Die Katyn-massaslagting het gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog en daarna opslae gemaak. Katyn word Kah-thin uitgespreek (Daniel Ford, bron hier onder, Kindle 214). Ek gaan hierdie gebeurtenis belig om aan te toon hoe regerings en die massamedia inligting weerhou of verdraai om die publiek te mislei. JK Zawodny se boek, Death in the forest: The story of the Katyn forest massacre (Pickle Partners Publishing, 1962, 258p; Amazon Kindle $5,69) , is deur Goolding beskryf as “one of the most complete accounts of Katyn” (Matthew Goolding, bron hier onder, Kindle 55). Maar van Zawodny se inligting is na meer as ‘n halfeeu verouderd. Eugenia Maresch se boek, Katyn 1940: The documentary evidence of the West’s betrayal (Stroud: The History Press, 2010, 288p; Amazon Kindle $13,67), is gebaseer op nuwe argivale inligting. George Sanford se boek, Katyn and the Soviet massacre of 1940: Truth, justice and memory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005, 273p; Amazon Kindle $49,49), word deur Goolding beskryf as “the most important recent work about this topic” (77). Sanford se boek is egter onbetaalbaar duur.
Vir die doeleindes van hierdie rubriek maak ek van twee ander boeke gebruik. Uit die Amerikaanse oogpunt gebruik ek Daniel Ford se boek, A death in the forest: The US Congress investigates the murder of 22 000 Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn massacres of 1940 – Was Stalin or Hitler guilty? (Durham NH, Warbird Books, 2014, 82p; Amazon Kindle $3,41). ‘n Groot voordeel van Ford se boek is dat dit die kern weergee van die Amerikaanse Departement van Verdediging se verslag van 2 162 bladsye na aanleiding van verhore wat in 1951/52 gehou is: The Katyn forest massacre (Progressive Management, 2013; Amazon Kindle $6,83). Die Britse gesigspunt word belig in Matthew Goolding se boek, Katyn: A British dilemma (2014, 45p; Amazon Kindle $3,41). Ford en Goolding se boeke het die voordeel dat hulle, naas die verskillende invalshoeke, die jongste inligting bevat.
Die Tweede Wêreldoorlog (1939-1945) het op 1 September 1939 begin toe Duitsland oorlog teen Pole verklaar het. Op 13 September het die Sowjetunie die nie-aanvalsverdrag met Pole opgehef. Sowel Duitse as Sowjettroepe het hulle gehaas om soveel moontlik Poolse grondgebied te beset. Albei wou die onafhanklike Pole, wat in 1918 na die Eerste Wêreldoorlog voorwaardelik tot stand gekom het, vernietig. Die Sowjetunie en Duitsland het op 28 September 1939 ‘n nie-aanvalsverdrag gesluit; die Molotov-Ribbentrop-verdrag, waarmee Poolse grondgebied tussen die Sowjetunie en Duitsland verdeel is. Die besetting van die stad Lwów (tans Lviv, in die verre weste van die huidige Oekraïne), in die suide van die destydse Pole, was vir albei lande van strategiese belang. Die Duitsers wou verhoed dat Poolse burgers na Roemenië in die suide vlug terwyl die Sowjetunie sy wesgrens so gou moontlik verder weswaarts wou verskuif. Die Poolse bewind het die stad suksesvol teen die Duitse aanslag verdedig maar is deur die Sowjetmagte oorweldig.
Nikita Khruschev (1894-1971, Sowjetstaatshoof 1953-1964) was in 1939 as die Russiese goewerneur van die Oekraïne in bevel van die Sowjetbesette Poolse grondgebied. Die Russiese geheime polisiediens, die NKVD (“Peoples’ Commissariat of Internal Affairs”), het baie Pole krygsgevange geneem; nie net soldate en polisiemanne nie, maar ook die leiers in die gemeenskap, die intelligensia of elite; dus enigeen wat teen die Sowjetbesetting weerstand kon bied of kon help om ‘n onafhanklike Pole te laat herrys. “Kozielsk, located east of Smolensk, imprisoned 5 000; Starobielsk, near Kharkov, held 4 000 Polish officers; and Ostashkov, near Kalinin, where 6 400 Poles were interned” (Ford 315), dus 15 400 altesame. “They comprised the elite of the Polish military and civilian leaders” (Ford 331). “These prisoners remained at the three camps from September-October 1939, until April-May 1940” (Ford 331).
