Ricardo Duchesne

Leon Lemmer: Nasionalisme teenoor globalisme – Lauren Southern en Ricardo Duchesne

Lauren Southern (gebore in 1995) is ‘n aantreklike Kanadees wat haar politieke idees as regs eerder as konserwatief beskryf. Sy is reeds op Praag (14.07.2018) bekend gestel. Tot Maart 2017 was sy ‘n joernalis by Rebel Media, wat deur Ezra Levant (gebore in 1972) gestig is. Sedertdien doen sy onafhanklik joernalistieke werk. Levant was aktief betrokke by die Unite the White-beweging (1996-2003) in Kanada en was daarna die redakteur van die Western Standard (2004-2007) in Calgary, Alberta. In 2006 het hy heelwat opspraak verwek deur die Deense Mohammed-spotprente te publiseer. Levant het naas ander boeke twee uitstekende werke gepubliseer, wat ek nog wil bespreek: Shakedown: How our government is undermining democracy in the name of human rights (2009, 234p; Amazon Kindle $13,79) en Trumping Trudeau: How Donald Trump will change Canada even if Justin Trudeau doesn’t know it yet (2017, 102p; Amazon Kindle $5,74).

Hierdie rubriek handel egter veral oor Southern. As regse aktivis is sy net so bedrywig soos Milo Yiannopoulos (gebore in 1984) (Praag 7.10.2017), maar anders as die homoseksuele Yiannopoulos is Southern se standpunt dat daar net twee geslagte is. Sy is ook teen militante feminisme gekant. In Mei 2017 het sy in die moeilikheid in Italië beland toe sy wou verhoed dat skepe onwettige immigrante of vlugtelinge uit die Middellandse See red. Sy is sterk teen veral Moslem-immigrante gekant en is om hierdie rede hertoelating tot Brittanje geweier. In Julie 2018 was sy in Australië en het sy ‘n T-temp met die bewoording “It’s OK to be white” gedra as teenvoeter vir “Black is beautiful.” In Australië het Southern sowel ondersteuning as teenstand ervaar. Na aanleiding van Southern se T-hemp: Onder die leiding van blankes is Suid-Afrika vóór 1994 tot die voorspoedigste land in Afrika ontwikkel. Ons as blankes moet dus nie toelaat dat skuldgevoelens by ons aangewakker word deur elemente wat openlik verklaar het dat hulle, ten einde die politieke mag te bekom, bereid was om die land tot in die grond af te breek nie; iets wat hulle sedert 1994 eintlik steeds doen.

In Augustus vanjaar is Southern se besoek aan Nieu-Seeland gesaboteer op ‘n manier soortgelyk aan die taktiek wat plaaslik en elders, bv in Nederland, teen Steve Hofmeyr gebruik is: Die eienaars van die lokale waarin sy sou optree, het weens politieke inmenging hulle toestemming vir die byeenkomste teruggetrek. Daar is beweer dat dit in die openbare belang gedoen is terwyl sy aanvoer dat daar geen sprake van haatspraak by haar is nie en dat vryheid van uitdrukking weens sulke optrede ondermyn word. Wat van besondere plaaslike belang is, is dat Southern in Junie vanjaar ‘n dokumentêre video oor Suid-Afrikaanse plaasmoorde en die kwessie van grondherverdeling vrygestel het. Dit is op die internet beskikbaar. Sy is onthuts oor die wrede marteling wat so kenmerkend van plaasmoorde is. Daarenteen laat sy haar positief oor Orania uit. Kort hierna, in Augustus, is Ernst Roets se boek oor dieselfde onderwerp gepubliseer: Kill the Boer: Government complicity in South Africa’s brutal farm murders (2018, 413p; Amazon Kindle $11,49).

Hierdie ronde skryf ek egter oor Southern se boek, Barbarians: How Baby Boomers, immigration, and Islam screwed my generation (Toronto: Rebel Media, 2016, 90p; Amazon Kindle $5,74). Baby Boomers is die Amerikaanse benaming vir die geslag wat ná die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gebore is. In haar erkennings bedank sy haar pa vir sy wysheid en spreek sy die hoop uit dat haar generasie ‘n skild teen barbaarsheid en globalisme sal wees en ‘n bydrae tot die behoud van (Westerse) beskawing sal lewer (Kindle 45). Oor Southern word gesê: “She is an avid reader and lover of liberty, individualism and responsibility” (1184). In sy voorwoord beskryf Ezra Levant die outeur as: “a right wing millennial with a cause” (56).

