Namate ‘n mens ouer en jou oorblywende dae min word, is daar onder meer twee dinge wat jou bybly. Die een is ‘n al hoe groter waardering vir dinge wat lewe, hetsy plante of diere. Dit geld nie alle lewende dinge nie omdat party van hulle ongewens is, bv peste. Toe hy hulle stemme wou werf, het Nelson Mandela beweer dat Suid-Afrika se mense die land se grootste bate is. Ek, daarenteen, dink dat ons dit buitengewoon ongelukkig getref het; dat daar heeltemal te veel mense is wat hulle aan anti-sosiale gedrag skuldig maak maar nogtans nie (permanent) uit die samelewing verwyder word nie. Plaaslik is daar waarskynlik ook meer mense wat op die staat parasiteer as wat werk, waarvan sommige sonder teenprestasie (gewelddadig en dikwels suksesvol) eis wat hulle ook al wil hê. Dit is ‘n onfeilbare resep vir ‘n chaotiese, mislukte staat.
‘n Ander gewaarwording van bejaardes is dat hulle dit al hoe moeiliker vind om by die vinnig veranderende werklikheid aan te pas. Daar is die onverkwiklike dwaasheid van 1990/94, wat plaaslik toenemend katastrofiese gevolge het. “The price for peace is at times higher than the price of conflict” (Asad Durrani, bron hier onder, Kindle 1305). Daar is te veel aan buitelandse druk toegegee. “When we invite outsiders to mediate our disputes, the settlement would be in their favour and on their terms” (3864). Ek kan as ‘n ongetransformeerde organisme geëtiketteer word omdat ek geen heil nie, of bitter min, in die huidige staatkundige opset sien. “If people start believing there is a bridge, then even if there’s no bridge it’ll serve the purpose” (AS Dulat, dieselfde bron, 1345). ‘n Ander faktor wat baie bejaardes vervreem, is tegnologie-gedrewe verandering. Almal kan die voordele ervaar wat bv rekenaars en selfone gebring, maar baie bejaardes vind dit moeilik om die vaardighede te ontwikkel sodat hulle self sulke tegnologiese hulpmiddels met gemak en ten volle kan benut.
Die wonder van bv elektroniese publikasie en vinnige wêreldwye telekommunikasie is onlangs weer by my tuisgebring. Op 29 Mei is in ‘n RSG-nuusbulletin genoem dat ‘n nuwe boek opslae in Pakistan maak, soortgelyk aan die invloed wat Jacques Pauw se The president’s keepers plaaslik gehad het (Praag 11.11.2017). Ek het die volgende e-boek by Amazon bestel en dit binne ‘n minuut of twee op die skerm van my Kindle gehad: AS Dulat, Aditya Sinha en Asad Durrani, The spy chronicles: RAW, ISI and the illusion of peace (Noida: HarperCollins, 21.05.2018, 344p; Amazon Kindle $6,89). Voor die nuusbulletin verby was, kon ek begin lees. Dink aan hoe dit voorheen was: As ek in die vorige eeu ‘n boek by ‘n bekende boekhandelaar bestel het, moes ek vooraf dubbel die uitgewersprys betaal* en daarna die boek na verloop van meer as ‘n maand, nadat ek ‘n kennisgewing ontvang het, by die boekwinkel gaan haal. [* Ek verwys na die tyd toe daar pariteit tussen die rand en die Amerikaanse dollar was.]
Dulat (gebore in 1940) was die hoof van die Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) van Indië se Intelligence Bureau (IB). Durrani (gebore in 1941) was die hoof van Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), die Pakistanse geheimediens. Sinha is ‘n Indiese joernalis wat hierdie twee bejaardes ondervra het. Die teks word aangebied as ‘n dialoog tussen hierdie drie met Dulat en Durrani as die primêre sprekers. Dit blyk dat al drie baie goed oor sowel Indiese as Pakistanse sake ingelig is. Die gesprekke is op ‘n buitengewoon hoë vlak deur drie intelligente mense gevoer. Daar is diegene wat kan neig om hierdie intellektuele verfyndheid toe te skryf aan die Ariërs wat van 1500 tot 1200 vC vanuit die noorde die Indiese subkontinent binnegekom het en hierdie gebied die bakermat van onder meer die Indo-Germaanse tale (bv Afrikaans) gemaak het. Sinha het die twee oud-veiligheidshoofde ongetwyfeld vooraf ingelig oor die onderwerpe waaroor hulle gaan praat, want dit is (bykans) onmoontlik om uit die vuis so sistematies en in besonderhede oor gebeure, soms van jare gelede, te praat. Dit is ook hoogs waarskynlik dat die teks voor publikasie aangevul en ook in ander opsigte verander is. Sinha verwys bv na “the second thoughts of each participant at different points” (93).
