Hans Strijdom – praag.co.za

Leon Lemmer: Politici met lang oë

Nadat Nelson Mandela uit die tronk vrygelaat is, is sy lewensloop datumgewys in Die Burger aangestip. Omdat toegelaat is dat hy oornag van terroris tot vryheidsvegter en selfs heilige getransformeer is, is Mandela se eerste huwelik verswyg. Dat hy as getroude man en flambojante laventelhaan in sy groot Amerikaanse Oldsmobile-motor met vroue soos Winnie rondgeflenter het, is doelbewus weggelaat. Wat by Mandela opgeval het, is “his weakness for women … especially the pretty ones” (David James Smith, Young Mandela, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010, p 109). Mandela het self erken: “I led a thoroughly immoral life,” maar op ‘n absurde manier word hy “widely regarded as … perhaps our greatest living beacon of moral authority” (97). “It was hard to accept that family was so unimportant in the scheme of his life” (161). Toe hoogs uitsonderlik ‘n onderhoud met Mandela se eerste vrou, Evelyn Mase, gevoer is, het sy opgemerk dat sy nie verstaan hoe enigeen hom as ‘n heilige kon beskou nie. Fred Bridgland “found her fuming gently at the manner in which her ex-husband’s release [from prison in 1990] was being compared to the second coming of Christ” (59).

Sedertdien is Mandela se drie huwelike in so ‘n mate deur Jacob Zuma getroef dat “die vader van ons jong demokrasie” skynbaar opnuut heilig geword het. Oor Zuma skryf Ben Turok: “Over the years there have been persistent rumours that he tended to be overfriendly with young female cadres in the camps and particularly at Somafco, the ANC school in Tanzania” (With my head above the parapet: An insider account of the ANC in power, Auckland Park: Jacana, 2014, p 78). Ook: “Zuma also came in for some ridicule over his personal life, especially his marriages and extra-marital affairs” (158).

Ronnie Kasrils skryf in sy boek, A simple man: Kasrils and the Zuma enigma (Auckland Park: Jacana, 2017), oor hulle terugkeer uit ballingskap: “My one-time friend Jacob Zuma had returned home to a previous wife in rural Zululand, and at least two wives from exile, with nine children between them, and several other offspring fathered over the years” (p 16). Een van laasgenoemde twee vroue was Kate Mantsho, wat Zuma in Maputo, Mosambiek, leer ken het. Sy het in 2000 selfdood gepleeg. Sy het ‘n nota nagelaat: “‘Life had been hell’ living with him; ‘bitter’ and ‘painful’, she wrote” (28). In Adriaan Basson se boek, Zuma exposed (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2012), is daar ‘n foto van Gloria Zuma, “Zuma’s sixth wife,” en langsaan ‘n foto van Sonono Khoza, “Zuma’s lover and mother of his child” (p xiv).

Oor die Khwezi- (eintlik Fezekile Ntsukela Kuzwayo) verkragtingsaanklag teen Zuma in 2005 skryf Kasrils: “I knew Zuma’s liking for female flesh” (106) en “knowing his notorious incapacity to control his libido” (112). Khwezi was lesbies en MIV-positief (109). Zuma was 61 en sy 31 jaar oud (113). Zuma is vrygespreek maar “he never apologised to Fezeka or to Beauty Kuzwayo [her mother]” (115). “In the court of public opinion there were no doubts. Zuma had escaped a guilty verdict on the charge of rape” (119-120). “Following the rape trial, the ANC leadership compelled Zuma to pledge that he would no longer engage in extramarital sex, which he soon flouted” (118).

In sy outobiografie skryf FW de Klerk van sy “commitment to Christian values,” wat in dieselfde asem genoem word as sy “responsibility for assuring the best possible future for my own people” (The last trek – A new beginning London: Macmillan, 1998, p xviii). “I had become an important role model in more than just politics” (367). De Klerk roem hierop onmiddellik nadat hy oor sy egskeiding van sy eerste vrou, Marike, weens sy owerspel met Elita Georgiadis, later sy tweede vrou, geskryf het. “Throughout my political career I sincerely tried to separate my personal problems from my political responsibilities” (368). Sedert 1994 ervaar ons daagliks eerstehands in hoeverre De Klerk sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor die blanke kiesers en hulle nageslag nagekom het.

FW de Klerk se ouer broer, Willem (Wimpie, van verlig/verkramp- en Boetman-faam), het destyds aan sy kleinboet die raad gegee dat hy sy egskeiding so vinnig moontlik moet afhandel. Willem was toe reeds self deur sy egskeiding van sy eerste vrou. Hy het toe met sy mede-dosent in kommunikasiekunde aan die Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, Nina Overton,* getrou. Willem het graag vertel dat hy as dosent uit Potchefstroom weg is omdat hy gedans het, maar van sy studente het aan my genoem dat sy probleem was dat hy, soos Mandela, te lief vir mooi vroue was.

[* In die politieke literatuur kom ‘n mens dikwels die frase “Overton window” teë. Dit is nie na Nina vernoem nie, maar na Joseph Overton (1960-2003). Hierdie venster omraam die idees, veral van ‘n politieke (of breër: ideologiese) aard, wat in ‘n bepaalde (bv die huidige) geestesklimaat in openbare gesprekke aanvaarbaar is of geduld word. Tans is ons sekerlik uitgelewer aan politieke korrektheid, wat een van die manifestasies van kulturele marxisme is. Politieke inkorrektheid (en dus Praag) val buite die Overton-venster. Glenn Beck het ‘n gewilde roman hieroor geskryf: The Overton window (2010, 480p; Amazon Kindle $2,27). In die nuwe Suid-Afrika word al hoe groter beperkings geplaas op wat blankes mag sê. Hulle Overton-venster word al hoe kleiner. Die uitdrukkingsvryheid van swartes, daarenteen, word feitlik in geen opsig aan bande gelê. Vir hulle is daar eintlik nie ‘n Overton-venster nie. Dalk is hulle venster gesteel.]

Dit bring my by ‘n politikus wat vanweë sy tweede huwelik verwant aan hierdie De Klerks is. Ek verwys na Johannes Gerhardus (Hans) Strijdom (1893-1958), ‘n eertydse eerste minister (1954-1958). Strijdom het in 1931 met Susan, die suster van Willem en FW se pa, Jan de Klerk, getrou. Hiermee het Strijdom verwantskap met die Doppers verkry, wat ironies is omdat dit juis die Doppers was wat vergaderings van die Nasionale Party ontwrig het as die gehoor dit gewaag het om gesange te sing (Bloomberg, bron hier onder, p 147-148). Hoewel Jan teen 1954 nog geen politieke pos beklee het nie, het Strijdom sy swaer as ‘n minister in sy kabinet aangestel. Dit is wyd en tereg as nepotisme veroordeel. Hoe uiters nadelig so ‘n vergryp kan wees, blyk uit die feit dat Jan, Willem en FW se betrokkenheid by die politiek tot hierdie misstap teruggevoer kan word. In 1990/94 het dit tot die ondergang van die blanke bewind gelei; iets wat Strijdom sekerlik glad nie begeer het nie.

Oor Strijdom se eerste huwelik is meesal geswyg. Andersins is net vaagweg daarna verwys. Soms is beweer dat Strydom se eerste vrou ‘n Engelse aktrise was. Onlangs is ‘n boek gepubliseer wat in besonderhede oor die gebeure handel: David Bloomberg, The lion and the thespian: The true story of prime minister JG Strydom’s marriage to the actress Marda Vanne (Johannesburg: Bookstorm, 2017, 335p, R300). In Kaapstad was Bloomberg (gebore in 1932) as regspraktisyn bekend, asook in teatergeledere. As polities oorverligte was hy ‘n raadslid van Kaapstad en van 1973 tot 1975 ook die burgemeester. In 1988, toe dit waarvoor hy hom beywer het, naamlik ‘n swart regering, al hoe meer ‘n moontlikheid geword het, het Bloomberg eers na Engeland uitgewyk en hom daarna in Switserland gevestig.

Bloomberg is een van baie anti-apartheidsaktiviste wat die omstandighede in die nuwe Suid-Afrika as onleefbaar beskou en gevolglik geëmigreer het. Deel van Bloomberg se politieke byderwetsheid blyk uit die buitensporige mate waarin hy in hierdie boek homoseksualiteit goedpraat. Wanneer hy Strijdom laat sê: “Sexual preferences have no place in Afrikaner society” (p 148), dateer hy ‘n hedendaagse kwessie terug tot die 1920’s. Ook wanneer hy beweer dat Strijdom tydens ‘n politieke vergadering nie die aanspreekvorm “dames en here” gebruik het nie (152), maar soos die swartes deesdae van “brothers and sisters” gepraat het (148). Ook verwysings na mense wat meer ruimte/”space” in ‘n verhouding wil hê (170, 304), klink erg hedendaags.

Die leeu waarna in die boektitel verwys word, is Hans Strijdom, wat in politieke geledere as die Leeu van die Noorde bekend gestaan het. Die aktrise waarna verwys word, is Margaretha van Hulsteyn, wat die verhoognaam Marda Vanne aangeneem het omdat dit meer aanvaarbaar in Britse teatergeledere is. “A name that tripped a little more easily off the tongue might be more acceptable to English audiences” (61). Die “Vanne” is ‘n aanpassing van Van Hulsteyn (62). Daar word beweer dat Strijdom na aanleiding hiervan ook sy van na Strydom verander het (229), maar ek hou by die meer gebruiklike en oorspronklike spelling van Hans se van. “Thespian” is “a fancy name for an actor or actress … It comes from a fellow called Thespis, an early actor in Ancient Greece” (p 237). Die outeur stal deurgaans sy grondige kennis en ervaring van die teater uit.

Die werk word aangebied as “a biographical novel based on the true story of the marriage, in 1924, of JG Strijdom … to the actress Marda Vanne” (vii). Fiktiewe tonele en dialoog is bygevoeg, asook ‘n vyftal karakters (viii), om die boek meer leesbaar te maak. Hou veral die fiktiewe aard van die dialoog in gedagte. Dit lyk asof die navorsing oor die toneelspelers deeglik gedoen is; minder so wat Strijdom betref. Die outeur gaan taamlik loslit om met historiese gebeure, bv die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek. Hiervoor het hy skynbaar op sy algemene kennis en geheue gesteun. Byvoorbeeld, volgens Hermann Giliomee het die Franse Hugenote tussen 1688 en 1700 in die Kaap aangekom, terwyl Bloomberg wyd van die merk is met “with the arrival of the Huguenots in the 1830s” (148).

Margaretha (1896-1970) was die dogter van ‘n Pretoriase advokaat, sir Willem van Hulsteyn (gebore in 1865), wat as ‘n 15-jarige uit Nederland geëmigreer en hom in Pretoria gevestig het. Sy titel het hy van die Britte ontvang ter erkenning van die dienste wat hy aan hulle tydens die Anglo-Boere-oorlog gelewer het (5). Na die oorlog het Willem egter sterk Afrikaner- en Afrikaansgesind geword. Margaretha was egter ‘n “non-conformist” en ‘n “tomboy” met ‘n sterk wil (6). Haar aggressiwiteit het uiting in “many scraps” gevind, gevolglik het ‘n onderwyser haar die bynaam Scrappy gegee (7). Later sê sy: “I was never a committed Christian … I’m probably agnostic” (175). Ek gebruik voortaan die name Hans en Scrappy.

Scrappy was “flirtatious” en daar was van vroeg af twyfel “to which side of the divide” haar seksualiteit sou ontwikkel (16). Sy was versot op toneelspel en van jongs af “flirt with the actors and actresses” (19). Sy wou egter nie ‘n Afrikaanse aktrise wees nie. Sy het gedink Afrikaanse dramaturge se “outlook is too confined … British plays are far more cultured and cosmopolitan” (26). Sy wou na Engeland gaan vir opleiding as aktrise en bowenal om haar uitspraak van Engels te verbeter (26). Scrappy het op ‘n jong ouderdom die rookgewoonte aangeleer. “This habit gave her additional sophistication” (25).

Terwyl die Van Hulsteyn-gesin in 1912 in Muizenberg vakansie gehou het, het sy as 16-jarige ‘n seksuele verhouding met ‘n jong digter en skilder, Isaac Rosenberg (1890-1918), gehad. Rosenberg is homoseksueel (44) en Scrappy neig lesbies, maar “it’s not a sin” (45). Vir my is die irriterendste kenmerk van die boek die manier waarop Bloomberg vir Rosenberg en later vir Scrappy gebruik om nie net Joodse kultuur te verduidelik nie, maar om alles wat Joods is positief voor te stel en te propageer. Vir hierdie doel word Strijdom erg anti-semities uitgebeeld met Scrappy wat hom nie net oor die Jode teenspreek nie, maar ook oor sy anti-Britse en anti-swart gesindheid. Van Hans word gesê: “His vitriolic dislike of anything Jewish or English and his denigration of people whose skins were darker than his own suggested to Scrappy a person lacking culture and refinement” (164). “There are brilliant Jews in the world who have done much for humankind” (138).