Southern was in Kanada op skool en universiteit, hoewel sy net die eerste twee jaar van haar graadstudie voltooi het. Soos in Amerika is onderwys in Kanada deurspek met linkse politieke propaganda, soos ook al hoe meer in Suid-Afrika die geval is. “I was completely equal to everyone, which is to say average and mediocre. I was taught that diversity is unity. That to regress is to progress” (114), wat herinner aan die lof vir die nuwe demokratiese Suid-Afrika. Danksy die behoudende opvoeding wat sy tuis ontvang het, kon Southern haar gesonde(r) uitkyk op die werklikheid behou; “correcting my own flawed education … I think I’m slowly gaining on reality. If the rest of my generation are going to follow suit, they’re going to have to reckon with many of the same facts” (126).

Sy lys dan hierdie vyf feite vir haar tydgenote: “[1] They’ll have to accept that they’re not all that special, and greatness is measured in hard-earned victories, not participation trophies. [2] They’ll have to accept that Western ideals have shaped our cultures into some of the greatest, freest, most generous, most decent, most egalitarian, and most peaceful on Earth. [3] They’ll have to accept that it’s not Christian terrorism to push back as hard as possible against Muslim invasion. [4] They’ll have to accept the rights guaranteed by Western ideals exist because our civilization was willing to shed blood in order to shut down its enemies, rather than provide safe spaces to savages. And [5] most importantly, they’ll have to accept that diversity is not a strength; it’s a weakness. Its legacy is not peace and love, but division and hate” (132).

“While pride in the West has been ruthlessly suppressed to the point of being forgotten altogether, the unfortunate fact is that it’s been done with the consent of those indoctrinated by the new system, very much including many millennials” (139). “Dismissing the guidance built for us over thousands and thousands of years in the form of gender roles, traditional lifestyles, hard work, objectivity, and cultural supremacy was, in fact, painfully stupid” (151). “Sure, it’ll be hard for us to dig ourselves out of the pit that the left-wing indoctrination and media machines has dug for everyone our age” (168). Die eerste hoofstuk van haar boek het as opskrif: “The West is dying”, ‘n onderwerp wat ek al dikwels bespreek het. Die Weste gaan agteruit veral weens kulturele marxisme, wat alles wat bv blank en Westers is, ondermyn: “We have experienced an utter dispossession, dilution, and disintegration of the Western soul” (81). In die nuwe dekadente opset, “you won’t find more meaning. You won’t find more belonging. You won’t find more purpose” (74). Sy het ‘n sterk afkeer van jong mense se hedonisme; hulle toegewydheid aan plesier/genot (145).

Southern is nog jonk en sy moet nog heelwat leeswerk inhaal voordat haar insig in alle opsigte sal oortuig. Byvoorbeeld: “Rather than look up to giants of history like Charlemagne, Cecil Rhodes, or John Adams, our generation turns to virtue-signaling idiots like Justin Trudeau and Deray McKesson for moral guidance” (145). Justin Trudeau (gebore in 1971), is sedert 2015 die Kanadese eerste minister. Hy is onvleiend die onderwerp van Ezra Levant se 2017-boek, waarna in die eerste paragraaf hier bo verwys is. Deray McKesson (gebore in 1985) is ‘n swart Amerikaanse Black Lives Matter-aktivis. Maar Afrikaners sal kwalik met Southern oor die historiese grootsheid van Cecil Rhodes saamstem.