Wat opval, is dat die gespreksgenote ‘n onwikkelde aanvoeling vir die betekenis en gevoelswaarde van woorde het; die soort bedrewenheid wat die studie van die linguistiese wysbegeerte by ‘n mens kan tuisbring. Durrani sê: “India … will continue to manage [Kashmir] on most occasions, it can contain whatever happens, it can suppress Kashmiris, appease them, accommodate them” (1372). Ook: “Kashmir is a major problem without calling it [a] ‘core issue'” (1453). Oor Kasjmir vra Dulat later: “Why do you want to use this word dispute?” (2577). Hy verkies die woord “issue” (2577). Ook: “Why do you use the word ‘compromise’ when we are talking of cooperation?” (3041), ens.
Ek het die teks baie interessant gevind, deels omdat ek min van die politiek op die Indiese subkontinent weet. Vir Westerse lesers is die boek nie sonder uitdagings nie. Eerstens is daar die waarskynlike vreemdheid van die onderwerp. Die eindnotas verskaf gelukkig waardevolle oriënterende inligting. Tweedens is daar die oorvloedige gebruik van letterwoorde; woorde wat dalk op die Indiese subkontinent bekend is, maar nie in die Weste nie. Derdens is daar woorde en sinsnedes in plaaslike taal, soos Poenjabi of Kasjmiri, wat in baie gevalle onvertaald gelaat word. Durrani word dikwels as “General Saheb” (‘n Arabiese woord vir “vriend”) aangespreek.
Die Indiese subkontinent het vanaf 1651 (Jan van Riebeeck se tyd) stelselmatig in die besit van die Britse Oos-Indiese Maatskappy gekom en was ‘n Britse kolonie (“the Raj”) vanaf 1858. In 1947 is die land in twee verdeel (“the Great Divide” – 179): Indië met ‘n hoofsaaklik Hindoe en Pakistan met ‘n hoofsaaklik Moslem bevolking. In daardie stadium is daar dus nog amptelik erkenning aan verskille in kultuur/lewenswyse gegee. Dulat sê: “Partition has … left wounds” (1945). Die onafhanklikheidverklaring van hierdie twee lande het met grootskaalse bloedvergieting en bevolkingsverhuising gepaard gegaan. Dit is die grondslag van die wedywering en bitterheid wat daar steeds tussen Indiërs en Pakistani’s bestaan.
Kasjmir is as ‘n deel van Indië verklaar terwyl die bevolking hoofsaaklik Moslems is. Anders as in Suid-Afrika is Kasjmir in Indië en Pakistan die K-woord (1431). In 1965 en in 1971 het Kasjmir tot oorlog tussen Indië en Pakistan gelei. Daar was ook ander gewapende konflikte (bv in 1990 en 1999). Dulat het die volgende boek oor hierdie onderwerp geskryf: Kashmir: The Vajpayee years (Noida: HarperCollins, 2017, 376p; Amazon Kindle $4,57). Atal Bihari Vajpayee was die eerste minister van Indië van 1998 tot 2004. Tans beset Pakistan 37%, Indië 43% en China 20% van Kasjmir se grondgebied. Die meerderheid van Kasjmir se bevolking wil van Indiese beheer ontslae raak deur óf inlywing by Pakistan óf onafhanklikheid. Durrani sê: “Kashmiris’ heart is with us, so an independent Kashmir should gravitate towards us. I have no problem with independence” (1596). Hoe kan die huidige onbevredigende opset verander word? Durrani stel voor: “Instead of saying we want a divided or jointly administered Kashmir … I suggest an indirect and incremental approach, starting with little steps” (1856).
‘n Ander gevolg van die 1971-oorlog was dat Indië gehelp het om Oos-Pakistan as Bangladesj (die bevolking is hoofsaaklik Moslem) onafhanklik van Wes-Pakistan (voortaan Pakistan) te laat verklaar. ‘n Verdeelde Pakistan hou uiteraard ‘n mindere bedreiging vir Indië in. Hierdie drieledige verdeling het veroorsaak dat die Poenjab in Noord-Poenjab (Pakistan) en Suid-Poenjab (Indië) en Bengale (waar die Britte in 1651 met hulle besetting begin het) in Wes-Bengale (Indië) en Oos-Bengale (Bangladesj) verdeel is. “Punjab … is three-fourths of Pakistan” (2722).