Scrappy sê: “I’ve met a number of Jews and they have all been kind and understanding people, so wise. What makes them cleverer than others? Do you think they really are God’s Chosen People?” (211). Bloomberg dink sekerlik so. Hy laat Gerard Moerdijk sê: “The volk generally resent the Jews being more successful than they are” (212). Shakespeare word soos volg aangehaal: “Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions … If you prick us, do we not bleed?” (138, ook 35). Hans werp teë: “We Afrikaners have our own identity. We have no room for Jews; they cannot be assimilated into our volk … There is no such thing as a good Jew” (139). As teenvoeter verwys Bloomberg na die Boerejode, maar hy spel dit “Boerejoode” (138, 179). Bloomberg sorg dat Eugène Marais die volgende lof aan Jode toeswaai: “Jews … are an extraordinary race and their contribution to the cultural, intellectual, scientific and technological evolution of humankind has been immense … no other race or group of people has even come close in matching, proportionally, Jewish abilities and accomplishments” (178).

Hans is op die plaas Klipfontein in die distrik Willowmore gebore. Hy het hom aan die Victoria College op Stellenbosch in die regte bekwaam (20) en daarna op Nylstroom gepraktiseer (49). Hy was kaptein van die plaaslike rugbyspan (50) en lid van die onlangs gestigte Nasionale Party (21). Hans het die ná-oorlogse Afrikanernasionalisme onderskryf: een volk en een taal. “My people, the Afrikaners, have to be reborn and emerge young and creative and a force to be reckoned with – in business and in politics. If we are not able to do this, there is a fear that we will be wiped out as a people … I find it very difficult to develop any kind of loyalty towards the British. We are a different breed and it is my fear that unless we are very strong our people will be eliminated” (23).

Volgens Hans “the war is not over – it is only half-time. Afrikaner nationalism is on the rise. We suffered enough at the hands of the British. The war was caused by the British. They have lived off our land – and we will get it back” (51). Die laaste sinsnede is later deur Nelson Mandela met pro-swart en anti-blanke motiewe geëggo. Hans word beskryf as “honest … dedicated and incorruptible” (50, ook 133) en as “trustworthy, reliable, God-fearing and loving” (211). “A man of granite determination and huge confidence” (83). “An unabashed and unapologetic champion of white supremacy” (293).

Aan die begin van 1915 vertrek Scrappy, nie sonder aanvanklike teenstand van haar ouers nie, na Engeland en skryf as student in by die Central School for Speech Training and Dramatic Art in Londen (52). Sy is beïndruk met die toneelspel van ‘n opkomende aktrise, Gwen Ffrangcon-Davies (1891-1992), en skryf as ‘n bewonderaar ‘n brief aan haar. Gwen is lesbies en ‘n Christian Scientist (59, 121). Ná ‘n jaar het Scrappy weens die uitbreking van die Eerste Wêreldoorlog na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer. “You have made great strides in remedying your accent … you almost sound British” (60). Terug in Suid-Afrika sê sy: “I don’t speak Afrikaans any longer” (66). “She avoided speaking in her mother tongue” (80). Scrappy woon en sosialiseer in boheemse geledere (70, 80) en tree in ‘n aantal Engelse toneelstukke op. Sy het ‘n “angelic appearance” maar “beneath it lay an enfant terrible who was mischievous, opinionated, promiscuous and even rebellious” (70). In 1918 tydens ‘n besoek aan Kaapstad kom sy weer vir Rosenberg teë, wat ‘n gedig aan haar opdra, maar haar ‘attempt at seduction … failed” (77). Scrappy sê aan Rosenberg: “Perhaps my passion is stronger than yours. I, I have to confess, have probably been promiscuous … Favouring my own gender, I suppose. But I have enjoyed dalliances on the other side too” (75-76). “Her flirtations were many and varied” (80). Sy korrespondeer met Gwen (80).

Scrappy se pa ken vir Hans en hulle woon een van sy politieke vergaderings in Pretoria by. “There was a fire and determination in the man’s eyes that Scrappy had not encountered before” (84). By die onthaal ná afloop van die vergadering word sy aan Hans voorgestel. Dit blyk toe dat Hans al vir Scrappy op die verhoog sien optree het, maar “I would be much happier if you were in the Afrikaans theatre” (85). Hans sê ook: “I have never left my fatherland … I have all the culture I need right here. Afrikaner culture” (86).

Scrappy keer in 1918 terug na Londen en verneem daar dat Rosenberg in Duitsland gesneuwel het (88). Haar Londense agent, Bernie Lewis, is ‘n karakter wat Bloomberg geskep het en hierdie Jood is te goed vir woorde. Lewis sê: “I am a mensch, I assure you … Yiddish. A man of integrity” (95). Scrappy ontmoet vir Gwen, maar hulle kan nie saambly soos Scrappy dit wil hê nie. Gwen sê: “There is a [married] man who has being paying me a lot of attention lately” (100). “This would not be my first choice – my body does not yearn for a man, but in its own way it’s quite thrilling to be in the arms of a handsome man” (101). “A thoroughly deflated and disillusioned Scrappy” gaan terug na haar Londense blyplek en drink sjerrie. “Her excessive drinking and smoking” (136, ook 206) sou ‘n al hoe meer vernietigende rol in haar lewe speel. “The Boers prefer brandy” (118); iets wat sy uitgeleef het (123, 125). Sy speel ses maande lank in toneelstukke in Birmingham (106). Werk is skaars omdat die gewildheid van radio inbreuk op teatergang maak en klankrolprente na verwagting spoedig lewende opvoerings ernstig sou kortwiek (105).

Hierna het Scrappy en Gwen saam in ‘n huurhuis in Londen gewoon (112). Die homoseksuele akteur, John Gielgud (1904-2000), was ‘n huisvriend. Hy het gesê: “Homosexual experience did not exclude those whose preferences lay elsewhere and that it was quite common for people to stray from their first gender of choice” (115). “The theatre … was regarded as a breeding ground for deviant behaviour” (116). “All forms of sexuality were accepted and tolerated by those in the theatre” (117). Maar Gielgud “in public … masquerades as a robust figure of the male sex” (118). Ook Gwen “chose to exercise discretion and presented to the public a much-feminised personality and lifestyle … Scrappy, on the other hand, was much less discreet” (116). Scrappy was nooit so bekend en beroemd soos Gielgud nie; ook nie in dieselfde mate as Gwen nie. “Scrappy did not achieve the same level of stardom as her companion” (114; ook 123). Haar agent sê aan haar: “You’re not the sex-kitten type” (274). Alec Waugh (1898-1981) skryf: Scrappy “lacked sex appeal on stage … She did not look embraceable” (Wikipedia). Soveel te meer vra ‘n mens jou af: Waarom het Hans aangetrokke tot haar gevoel? – hoewel sy dalk as jong meisie aantrekliker as later was.

Na ‘n afwesigheid van vyf jaar het Scrappy na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer om haar pa se 60ste verjaardag te vier (124). “After the sophistication of London [she] found it difficult to fit in to essentially Afrikaner provincial life in Pretoria in 1923 [1925?]” (127). “In her youth, father and daughter had had a special relationship but the more she became involved in theatre, the more they drifted apart” (128). Bloomberg doen deurgaans moeite om die Britse lewenswyse te verheerlik en te beklemtoon hoe agterlik Afrikaners is. Scrappy se pa sê aan haar: “I now know where my roots are and I stand tall as a proud Afrikaner. The move in this country is towards Afrikaner solidarity and nationalism, and the volk, at least, are not going to tolerate [Jan] Smuts’s love affair with foreign countries, particularly the British” (131).

Scrappy ontmoet weer vir Hans nadat haar pa gesê het: “Whenever he sees me he asks about you … He made me promise you’d call him when you got home” (132). Scrappy is pro-Brits, maar Hans sê: “I cannot forgive. And I refuse to forget. Feelings here run very deep. The British are still here – but this is our country; it belongs to the volk” (134). “[I] am prepared to give my life to ensure that this country remains a white Afrikaner nation” (140). Wat het Hans van Scrappy verwag? “To be my partner in building a new country for the Afrikaner people. A South Africa that would be able to compete with other great countries of the world” (142).

Op ‘n politieke vergadering sê Hans: “The white man must rule, and rule firmly with an iron fist” (150). “This is a white man’s country and it has to stay that way” (151). Dan lê Bloomberg hierdie woorde in Hans se mond: “I will propose that we get rid of all the Jews!” (154). Hans en Barry Hertzog stem saam “racial separation is imperative to the interests of our volk … [It] is also in the best interests of Native culture and traditions … it is in their own interest too” (202).

In Nylstroom is die digter, Eugène Marais (1871-1936), en die argitek, Gerard Moerdijk (1890-1958), Hans se grootste huisvriende (162). Soos van Scrappy verwag kon word, word haar verhouding met Hans in Nylstroom dadelik van ‘n intieme seksuele aard. Hulle “rapidly moved from park to first gear” (167). Hoe is dit moontlik dat twee sulke teenoorgesteldes mekaar kon vind? Scrappy het dit later soos volg verduidelik. “When I first met him I did not believe we could even be friends … while I was astonished at his abilities as an orator, I have to confess that I found him a little arrogant and bombastic. And I certainly didn’t share many of his political views. Since then, I’ve got to know him much better … He is undoubtedly a strong man – something I admire – fiercely patriotic, a nationalist, and uncompromising in his politics. He is also, of course, anti-British, anti-Native and anti-Semitic … he is also very intelligent, kind. And he seems to like me – a lot! There are two sides to the man. When addressing a meeting, he is like a lion; politically ruthless, he seems to cast a spell over his audience … He believes every word he says. Off stage, with me, he is gentle and tender” (193-194).

Hans vra haar om met hom te trou (196). Scrappy reageer: “I need time to sort myself out” (196). “I do not share many of the views that define your manifesto” (197). “I don’t hate the British the way you do” (198). Sy hou ook nie van sy “hatred of the Jews” nie (198). “I would worry about your irrational fear of the Natives. You see them very differently to the way I do, as partners in the new Union” (199). Hier het Bloomberg nuwe Suid-Afrika-retoriek tot die 1920’s terugdateer. “We do have these fundamental differences” (199). “I find many of his political views abhorrent” (210). “She did not agree with many of his extreme right-wing views” (207). Sy gaan terug na Londen.

Wanneer Scrappy terugkeer na Pretoria en Nylstroom is daar in kerklike en politieke geledere beswaar teen die sonde van “premarital and extramarital sex” (217) waarin sy en Hans lewe en ook teen haar gehegtheid aan die Engelse (222). Druk word uitgeoefen dat hulle moet trou (223). Hulle raak verloof en Scrappy wil dáár die streep trek. “Why can’t we just go on being engaged?” (233). Daarna stel sy voor: “Say I agree to marry you for a year” (235). Grondliggend aan haar twyfel is nie net Hans se politiek nie maar ook die aard van haar seksualiteit. Hans aanvaar hierdie kompromie in die hoop dat sy hulle huwelik onbepaald sou voortsit (236).

Die huwelik buite gemeenskap van goedere word op 7 Januarie 1924 volgens Scrappy se voorkeure voltrek voor ‘n magistraat, genaamd Wollaston, te Caledonplein, Kaapstad (239). Hans se ouers en sy ouer broer, Matthys, daag vir die onthaal in die Hotel Alexandra in Muizenberg op; nie sy drie ander broers en suster nie (239, 241). In ‘n tydskrifartikel word Hans se ouers as “one of the old pioneer families that settled at Oudshoorn” beskryf (244). Bloomberg noem dat Hans se ouers van Willowmore gekom het en het die vermetelheid om die Strijdoms “unsophisticated farmers” te noem (241). Alles wat Joods is, is volgens Bloomberg wonderlik. Hy vertel, blykbaar met smaak, dat Hans tydens die huweliksonthaal roomys wou hê en toe meegedeel is dat dit nie in ‘n “kosher hotel” verskaf kon word nie. Bloomberg verduidelik wat dit beteken: “We follow the Jewish dietary laws, ‘Kashrut’, which is the separation of meat and dairy. You have already eaten meat and this cannot be followed by ice cream, which is dairy” (245).

Die egpaar bring hulle wittebrood in Hermanus deur (245), gevolg deur ‘n geselligheid in Pretoria (246). Scrappy lig Gwen per brief in oor die gebeure: “I just got used to the relationship and I guess I must now admit to myself, at least, that I am attracted to both men and women … I have told Hans that I will stay married to him for at least one year but I don’t think he takes that seriously” (247). Gwen skryf terug: “I have difficulty in visualising you being married to a politician and living in a small country village. I never thought that you had the capacity to make such a volte-face from the life you were used to and were such a part of in London” (261).