In die 21 maande wat die aanvanklike Sowjet besetting van Poland geduur het, is honderd duisende Pole gevange gehou in “some hundred-odd camps in Poland’s eastern territories and the western provinces of the Soviet territory” (Ford 315). “Perhaps one hundred thousand Polish civilian had been arrested and sent into the Gulag* in 1940 and 1941” (Ford 446). Die Pole wat in die Sowjet-Poolse Oorlog (1919-1921) geveg het, waarin die Pole hulle grondgebied grootliks suksesvol verdedig het, moes dit veral ontgeld. Op 22 Junie 1941 het die Duitse regering sy nie-aanvalsverdrag met die Sowjetunie verbreek, die gebied met Operasie Barbarossa binnegeval en spoedig Pole, insluitende Lwów (Lviv), verower. In daardie stad het die Duitsers toe die lyke van sowat 7 000 vermoorde Pole in die Brygidki-tronk gevind (Ford 242). [* Gulag: “Russian term for the system of prisons and labour camps used to silence dissidents and opponents of the Soviet regime” (Collins World Encyclopedia, 2003, p 405.]
Die Russies-Finse of Winteroorlog (1939-1940) het baie krygsgevangenes opgelewer. Saam met die wêreldoorlog-krygsgevangenes het die Sowjetowerheid meer prisoniers gehad as wat hy kon hanteer. Te Bykovnia (naby Kiëv) en Kharkov, is baie Pole om die lewe gebring. Ford skryf: “Those from southeastern Poland are buried at Bykovnia near Kiev … and many or all of their names are known. Those from the northeast were presumably executed in present-day Belarus, but their names and whereabouts [are] still a mystery” (904). Daar was ander plekke in die Oekraïne, Belarus en Rusland waar ook massamoorde teen Pole gepleeg is. Met die uitsondering van Katyn is hierdie grafte nog nie opgespoor nie.
Die Duitse magte het in Operasie Barbarossa ooswaarts tot by bv Leningrad (nou Sint Peterburg) gevorder. Die Sowjetowerheid het dermate bedreig gevoel dat hy toe bereid was om hulp uit enige oord teen die Duitsers te aanvaar, selfs van Poolse soldate wat krygsgevangenes was. Op 30 Julie 1941 is ‘n Sowjet-Poolse ooreenkoms hieroor aangegaan, wat diplomatieke bande ingesluit het. “Under this agreement, all Poles interned in Soviet prison camps within the territory of the USSR were to be released by the Soviets” (Ford 294). Die militêre verdrag tussen die Poolse en Sowjetregering is op 14 Augustus 1941 gesluit. Op 16 Augustus 1941 het die Poolse militêre bevelvoerder, generaal Wladyslaw Anders, wat uit ‘n Moskouse tronk vrygelaat is, begin om na Poolse soldate te soek wat deur die Russe krygsgevange geneem is. Hy kon baie van hulle nie opspoor nie. Sowat 8 300 Poolse soldate het verdwyn (Goolding 232). By navraag kon bv die Sovietstaatshoof, Josef Stalin, sy minister van buitelandse sake, Vyacheslav Molotov, en die NKVD-hoof, Lavrentiy Beria, geen bevredigende verduideling verskaf nie.
Die Duitse opmars teen die Sowjetmagte is in Januarie 1943 by Stalingrad (tans Volgograd) gestuit. Terwyl die Duitse troepe reeds besig was om die aftog in Rusland te blaas, het hulle op massagrafte in die Katyn-woud, 18 kilometer wes van Smolensk, in Rusland, afgekom. Hierdie vonds is op 13 April 1943 bekend gemaak. Die Duitsers het die Sovietunie van hierdie massaslagting beskuldig. “The Russians immediately put out the counter-claim that the atrocity was actually a German one – suggesting, among other novelties, that the bodies were actually those of murdered Jews, dressed in Polish uniforms. To their shame, the American and British governments accepted the Russian version” omdat Westerse belange “called for cooperation with the Soviet Union in the common crusade against Nazi Germany ” (Ford 249).
Die Poolse regering in ballingskap in Londen, met Wladyslaw Sikorski as eerste minister, het die Internasionale Rooi Kruis op 15 April 1943 gevra om ‘n neutrale ondersoek in te stel. “The Poles were ‘extremely unfortunate in that the Germans also asked the Red Cross to investigate at exactly the same time, which allowed the Soviets to depict their wholly independent moves as being part of a coordinated conspiracy’ … British people took to the idea, especially as popularity of Stalin was at an all-time high” (Goolding 586) sedert die Slag van Stalingrad. “Among civilians, a most common sentiment was an almost unbridled admiration for the Soviet Union in general, and for the Red Army in particular” (Goolding 615).