Indië word sedert 1947 gekenmerk deur ‘n demokratiese staatsbestel en Pakistan en Bangladesj deur militêre beheer en diktature. Durrani erken: “We are not fond of the democratic ways of doing things” (924). ‘n Ander belangrike faktor is dat Indië en Pakistan sedert 1998 kernmoondhede is. Hulle kan kwaklik waag om in ‘n (kern)oorlog betrokke te raak. Dit word die “nuclear overhang” of “Cold Start doctrine” genoem (3233), asook “a stable stalemate” (4075). Durrani sê: “The nuclear assets are primarily political and psychological weapons” (3388), dus nie gebruiksartikels nie. “That’s why they [generals] preach: be so prepared that the other side thinks many times before they take you on. Plans are based on deterrence, avoidance of war, minimum use of force” (3420). ‘n Ander faktor is: Weens die Russiese besetting van Afganistan in 1979 het miljoene vlugtelinge hulle in Pakistan gevestig. “Karachi has been the world’s largest Pushtun city for many years and is now the second largest ‘Afghan’ city with maybe 2.5 million Pushtuns” (3563). Om hierdie en ander redes wil Pakistan hê dat Amerika, wat ná 1989 Rusland se plek ingeneem het, sy troepe aan Afganistan onttrek (3602).
Dat ons in ‘n (neo)multikulturele era lewe, blyk uit die boek. Sinha se ouers het in Engeland gewoon (14) en sy dogter het aan New York University studeer (63). Durrani het opleiding in Duitsland ondergaan (204). Sy seun woon in Duitsland en is aldaar die medestigter van ‘n maatskappy (441).
Voorheen, toe dit ‘n enkele land was, het baie mense ‘n tyd lank in Indië en daarna in Pakistan gewoon, of andersom, of familie en vriende in die ander land gehad. Op hierdie tradisionele vriendskapsbande wou hierdie gesprekke en dus die gepubliseerde boek voortbou. Dulat en Durrani het voorheen saam twee artikels gepubliseer (264). Die amptelike betrekkinge tussen Indië en Pakistan is egter so delikaat dat hierdie gesprekke in ander lande gevoer is: Istanboel (Turkye) in 2016, Bangkok (Thailand) in 2017 en Kathmandoe (Nepal) in 2017. Dulat sê: “The basic problem between India and Pakistan … is distrust” (1929). “It has grown over the years because Partition happened and Pakistan was not happy with Kashmir going to India, the invasion of Kashmir, and its bifurcation. We had … the war of ’65, then the ’71 war” (1945). “Militancy hasn’t ended in Kashmir. Terrorism has become a part of Kashmir’s landscape” (3080). Soos ons in Suid-Afrika ervaar, vewys diegene wat hou van die opstandelinge in Kasjmir na “freedom fighters, not terrorists” (3090). Vorige “freedom fighters became terrorists” vir die Amerikaners ná 9/11 (3859). Dulat sê: “Radicalism is growing” (3112).
Sinha skryf oor die Dulat/Durrani-dialoog: “Their conversation goes to the heart of the India-Pakistan relationship” (82). Dulat sê: “We have tried to stay as close to the truth as we believe it to be” (162). Durrani sê: “One can give perspective on some matters. If one would say one’s piece as frankly and honestly as possible, without being defensive or offensive, then this was a project worth pursuing” (264). Ek het die indruk dat die gespreksgenote grootliks eerlik met mekaar was en gepoog het om nuut oor die verhouding Indië-Pakistan te besin ten einde die dooiepunt te probeer oplos. Oor al drie se lojaliteit teenoor hulle land behoort daar nie twyfel te wees nie.
In Pakistan het die publikasie van die boek dadelik ‘n beroering veroorsaak. Durrani is verbied om Pakistan te verlaat en gelas om sy uitlatings aan die owerheid te verduidelik. Sy uitgangspunt tydens die gesprekke was dat “we were prepared to concede our faults” (218). Duranni het sekerlik nie hierdie reaksie van die Pakistanse owerheid verwag nie. “Whatever I said and wrote, never once was I cautioned … After being liberated from service constraints, I have written joint papers with a former RAW chief [Dulat] and given my assessment on the killing of Osama bin Laden, not quite in line with official versions. No one has ever accused me of indiscretion” (1078).