Scrappy woon selde kerk saam met Hans by (252). “Scrappy had not been very successful in making friends with any of the women in Nylstroom. Those she did meet tended to be narrow-minded churchgoers entirely caught up in white nationalistic politics, and she found she had little in common with any of them” (254-255). “There isn’t a woman in this village with even the intellectual capacity of a bobbejaan for me to befriend” (258). Bloomberg sê dit via Scrappy van Afrikanervroue, maar hy durf dit nie van swartes skryf nie. “I’m bored stiff … life here for me is just so dreary” (255). “Dull in the extreme” (259). “The public knows me there [in London]; here I’m a nonentity – the wife of a politician … I don’t see myself as the demure, prim, conforming, churchgoing wife of an ultra-conservative nationalist member of parliament” (256-257). “Being his wife is a lonely experience” (260). “In order to alleviate the depression that had descended on her, she had to find a way of ending the marriage. It had all been a dreadful mistake and she felt that if she acted now she could return to London, pick up the pieces, retrieve her position as a successful actress, possibly resume a private life with Gwen” (263).

Scrappy bespreek haar situasie met Hans. Sy openbaar dat sy lesbies is. “That’s the way I am really … It’s just the way some people are born” (264). “Who knows how better to make love to a woman than another woman? Who knows a woman’s body better than another woman?” (266). Hans se standpunt is bybels gegrond: “It says that women who commit unnatural sexual acts behave immorally and shamefully. It describes sexual impurity as an act that degrades our bodies” (265). “He was grim-faced, clearly hurt and in shock” (265). “I am devastated, Scrappy … Shame on you that you could be so deceitful. You perpetrated a fraud on me … I am mortified” (267). Scrappy reageer: “What I’ve done to her [Gwen] – and to you – is despicable beyond words, I know, and I am deeply ashamed of myself. I have hurt the two people that I care most about” (267). “This life is not for me … I can’t allow myself to be condemned to Nylstroom – or even Pretoria – for the rest of my life. I have no real interest in politics; frankly, I’m bored out of my mind … I’m a city girl and … my future lies on the stage there [London]” (268). “I cannot go on living this lie” (270).

Scrappy is terug na Londen (270). “Her love for Gwen was undiminished” (271). “Heterosexual experience does not preclude a lesbian identity” (295). Tot haar spyt het sy Gwen ‘n jaar lank verruil “for an Afrikaner with whom she had little in common” (272). Gwen neem haar nie dadelik terug in haar huis nie. Gwen stel voor “we both keep our separate homes, certainly for the time being” (295). Gwen voer onder meer hierdie rede aan: “You seem to have a greater need for carnal pleasure than I do” (294).

“A distressed but not embittered Hans Strydom entered the process of adjusting to life without Scrappy” (275). “He … was living the lie that his wife’s absence was no more than temporary” (276). Hy besef egter dat Scrappy nie na hom sal terugkeer nie, gevolglik skryf hy aan haar dat hy om ‘n egskeiding op grond van verlating aansoek gaan doen (277). Sy stem in (278). Op 24 Desember 1924 slaag die aansoek om egskeiding (281). Hierna tree Scrappy in Amerika in ‘n toneelstuk op. Op 1 Februarie 1926 word die egskeidingsbevel skriftelik deur haar in New York City aanvaar (282). Op 12 November 1926 word hulle amptelik geskei (286). “Thus ended a marriage that had lasted some seven months of the parties living together, but which legally endured for two years before termination” (286). Scrappy se reaksie was: “That regretful period of my life is over. I am now a gay divorcee” (289).

“On 14 January 1931, JG Strydom MP, aged thirty-seven, married for the second time. His bride was the twenty-one-year-old Susanna (Susan) de Klerk, who had been born in Aliwal North. She came from a long, well-established line of Afrikaner political stock. Her father was the Reverend Willem Johannes de Klerk, who in 1914 was a founder member of the National Party, and her mother was Aletta Johanna van Rooy. Susan’s brother was Johannes (Jan) de Klerk, who had been born in Burghersdorp but grew up in Potchefstroom” (297). “In 1927, [Jan] de Klerk had married Hendrina Cornelia Coetzer whose father was also involved in Afrikaner politics” (298). Hulle het twee kinders gehad, Willem en FW.

Gwen en Scrappy het mettertyd ‘n eiendom “near Stambourne, about five miles from Finchingfield” (302), genaamd Tagley Cottage, in Essex gekoop. In 1936 het hulle na Suid-Afrika gekom (307) en onder meer Scrappy se ouers besoek. Ná ‘n afwesigheid van drie en ‘n halwe maand was hulle terug in Londen (309). “Although Gwen’s physical needs had waned, their relationship remained a loving one, despite Gwen knowing full well of Scrappy’s affairs with their joint friends, the novelist Angela du Maurier [1904-2002] and the stage director Margaret Webster [1905-1972], among others. Scrappy rationalised her behaviour by convincing herself that her strong libido required attention and that her relationship with Gwen had become an open one. Mutual friends long believed that Gwen’s life was dominated by her work, while Scrappy’s life revolved around her sexuality” (311).

In 1940 het Scrappy en Gwen weer na Suid-Afrika gekom om die gevare van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog te ontduik (314). Hulle het in die stede en op die platteland toneel gespeel (319), “but we know our own professional standards are not being met” (318). “The ladies were invited to have tea in Pretoria with King George VI and Queen Elizabeth during their 1947 royal visit to South Africa” (321). Ná die stigting van die Nasionale Toneelorganisasie het Scrappy van 1948 af in die NTO-raad gedien en van 1950 af as die NTO se artistieke adviseur gewerk (322). In 1950 is Gwen terug na Engeland (322). Scrappy het haar later gevolg maar eers nadat sy weens dronkbestuur gearresteer is (323). In 1952 was albei vir ‘n wyle terug in Suid-Afrika (324). Scrappy het die res van die jare vyftig plaaslik deurgebring. In 1954 het sy Hans per telegram geluk gewens met sy verkiesing as eerste minister (325). Volgens Bloomberg “Strydom was a naked racist and intransigent, and ruled his cabinet with an iron fist” (329). In 1965 het Scrappy Britse burgerskap aanvaar (325). Sy en Gwen het saam in Tagley Cottage gewoon. Na Scrappy se dood in 1970 (325) het Gwen in 1971 vir oulaas weer vir ‘n wyle in Suid-Afrika toneel gespeel (333).

Hans het weens sy troue met Scrappy spreekwoordelik ‘n perd opgeklim wat hy nie kon ry nie. Maar hy het nie ander mense benadeel nie en die skade aan sy openbare beeld redelik gou oorkom. FW de Klerk het egter met sy grondwetlike onderhandelings met terroriste en kommuniste, wat toegelaat is om feitlik ongesteurd hulle gewelddadige bedrywighede voort te sit, ‘n perd opgeklim wat die Europese beskawing, die land en blanke inwoners en hulle nageslag onberekenbare skade aangedoen het. Hans se misstap is mikroskopies klein in vergelyking met De Klerk se kolossale dwaasheid.

Leon Lemmer: Die dodemars van die Afrikaner en Suid-Afrika?

Diegene wat daarin belangstel om te weet watter soort mens Nelson Mandela was, kan gerus FW de Klerk (gebore op 18 Maart 1936) se outobiografie, The last trek – A new beginning (London: Macmillan, 1998, xx, 412p) lees. Die boek bied uitstekende insig in die kleinheid en immoraliteit van Mandela se gees. In hierdie rubriek skryf ek egter oor De Klerk. Soos Mandela kon De Klerk nie op sy eie sy outobiografie skryf nie. Dave Steward is eintlik die mede-outeur en die joernalis Alf Ries en De Klerk se kantoorpersoneel het ook gehelp (p xiii). Ten spyte van al die hulp word bv verkeerdelik beweer dat die Vrede van Vereeniging in Vereeniging pleks van in Huis Melrose in Pretoria onderteken is (36).

De Klerk se huistaal is deesdae Engels. Die manuskrip van sy outobiografie is ook in Engels geskryf, wat ‘n aanduiding kan wees van die mate waarin hy homself van Afrikaners vervreem het. ‘n Niggie van De Klerk het die Afrikaanse vertaling versorg. Die teks van sy toespraak van 2 Februarie 1990 het hy oorspronklik nog in Afrikaans geskryf (164). In Namibië, waar Afrikaans veel beter as Engels verstaan word, het De Klerk in 1990 verkies om Engels tydens die onafhanklikheidsplegtigheid te praat (171). Ek gebruik die Engelse uitgawe van De Klerk se outobiografie omdat ek my eksemplaar tweedehands teen R20 gekoop het. In die gebrekkige indeks is daar net twee verwysings na Afrikaans. Heel teen die einde word die hedendaagse “downgrading of Afrikaans” darem genoem (395). Andersins word na Afrikaans eintlik net in die konteks van regse Afrikaners verwys. Daar word oor Afrikaanse kultuur (bv 42, 46) pleks van Afrikanerkultuur (‘n onderskeid wat deesdae ook nie meer deur bv die ATKV gemaak word nie) geskryf. Ná sy roemlose magsoorgawe en ten spyte van sy uiterste verlooptheid verwys De Klerk ironies na “my people, the Afrikaners” (295). Vermelding van sy berugte en grootliks fiktiewe wigte en teenwigte (“checks and balances”), waarvan ons destyds so dikwels gehoor het, kom selde in die boek voor (236, 325).

Die boek is eintlik ‘n selftevrede regverdiging van die blanke politieke magsverlies sedert 1990/94. Terugskouend is dit duidelik dat De Klerk nie net die gevaar in die swart gevaar misken het nie, maar ook die gevaar in die rooi gevaar. Hy het die politieke mag sonder daadwerklike beperkings aan die swartes en kommuniste oorgedra. Hierdie wete is selfs ‘n bron van tevredenheid by De Klerk: “Few heads of goverment could ever have laid aside their high office with a greater sense of accomplishment, regardless of the uncertainties of the future” (xix). Die teks is deeglik en slim (of slu) geskryf en daar word uiteraard – meesal sonder om dit te erken (behalwe in hoofstuk 35) – sterk op nabaat gesteun, bv “I … vowed quietly to myself that I would change all this if I ever became president” (69), maar ook: “With the benefit of hindsight I today believe that we should have given much more attention to the federal option” (109). Hou in gedagte dat die boek in die Mandela-era (1994-1999) tot stand gekom het, dus toe die daadwerklike agteruitgang van die land maar pas begin het. Ek gaan nie De Klerk se lewensloop vertel nie en eerder konsentreer op politieke aspekte van aktuele belang.

De Klerk voldoen aan twee hedendaagse prestige-vereistes. Hy stam af van ‘n Indiese slavin (4) en “my best playmates were the young sons of the black farmhands who worked for my father” (20). By FW was daar toe nog ‘n “strong sense of [cultural] difference” (20). Sy pa, Jan de Klerk, het na bewering ‘n “long and distinguished political career” gehad (11). Jan se suster, Susan, was eerste minister Hans Strijdom se eggenote. Strijdom het vir swaer Jan as ‘n minister aangestel. Dit is destyds (tereg) as nepotisme veroordeel (17). Dat nepotisme uiters gevaarlik, selfs volks- en beskawingsvernietigend kan wees, blyk uit die feit dat FW as gevolg hiervan sy voet in die deur van die politiek gekry het. “I am convinced that he [Jan] would also have supported the reform initiatives that I took during my presidency” (18). FW waag dit gelukkig nie om te beweer dat Hans Strijdom in die nuwe Suid-Afrika tuis sou voel nie. Strijdom se standpunt was immers: “The white man must remain master of the white areas of South Africa” (29). Oor Mandela as staatshoof skryf FW: “My uncle [Strijdom] would never have dreamed that such a development could ever take place or that I would play a major role in bringing it about” (21).

Wat De Klerk as staatshoof gedoen het, is die teenoorgestelde van waarvoor die Nasionale Party (NP) hom histories beywer het. Apartheid in die sin van rasse-onderskeid of -diskriminasie was die tradisionele beleid van Suid-Afrika, tydens Britse kolonialisme en sedert 1910. “Law by law, during my presidency and that of my predecessor, President PW Botha, it had been dismantled” (xv). Afsonderlike ontwikkeling, waarvolgens elke etniese of kultuurgroep self oor sy eie sake beheer uitoefen, was die noodsaaklike voorwaarde vir blanke (insluitende Afrikaner-) selfbehoud. Die vernietiging van sowel apartheid as afsonderlike ontwikkeling het gelei tot meerderheids- (oftewel swart) oorheersing: “the day that many white South Africans had dreaded for centuries” (xvi) – en nie sonder grondige redes nie; “the day that my party, the National Party, had for most of its existence done everything in its power to avoid” (xvi). Maar dít is presies wat De Klerk vermag het.