“On April 19, 1943, the Soviet newspaper, Pravda, carried a front-page editorial which attacked the Polish Government’s request for assistance of the International Red Cross in ‘investigating something that never happened'” (Ford 561). Hierdie versoek van die Poolse regering en die felheid van sy anti-Sowjetpropaganda oor Katyn het daartoe aanleiding gegee dat die Sowjetunie op 25 April 1943 diplomatieke bande met die Poolse regering verbreek het. Die Sowjetunie het nie meer die Pole se steun nodig gehad nie. Al die Poolse krygsgevangenes is tot Sowjetonderdane verklaar. Dit was duidelik dat die Sowjetunie permanente beheer oor Pole wou verkry. “The Western Powers proved incapable of countering this pressure with equal energy. They were obsessed by anxiety as to the loyalty of the Soviet ally and feared to provide him with an excuse for a separate deal with Germany” (Goolding 120). “On April 30, 1943, a medical commission of leading representatives of medical jurisprudence and criminology from 12 European universities and neutral countries, selected by the Germans, signed a protocol establishing these Polish officers were massacred in the Spring of 1940” (Ford 302).
Wat het in 1940 met hierdie Pole gebeur? Om die samewerking van Poolse aangehoudenes in Sowjet-krygsgevangekampe te verkry, is die gerug onder hulle versprei dat hulle huis toe gaan (Ford 347). Die gevangenes van die Kozielsk-kamp is per trein na Gniezdovo-stasie, 18 kilometer wes van Smolensk, vervoer en vandaar 3 kilometer per bus na die Katyn-woud (Ford 371). Oor die sewe massagrafte word gesê: “4 143 bodies [were] exhumed at Katyn, and another 110 found but not exhumed” (Ford 818). Daar is ‘n groot mate van konsensus dat die moorde van Maart tot Mei 1940 gepleeg is (Goolding 377). Ford voeg by: “In addition to the roughly 5 000 Poles buried in the Katyn Forest itself, some 20 000 Polish prisoners were murdered at other sites in the Soviet Union” (825).
Daar was eintlik drie “Katyns”, een elk vir die drie Poolse krygsgevangenekampe Kozielsk, Starobielsk en Ostashkov (Ford 404). Slegs sowat 400 van hierdie 15 400 prisoniers het die oorlog oorleef (Ford 347). Die Poolse prisoniers in die Ostashkov-kamp is in die Witsee by Tver verdrink (Ford 396, 404). “The prisoners in Ostahkov were placed on two very old barges, and when the barges were towed out to sea they were destroyed by Russian artillery fire” (Ford 404). Die amptelike Amerikaanse verslag lui: “We are equally certain that the 15 000 Polish officers – those interned at Starobielsk and Ostashkov – were executed in a similar brutal manner. Those from Starobielsk were disposed of near Kharkov, and those from Ostashkov met a similar fate. Testimony was presented by several witnesses that the Osthashkov prisoners were placed on barges and drowned in the White Sea. Thus the committee believes that there are at least two other ‘Katyns’ in Russia” (Ford 896). “The committee … wish to impress … that the investigation of the Katyn massacre barely scratches the surface of numerous crimes against humanity perpetrated by totalitarian powers” (Ford 921). Die komitee noem dit “Katynism” (Ford 929).
Tydens die oorlog was Winston Churchill die Britse eerste minister en Anthony Eden die minister van buitelandse sake. “Churchill advised Sikorski against provoking the Soviets” (Goolding 165). Eden “had done all he could to persuade the Poles to treat this [Katyn] as a German propaganda move designed to sow discord between the allies … The [British] War Cabinet was already concerned that this business would hamper their efforts to use Polish troops for fighting Germany in the Middle East” (Goolding 174). “The British were primarily concerned with maintaining Allied unity, despite suspecting that the Soviets were indeed responsible for the Katyn killings” (Goolding 222). “The anger and unconvincing terms of Russian denials suggest a sense of guilt” (Goolding 232).
“Churchill claimed to Stalin that ‘the Polish press will be disciplined in future'” (Goolding 543). Churchill het in ‘n kabinetsvergadering gesê: “No Government which had accepted our hospitality had any right to publish articles of a character which conflicted with the general policy of the united nations and which would create difficulties for the Government” (Goolding 648). “It must … be remembered that Poland was the reason Britain initially went to war” (Goolding 578). Die Britse regering het die Amerikaanse regering versoek “to promote Germany as ‘enemy No 1′” (Goolding 250). In die Britse parlement het Eden op 4 Mei 1943 gesê: “His Majesty’s Government have no wish to attribute blame for these events to anyone except the common enemy” (Goolding 258).
