en hoe hulle in eie woongebiede, soos Epping (nou Ruyterwacht) naby Kaapstad, gevestig is. Ook van die streng toesig, uitgeoefen deur maatskaplike werkers, waaraan hulle onderhewig was. Op hierdie manier is hierdie blankes opgehef. “After the fall of apartheid, life in these suburbs changed drastically. State subsidies for the white residents were cancelled and social aid withdrawn. Unable to afford their cost of living, many residents dispersed to caravan parks or squatter camps … Coloured people began moving in” (1039). “‘The government won’t recognise disability in whites’ … There are about 400 white squatter camps in South Africa … approximately 600 000 of South Africa’s 3 million Afrikaners live below the poverty line. In 2008 that figure was 420 000” (2409).
“There is a prevailing conviction among the majority that all white people are wealthy – a misconception largely shared by the ANC leadership. Confronted with a statement that there had been a 30 per cent increase in white people being counted as among the poorest of the poor, former president Mbeki replied that he found it ‘very encouraging’ that income disparity between white and black was now levelling out” (2417). Koerante stel myns insiens nie daarin belang om oor arm blankes verslag te doen nie; veral nie Naspers se Media24-publikasies nie. Op vele terreine wreek die swart regering hom op die blankes, veral die Afrikaners. By die massa-inligtingsmedia is daar skynbaar geen begeerte om hieroor ondersoek in te stel en oor die bevindings verslag te doen nie.
Norman noem dat die militêre of geweldsarm van die ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in 1961 gestig is met “none other than Nelson Mandela” as sy hoof (1981). “In 18 months the group carried out some two hundred acts of sabotage” (1988). Dit behoort nuus vir die Swede te wees. Maar selfs in Suid-Afrika dink baie mense dat Mandela ‘n vredeliewende mens was wat met jare lange tronkstraf onmenslik veronreg is. “Between 1976 and 1983 the ANC carried out 362 acts of violence” (2004). Daar was mededinging en wrywing tussen bv die ANC en Inkatha. “The ‘black-on-black’ struggle claimed thousands of lives, almost three times as many as those taken by the security forces. However, international media downplayed, or even ignored, this side of the ANC” (2011). “Black-on-black violence during the freedom struggle was almost completely ignored by international media outlets” (2035).
Die Aftrikaner-Broederbond het in 1986 voorgestel: “Power-sharing should be done in such a way that no one group could dominate another. A negotiated settlement focusing on minority rights was deemed to be the way forward” (2177). In 1986, volgens Jan Bosman, die huidige hoofsekretaris van die Afrikanerbond, “80 per cent of Afrikaners weren’t ready” vir magsdeling (2694). Ek voeg by: Wat begin het as beloofde magsdeling het teen 1994 algehele magsoorgawe geword, met swartes wat al die ander etniese groepe oorheers. Daar is sedertdien geen sprake van groepregte, bv minderheidsregte, nie. Die nie-wit meerderheid het egter sedert 1996 die grondwetlike reg om onbepaald teen die blanke minderheid te diskrimineer. Mense soos Tim du Plessis dink blykbaar dat tydens hierdie politieke oorgang “the media had evolved into a moral compass for Afrikaners” (2196). Die buitensporige onreg wat blankes, veral Afrikaners, in die nuwe politieke bedeling aangedoen word, skeel diesulkes min.
“Although the elite had started to realise that change was inevitable, the average Afrikaner was far from ready to hand over power. Many feared recrimination, discrimination and retaliation, and support for right-wing parties began to rise again. According to a poll conducted in 1988, only one per cent of Afrikaners and three per cent of [white] English-speakers wanted to see Mandela in power. A mere three per cent of Afrikaners said they found majority control acceptable” (2235).
In die 1992-referendum “a surprising 69 per cent of the electorate voted Yes despite the fact that only 15 per cent of the white population believed that they would be better off in a so-called new South Africa … few [white people] expected the handover of power to be quite so unconditional” (2251).