Die ANC het in 1994 die politieke mag by die NP oorgeneem. Pleks van skaam en veel meer as skaam te wees, spog De Klerk oor die blankes se magsverlies: “It was the moment for which I worked day and night since I became president of South Africa in September 1989” (xvi). “I had never had any illusions that this would be the outcome of the reform process that I began on 2 February 1990” (xvii). “What we did was part of a clear vision and that we were aware of where it would lead us” (101). As dit die waarheid is dat De Klerk hom sedert 1989 of 1990 vir swart magsoorgawe beywer het, was die 1992-referendum oor magsdeling ‘n slenter, dus ‘n skelmstreek, soos ek voorheen uitgewys het (Praag 2.05.2015).

[Robin Renwick, die Britse ambassadeur in Suid-Afrika (1987-1991), het rekord van die gebeure gehou en spreek De Klerk teë. Oor sy gesprek op 20 April 1989 met Barend du Plessis skryf Renwick: “Du Plessis, like his colleagues, including De Klerk, was thinking in terms of power-sharing and certainly not of a transfer of power” (Mission to South Africa: Diary of a revolution, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2015, 139p; Amazon Kindle $11,39, 1373). Op 10 May 1989 “De Klerk told me [Renwick] that he envisaged a new constitutional body that would be above the existing houses of parliament. The homelands would become part of a federation” (1393). Onder die opskrif “June 1989” skryf Renwick oor FW de Klerk: “His brother, Wimpie [Willem], who was playing a leading role in the private discussions with the ANC, told me he feared that his brother was far too conservative to be a good president” (1432). Op 26 Oktober 1989 het De Klerk aan Renwick gesê “he was not in the business of ‘reforming himself out of power'” (1584). Op 19 Maart 1990 De Klerk “considered the key to be the protection of minority rights … He talked of some form of power-sharing” (1874). Ek het die politieke gebeure destyds nougeset gevolg en glo eerder vir Renwick as De Klerk.]

De Klerk skryf: “In the end they [the blacks] were liberated not by violence … but through peaceful negotiations and compromise” (xvi). In werklikheid toon sowel De Klerk as Niël Barnard (Praag 8 Julie) aan dat geweld ‘n deurslaggewende rol tydens die onderhandelings tot voordeel van die ANC gespeel het; dermate dat daar baie meer (fundamentele) NP-toegewings as die enkele (onbeduidende) ANC-kompromieë was. Hermann Giliomee verskaf in talle opsigte ‘n nugtere perspektief op die verknoeide grondwetlike onderhandelings (Praag 18 Maart).

In sy jeug het De Klerk homself as ‘n “brave defender of the truth” beskou (20). Ook: “I … did not seek popularity” (25). André P Brink (1935-2015), wat saam met De Klerk ‘n student op Potchefstroom was, het ‘n ander siening: “Sy mees opvallende eienskap was ‘n drang om mense ter wille te wees en ‘n bereidwilligheid, selfs ‘n gretigheid, om nogal laag te kruip om dit te bereik” (‘n Vurk in die pad: A memoir (Kaapstad: Human & Rousseau, 2009, p 143-144) en “Hoewel alles in hom en alles in sy verlede in opstand moet gewees het daarteen, was De Klerk geslepe genoeg as politikus om die tekens van die tye en die luim in die land akkuraat genoeg te lees en daarvolgens te handel” (441).

In sy outobiografie skryf De Klerk oor sy rol as minister: “I am by nature a peacemaker” (130). “I increasingly began to play the role of a peacemaker and bridge builder” (81); ‘n brug wat tot die onsaligheid van ‘n swart meerderheidsregering gelei het. “I increasingly took the lead in our internal debates in formulating compromises and in defusing potential crises” (82). “There comes a time when true peace is no longer attainable and the sham peace does more harm than good” (130).

Voor 1990 het De Klerk gesonde politieke insig getoon. “In my perception, our determination to retain the right of white South Africans to rule themselves was not simply a matter of chauvinism. I believed that it was also essential for the maintenance of our physical security and basic freedoms” (38). De Klerk verduidelik soos volg die U-draai wat hy in die politiek gemaak het: “Throughout my life I would share his [my father’s] deep commitment to the cause of Afrikaner nationalism and to the Afrikaans culture, language and heritage. Later in my career I would, however, develop a very different approach to the manner in which Afrikaner interests – together with those of South Africans of all races – could best be accommodated in an inclusive and non-racial society” (12). “I supported apartheid as a young man … how could we all have supported policies that we now regard as unjust and repressive?” (15).

Die NP se “new policy … constituted a 180 degree change in policy for ever away from apartheid, separate development and racial discrimination. The proposed framework accepted the fundamental principles of one united South Africa; one person, one vote; the eradication of all forms of racial discrimination; and the effective protection of minorities against domination. It sought to strike a balance between the ideal of having one nationhood on the one hand, and the reality of our cultural diversity on the other. The new policy framework was accepted by a special Federal Congress of the National Party in Durban in August 1986” (109).

Hier word die lesers van die boek myns insiens ernstig mislei, of die beweerde besluit oor bv een mens, een stem, is destyds nie aan die blanke kiesers gekommunikeer nie. Later dateer De Klerk die NP se aanvaarding van die beleid van een mens, een stem, dalk selfs verder terug: “It was a great pity that the ANC and its allies had opposed all the reform measures that the government had adopted from the end of the 1970s. (In fact, they stepped up their armed struggle after the National Party had already accepted its new vision of a united South Africa with one-man, one-vote.)” (376).

[Op 12 April 1990 het Robin Renwick vir Roelf Meyer gevra “to deal directly with the issue of one person, one vote” (Renwick, Kindle 1968). Op 19 April 1990 “De Klerk made a speech to parliament in which he accepted for the first time the possibility of universal suffrage based on a common voters’ roll … De Klerk continued to reject the notion of ‘black majority rule'” (Kindle 1987). Op 8 November 1990: “The ANC had two demands – the complete scrapping of apartheid and giving everybody the vote” (2264). Volgens hierdie aantekeninge van Renwick kan De Klerk en die NP se aanvaarding van algemene stemreg gebaseer op die beginsel van een mens, een stem, onmoontlik tot 1986 teruggedateer word. Hermann Giliomee skryf: “De Klerk het later aangevoer dat die tussentydse grondwet van 1993 die logiese gevolg was van besluite wat die NP in 1986-87 geneem het. Dié mening moet verwerp word. Die 1986-besluite het wel ‘n gesamentlike stelsel aanvaar, maar binne die raamwerk van verpligte rasseklassifikasie en ‘n onderskeid tussen ‘eie’ en ‘algemene’ sake. Die doel was ‘n stelsel wat versigtig ontwerp moes word om swart oorheersing deur blote getalleoorwig te voorkom” (Die laaste Afrikanerleiers, Kaapstad, Tafelberg, 2012, p 297-298).]

De Klerk sou nooit ‘n ja-stem in die 1992-referendum gekry het met ‘n openlik verklaarde beleid van een mens, een stem nie, want dit sou swart meerderheidsregering geïmpliseer het en nie die beloofde magsdeling nie. Maar hy beweer: “I did not shy away in any [!] manner from the logical consequences of one-man, one-vote in a united South Africa” (230). Dit mag só wees nadat die ANC en die NP-onderhandelaars De Klerk in hierdie posisie ingedwing het. Maar die aanvaarding (eintlik toegewing) van een mens, een stem is aanvanklik nie bekend gemaak nie. Ek het die onderhandelinge destyds toegewyd gevolg en herinner my dat De Klerk in die buiteland was toe hy om kommentaar op hierdie beginsel gevra is. Hy het toe, pleks van daardie gewraakte frase (een mens, een stem) te gebruik, volgens berigte erken dat daar eengekom is dat alle stemme gelyke gewig of waarde sou hê.

Let op hierdie kostelike/tragiese eufemisme: “Our policies … had undergone a fair amount of adaptation since the general election of 1989” (231). ‘n Mens kan byvoeg: ook sedert die 1992-referendum.* “The National Party was in essence a new party as a result of its transformation into a true non-racial party” (232). In die 1994-verkiesing “the National Party’s policy, principles and value system were … strongly marketed” (330-331). Watter beleid, beginsels en waardes het oorgebly waarop tradisionele NP-ondersteuners kon peil trek? Maar De Klerk skryf: “There had throughout been the constitutional continuity for which I and my party had always [!] worked” (291-292). Tog sou die NP uiteindelik amptelik in die skoot van die ANC beland (dus voortgesette kontinuïteit?) en nie in dié van die veel meer nie-rassige Demokratiese Alliansie nie. [* Giliomee skryf: “Die tussentydse grondwet van 1993 was ligjare verwyder van hierdie [1989-]plan van aksie, wat veronderstel was om die party se mandaat te wees” (307).]

In 1996 het die Nasionale Party hoopvol sy nuwe hoofkantoor in Pretoria ingewy (357). “I spelled out our new vision for the National Party that one day, by ourselves or together with others [ie ANC?], under our present name or under some other [ie ANC?], we would once again form the majority” (397). De Klerk het besluit “the National Party should accept a new forward-looking vision” (357). “I made it clear that our first objective was a new political movement of which the National Party would be part, but with the retention of its identity” (363). Watter identiteit?

Op 26 Augustus 1997 het ‘n selftevrede De Klerk sy uittrede uit die politiek aangekondig (364). “I had become an important role model in more than just politics” (367). “I was soon replaced as leader of the National Party by one of our brightest and most articulate young stars – Marthinus van Schalkwyk” (364-365). In 2005, onder Van Schalkwyk se leiding, is die NP – sedert 1997 bekend as die Nuwe Nasionale Party – in die ANC opgeneem, ‘n stap wat ‘n dekade lank (2004-2014) aan Van Schalkwyk ‘n ministerspos in die ANC-kabinet verseker het.

Frederik van Zyl Slabbert skryf dat daar eers tydens die grondwetlike onderhandelings tot meerderheidsregering ingestem (eintlik toegegee) is. Roelf Meyer het “by ‘n kritieke vergadering van die Onderhandelingskomitee die beginsel van meerderheidsregering” aanvaar. “Toe hy dit aan De Klerk rapporteer, sê De Klerk geskok, ‘My God, Roelf, jy het die land weggegee.’ Cyril [Ramaphosa] het my vertel die oomblik toe Roelf dié beginsel namens die regering se onderhandelingspan aanvaar, het hy (Cyril) gevra vir ‘n verdaging van 15 minute ‘sodat ons opsy kon gaan na ons eie kamer en kon uitbars van die lag'” (Duskant die geskiedenis, Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 2006, p 49).

De Klerk skryf: “I came, more and more, to the conclusion that there could be no solution without the removal of all [!] forms of racial discrimination” (97). Terselfdertyd steun De Klerk egter regstellende aksie. Rassediskriminasie was glo die groot euwel in die vorige politieke bedeling. Van ‘n absolute verbod op rassediskriminasie in die nuwe bedeling is daar egter geen sprake nie. De Klerk skryf: “I believed strongly that in multicultural societies the assurance of group security was the key to intergroup peace” (108). Maar geen groepregte word in die nuwe Suid-Afrika erken nie. In die praktyk het die swartes egter weens hulle getalle die groepreg om alle ander groepe te domineer. Daar is tans geen sprake van “the effective protection of minorities and also the prevention of group domination [by blacks]” nie (108). Die kern van De Klerk se visie was “a united South Africa where everybody would have equal rights and opportunities and within which our many minorities would not be threatened or suppressed” (161). Volgens De Klerk sou die finale toets “justice for all South Africans” wees (161); ‘n toets wat De Klerk en kie skouspelagtig gedruip het.

Toe De Klerk op 2 Februarie 1989 as leier van die NP verkies is, “I said that our goal was a new South Africa: a totally [!] changed South Africa which would rid itself of the antagonisms of the past and would be free from domination and suppression, in whatever form” (150). Dit dui op revolusionêre eerder as evolusionêre verandering. Maar De Klerk skryf oor die aanvaarding van die tussentydse 1993-grondwet: “We had succeeded in bringing our country to this historic point through evolution – and not revolution” (291).

(Myns insiens kom die politieke gebeure van 1990/94 neer op ‘n slapgat-toegee-revolusie. Ek voorsien ‘n volgende revolusie: ‘n Gepeupelrevolusie waaraan ook miljoene nie-Suid-Afrikaanse inwoners gaan deelneem en die gedaante van gryp en vernietig sal aanneem; by uitstek van blankes en hulle besittings, maar eintlik ten koste van die land. Die komende revolusie word onder meer gevoed deur die meeste huidige politieke partye, wat met die oog op stemwerwing, gegrond op ons “demokratiese” Grondwet, die idee populariseer dat veral swartes op alles geregtig is waarop hulle aanspraak maak; die euwel van toe-eiening/”entitlement”.)

In die kantoor van De Klerk se direkteur-generaal “were small brass busts of South Africa’s first six prime ministers” (164). Terwyl De Klerk se personeel aan die teks van sy 2 Februarie 1990-toespraak gewerk het, “they politely turned the faces of the busts to the wall. They were pretty sure that Hendrik Verwoerd, in particular, was turning in his grave” (164). Dit dui op De Klerk se absolute breuk nie net met die geskiedenis van die NP nie (“the National Party would have to transform itself” – 191), maar ook met die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika.