Hoofstuk 2 handel oor Southern se ervaring as universiteitstudent in Toronto. In Engels I is van studente verwag om ‘n werkstuk oor die swart Amerikaner, Toni Morrison (gebore in 1931), te voltooi. Morrison het in 1993 die Nobel-prys vir Letterkunde ontvang. Die ontleding van haar Nobel-aanvaardingstoespraak is ‘n tipiese voorbeeld van die soort werk wat van studente aan Kanadese en Amerikaanse universiteite verwag word. Die dosent “started bringing up politics and with each session, his views got progressively more unhinged and radical” (184); dermate dat Southern later nie meer stil kon bly nie. Die oorwegend linksgesindheid van hierdie dosente assosieer sy met die Baby Boomers-geslag. Hulle is gebore in ‘n tyd toe voorspoed en vryheid vooropgestel is. “Which, naturally, led them being absolutely unwilling to absorb the tough-minded values of their parents … Instead, they wanted to start a new generation of love, of peace, and of no mean authoritative figures” (230).

Die meeste van hierdie dosente “fell in love with communism and fell out with religion” (236). Hulle is vaandeldraers van “the New Left” (248). In hierdie konteks verwys sy goedkeurend na die gelowige Rooms-Katoliek, William F Buckley, jr (1925-2008), se boek, God and man at Yale: The superstitions of ‘academic freedom’ (1951/2012, 304p; Amazon Kindle $10,92). Sedertdien het die situasie in die akademie aanmerklik versleg, want die dosente in die middel van die vorige eeu “still believed in classical Western concepts like rationalism, free speech and free inquiry” (242). In Noord-Amerika, soos deesdae in Suid-Afrika, is daar aan die universiteite, asook in die hoofstroom-inligtingsmedia, “bitter and authoritarian suppression of contrary viewpoints” (266). Op universiteitskampusse ontlok behoudende, tradisionele, konserwatiewe of regse menings hewige teenstand: “The protests themselves had never been anything but cover for communist infiltration – and destruction – of Western centers of learning” (266).

Dít is deel van wat die linkse Duitse studenteleier, Rudi Dutschke (1940-1979), “the long march through the [Western] institutions” van mag, waaronder die universiteite, noem (271). Geen wonder dat Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), ‘n aanhanger van die Kritiese Teorie van die marxistiese Frankfurt-skool, van Dutschke se strategie gesê het: Dit is “‘the only effective way’ to achieve the communist domination required to achieve utopia” (278). Nelson Mandela se outobiografie, Long walk to freedom (1994), is in dieselfde liga weens sy anti-blanke en anti-Westerse ingesteldheid. ‘n Sinvolle boek oor hierdie onderwerp is Roger Kimball se The long march: How the cultural revolution of the 1960s changed America (New York: Encounter Books, 2000, 338p; Amazon Kindle $11,49). Die boektitel is ontleen aan Mao Zedong/Tse-tung (1893-1976) se kommunistiese leër wat Jiang Jie Shi/Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) se Guamindang/Kuomintang-magte in 1934/5 oor ‘n afstand van 10 000 kilometer ontvlug het.

Kragtens Marcuse se “repressive tolerance” moet regse idees onderdruk en linkse idees ooreenkomstig “liberating tolerance” bevorder word (285). Lees bv die artikel oor die boek, A critique of pure tolerance (1965), in die Wikipedia. Southern verwys ook na die destruktiewe gevolge van Michel Foucault (1926-1984) se poststrukturele opvattings en Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) se dekonstruksie-idees (299). Volgens Foucault is geestelike gesondheid en rasionaliteit konstrukte “designed by society to keep the oppressed down” (305). “Derrida argued that language itself was a social construct designed by the powerful to keep the oppressed down” (312). Dit is hierdie soort idees wat by voorkeur deur die “Boomer academics” versprei word (317).

In Amerika word tussen allerhande soorte konserwatisme onderskei. In Suid-Afrika is linksheid egter so oorheersend dat ‘n mens geneig kan wees om enige gematigde of behoudende standpunt te ondersteun. Fynere onderskeide word dan as van mindere belang beskou. Dit sou egter ‘n fout wees, soos hier onder duidelik blyk. In hoofstuk 3 noem Southern die verkiesing in 2016 van Donald Trump (gebore in 1946) as die 45ste Amerikaanse president “exhilarating” (370). Sy skryf: “Baby Boom conservatism is definitely dead” (378). Sy verwys hier veral na die aanvanklike onwilligheid en die voortgesette traagheid in die Republikeinse Party om Trump te ondersteun. “With rare, rare exceptions, the anti-Trump ‘conservatives’ were out of touch, boring, lame, ineffective, self-righteous losers without enough flare or original thought” (399).