In 1996 het FW de Klerk die Nasionale Party aan die regering van nasionale eenheid onttrek, “leaving the white community without any formal political power” (2266). “Under the lead of President FW de Klerk, they [white South Africans] laid down their arms and walked into an uncertain future” (3725). Daar is myns insiens geen moontlikheid dat die uitslag van die 1992-referendum ten gunste van magsdeling op ‘n etiese manier as ‘n mandaat vir magsoorgawe vertolk kon word nie, maar dit is presies wat De Klerk gedoen het. Dit is myns insiens moeilik, indien nie onmoontlik nie, om groter verraad as dit in die politiek van enige land op te spoor.
[ Ek het onlangs ‘n skrikwekkende boek gelees, Tim Marshall se Shadowplay: The inside story of the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic (Bookbaby, 2002, 225p; Amazon Kindle $5,69). Daarin word aangetoon hoe Westerse regerings, veral Amerika, Brittanje en Duitsland, op hoogs onetiese wyse saamgespan het om Korsovo, die oorspronklike tuisland van die Ortodoks-christelike Serwiërs, aan Albaniese Moslems te oorhandig, die Serwiërs en sigeuners uit Korsovo te verdryf en die Serwiese staatshoof, Milosevic, tot ‘n val te bring. Geld is kwistig agteraf aan vyande van die Milosevic-regering uitgedeel. Wat daar gebeur het, is nie uniek in die internasionale, insluitende Westerse, politiek nie. Dit is ingeoefende standaardpraktyk. Dit lyk hoogs waarskynlik dat iets soortgelyks ter vernietiging van die blanke bewind in Suid-Afrika gebeur het, maar daardie inligting is nog nie opgediep en gepubliseer nie.]
In Norman se boek is daar ‘n hele hoofstuk oor transformasie, bv regstellende aksie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging. Dit is ‘n onderwerp wat glad te min aandag in die openbare diskoers kry. Die vorme wat transformasie aanneem, is myns insiens die uitdrukking van fanatieke rassisme wat blankes doelbewus veronreg en benadeel. Tydens apartheid het baie teoloë hulle hoogs sensitief voorgedoen vir enige onreg teen swartes. Deesdae swyg hulle oor die onreg wat sienderoë ten koste van blankes gepleeg word. Regstellende aksie het in Amerika ten behoewe van die swart minderheid ontstaan maar word in Suid-Afrika misbruik om die swart meerderheid te bevoordeel. Toe regstellende aksie in 1961 in Amerika ingestel is, is dit as ‘n tydelike maatreël beskou (2481), maar sedertdien is dit uitgebrei na ander minderheidsgroepe en selfs na ‘n meerderheidsgroep, naamlik vroue.
In 1998 het die ANC-regering gekom met die rasgebaseerde beleid dat poste op alle vlakke die demografie moet weerspieël (2488). Barloworld “offer newly qualified black accountants roughly 20 per cent more money than their white colleagues. In addition to this, they receive an entry-level BMW and greater prospects for promotion. Even so, ‘after a few months, they are mercilessly head-hunted'”(2551). Blankes is myns insiens nooit op rasgronde dermate bevoordeel nie. Swartes word deesdae bevoordeel en blankes word uit poste gestoot of geweer en word verplig om entrepreneurs te word.
“If a company has 15 per cent white employees it’s a big problem, but if a company has a hundred per cent black employees it’s not a problem” (2543).