“I knew that my speech would usher in a new era” (165), wat myns insiens die moontlike einde van die Afrikanerdom ingelui het. Aan sy eerste vrou het De Klerk daardie dag (2 Februarie 1990) gesê: “After today South Africa will never again be the same” (165). Ons ervaar die bittere waarheid hiervan iedere dag. Daar sou glo “no more reason for violence” wees (166). Ons ervaar die valsheid van hierdie voorspelling iedere dag. “We had succeeded in dramatically changing global perceptions of South Africa” (168). Ja, maar ten koste van die belange van veral blanke Suid-Afrikaners. Die aanvanklik gunstige buitelandse persepsies oor die nuwe Suid-Afrika het mettertyd al hoe meer ontnugterd en realisties geraak.

Die tragedie is dat De Klerk erken het dat dit “an irreversible process” is “and nobody could predict precisely how it would end” (170). “I knew from the start that the negotiations would be difficult and that their outcome was unpredictable” (173). “A government should have a valid [!] mandate from the voters for the implementation of important policies” (229). Waarom dan voor die 1992-referendum magsdeling aan die blanke kiesers belowe, met eie woongebiede en eie skole, dat niemand sy werk sou verloor nie en dat daar ‘n opvolgreferendum sou wees waartydens die blankes voor of teen die nuwe grondwet kon stem?

De Klerk se allerantwoord is: “I delivered on the undertakings that we gave during the referendum. I sincerely believed that we did” (233). ‘n Volbladsy-advertensie wat die NP die dag voor die referendum in koerante gepubliseer het, het egter as banieropskrif gehad: “As jy bang is vir meerderheidsregering, stem ‘Ja'” (Hermann Giliomee, historikus: ‘n outobiografie, Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 2016, p 271). Het woorde nog betekenis? Wat ons sedert 1994 het, is grootliks ongebreidelde swart meerderheidsregering; nie enigsins effektiewe of noemenswaardige magsdeling nie. Dit is De Klerk wat hiervoor die hoofverantwoordelikheid moet aanvaar.

“The new South Africa was just as much our creation as it was the creation of any other party” (379). “An essential [!] element of our mandate in the election of 1989 and the referendum of 1992 was the concept of power-sharing” (236). “We were satisfied that we had substantially [!] succeeded in achieving the total [!] package that I had spelled out as our bottom line during the referendum … the transitional constitution [1993] was the distillation of the dreams of generations of disenfranchised South Africans. It offered a reasonable [?] assurance of continuing security for others who had traditionally had the vote … we created a basis for good hope for this and for future generations of all [!] our people” (291).

Wat De Klerk gedoen het, is om ‘n groot (en roekelose/katastrofiese) kans ten koste van ‘n eens beskaafde en voorspoedige land en samelewing te vat. “I felt … the government and no one else from our side should determine the timing and direction of the process” (173). In werklikheid is die ANC van die begin af en mettertyd al hoe meer toegelaat om die kitaar te slaan. “I … wondered precisely where all this would end” (172). Chaos, agteruitgang en rommelstatus het geblyk van die resultate te wees. Kortom, ‘n opgedonderde land. Is die nuwe Suid-Afrika ‘n toonbeeld van “responsible reform”? (188). Uitsluitlik regse instansies “claimed that the referendum was the white voters’ last chance to stop wat they called the ‘National Party/ANC alliance from imposing a black government on the country.’ Their campaign was essentially racist, while ours was clearly aimed at a non-racial South Africa in which there would be no [!] form of racial discrimination” (233-234).

Reekse toegewings aan die ANC het hierdie revolusie moontlik gemaak. De Klerk het die mooi klinkende ideale van “peace and justice for all” gehad, “of searching together for mutually acceptable solutions” en “a firm stand against unrest, terrorism and violence” (151). Maar die uiteinde was grootliks onverdiende winste vir die swartes, onder meer weens hulle volgehoue gewelddadigheid, en onregverdigbare, skandalige verliese vir die blankes. Dit is die vrugte van De Klerk se “much more adventurous approach” (161), wat hy herhaaldelik graag ‘n paradigmaskuif (bv 162, 166) of ‘n kwantumsprong (bv 162, 228) genoem het. Dit het geblyk nie bloot die oorsteek van die Rubicon-rivier te wees nie, maar ‘n sprong die afgrond in. “We needed a comprehensive negotiation strategy” (161), maar volgens Niël Barnard het so iets nooit werklik in afdoende mate bestaan nie.

De Klerk het hom as staatshoof so veel moontlik van John Vorster en PW Botha se effektiewe gebruik van die veiligheidsmagte (weermag en polisie) en veiligheidsafdelings, “the securocrat system” (115), gedistansieer. Dit het noodlottige gevolge gehad omdat hy bereid was om met die ANC en die PAC te onderhandel sonder dat hierdie terreurgroepe geweld en kommunisme afgesweer het. Magnus Malan, die minister van verdediging, was spoedig nie meer “an integral part of the negotiation team” nie (176). “I realized that I would no longer be able to keep Magnus Malan and Andriaan Vlok [minister of law and order] in their high-profile security portfolios” (209). Die speelveld was ongelyk: “The security forces were expected to play by the rules while their opponents could, and did, use any methods that they liked” (121).

De Klerk kry ‘n verdere hou teen PW Botha in: “I disliked being part of a system which I believed was undermining the sound principle of full collective responsibility within the cabinet” (116). “In my team there was no place for inner circles and no by-passing the cabinet” (153).* Maar sommige van De Klerk se ministers was dikwels net vaagweg bewus van wat in die onderhandelings gebeur. Niël Barnard vertel dat die ministers wat met bv die ANC onderhandel het, hulle nie genoegsaam aan voorskrifte gesteur het nie en andersins geen afdoende leiding van De Klerk en sy kabinet ontvang het nie. [* Giliomee skryf: “De Klerk het egter nie, soos die reël was, die hele pakket van 2 Februarie [1990] vooraf aan die koukus voorgelê nie” (Die laaste Afrikanerleiers, p 323.]

Die veelgeroemde eerste demokratiese verkiesing in 1994 was ‘n chaotiese klug, maar hierdie feit word baie selde genoem. Onder die leiding van Johann Kriegler was dit in talle opsigte ‘n volslae gemors. Daar was geen kierserslys nie. Alle volwasse Suid-Afrikaners kon stem, maar baie minderjariges en nie-Suid-Afrikaners het ook gestem en talle is toegelaat om meer as een stem uit te bring. Die verkiesing was nóg vry, nóg regverdig. “There was simply no possibility of reconciling the ballots in boxes with the number of ballots that had been issued to presiding officers” (334). Die politieke partye het na bewering onderling ooreengekom oor hoeveel stemme elk gekry het, maar De Klerk ontken dit. Daar was “allegations that, confronted with the virtual collapse of the vote counting process, the major parties had secretly agreed on a result by sufficient consensus. There is no [!] truth in these allegations” (336).

“I am convinced that as many as a million illegal votes might have been cast and allocated to other parties” (335). “We had little choice but to accept the outcome of the election in the interest of South Africa and all [!] its people” (336). Die verkiesing “represented the realisation of the vision that I had spelled out in Parliament on 2 February 1990” (334). “The last trek had ended” (341). Diegene wat weens De Klerk se inisiatiewe verplig gevoel het om die land te verlaat, is egter baie meer as dié wat voorheen binne die land rondgetrek (bv die Groot Trek) of uit Suid-Afrika padgegee het (bv ná die Anglo-Boere-oorlog), maar die huidige grootskaalse emigrasie word blykbaar nie deur De Klerk as ‘n trek gereken nie. Hierdie trek aan die einde van die 20ste en begin van die 21ste eeu het veel meer smart as al die vorige trekke tesame opgelewer, maar hiervoor voel De Klerk blykbaar vere. Blankes wat deesdae weens blatante rassediskriminasie vir die eerste keer in die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika in die openbaar staan en bedel, skeel hom seker ewe min.

De Klerk se beloofde magsdeling het in die praktyk grootliks algehele oorgawe aan swart mag geword. Hierdie uitkoms beskou hy nie as die grootste mislukking van sy katastrofiese onderhandelings nie. Hy dink nie aan die lot wat alle blankes en hulle nageslagte weens sy toedoen getref het nie. Hy dink eerder aan diegene, veral blankes, wat deel van die staatsopset was en deur die swartes van oortredings beskuldig kan word: “The manner in which we dealt with the question of amnesty was probably our greatest failure during the negotiating process” (289).

Terugskouend aan die einde van sy boek is daar steeds geen werklike verootmoediging by De Klerk oor sy gruwelike verbrouing nie. “I … remain convinced that all the most important decisions that the National Party and I took since 1989 were necessary and in the best interests of all [!] South Africans – including my own people. I would once again accept co-responsibility for the National Party’s decision to make a total break with the policy of separate development and to accept a new vision. I would still have worked for a united South Africa with a single citizenship, a one-man-one-vote franchise, and the abolition of all forms of discrimination on the grounds of race and colour … I would … once again say yes to both the interim and final constitutions … I would once again … accept the result of the 1994 election” (386). “I still believe that the final package … was much closer to our opening positions than it was to those of the ANC … the new constitution could hardly have given individuals and minorities fewer rights than those that they now enjoy [!] in terms of our new constitution” (388). Dus, alles is wel omdat alles na bewering goed geëindig het.

Daarna krabbel De Klerk ‘n bietjie terug. “My greatest disappointment in the constitutional field relates to our lack of success in producing a power-sharing model suited to the needs of our complex nation … The majoritarian reality which has now, to a certain extent, been thrust on us contains the clear threat of the kind of racial domination which must be avoided at all costs” (389). Dit moes vóór 1994 voorkom gewees het.

Hierna neem sy ego weer beheer oor: “The reality is that despite all our problems we are in a far better position now than we would have been had we failed to act as we did. I maintain that we have substantially [!] delivered on our referendum promises” (389). “After generations, whites have been freed from the defensive laager in which they had for centuries been confined” (390); daardie laer waarin Afrikaners baie veiliger as tans gevoel het. “We finally crossed the Rubicon” (390), wat vir blankes kan blyk die doodsrivier, die Styx, te wees. De Klerk noem sagkens: “There is disillusion over the perceptions that whites are no longer really welcome in the new South Africa unless they conform with the ANC’s model” (395). Kortom wil hy egter hê dat ons ons sterre moet dank vir iemand soos FW de Klerk.

Tydens die 1994-verkiesing het talle bruines en Asiate valslik beweer dat hulle vir die eerste keer kon stem. In werklikheid het die Driekamerparlement sedert 1984 (95) aan hulle reeds ‘n dekade lank die geleentheid gebied om beduidende inspraak in hulle eie sake te hê; eintlik kan erkenning van hulle selfbeskikking tot 1977 teruggedateer word (83). “I was … enthusiastic about the underlying principles of selfdetermination for whites, coloureds and Indians, with regard to their so-called [?] own affairs … the development of cultural self-determination was increasingly accepted in multicultural societies” (95). Die waarheid is dat die huidige politieke opset, wat al hoe meer deur die toenemend radikale swart meerderheid oorheers word, inspraak van ‘n minder effektiewe aard aan blankes, bruines en Asiate bied as wat in die vorige grondwetlike bedeling die geval was.

Ons as blankes kan dus nou met dieselfde mate van waarheid as die destydse bruines en Asiate beweer dat ons geen (effektiewe) stemreg het nie. Die meeste nie-swartes (blankes, bruines en Asiate) sou myns insiens nooit tot hierdie bedeling ingestem het as hulle vooraf volledig daaroor ingelig is nie. “Ironically, in recent discussions, coloured and Indian leaders have told me that their communities had far more political clout under the ‘tricameral’ constitution then than they now have in the new one-man-one-vote system” (96-97).

‘n Uiterste vorm van demokrasie is aan ons opgedring, waarin daar geen minderheidsregte is nie; anders as in bv Amerika waar swartes ruim minderheidsregte, insluitende bevoordeling bo blankes, geniet. Suid-Afrikaanse blankes het in veel groter mate as bruines en Asiate politieke mag ingeboet. Blatante oneerlikheid teenoor al hierdie nie-swart kiesers is myns insiens een van die prominentste kenmerke van die grondwetlike proses van 1990/94. Maar De Klerk verseker ons: “I had no appetite for the dark side of politics” (64) en “I had committed myself to open and unassuming leadership” (88). Dit kom van iemand wat glo weet van die “critical importance of good and effective communication” (105).