Southern noem twee konserwatiewes van weleer waarvoor sy respek het: William Buckley en Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) (406). Later noem sy ook die sosioloog, Daniel Bell (1919-2011), wat myns insiens nie genoeg waardering ontlok nie,* en die joernalis, Irving Kristol (1920-2009). Laasgenoemde “coined a cute little definition ..:’A neoconservative is a liberal who’s been mugged by reality'” (424). Die Britse joernalis, Melanie Phillips (gebore in 1951), gebruik Kristol se frase, “mugged by reality”, om haar eie oorgang van linksheid na konserwatisme te beskryf (Praag 18.08.2018). Southern het ook waardering vir Barry Goldwater (1909-1998), wat as Amerikaanse presidentskandidaat in 1964 die weg vir die presidentskap van Reagan (1981-1989) voorberei het (430). [* “Daniel Bell used to say that he was a social democrat in economics, a liberal in politics, and on social and cultural matters somewhat conservative” (David Goodhart, The road to somewhere: The new tribes shaping British politics, Penguin, 2017, 304p; Amazon Kindle $14.46, 268).]

Maar die algemene neiging by neokonserwatiewes in Amerika was al hoe meer “to sanitize the right – to make it more like the old left. In other words, they tried to make it more technocratic, more stuffy, more ‘responsible’, less rebellious, less edgy, less young, and above all, less politically incorrect” (Southern 430). “Let’s be clear: the modern generation of neoconservatives are deeply dangerous to the right because even in the context of a Trump administration, they still have the means to control how young right-wingers learn the history of their movement” (459). Dit is blykbaar veral George W Bush (gebore in 1946, die 43ste Amerikaanse president en die oudste seun van George HW Bush, gebore in 1924 en die 41ste president) wat as neokonserwatiewe nie guns in Southern se oë vind nie (471).

Hoofstuk 4 het as opskrif: “How immigration is ruining everything.” “We’re not going to pretend religious freedom or multiculturalism takes primacy over everything if it permits Jihadists to enter our country” (500). “Before his father was elected, Donald Trump, Jr [born in 1977], got into a lot of trouble for comparing immigration to a bowl of Skittles [± Smarties]. If only a few Skittles in a bowl were poisonous, Trump, Jr, asked, would you still take a handful? This set off a flood of outrage from lefties and cucked ‘conservatives,’ who complained that the metaphor was ‘dehumanizing.’ Which is another way of saying ‘too on-point for our feelings to handle'” (535). “In small numbers, it [immigration] can be fine, and even improve your country’s makeup. But take too many in, and you lose the ability to assimilate them, and everything goes to s–t ” (544). (Southern is ongelukkig geneig om te dikwels op ‘n steurende manier na mense se uitskeidings en seks te verwys.)

Die ekonoom, Milton Friedman (1912-2006), het tereg genoem: “You can’t have open borders and a welfare state” (550), maar dit is ongelukkig deel van die wrede werklikheid van die nuwe Suid-Afrika. “Even if you only consider immigration from an economic perspective, an ‘invite the world’ policy still comes out to an invitation for eventual anarchy” (567). “With the conservatives, you can argue economics and facts. Liberals have no such limitations. For them, immigration is all about playing mommy to the poor, vulnerable immigrant population, who obviously contribute so much to diversity and multiculturalism” (578). “Invite the world” is die frase wat gebruik word om die immigrasiebeleid van Pierre Trudeau (1919-2000) en sy oudste seun, Justin (gebore in 1971) te beskryf. “In 1971, during Pierre Trudeau’s reign, Canada was the first country in the world to adopt state multiculturalism as official policy. If you look [at] his son, Canada’s current prime minister Justin Trudeau, it should be obvious to you at this point that the worm-eaten apple doesn’t fall far from the tree. By now, it should be obvious how cancerous the dedication by both Trudeau’s to a ‘multicultural’ state has been throughout the West” (594).