George Sanford skryf in sy bogenoemde boek: “The official and public policy was to use the inconsistencies and gaps in the Katyn evidence to justify a policy of non-attribution of guilt” (Goolding 275). Dít ten spyte van Owen O’Malley, die Britse ambassadeur by die Poolse regering in ballingskap, se verslag van 24 Mei 1943 waarin hy skryf: “I think most of us are more than half convinced that a large number of Polish officers were indeed murdered by the Russian authorities” (Goolding 290). “O’Malley seems distressed that their morals have been tested so brutally in order to continue their good relationship with an important ally” (Goolding 290). Goolding skryf: “I would argue that this report from O’Malley marks a momentous acceptance from many British officials regarding the probability of Soviet responsibility for the massacre. There was also an acceptance that they were themselves involved in a cover-up, expressing some melodramatic mourning for the loss of their ‘English’ morals” (307).
Alexander Cadogan, die Britse adjunkminister van buitelandse sake, het die Nuremberg-verhoor vooruitgeloop met hierdie opmerking: “The other disturbing thought is that we may eventually, by agreement and in collaboration with the Russians, proceed to the trial and perhaps execution of Axis ‘war criminals’ while condemning this atrocity. I confess I shall find that extremely difficult to swallow” (Goolding 307).
“The policy of the British Government headed by Churchill was to ‘suspend judgement’. The fact that this suspension of judgement was merely a way of continuing the cover-up troubled Foreign Office members, but it didn’t force them to change their policies. They were desperate to encourage all parties to refrain from public comment” (Goolding 322). Sanford word soos volg aangehaal: “The liberal moralism of the British elites made it psychologically impossible, quite apart from their definition of the National interest, for them to accept, at least publicly, that their Soviet ally was a mass murderer. They, therefore, had to reject what would normally have been accepted as overwhelming evidence of proof of Soviet guilt for the Katyn massacre” (Goolding 329). V Rockwell, Anthony Eden se biograaf, het geskryf: “The British public suffered ‘a fit of immorality in which few were concerned with anything except winning the war and keeping the alliance with Russia intact'” (Goolding 656).
Naas hoedanig die aanvanklike reaksie in Britse regeringskringe oor Katyn was, het Goolding ook ondersoek ingestel na die houding van ander Britse instelling van April tot Junie 1943 oor die Katyn-gebeure. Die Britse radiodiens, die BBC, het anders as bv die Duitse senders, geen woord oor Katyn gerep nie (Goolding 335). Op 15 April 1943 “the German Home Service discussed the response from Allied nations: ‘The murder of some 12 000 Polish officers has not made the slightest impression so far on the British news services. Whereas London as a rule pretends [to] stand guard over the moral behaviour of humanity it pretends to be hard of hearing in the Katyn case'” (Goolding 411). Die BBC se standpunt was soos volg: “The BBC, whilst maintaining its independence, entered into a gentleman’s agreement with the government to accept official guidance in their treatment of public affairs. That is to say they undertook to conform to official policy, whilst reserving the right to execute it in their own way” (Goolding 350).
Gedurende die oorlog was die Britse pers onderhewig aan streng sensuur. Regulasies “prohibited the publication of information useful to an enemy and … empowered the Home Secretary to suppress a newspaper which systematically published matter calculated to foment opposition to the prosecution of the war” (Goolding 467). The Times het berig dat die Poolse regering die Internasionale Rooi Kruis gevra het om ondersoek in the stel. Time Magazine het gemeld “there is no way of knowing whether the German story is true” (Goolding 486). “Stalin himself won Time Magazine‘s ‘Man of the Year’ 1942″ (Goolding 568). “The British mainstream press seem to be fairly responsive to Government requests, usually keeping their articles to a neutral tone. The most extreme example I have found is the Guardian article postulating German guilt” (Goolding 534).
“On January 24, 1944, the Soviet Special Commission To Investigate the Katyn Massacre released its own report stating that the Nazi Germans had committed the atrocity after the Poles fell captive to the Nazis in July-August 1941” (Ford 310). Die Russe het soos volg beweer: “The Poles interned in the three camps had been transferred by the Russians to other camps in the vicinity of Smolensk during March and April 1940 and were taken prisoner by the Germans during the Russian retreat. The Russians flatly accused the Germans of executing ’11 000′ Polish officers in 1941” (Ford 569).