De Klerk gaan deesdae voort om die fabel te verkondig dat die nuwe Suid-Afrika vir almal beter as die ou Suid-Afrika is. Soos Leon Wessels dit stel: “Alle Suid-Afrikaners se regmatige aspiraries word in die Grondwet vervat” (Vereeniging: Die onvoltooide vrede, Kaapstad: Umuzi, 2010, p 270). Daar is steeds geen verootmoediging by De Klerk nie. “Looking back, I have no regrets” (Biznews 15 September). Soos gebruiklik kom hy met die fopspeen van “upholding the Constitution,” asof dit ‘n onfeilbare bron van saligheid in die nuwe Suid-Afrika is, terwyl hy weet dat elke woord wat daarin staan verswelgbaar is. Daar is in elk geval ‘n valsklank in De Klerk se huidige koestering van die Grondwet, want Wessels vertel: “Voor die stemming vir die aanvaarding of verwerping van die konsepgrondwet op 8 Mei 1996, flankeer FW openlik met die gedagte om teen die Grondwet te stem” (279). Maar De Klerk het weer toegegee en die NP-koukus “beweeg om vir die Grondwet te stem” (281). NP-stemme teen die Grondwet sou immers neerkom op erkenning dat die NP-onderhandelaars tydens die grondwetlike onderhandelings drooggemaak het. “Mit der Dummheit kämpfen Götter selbst vergebens” (Friedrich von Schiller).

Historici sal hopelik anders oor De Klerk, Wessels en diesulkes oordeel. Hulle kan gerus ernstige aandag skenk aan wat die vader van historici, Herodotus, reeds in die 5de eeu vC geskryf het. Oor moontlike Griekse oorgawe aan die Perse het hy gesê: “There is Greekness, being of the same blood and language, and having shared shrines and rituals of the gods, and similar customs, which it would not be right for the Athenians to betray” (Nicholas Ostler, Empires of the word: A language history of the world, London: HarperCollins, 2005/2010, 640p; Amazon Kindle $6,83, 3936).

Wat in 1990/94 gebeur het, is glad nie in pas met die Afrikaner se geskiedenis nie. ‘n Klein groepie Afrikaanssprekendes het hedendaagse Afrikaners en hulle nageslag uit ‘n (leefbare) toekoms in Afrika verneuk. Dit is nie soseer weens immoraliteit nie. Dit kan grootliks aan onbekwaamheid en ‘n gebrek aan insig toegeskryf word. Die eindresultaat was en is verraad. Bokkespronge kan nie die werklikheid of die waarheid verander nie.

Leon Lemmer: Enoch Powell se bloedrivier

John Enoch Powell (1912-1998), ‘n Brit, het in 1937 op die ouderdom van 25 jaar ‘n professor in antieke Grieks aan die Universiteit Sydney in Australië geword. In sy jeug het hy vier digbundels gepubliseer en later boeke oor die klassieke en politiek. Hy het in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog militêre diens vir Brittanje gedoen. Hy het toe tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat Amerika die Britse Ryk wou vernietig en veral Indië polities onafhanklik wou hê. Reeds vroeg in sy lewe was dit Powell se ideaal om die Britse onderkoning (“viceroy”) van Indië te word. Die onafhanklikheidswording van Indië het sy planne verydel en hom lewenslank skepties oor Amerikaanse buitelandse beleid gemaak. Die Britse verlies van Indië as kolonie in 1947 en die Suez-krisis in 1956 het van Powell ‘n anti-imperialis maar nasionalistiese Brit gemaak. Volgens hom moet aanvaar word dat Brittanje nie meer ‘n wêreldmoondheid is nie. In hierdie rubriek maak ek by uitstek gebruik van John Gregory se boek, Enoch Powell, the patriotic prophet: The speeches of Enoch Powell (Patropress, 2013, 208p; Amazon Kindle $11,39). Gregory noem Powell “without a doubt the greatest Prime minister we never had” (Kindle 20). Sy naaste Afrikaner-ekwivalent is seker die beginselvaste Jaap Marais (1922-2000) of dalk die kompromislose Hans Strijdom (1893-1958).

Powell was gegrief oor die aanvanklike paaibeleid van die Konserwatiewe Party teenoor Adolf Hitler en het dus in die 1945-verkiesing vir die Arbeiderdsparty gestem. Die verlies van Indië onder ‘n Arbeidersregering het Powell genoop om sy gewig by die Konserwatiewe Party in te gooi. Hy het ‘n parlementslid vir die Konserwatiewe Party (1950-1974) en die Ulster Unioniste (1974-1987) geword. (Hy het die aanbod om ‘n kandidaat vir die regse en uitsluitlik blanke Nasionale Front (NF), gestig in 1967, te word, geweier. Die NF se beleid is dat alle nie-blanke immigrante gerepatrieer moet word.) As Noord-Ierse parlementslid het Powell gepoog om daardie gebied ‘n integrerende deel van Brittanje te maak, want die aparte, selfregerende parlement en eie eerste minister in Belfast sou noodwendig meebring dat Noord-Ierland mettertyd deel van die Ierse Republiek word. Hy was gegrief oor die Amerikaanse standpunt dat die Ierse Republiek en Noord-Ierland moet verenig voordat Ierland lidmaatskap van NAVO kon kry.

Powell was die minister van gesondheid in Harold MacMillan se kabinet (1960-1963) en die skaduminister van verdediging in die opposisieparty van Edward Heath (1965-1968). As politikus het Powell hom van vroeg af vir die opruiming van krotbuurte en beheer oor immigrasie beywer. In die 1964-verkiesing het hy gesê: “It was essential, for the sake not only of our own people but of the immigrants themselves, to introduce control over the numbers allowed in. I am convinced that the strict control must continue if we are to avoid the evils of a ‘colour question’ in this country, for ourselves and for our children” (Wikipedia).

Op ekonomiese gebied was Powell ‘n voorstander van disinflasie, eerbied vir markkragte, die bevordering van vrye handel, die privatisering van sommige staatsbates en die monetarisme wat Margaret Thatcher (1925-2013, Britse eerste minister 1979-1990) mettertyd sou aanhang. Voor die onafhanklikwording van Kenia in 1963 het Powell gesê dat Brittanje nie ander standaarde in bv Afrika as tuis kan hê nie. Uit Kenia was daar ‘n groot toestroming van Asiate na Brittanje toe swartes na ‘n jare lange skandalige veldtog van terrorisme die politieke beheer oorgeneem het.* Powell “said terrorism was a form of warfare which could not be prevented by laws and punishments but by the aggressor’s certainty that the war was impossible to win” (166). (In Suid-Afrika het die ANC en ander immorele terroristebewegings besef dat hulle nie die militêre stryd kon wen nie. Desnieteenstaande het FW de Klerk en sy patetiese onderhandelaars roemloos boedel oorgegee. Dit is tragies dat hulle nie van Powell se mening kennis geneem en die terroriste met mag en mening beveg het nie.) [* “The Kenia Independence Act … has the unexpected effect that some 200 000 Indians in Kenya alone have become literally indistinguishable from the people of the United Kingdom, so that they have an absolute right of entry to this country and thus enjoy priviliges which no Commonwealth citizen … possesses” (1239).]

In Oktober 1968 het Powell voorgestel dat behuisingsubsidies en die finansiële ondersteuning van ander lande (“foreign aid”) geskrap moet word. Powell was nie net teen Amerikaanse invloed op Britse regeringsbeleid gekant nie, maar ook skepties oor groter aansluiting by Europa. Hy het kapsie gemaak teen Britse lidmaatskap van die Europese Ekonomiese Gemeenskap (EEG), wat later die Europese Unie (EU) geword het. Hy wou hê dat die Britse parlement outonoom bly en nie onderhewig moet wees aan bv EU-voorskrifte oor ekonomiese beleid, menseregte en immigrasie nie. Volgens Powell moet kernwapens nooit werklik gebruik word nie. Lande wat oor hulle beskik behoort sulke wapens bloot as afskrikmiddels te behou.

In Powell se politieke loopbaan was daar twee breuke. In 1968 is hy as skaduminister ontslaan en in 1974 het hy die Konserwatiewe Party verlaat. In 1968 het die breuk gekom vanweë sy sogenaamde “rivers of blood”-toespraak. Daardie beroemde, profetiese toespraak is die hoofonderwerp van hierdie rubriek. Dit handel oor immigrasie uit Statebondslande en anti-rassediskriminasie-maatreëls. Powell het dié sprekende voorbeeld gestel van hoe ‘n enkele toespraak ‘n politikus kan maak of breek. Die 1974-breuk is veroorsaak toe Brittanje onder die leiding van ‘n Konserwatiewe regering op lidmaatskap van die EEG besluit het. Powell se standpunt was dat Brittanje nie ‘n provinsie van ‘n Europese superstaat moet word nie. Van die begin af was die EEG sowel ‘n ekonomiese as ‘n politieke alliansie.

Powell was hoogs intelligent en boonop ‘n uitstekende orator. Hy het al sedert die vroeë jare sestig die aandag gevestig op die gevare wat grootskaalse immigrasie uit Statebondslande vir Brittanje inhou. Hy het beswaar gehad teen die vreemde kultuur van hierdie immigrante omdat dit nie met die tradisionele Britse lewenswyse versoenbaar was nie. Sy standpunt was dat immigrante nie die monokultuur van die Britte met multikulturaliteit moet versteur nie. Klein getalle vreemdelinge kon moontlik sonder (groot) kulturele skade in die Britse gemeenskapslewe geabsorbeer word (dus geïntegreer en mettertyd geassimileer word) maar nie ‘n onophoudelike en progressief groter wordende stortvloed nie.

Die gewraakte “rivers of blood”-toespraak is op 20 April 1968 in Birmingham gelewer. Sedertdien is Enoch Powell wêreldbekend. Die direkte aanleiding vir die toespraak was die Arbeidersregering se Race Relations Act (1968), wat rassediskriminasie verbied het. (In die nuwe Suid-Afrika is daar steeds geen sodanige verbod nie. Daar mag nie teen swartes gediskrimineer word nie, maar wel teen wittes. Rassediskriminasie teen blankes word egter verdoesel deur dit regstelling, transformasie, positiewe diskriminasie, ens, te noem.) In sy toespraak het Powell glad nie van “rivers of blood” gepraat nie. Dit is ‘n frase wat joernaliste aan die toespraak gekoppel het. Vandaar die groot bohaai wat gevolg het, hoewel Powell wesenlik niks anders gesê het as wat hy reeds voorheen verskeie kere kwyt geraak het nie (kyk die 1964-aanhaling uit die Wikipedia hier bo en verdere voor-1968-verwysings hier onder).

Powell het sy beroemde toespraak soos volg begin: “The supreme function of statemanship is to provide against preventable evils … the besetting temptation of all politics [is] to concern itself with the immediate present at the expense of the future … the discussion of future grave but … avoidable evils is the most unpopular and at the same time the most necessary occupation for the politician” (322). Reeds in 1968 het Powell waargeneem Brittanje is “undergoing the total transformation to which there is no parallel in a thousand years of English history” (342). Hy het tereg genoem dat die immigrante nie egalig verspreid dwarsoor die land aangetref word nie maar in bepaalde gebiede (“foreign areas” – 1158) gekonsentreer is.

Hy het ook ‘n vinnige toename in getalle voorsien. “It is this fact above all which creates the extreme urgency of action now, of just that kind of action which is hardest for politicians to take, action where the difficulties lie in the present but the evils to be prevented or minimized lie several parliaments ahead” (348). “Numbers are of the essence,” daarom is die volgende aksie nodig: “by stopping or virtually stopping, further inflow, and by promoting the maximum outflow” (356). “We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50 000 dependents, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre” (362). Daar mag glo geen rassediskriminasie wees nie, maar “at work … employers hesitated to apply to the immigrant worker the standards of discipline and competence required of the native-born worker” (409).

Powell vertel: “Eight years ago in a respectable street in Wolverhampton [Powell se kiesafdeling] a house was sold to a Negro. Now only one white (a woman old-age pensioner) lives there” (422). Powell is daarvan beskuldig dat hy ‘n fiktiewe voorbeeld gebruik het, maar na die tyd is die persoon as Druscilla Cotterill geïdentifiseer en is sy weergawe korrek bewys.* Hierdie vrou was ‘n weduwee. Albei haar seuns het in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gesneuwel. Sy het haar huis as ‘n losieshuis bedryf, maar die loseerders het weggetrek weens die verswarting van die buurt. Sy was nie bereid om swart loseerders te aanvaar nie. Die prys wat vir haar huis aangebied is, was ook te min. Sy wou nie toelaat dat swartes haar telefoon gebruik nie. Sy is van rassisme beskuldig en aan die uiterste intimidasie blootgestel. “Windows are broken. She finds excreta pushed through her letterbox” (435). (Die misdadigers wat hulle op ‘n soortgelyke manier op die kampus van die Universiteit Kaapstad en elders gedra, is dus nie uniek nie. Die strooiing van ontlasting is ‘n beproefde handeling van sommige in ‘n politieke magstryd.) [* In Februarie 1968 (dus voor sy beroemde toespraak) het Powell verwys na ‘n enkele wit kind wat in ‘n skoolklas oorgebly het (1217). Weereens is hy van leuens beskuldig en weer is hy reg bewys.]