“In the end the result of mass immigration is the destruction of the economy, of our culture, and of the very moral norms that make those emotional arguments have resonance in the first place” (600). “Unchecked immigration is a moral eyesore. It asks our states to fail their most basic obligation by putting the needs of faceless, dubiously friendly strangers over the needs of the citizens they exist to protect and serve” (605). “The multicultural worldview that promotes unchecked immigration is not about fulfilling the obligation of a government toward its own people. It is instead a recklessly naïve, utopian view of the world holding hands, loving each other, and singing Kumbaya [a spiritual folk song], even though all of history, social science, and common sense militate against that actually happening. Similarly, multiculturalism is not motivated by a desire for integration or assimilation of the best of foreign cultures into Western culture: rather, it seeks to put every culture in its own ghetto-sized safe space while forcing the surrounding country to conform, rather than the other way round” (612).

“They [globalists] say it [mass immigration] means simply being a ‘citizen of the world,’ which sounds great. But behind that contentless phrase are sinister implications. Thus the more wonky defenders of globalism define it as being ‘interconnected by removing cultural and legal barriers,’ or as ‘the pooling of states’ sovereignty into supranational organizations’ … They don’t want your vote to count unless the wise men in Brussels, or on Wall Street, or in the UN building, decide to allow it to count” (669). “Individualism and unique identity is the antithesis of global government. It’s the antithesis of the European Union, of the United Nations, of the World Bank … This is why globalists hold contempt for citizenship, tradition, national culture and religion. These things promote sovereignty of nations – they create unique identities for nations. Destroying those unique identities is the key to submission” (675).

“The first goal of Marxists was to destroy the family and the church because both were foundations for one’s life. You could count on both to support you, you could count on them to give you guidance. But for Marxists and their progressive allies, it was essential that government fill both roles: both as your last line of support, and as the people with the power to set the agenda for your life. Globalism has a similar goal on a larger scale. They don’t want the family, the church or your government to set the agenda – they want to set the agenda from super-national organizations. They want to sweep nationalism, nation states, and national democracy under the rug. They want to leave local communities to pick up the tab for their agenda, and shut out any local voices complaining about the cost. Whether that be financial, criminal, or cultural” (682).

“They use the false flag of ‘diversity’ as cover to mold people into how their balance sheets and Econ 101 textbooks see you – as faceless, expendable consumers, deprived of culture, identity or thought. They’ve had a strong grip on society for the last decade, but Trump and those like him are monkey wrenches thrown into their machine of deceit. Out of nowhere, Trump and his allies spoke up for those who were disaffected by the failure of immigration and had no compunctions about naming the problem. As Trump himself said in a speech, no longer will we listen to the ‘false song of globalism'” (689).

“Whatever libertarian wonks and naïve evangelical missionaries on the right believe, mass immigration is not about the economy or about moral duty. It’s about diversity, and the dilution of what makes our countries recognizable, pure and simple. It’s about dividing the people so that politicians and corporate elites have an easier time picking their pocket” (695).

Hoofstuk 5 handel spesifiek oor Moslem-immigrante wat nie wil integreer nie en die gasheerland volgens hulle behoeftes wil verander. As bedenkinge teen hierdie Moslems uitgespreek word, word dit uit linkse geledere ‘n fobie, ‘n irrasionele vrees, genoem (725). “Western citizens might be justified in being suspicious or hostile toward non-Western culture … as the Dutch politician Geert Wilders has repeatedly stressed, while individual Muslims can no doubt be decent and noble people, just as tame wolves do exist, the fact is that Islam the religion is by its nature dangerous to the West” (737). Daar word teengewerp dat die Bybel ook barbaarse idees verkondig. “Sure, there are parts of the holy books of practically every religion that would offend our modern enlightenment-era sensibilities. But there are also centuries of theology that have been written since those holy books that have rendered the offending passages inoperable in the minds of all but the most fanatical believers … Islam has not had its enlightenment” (743). “Where are the marches on the streets against terrorism by Muslims?” (755). “Islam’s ambition has been the destruction of Christendom – which is to say, not just Christians, but Jews, European Pagans, and everyone else living under the banner of Western culture” (814). Die Moslem-einddoel is “a global caliphate” (989).