Daar is veralgemenende uitsprake van Durrani wat in Pakistanse regeringsgeledere aanstoot kon gee, bv: “We hardly see any cooperation between our agencies” (871). “In Pakistan, cooperation between government departments, civil-military, and generally is far from desirable” (877). “The weakness is it’s the military holding Pakistan together” (914). “Institutionally, the military in Pakistan is not anti-India” (2020). “Our gang does not know how to make use of developments in Kashmir, or for that matter, any development” (2031), wat Sinha laat opmerk het: “You seem to be cynical about your political leadership” (2031). Durrani reageer soos volg: “I don’t like politicians at all, they may come up with something at the last moment that has no chance, just to save face” (2042), wat Sinha laat vra: “Are politicians less keen about the national interest and more about image management?” (2052). Durrani antwoord: “In the long run the national interest can be served … But in the short term, or for their political tenure or for their image management, these people did well for themselves. For themselves” (2057). Oor Pakistan: “It’s an illusion that the State is everywhere; we are not a terribly efficient State. Our apparatus does not reach even those against us, leave aside others” (3070).
Vir die Pakistanse regering is die sensitiefste aangeleentheid waarskynlik die dood van Osama bin Laden in 2011, toe hy in sy skuilplek in Pakistan opgespoor is. Durrani sê: “At some stage the ISI probably learnt about it and he was handed over to the US according to a mutually agreed process. Perhaps we are the ones who told the Americans … [but] we are going to feign ignorance. If we denied any role, it may have been to avoid political fallout. Cooperating with the US to eliminate a person regarded by many in Pakistan as a ‘hero’ could have embarrassed the government” (520). Soos in Suid-Afrika kan terroriste dus in Pakistan as helde of ikone beskou word omdat hulle valslik as moreel meerderwaardig voorgestel word. Later sê Durrani: “Pakistan offered to take out Osama bin Laden, given time, so that the US wouldn’t have to come and attack. But that would not have satisfied the Americans” (3399).
Durrani herhaal: “I think Pakistan has cooperated. Without cooperation the operation would have been risky” (3462). “It will not go down well in Pakistan that we cooperated with the US to eliminate someone many Pakistanis considered a hero” (3467). Dulat sê: “Our assessment is the same. That he was handed over by Pakistan” (525). Daar word baie gespekuleer oor wat werklik tydens bv 9/11 en die dood van Bin Laden gebeur het. Die amptelik-vrygestelde CIA- [die Amerikaanse Central Intelligence Agency] inligting word nie sonder meer geglo nie. Durrani sê: “The 9/11 report has 28 pages missing because of sensitive information, or because of American inefficiency, or because of possible complicity; some persons had been released as they had business connections or links to the Bush family. It helps the US avoid unpleasant action” (2847). “The USA’s great success is its ability to control the narrative” (3112). Later: “The US control of this narrative and the media was marvellous” (3472).
Durrani sê ook: “We never know what [the] USA was up to in this region” (1988). In die konteks van bv Afganistan verwys hy na “the people who have done so much wrong and damage to Pakistan: the US” (2857). Daar is reeds verskeie boeke oor 9/11 en Osama bin Laden gepubliseer. Ek wil nog die volgende boek lees, van outeurs wat reeds ‘n boek oor Kasjmir gepubliseer het: Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, The exile: The flight of Osama bin Laden (London: Bloomsbury, 2017, 640p; Amazon Kindle $24,15). Volgens Durrani het dr Afridi, ‘n geneesheer, hom voorgedoen as iemand wat ‘n opname oor polio by kinders maak. Hy het Osama bin Laden se skuilplek ontdek (3509). “I have no doubt that a retired Pakistani officer who was in intelligence walked in and told the Americans. I won’t take his name because I can’t prove it and also I don’t want to give him any publicity. How much of the 50 million dollars he got, who knows. But he is missing from Pakistan” (3515). Dr Afridi, daarenteen, is in ‘n tronk in Pakistan (3509, 3521).