Om sulke mense in ‘n blanke gemeenskap te integreer is problematies, want “to be integrated into a population means to become for all practical purposes indistinguisable from its other members” (435). Maar daar is immigrante wat glad nie wil integreer nie en spesiale regte eis sodat hulle hulle gewoontes/gebruike in Brittanje kan voortsit. Powell se standpunt was “the same rights and the same treatment as anyone else” (970); dus geen rasgebaseerde diskriminasie, regstelling, bemagtiging, bevoordeling of wat ook al nie. Dan kom Powell by sy stelling wat deur joernaliste tot die meer opspraakwekkende/sensasionele “rivers of blood” herformuleer is: “Like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood’.* That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the [United] States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come. In numerical terms, it will be of American proportions long before the end of the century. Only resolute and urgent action will avert it even now” (455). [* Aangehaal uit die Romeinse digter Vergilius (70-19 vC) se Die Aeneïs, 6, 1.86.]

Die waarheid van Powell se profetiese toespraak word soos volg deur John Gregory toegelig: “If we take a look at today’s so called multi-cultural Britain, with off duty soldiers being beheaded on the streets of London by Islamists, Muslim grooming gangs raping our children, and ethnic gangs plaguing all our major cities and towns, be it Asian and Turkish herion gangs, Romanian pick pocket gangs or other Eastern European mafias, slave trading girls for prostitution, Somalian and African post code gangs – the list is endless. Put this together with a Nation of indigenous people who are at breaking point with being ignored by public schoolboy pleb politicians, who only serve themselves” (279). ‘n Versugting wat dwarsoor Europa en in Amerika opklink, is dat die sogenaamde demokraties verkose regerings se beleid oor immigrasie glad nie versoenbaar met die mening van die oorgrote meerderheid kiesers is nie.

Die dag na sy toespraak is Powell as skaduminister ontslaan. Hy het nooit weer ‘n senior politieke pos beklee nie. Hy is daarvan beskuldig dat hy die raskaart gebruik het, ‘n rassis is, ens. Maar ‘n meningsopname het getoon dat 74% van die Britse kiesers Powell se mening onderskryf. Die frase “Enoch was right” word sedertdien dikwels gebruik wanneer die kwessie van immigrasie in Brittanje ter sprake kom. Powell het self 120 000 briewe ontvang, waarvan die oorgrote meerderheid sy standpunt ondersteun het. Dit word algemeen aanvaar dat die opskudding wat Powell veroorsaak het die Konserwatiewe Party in staat gestel het om die 1970-verkiesing te wen. Die plaaslike politieke kommentator RW Johnson, destyds verbonde aan die Universiteit Oxford, is een van diegene wat hierdie pluimpie aan Powell gegee het. In 1972 het ‘n meningspeiling getoon dat Powell steeds die gewildste politikus in Brittanje was.

Na sy breuk met die Konserwatiewe Party in 1974 het hy kiesers aangemoedig om in die 1974-verkiesing vir die Arbeidersparty te stem, ‘n verkiesing wat die Arbeiders gewen het. Edward Heath het hierdie nederlaag aan Powell se invloed toegeskryf. Dit is ook die rede waarom Margaret Thatcher later geweier het om Powell as ‘n skaduminister of minister aan te stel. In 1982 het Powell as nasionalis en lojalis Thatcher tydens die oorlog met Argentinië oor die Falkland-eilande gesteun. Na sy uittrede uit die politiek het Powell in die 1990-verkiesing die Konserwatiewe Party aangeraai om die “British Card” te gebruik. Thatcher was toe vol lof vir Powell: “I have always read Enoch Powell’s speeches and articles very carefully … I always think it was a tragedy that he left. He is a very, very able politician. I say that even though he has sometimes said vitriolic things against me” (212). Maar Powell het nooit weer lid van die Konserwatiewe Party geword nie. In sy latere jare het hy die regse United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), gestig in 1993, ondersteun, maar hy het homself as te oud gediskwalifiseer om ‘n UKIP-kandidaat in ‘n verkiesing te wees.

In Powell se ander toesprake is daar ook baie pêrels, waarvan ek enkeles uitlig. In 1966 het hy die aandag op ‘n anomalie in die Britse immigrasiebeleid gevestig: “Our nearest European neighbours were aliens, to be strictly excluded from Britain, but that the myriad inhabitants of independent countries in Asia, Africa and the New World were British, indistinguishable from native-born inhabitants of these islands [ie Britain], and that no limitation could be placed on their inherent right to enter and leave this realm at will. For fear, so it was said, of ‘offending the Commonwealth’, we persisted in this course until we had entailed upon ourselves a fearful and wholly unnecessary problem, one which has brought no compensating benefit to any other country, and one with consequences of which our children and their children will still be coping” (940). (Insgelyks kan ‘n mens sê dat die ongelooflike plaaslike onnoselheid van 1990/1994 voorkombaar en dus onnodig was en ons nageslag selfs in groter mate as ons huidige geslag die dure prys daarvoor gaan betaal.) Pleks van hande te vat sê Powell: “There comes always a time ‘when the kissing has to stop'” (961); ontleen aan die Engelse digter Robert Browning (1812-1889) se “A toccata of Galuppi’s” (1855).

‘n Bekende strategie is dat ‘n man hom as immigrant in ‘n ander land vestig en dan spoedig sy (uitgebreide) familie ook daar wil hervestig. Powell praat van “actual or alleged dependents” (1224). As dit geweier word, word die owerheid van harteloosheid en erger beskuldig. Powell stel sy standpunt, ‘n elementêre waarheid, baie duidelik: “There are two directions in which families can be reunited” (1224). Dit is moeilik om van onwettige inkommers ontslae te raak; tans onder meer vanweë ‘n EU-menseregtebepaling dat gesinslewe nie ontwrig mag word nie.”We are ‘stark, staring bonkers’ to offer all illegal entrants a prize for breaking the law” (1246).

Wanneer geweld uitbreek, is die neiging (ook in Suid-Afrika) om sonder meer te aanvaar dat daardie misdadigers (regverdigbare) griewe het. Powell het ‘n ander mening: “Today violence and mob law are organised and speading for their own sake” (1819). Daar is mense “who by reason of some kind of fecklessness or incompetence are chronically unable to feed, clothe and house themselves and their families” (1826). Pleks van op eie inspanning staat te maak, beweer armlastiges dat hulle ‘n heilige reg op baie dinge het. In Suid-Afrika verneem ons telkens van gevalle waar skole afgebrand word omdat daar glo te min klaskamers is. Die misdadigers kan nie die berekening doen dat daar dan nog minder klaskamers oorbly nie. Mense wat nie vir munisipale dienste betaal nie, betoog oor swak dienslewering terwyl hulle in werklikheid suiwer ekonomies/finansieel op niks aanspraak kan maak nie. Een van die baie euwels van demokrasie is dat oproermakers onwegneembare stemreg het. Die politieke partye wil nie sulke elemente in die bek wil ruk deur bv klipgooi, die oprigting van padversperrings en die brand van buitebande absoluut te verbied en swaar strawwe aan oortreders op te lê nie. In Suid-Afrika het terroriste bewys dat misdaad hoogs lonend kan wees. Geweld is steeds die bewese manier om die owerheid tot die verlangde optrede te verplig. Dit sal dus onbepaald en seker in al hoe groter mate voortgesit word.

Reeds in 1970 het Powell gesê: “University disorder [is] … connected with that more general civil disorder or anarchy which I believe is also on the ascendant” (1928). “The essential ingredient of the success of anarchy in its new form is the enslavement of the majority by a tiny minority [dink bv aan Open Stellenbosch] In the political sphere the technique is comparable in importance and in novelty to the development of the nuclear weapon in the military sphere; for a method has been discovered of achieving immense results with negligible initial effort, thanks to a sort of gearing or leverage which brings the majority into play under the direction and control of the minority” (1936). “The secret weapon is the assumption that violence and disorder imply grievance. From this it follows that the grievance must be removed in order to stop the violence and disorder. It follows that the real blame lies not with the violent and disorderly but with those responsible for the assumed grievance … The burden of accusation and condemnation is thus automatically diverted from the guilty on to the innocent … the general public itself are so mesmerised by this technique that they become the instruments of its success” (1943).

Wat doen iemand soos Wim de Villiers in so ‘n geval? “Buy off the aggressors” (1950). “Violence is automatically in the right and authority necessarily in the wrong” (1987). “It is an old delusion to suppose that those bent on violence and anarchy can be satisfied with instalments of what is miscalled reform [transformation!]. If reform were the object, they could be: but the object is not reform, the object is destruction. When a concession has been extorted here, it will be followed by another demand there; when one humiliation has been inflicted on the authorities, the means will instantly be sought of inflicting another. There is no quantity of danegeld* which buys off anarchy; there is no end to the instalments which will be swallowed and leave the aggressor unsatisfied … We have been content to stand on the touchline and watch the university authorities, in their pitiful inexperience and gaucherie, go down to one defeat after another” (2021). [* Danegeld: “In English history, a tax imposed from 991 onwards by Anglo-Saxon kings to pay tribute to the Vikings. After the Norman Conquest (1066), the tax was revived and was levied until 1162; the Normans used it to finance military operations” (Collins World Encyclopedia, 2003, p 256).]

Ek het die volgende juweel oorgehou vir laaste. Dit gaan oor menseregte, spesifiek die reg op behuising, waarvoor Suid-Afrikaanse belastingbetalers jaarliks baie moet opdok. Wanneer iemand beweer hy het die reg op iets, verwys hy na iets wat hy nie het nie: “‘I have a right to that’, the statement clearly means that somebody else … ought to furnish me with it, and that if he does not do so voluntarily, he can and should be forced to do so” (1464). Teen wil en dank moet bv die blankes in Suid-Afrika hulle eie huisvesting voorsien en ook huise vir die miljoene armlastige huisloses. As die owerheid die bedrag beperk waarteen huise verhuur kan word, lei dit tot krotbuurte. As die regering gesubsidieerde huise bou, “because the price is artificially reduced, the demand must by definition always exceed the supply … Thus, where everyone has a right to a house, shortage of housing is guaranteed in perpetuity” (1487). Sodanige opset saboteer persoonlike vryheid: “There is no man so independent as he who pays the market price for what he gets” (1495). In Suid-Afrika is die probleem dat baie mense politieke vryheid wil hê (die reg om te stem vir wie hulle wil) maar geen morele beswaar het teen ekonomiese afhanklikheid van die staat vir bv toelaes wat sonder enige teenprestasie ontvang word nie.

In Suid-Afrika word ongebreidelde immigrasie (wettig en onwettig) sienderoë toegelaat. Om te voorkom dat hulle (potensiële) kiesers vervreem en van xenofobie/vreemdelingehaat beskuldig word, verkies politici om oor hierdie aktuele probleem te swyg. Daar is in Afrika Unie-geledere selfs planne om die vrye vloei van immigrante dwarsoor die hele Afrika-kontinent te wettig. Dit is dalk ‘n onfeilbare resep om (feitlik) alles te vernietig wat sedert 1652 plaaslik tot stand gebring is. Het dit nie tyd geword dat ons Enoch Powell se nagedagtenis huldig deur bv strate na hom te vernoem pleks van om bv immorele terroriste op allerhande maniere te vereer nie?

Die agteruitgang van voorspoed en beskawing

deur Leon Lemmer

Dit is bekend dat baie Jode sterk oor hulle identiteit voel; dat hulle hulle geskiedenis ken en eer en hulle kultuur, bv godsdiens, bly aanhang al woon hulle seker meer verspreid oor die aarde as enige ander etniese groep. Toe Jode met die vorige Suid-Afrikaanse politieke bedeling gekonfronteer is, het sommige apartheid as die soort rassediskriminasie beskou wat aan naziïsme herinner. Hulle het hulle dus by die swartes in hulle “vryheidstryd” geskaar.

Ander Jode het anders gereageer en besef dat dit vir die blankes en veral die Afrikaners om oorlewing en om die behoud van hulle identiteit en die handhawing van beskaafde Westerse standaarde gaan. Apartheid was nie “a theory of white supremacy” nie, maar eerder”a strategy for survival” (Mercer, bron hieronder, Kindle 1653). Hans Strijdom het bv gedink “white hegemony was indispensable for the good of all” (1658). Hermann Giliomee meen “Afrikaner anxieties were overwhelmingly existential, rather than racial” (1671). “Israel was … perhaps the only friend which the Old, orderly South Africa had” (4013). “The New South Africa is anything but a friend to Israel” (4034), “that small spot of sanity in a sea of savagery” (4280).

Al het sommige Jode se politieke simpatie aanvanklik by die swartes gelê, het die wrede werklikheid van die tirannie van die meerderheid hulle op groot skaal laat emigreer. Ilana Mercer is so ‘n geval. Ek skryf na aanleiding van haar boek, Into the cannibal’s pot: Lessons for America from post-apartheid South Africa (Seattle: Stairway Press, 2011, 340p; Amazon Kindle $11.99). Die boektitel “is inspired by Ayn Rand’s wise counsel against prostrating civilization to savagery” (535), oftewel “putting Ghana over Grandma” (3516). Rand: “In America … the majority of religious people … do not accept on faith the idea of jumping into a cannibal’s pot and giving away their last shirt to the backward people of the world” (535).