“On July 1 and 2, 1946, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg heard testimony from both German and Russian witnesses concerning the Katyn massacre. No decision as to guilt was announced by the tribunal” (Ford 310). ‘n Britse minister, Rab Butler, “argues the British hid from the limelight at Nuremberg, stating that they ‘had no direct evidence on the subject [Katyn] in their own possession.’ They let the Soviets control the prosecution, which was ultimately a sham” (Goolding 314). Een van die Nazi-beskuldigdes, Hans Frank, het in sy Nuremberg getuienis hierop gesinspeel: “Germany’s guilt had been erased ‘by the conduct of our war-time enemies towards our nation and its soldiers.’ Such conduct had been entirely excluded from the trial, he was saying, a lopsided justice. Mass crimes ‘of the most frightful sort’ had been committed against Germans” (Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the origins of genocide and crimes against humanity, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2016, Kindle 5434).
Die Koue Oorlog tussen die Weste en die Sowjetunie het in 1948 met die Berlynse blokkade begin en het in 1950-1953 uiting in ‘n militêre konflik gevind toe Noord-Korea met Josef Stalin se goedkeuring Suid-Korea binnegeval het (Ford 256). Eers in 1951 en 1952 het die Amerikaanse Kongres verhore oor die Katyn-menseslagting gehou, dus meer as ‘n dekade nadat die gebeure plaasgevind het. Gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het die Weste die steun van die Sowjetunie in die oorlog teen Nazi-Duitsland nodig gehad. Tydens die Koreaanse Oorlog was dit nie meer nodig nie en was die Sowjetunie die vyand van die Weste. Die Amerikaanse Katyn-ondersoekspan is nie in die Sowjetunie toegelaat nie.
Daar is bevind dat die Katyn-slagoffers individueel met ‘n pistool van agter in die kop geskiet is. Duitse koeëls is gebruik. Die Duitse koeëls is deur die Russe as argument gebruik om die skuld op die Duitsers te pak. Ford verskaf egter die volgende verduideliking: “The NKVD favored the compact Walther PPK semi-outomatic for this work, because the German pistol’s recoil was less severe than that of the Russian service revolver, the Belgian-designed Nagant. An executioner might have to kill two hundred and fifty men a night; the standard-issue revolver would have bruised his hand so badly that he couldn’t have used it the following day. The PPK was also a bit lighter and, with its cartridges stacked in the hand-grip, more nicely balanced. The same weapon was favored by the German Gestapo and by the American covert agency, the Office of Strategic Services. In this manner, the NKVD murdered the Polish officers, sergeants, policemen, and civilian leaders” (216). “In all, the NKVD eliminated almost half the Polish officer corps – part of Stalin’s long-range effort to prevent the resurgence of an independent Poland” (Ford 229)
Goolding verwys tereg na die skynheiligheid (“hypocrisy”) van die Britse en Amerikaanse regerings oor die Katyn-massamoord (79). Goolding noem, met spesifieke verwysing na die Britte, die gebeure as “damaging the perception of Britain as a moral idol” (103). Die Britte het nog nie verskoning vir sy verskroeide aarde-beleid en konsentrasiekampe gevra nie. Sedert die Anglo-Boere-oorlog weet Afrikaners om nie Britse regerings te vertrou nie. Sedert die betrokkenheid van die Suid-Afrikaanse weermag in Angola weet Afrikaners om nie Amerikaanse regerings te vertrou nie. Ook nie Russiese regerings nie. “We hear so much about Germany’s conquests, and so little about Russia’s parallel aggressions” (Ford 142).
Op 17 Maart 1992 het die Suid-Afrikaanse blanke kiesers in ‘n referendum ten gunste van magsdeling gestem. Reeds op 5 Oktober 1992 het Pieter de Lange, die voorsitter van die Afrikaner-Broederbond, te kenne gegee dat dit in werklikheid om magsoorgawe gaan; dat “magsprysgawe” ‘n “gesuiwerde” staanplek aan wit mense sal gee. “Al sê die politici ook wat, blankes moet aanvaar dat hul magsprysgawe permanent sal wees” (JC Steyn, Afrikanerjoernaal: ‘n Vervolgverhaal in 365 episodes, Pretoria: FAK, 2016, p 386). Sedertdien weet Afrikaners om nie die NP-regering te vertrou nie; sekerlik ook nie die ANC-regering nie. (Ek hoop om volgende keer oor Steyn se boek te skryf.)
Volgens Russiese argivale inligting is 21 857 Poolse krygsgevangenes tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog deur die Sowjetunie vermoor (Ford 223). “A more recent CIA analysis suggests that the total may have been as high as 25 000, and that the killings continued past May 1940” (Ford 323). “The Russians only formally admitting guilt in 1990″ (Gooding 39).
Kyk ook dié video oor die Katyn-slagting op die PRAAG-YouTube-kanaal:
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