Dulat en Durrani het eerstehandse kennis van ander lande se intelligensiedienste. Durrani “said his opinion of the CIA was that it is a great organisation but it is a third-rate intelligence agency” (833; ook 964). Hy sê verder: “The CIA, State Department [Foreign Affairs], Pentagon [Department of Defence], and the military-industrial complex make political leadership helpless” (515). Amerika se voorspoed is in substansiële mate van die ontwikkeling, vervaardiging en verkoop van wapens afhanklik. Durrani sê: “What does America sell, more than anything else? Weapons” (3370). “Many intelligence agencies have been called the Deep State … It’s a term denoting an establishment which runs the affairs of state behind the scenes” (511). “Deep State … is … making life miserable for President Donald Trump, preventing him from improving relations with Russia or fulfilling his election promises to disengage from foreign military ventures” (520). Sowel Dulat as Durrani verkies Trump bo Hillary Clinton. Durrani sê: “I considered Hillary Clinton a known disaster” (3754).
Durrani sê: “The Americans and the British do this the best: Manufacturing facts, creating an environment for when you go to war, these people do it with the help of the media” (964) – dink aan Bosnië en Kosovo (Praag 12.05.2018). “I never rated CIA assessments highly. Never. They don’t believe they have to carry out good assessments. Because in any case they are going to set the place on fire. Bomb it. Essentially they rely so much on technology. It’s only a fascilitator, ultimately the assessment is made by human beings” (978). “I don’t hold them high when it comes to human intelligence (humint) or analysis … they got it wrong for both the Gulf wars [Kuwait (1991), Iraq (2003)]. They were just providing an excuse for the US military action” (986).
Dulat dink “the Brits are pretty good. They talk least, do their job quietly” (1030). “The chiefs of MI6 and MI5 have access to their prime minister whenever they want” (1037). Hy stem saam met Durrani: “CIA assessments have not always proven correct. There’s a lot of wishful thinking” (992). Durrani sê: “It is the president who picks the CIA chief” (1066), vandaar die vermoede dat die CIA die sittende president help in sy herverkiesing of sy party se nominasie vir die presidentskap.
“The KGB [Russian secret service] is tougher [than the CIA], but they have their crudeness. They’re not the most sophisticated. KGB people have gotten into trouble in various countries. People say Mossad [Israel’s secret service] is the most professional, but I don’t know. It is so tight and they’re only concerned with their own agendas. It’s difficult to say. But there have been some great Mossad chiefs” (997). Van die KGB sê Durrani: “It’s … a system where dissent is not appreciated” (1008). Dulat sê: “KGB’s problem was that it was elitist” (1014). Durrani dink “the German BND works methodically, seriously … But their product is sometimes not up to the mark. BND is a victim of their own desire to be perfect” (1014).
Durrani se evaluering van die RAW is: “At least as good as we [the ISI] are” (725). “Generally we regard the Indian system as more effective [than the CIA]” (833). Dulat sê: “The best intelligence organisation because of its influence is the ISI” (1140). Verder: “Moles are easier to have than defectors” (755), maar blykbaar kon nóg die RAW nóg ISI daarin slaag om iemand te werf om die ander geheimediens te infiltreer en ondermyn. ‘n Mens kan jou afvra hoe die Suid-Afrikaanse geheimediens van weleer met ander vergelyk. Ek het die twee boeke van Niël Barnard gelees: Geheime revolusie (2015) en Vreedsame revolusie (2017). Die indruk wat hierdie boeke by my gewek het, is dat die amptename hulle doeltreffendheid sonder afdoende rede baie hoog aangeslaan het en dat hulle hulle allerhande luukses veroorloof het. Die huidige geheimediens is deur Jacques Pauw in The president’s keepers aan die kaak gestel.
Pakistan het in onguns by Amerika verval omdat hy goeie betrekkinge met Iran (2975, 2981) en China nastreef. In hierdie verband troos Durrani hom met ‘n waarheid wat Henry Kissinger in ‘n oomblik van helderheid kwytgeraak het: “Being enemies with the US is dangerous, being friends is fatal” (3869). Daar is ‘n plan om ‘n gaspyplyn van Iran na Pakistan aan te lê (3009, 4320). Durrani sê: “Jumdallah is a Sunni group that was targeting Shias in Balochistan [part of Pakistan and Iran]. It was supported by the US to carry out sabotage and subversion in the Iranian province of Siestan” (2998). “If Balochistan remains unsettled they [the Americans] can rationalise their military presence in the region a bit better” (3003). Amerika “bribe and arm people, whether it was Afghanistan even after the Soviets were kicked out, or Balochistan, or lately the Middle East. It is by no means a benign power” (3014). “There are so many instances of unfulfilled commitments. It’s in their DNA” (3486).