In hoofstuk 6 noem Southern dat sy verkwalik word omdat sy blanke bevoorregting ontken (836). Die uitgangspunt van linkse elemente is dat almal gelyk en wesenlik eenders is. As in die praktyk duidelik blyk dat daar ongelykheid is, dat die blankes wêreldwyd neig om welvarend te wees terwyl die nie-blankes dikwels arm is, word beweer dat dit is omdat die blankes die nie-blankes uitbuit. Die punt is dat die uitgangspunt foutief is. Mense verskil, ook binne dieselfde ras en etniese groep. Mense het verskillende talente wat meebring dat hulle in sommige opsigte uitmunt maar nie in ander nie. Sommige groepe kan oor die algemeen meer geskik wees vir prestasie in bv die hedendaagse ekonomies-finansiële werklikheid. Andersyds beleef ons plaaslik die Orwelliaanse werklikheid dat die gebruik van sekere woorde verbode is; dat blankes (anders as nie-blankes) hulle nie mag uiter nie; dat selfs tronkstraf aan blankes opgelê kan word al is geen skade bewys nie. Southern skryf: “Suppressing words doesn’t actually solve problems, and may actually make those problems worse” (896). Mense kan dan verplig voel om hulle gevoelens op te krop en hulle idees te radikaliseer. As ‘n mens teen iets gekant is en dit sê, is dit nie noodwendig haatspraak nie. Dit kan bloot die uitdrukking van meningsverskil wees.

In die laaste hoofstuk staan: “The West is withering away from cancer, and globalism is the cancer … Left-wing globalism is simply Communism Lite, where a Marxist culture replaces a Marxist economy” (971). Teenoor kulturele marxisme stel Southern nasionalisme as “a great, necessary idea … Nationalism is what builds societies” (1028). “Nationalism is more than just not-that-bad. It’s awesome. Particularly … pan-Western nationalism” (1034); dus, blanke solidariteit is nodig omdat die voortbestaan van blankes wêreldwyd bedreig word. Sy is optimisties: “This kind of nationalism has a chance at defining world politics for centuries. Why? Because it conforms to human nature … its superiority to globalism is actually based on one of the most healthy parts of human nature: the preference for a group that supports each other, like a family” (1039). “The West needs to think of itself as a family again, not as a sugar daddy for other people and their families” (1045).

“We need to re-learn that borders are good, necessary things” (1055). Dit is waarom Donald Trump ‘n muur op die Amerikaanse grens met Mexiko wil bou ten einde ongewenste inkommers uit te hou. Maar “he repeatedly talked about the ‘big, beautiful door’ he wanted to build in his wall” (1067). “We need to decide just who we do actually want to let through those doors” (1072). Die probleem is dat die tradisionele immigrasiebeleid in die Weste “simply fails to be remotely meritocratic” (1093). Trump wil dit regstel.

Nog ‘n pro-nasionalistiese ding wat ons moet doen, is “to restore a fair battle of ideas. The only way to ensure this is to ensure that complete free speech and expression triumph, and that those that try to destroy either are denied the power. Today, censorship proceeds not primarily from the government, but from the power of social sanction from a dominant culture ruled by the corporate and media left” (1105). In Suid-Afrika is dit swart mag wat sedert 1994 in beheer is en wyd deur blanke kruipsugtiges gesteun word. “Those of us on the right need to rediscover the capacity to argue against private censorship and the usage of corporate power to stifle dissent” (1105). “A free marketplace of ideas enables us to consider all options” (1110). In die nuwe Suid-Afrika neem selfsensuur en ‘n gepaardgaande gebrek aan durf ongelukkig groot afmetings aan.

‘n Ander euwel “and perhaps most crucially, entitlement culture must be destroyed. In the 60s, the UK and America had a culture that would leave one ashamed to be on the dole, to not have a job” (1110). In Suid-Afrika is daar meer mense wat staatstoelaes ontvang as wat daar betalers van inkomstebelasting is. Die absurditeit is dat hierdie meerderheid bakhandstaners met die stemreg waaroor hulle sedert 1994 beskik, kan verseker dat ‘n simpatieke, pro-welsynsregering in die kussings bly. As daar eerder ‘n kultuur van skaamte oor welsyn bestaan, “a welfare state can work as it was intended: as a safety net for those temporarily on hard times. Only when people treat welfare as an ugly necessity for the temporarily humbled, or for defeated, failed human beings with nowhere else to go, can it avoid becoming a machine for the creation of mass-entitlement” (1117).