In 2003 het swart ekonomiese bemagtiging gekom, “which required a certain percentage of ownership, management and control of any company to be in black hands” (2512). Swartes hoef nie te presteer om in die voordele van blanke maatskappye te deel nie. Al vereiste is dat hulle swart moet wees. “It makes no sense to add people who don’t create value” (2551). By sportspanne gebeur dieselfde. Die beste spelers mag nie gekies word nie. Spanne word volgens raskwotas saamgestel. Waarop dit volgens Makhenkesi Stofile, ‘n vorige minister van sport, neerkom is “to sacrifice winning in the name of transformation” (2526). Gert van der Westhuizen, Beeld se sportredakteur, het myns insiens intussen ontpop as een van die grootste voorstanders van raskwotas in sport. By sport het dit nie gebly. Wim de Villiers, die rektor van die Universiteit Stellenbosch, pas anti-blanke transformasie toe by studente-toelating, beurstoekennings, personeelaanstellings, ens. Sy hoogheilige viserektor, die teoloog Nico Koopman, opper geen beswaar teen die opsigtelike onreg wat teen blankes gepleeg word nie.
“Founded on a platform of non-racialism, the ANC doesn’t seem to see the inherent contradiction in using race-based affirmative action and empowerment policies to achieve transformation. Race is now used to promote the previously disadvantaged and disadvantage the previously advantaged, which means that your race still largely determines your opportunities in life” (2573). “The previously disadvantaged include all non-whites, women and the disabled. This means that close to 95 per cent of the population, with black people at the top,* are entitled to preferential treatment in hiring, promotion, university admissions and the award of government contracts. The flipside of this is that if you are a white male,** and hence part of the five per cent considered the most ‘previously advantaged’, your chances of being accepted to university, finding a job or being promoted are that much slimmer. As a result, many have ended up leaving the country” (2587).
Ek voeg by: ‘n Mens sou dink dat ANC-leiers in landsbelang die insig sou hê om daardie etniese groep, die blankes, wat hulleself meer as enige ander as voortreflike landsburgers bewys het (“the essential population of South Africa” – 3048), te koester en hulle eerder te bevoordeel as benadeel, maar Thabo Mbeki het gesê hulle kan maar gerus die land verlaat. Wat ook glad nie besef word nie is dat regstellende aksie in Amerika ingestel is om swartes te bevoordeel, wat sowat 12% van die bevolking is. Onbekwame swartes in poste sal in Amerika nie sulke vernietigende gevolge hê soos in Suid-Afrika met meer as 80% van die bevolking wat (onregmatig) op bevoordeling aanspraak maak nie.
[* Dit herinner aan wat George Orwell in Animal farm geskryf het: Almal is gelyk maar party is meer gelyk as ander. ** Blanke mans word op ‘n wraaksugtige manier vir benadeling uitgesonder omdat hulle hulleself as uitstekende uitroeiers van terroriste bewys het.]
Wynand Boshoff, die broer van Carel Boshoff IV, wys tereg daarop dat die herskryfde geskiedenis wat deesdae aan skoolkinders opgedring word, “Afrikaner-unfriendly” is (3134). “They have reduced all of Western civilisation to slave owners and oppressors … even vilifying Afrikaner achievements” (3134). Die historikus Fransjohan Pretorius voeg by: “The struggle history of today is purposefully partial” (3156). Dit is ‘n geval van “historians rewriting history with a lot of emotion … they do not come up with a balanced portrayal” (3164). “There is a lot of vengeance in what today’s historians say, and do, and write” (3172).
In die boek word daar dikwels na Bloedrivier verwys. Aan die ander kant van hierdie rivier het die ANC-regering die Ncome-museum opgerig as teenhanger vir die Bloedrivier-monument en -museum. Miljoene rande staatsgeld word aan die Ncome-museum bestee. “Afrikaners receive nothing, not even a grant for their museum” (3425). Het diegene wat oorloop van ‘n sug na geregtigheid, bv bevrydingsteoloë, soos Desmond Tutu, en meningsvormers, soos Max du Preez, al iets hieroor gesê of geskryf? ‘n Brug is oor die rivier gebou wat die twee museumterreine verbind. Norman skryf tereg: “The first guest across any bridge is assimilation” (3783). ‘n Ander opsie word in die opskrif van hoofstuk 14 verskaf: “Good fences make good neighbours” (1813).