Daar is die TTP: “Tehrik-i-Taliban, Paktistan: a pro-Taliban umbrella [“of 40 different groups – 3128)] group of anti-State terrorists operating along the Afghanistan border” (4659). Durrani sê: “The Afghan Taliban told us to keep the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ away from them” (3118). Die TTP “sided with the US against their fellow tribesmen, some for a variety of other reasons” (3128). Daar is klaarblyklik heelwat tweespalt. “The label that Pakistan gets is of ‘terrorism’ but it is in fact due to our inadequate policies, our Faustian dealings with the US, and indeed our relationship with India” (3133). Faust is die legendaries towenaar wat sy siel aan die duiwel verkoop het. Indië het die guns van Amerika ten koste van Pakistan probeer wen. Hierop volg (feitlik) noodwendig: “Examine how Russia, which was once India’s best friend, is now cosying up to Pakistan” (3448).
Durrani sê: “India made that famous offer [to America], Pakistan is part of the problem, we’d be a better ally in Afghanistan” (3293). Hy noem NAVO “a war organisation … After the Warsaw Pact dissolved, NATO was expected to follow suit, but it kept inventing new missions to rationalise its perpetuation. Initially it was to keep peace among the Europeans, but after its failure during the Bosnian crises, as well as with the ‘Partnership for peace’ by some of the states of the former Soviet Union, NATO is now breathing easy because it found employment in the unending wars in Afghanistan and elsewhere” (3355). Amerika wil sy teenwoordigheid in Afganistan behou omdat hy daar militêre basisse het waarmee hy gebeure in die hele omgewing kan beheer (3673). Dulat sê: “The Talibs are prepared to take everyone on board provided the goras [white people] get the hell out” (3719).
Reeds in 1963 is die Trans-Karakoram-ooreenkoms tussen Pakistan en China gesluit waarvolgens ‘n deel van Kasjmir aan China oorgedra is. Dit het die weg geopen vir die huidige “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)” – histories die “Wakhan corridor” wat sedert die antieke tyd China en Afganistan verbind (828). Durrani sê: “One could see a new axis emerging: Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China … I could see these countries closing ranks on coordinating policy on Afghanistan” (3619; ook 3946). Dulat se reaksie is: “The obvious thing is the Indian side cosying up to Trump to countervail against this Gang of Four” (3624).
Dulat sê: “The old Soviet Union went out of its way to support India, like in the ’71 war” (3883). “We’re not too good when it comes to a relationship … You’ve screwed up your relationship with the Russians, there is none with the Chinese, and there’s no great relationship with any neighbour … what the Americans have in mind is that India will provide a counterbalance to China” (3790). Naas die genoemde “Gang of Four” is daar “the Shanghai Five … created in April 1996 comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In June 2001 it became the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, of which India and Pakistan became full members in June 2017” (4698).
Daar is sprake dat Pakistan kan opbreek (1403, 3166), bv Baloetsjistan het min met Poenjap gemeen. ‘n Samevoeging van Afganistan en Baloetsjistan as Pastoenistan is ook moontlik. “There are twice the number of Pastuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan” (4386). Durrani sê: “I’ve always believed there were more chances of an Af-Pak confederation than an Indo-Pak one” (4386). Seker vandaar die pogings van Indië en Amerika om die Afgane wys te maak dat Pakistan Afganistan as hulle vyfde provinsie wil inpalm (3646).
Daar is ook sprake dat Indië kan opbreek (1410, 3172). Voor onafhanklikheid in 1947 is “maximum autonomy for the regions with a Muslim majority” voorgestel (4315). Die Indiese Kongresparty (soos die ANC in Suid-Afrika) wou egter beheer oor die hele Indiese subkontinent uitoefen. Dit het hewige onluste en bloedvergieting tot gevolg gehad. “Partition [1947], or trifurcation [1971], led to many problems” (4315). Die Indiese subkontinent kan in die vorm van ‘n konfederasie herenig (1416); ‘n losser samevoeging van state as ‘n federasie, dus die behoud van ‘n groter mate van selfbeskikking vir elke staat. Selfs ‘n konfederasie van Suid-Asia is moontlik (4336), bv van Iran tot by Indonesië (4363).
Les bes is daar hierdie insigvolle waarneming van Sinha: “China has ambitious plans for the future. Putin is merely trying to recapture past glory” (3974).