Die boek is onder meer opgedra aan “my Afrikaner brothers betrayed.” ‘n Mens kan jou kwalik ‘n boek voorstel wat meer positief Afrikanergesind as hierdie een is, bv: “There are no better farmers than the hardy Boers” (5104). Sy verwys onder meer dikwels na die menings van Dan Roodt, wat op haar webtuiste “South Africa’s finest polemicist” genoem word. As Jodin het sy die verdere voordeel dat sy nie die Engelse of Britte (of selfs die deursnee Amerikaners) ter wille hoef te wees nie. Maar dit was vir die outeur, weens die epidemie van politieke korrektheid, uiters moeilik om ‘n uitgewer te vind, al is die teks uitstekend geskryf en die inligting deeglik nagevors.

In die boek is daar volgens ‘n kritikus glo ‘n “‘unhealthy’ preoccupation with the methodical ethnic cleansing of the Afrikaner farmer” (199), bv “Afrikaner farmers … are being culled like springbok in a hunting safari” (461). “Upward of 3 000 members of this once 40 000-strong community – almost ten percent – have hitherto been exterminated” (466); “slaughtered in ways that would do Shaka Zulu proud” (1241). “This makes farming in South Africa the most dangerous occupation in the world” (1247).

Dié kanker het sy oorsprong in die strydlied van MK, die terreurarm van die ANC, wat deur Nelson Mandela gestig is: “Kill them – kill the whites” (3027). “Problematic too is Mandela’s Orwellian use of the word ‘deracialisation,’ when what he was in fact describing and prescribing is racialization – a coerced state of affairs whereby the economy is forced, by hook or by crook, to reflect the country’s racial composition” (3110).

Ilana Mercer, afgeneem met eksemplare van haar boek, 'Into the cannibal's pot' — Ilana Mercer, afgeneem met eksemplare van haar boek, ‘Into the Cannibal’s Pot’

Heel aan die begin verwys Mercer na Richard Goldstone (Praag 13 Okt), wat eens hartlik met die “apartheidsregime” saamgewerk maar hom daarna in Amerika gevestig het. Goldstone: “We now have, I’m proud to say, a working, wonderful democracy in South Africa” (169). Mercer huldig die teenoorgestelde standpunt: “When South Africa was governed by a racist white minority, it was scorned by the West and treated as Saddam Hussein was, with boycotts and sanctions. Now that a racist, black-majority government controls the country; that it is as violent as Iraq, Liberia, or the Congo, and rapidly becoming another Islamist-friendly, failed African state, it is the toast of the West” (389).

“The ‘New South Africa’ is [volgens Robert Guest], after all, not so new. It is being wrecked by the very ‘cronyism that has wrecked the rest of Africa'” (2120). Mercer verwys na ‘n “dying Christian civilization at the tip of Africa” (408). “The Old South Africa could only have improved; the New South Africa can but decline” (422). Andrew Kenny: “If you want to see the future of South Africa, it might not be a bad idea to look at the present in Zimbabwe” (510; ook 3202). Zimbabwe het gevorder van “Africa’s breadbasket” tot “dustbowl” (2807). “Except for Rhodesia before Mugabe, minority-ruled South Africa, with all its depredations, offered Africans more than any other country on the Dark Continent” (3691).

Die outeur is in Johannesburg gebore as die dogter van ‘n rabbi, Abraham Benzion Isaacson, ‘n anti-apartheidsaktivis wie se voorouers aan die begin van die 20ste eeu uit Rusland gevlug het. Isaacson was glo in die jare sestig verplig om na Israel uit te wyk, waar Mercer grootgeword het. Sy het egter in die 1980’s na Suid-Afrika teruggekeer, is hier getroud, maar het in 1995 na Kanada geëmigreer en in 2002 in Amerika gaan woon. Sy het egter baie goed op die hoogte gebly met wat in Suid-Afrika gebeur. Sy skryf oor “the embarrassment that is the democratic South Africa – the crumbling infrastructure of this once First World country, and the out-of-control crime – down to an ongoing mini-genocide” (397), asook die “unparalleled, radical, race-based wealth-distribution policies” (402).

“Hillbrow was then a hip, cosmopolitan, Johannesburg suburb. Today it is South Africa’s Harlem” (822). Daar was “the magnificent five-star Carlton Hotel … It closed in 1997; the safety of the guests could no longer be guaranteed” (829). “South Africa – with its space program and skyscrapers – was not exactly the product of the people currently dismantling it. Instead, it was the creation of British and Dutch colonists and their descendants” (1211). “Some people build; others destroy” (1277).

Soos tydens apartheid is die ANC-regering besig met “restructuring society around race. With one distinction: more people are murdered in one week under African rule than died under the detention of the Afrikaner government over the course of roughly four decades” (402). “If the sanctity of life is the highest value in a civilized society, then the New South Africa has little to recommend it” (441). “Universal suffrage is not to be conflated with freedom” (412). “A civilized society, ultimately, is one in which the individual can go about the business of life unmolested. If he can’t do that simple thing, of what value is the vote?” (417).

“You’d be hard pressed to find a family in democratic South Africa whose members have not been brutalized … They tell of the lives of good people ruined by rubbish” (593). “Realism is not racism. The undeniable reality is that, a decade since the abrupt transfer of power, the rule of the demos has turned a once-prosperous, if politically problematic, place into a lawless ramshackle” (631). “South Africans are fed up (‘gatvol’ in Afrikaans) with crime” (701). Sy verwys na die 69 swartes wat in 1990 by Sharpeville gesterf het en waarvan so dikwels in anti-apartheid propaganda gewag gemaak word. “In democratic South Africa that’s the daily carnage” (715).

“Few realize that during the decades of the apartheid regime a few hundred Africans in total perished as a direct and indirect consequence of police brutality. A horrible injustice, indubitably, but nothing approximating the death toll in ‘free’ South Africa, where hundreds of Africans, white and black, perish weekly. Nor did apartheid’s casualties come close to the ANC’s during ‘the armed struggle.’ Freedom’s forebears ‘necklaced’ 400 non-combatants, and murdered hundreds more – Zulu opposition, state informers and witnesses, rural headmen, urban councilors” (719). “Under apartheid, on average, 7 036 people were murdered each year, a small number compared to the carnage under the ANCniks: 24 206 annually” (730).

“Clearly, the era of apartheid remains a Golden Age with respect to the sanctity of life, for blacks and whites alike” (750). “Fifty-one percent of victims no longer bother to report crime, given that corruption is rife, arrests rare, and prosecutions and convictions still rarer” (736). “A hardcore criminal … has a ninety percent chance of getting away with murder … the country now has one of the world’s highest murder rates and lowest conviction rates” (840). “Lucky are the outlaws in the New South Africa” (952). Violent crime in the New South Africa is predominantly black on black and black on white. Since the demise of apartheid, it has both increased and spread from slum to suburb” (763).

Tydens die grondwetlike onderhandelings [sommige/enkele] Afrikaners “surrendered without defeat,” volgens Hermann Giliomee (793; ook 4288). Mercer: “Whites ceded mastery over their destiny” (1206). FW de Klerk “acceded to crude majoritarianism, thereby forfeiting equal treatment for white South Africans within a democratic South Africa” (2258). Dít nadat De Klerk die 1992-referendum onder die leuse, “Oppose majority rule” gewen het (4621). Mercer bevestig, soos Giliomee, dat De Klerk geen mandaat van die blanke kiesers vir magsoorgawe gehad het nie (4622).

“One day a white, relatively well-educated minority dominated all institutions; the next a skills-deficient black majority took over” (2383). Dit was ‘n geval van “minute-made democracy” (4947) in sy rouste vorm; dus eerder “idiocracy” (4974) “South Africa now has a political system which, as Mr Ralfe puts it, is ‘run by jailbirds'” (1332). “Europeans are … particularly and uniquely vulnerable within this political dispensation” (1206). “Empowering majorities in Africa has helped, not hindered, the propensity of hostile masses to extract revenge on helpless minorities” (1219). “A small but growing number of blacks [are] experiencing ‘apartheid nostalgia … it was a time when things worked better'” (812).

Die outeur verwys na wat Robert Guest, ‘n Economist-joernalis, “the world’s most extreme affirmative action program” noem. [Lees gerus Guest se uitstekende boek, The shackled continent: Africa’s past, present and future (2004).] Mercer bestempel dit as “a coercive transfer of private wealth from those who create it to those who consume it” (482; ook 2303); “a willingness to ‘sacrifice performance for racial ideology'” (1781). Dit is ‘n geval van “wealth distribution usurping wealth creation” (2282). “All redistribution … involves ‘taking’ from the original owners and/or producers … and ‘giving’ to nonowners and non-producers” (4721).

Hierdie rassisme vind uitdrukking in voorgeskrewe raskwotas; ‘n “quota culture” (2245). Mercer verwys na “race-based wealth distribution” (2091), oftewel “redistributive ‘justice'” (2251), en “racist labor litigation” (2091), bv dat staatskontrakte aan swart maatskappye toegeken word en die werkerskorps die demografie moet weerspieël. “Business must keep paperwork documenting their pigment-driven poaching” (2145). “‘Social justice’ becomes a demand for redistribution and revenge … making the more ‘fortunate’ fork over their fortunes to the less fortunate” (2469). “Bit by barbaric bit, South Africa is being dismantled by official racial socialism” (3159).

Oor grondherverdeling: “It seems to me patent that land that has been farmed intensively and scientifically must never be given to men whose capacity and craving is for kraal life” (2031). Volgens die Bybel mag ons nie begeer nie, maar in die nuwe Suid-Afrika is die reël: “Covet and you shall be rewarded” (2053); ‘n geval van “placate the envious by taking from those they envy” (2464). “In South Africa, the pool of haves is destined to be drained, or shrink to an unsustainable size” (2777). “In the United States, the ratio of voters to taxpayers is approximately two to one; in South Africa it is a stupefying eleven to one” (4738). “We must question the sheer waste and wholesale destruction of wealth which this supposed justice entails” (2058). “The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform has admitted that ninety percent of redistributed farms were ‘dysfunctional'” (2062). Misdaad kan nie sonder meer aan armoede toegedig word nie. “Wealth disparities fail to explain away the sadism invested in the onslaught against white South Africans” (1178).

Mercer het haar boek veral met die oog op Amerikaanse lesers geskryf. Maar daar is vir plaaslike lesers goeie inligting oor “progressiewe” denke in bv Amerika, soos:

“Crimes are caused, not committed.”
“Evil action don’t incriminate, they mitigate.”
“Perp[etrator]s don’t do a crime, but are driven to their deeds by forces beyond their control” (3235).
“The Boer killer is a ‘victim’ of apartheid” (3259).
“Crime is caused by deprivation and not depravity. Therefore, accelerating race-based wealth distribution will remove the reasons for crime” (3264).
“If colonialism was our [die wittes se] original sin, capitalism is our cardinal sin” (3246).

“Liberal intellectuals have made careers out of blaming the West for problems that were endemic to many societies both before and after their experiences as European colonies … The truth is that colonization constituted the least tumultuous period in African history” (3297). “Since the colonial powers decamped, economic conditions have declined across the Dark Continent” (3308). “Labor productivity is the main determinant of wages – and wealth. People in die West produce what they consume – and much more; they don’t remove, or steal it from Third Worlders … The concept of a wealth gap is an extension of the politically contrived construct of exploitation – rich of poor, North of South” (3317).

“Colonists in Africa reduced the state of squalor, disease and death associated with lack of development … once introduced to potable water, sanitation, transportation, and primary healthcare, few Africans wish to do without them” (3361). ‘n Gewilde verwyt is “that the colonial powers plundered Africa and failed to plow back profits into the place” (3373). “The infrastructure in Africa was built by the colonial powers,” maar al wat ‘n mens hoor, is die koloniale lande “got rich on the backs of poor nations” (3380). “The West is what it is due to human capital – people of superior ideas and abilities” (3389). “The colonial powers enchanced, rather than hindered, progress” (3422).

“South Africa is a microcosm of what America could become” (487). Mario Rantho van die ANC word soos volg aangehaal: “It is imperative to get rid of merit as the overriding principle in the appointment of public servants” (2075). Geen wonder dienslewering in die openbare sektor is so pateties nie. Volgens Mercer moet daar in Amerika teruggekeer word na meriete en individualiteit. In die VSA is daar, soos in die nuwe Suid-Afrika “reverse-racism laws. Being black guarantees special privileges” (2700). “Be it in the US or in South Africa, preferential treatment, enforced by legal fiat and rooted in the characteristics of a group (race) rather than the value of the individual, flouts justice in every respect” (493). “Creedal multiculturalism simply doesn’t admit of the possibility that aptitudes and abilities may vary by culture or ethnicity, as well as from one individual to another” (2708).