In Suid-Afrika is daar egter nie ‘n kat se kans dat die ANC aan die afhanklikes van staatstoelaes sal sê dat hulle selfversorgend moet word nie, dat hulle toelaes afgeskaal of weggeneem sal word nie. Die ANC sal eerder voor verkiesings hoër toelaes aan meer ontvangers belowe. In hierdie opsig is Southern pessimisties. Ietwat oordrewe skryf sy: “I don’t think anyone really wants to succeed anymore, period. They want to do as little as possible … They want to cheat the system and are happy to brag about it” (1123). Die kuur hiervoor is “a cultural revival of the idea that failure should be a source of shame, that losers should be shunned and even mocked” (1123). In Suid-Afrika word ‘n omgekeerde benadering gevolg: Diegene wat suksesvol was en is, word van uitbuiting en oneerlikheid beskuldig en daar word van hulle verwag om hulle oor hulle prestasies te skaam.

Daar is nog ‘n idee wat Southern wil laat herleef: “The idea that success through the power of the human will represents humanity at its best” (1129). “We are the people who will be forced to wake up to the failure of multiculturalism, liberalism and globalism” (1151). “To be on the right today is to want to restore things that have been lost: things like merit, justice, virtue and nationhood. But we have not lost truth, and with truth, all other things can be found” (1157).

Southern het dit tereg teen globalisme (‘n ideologie) en nie teen globalisering (‘n proses) nie. Dit is uiters belanglik om hierdie twee terme/begrippe duidelik te onderskei. Hou ook in gedagte dat Southern tussen neokonserwatisme (wat sy verwerp) en regsheid (wat sy onderskryf) onderskei. Robert Locke skryf: “Globalization and globalism are fundamentally different: globalization is an historical process, a fact of how things are, but globalism is an ideology, a set op opinions about how things ought to be. Globalism is the ideology that advocates the liquidation of nations. Its opposite is nationalism. Globalization, on the other hand, is not an ideology at all. Ultimately, it is just the growth of communications and trade, and it has been happening since 1492* … Globalism is a deliberate political choice, no more inevitable than socialism … Globalization can exist without globalism … Japan has based her economy on exports for 50 years without ceasing to be one of the most nationalistic and culturally distinctive nations on earth” (aangehaal deur Ricardo Duchesne, Canada in decay: Mass immigration, diversity, and the ethnocide of European Canadians, London: Black House Publishing, 2017, 374p; Amazon Kindle $7.56, 2797). [* ‘n Verwysing na Christopher Columbus se “ontdekking” van die Nuwe Wêreld/die Amerikas.]

Ricardo Duchesne is, soos Lauren Southern, ‘n Kanadees. Op grond van die duidelike onderskeid wat Robert Locke tussen globalisering en globalisme tref, skryf Duchesne tereg: “Globalization and immigration are not necessarily connected” (2780). Later brei hy hierop uit en maak Duchesne seker die duidelikste en briljantste onderskeid tussen neokonserwatiewes (hier regse genoem) en linkses, bv liberaliste, wat ek in die literatuur teëgekom het: “It has been … in their endorsement of globalism (masquerading as globalization) that the left and right [called neoconservatives by Southern] have really converged in a state of amicable reinforcement, notwithstanding their varying emphasis on different aspects of globalism. The right’s [neoconservative’s] main interest has been the promotion of policies that augment the expansion of global capitalism, deregulation, freer mobility of capital and information at low cost between borders, as well as international labour migration” (5996). “National identities are inefficient, slow moving, inconsistent with the new technologies of communications. They want humans without national identities endlessly seeking pleasures in a ‘homogenized world market’ in which every person in the globe ‘wants products and features that everybody else wants.’ Different cultural preferences, national tastes, production standards and technologies are ‘vestiges of the past'” (6005).

“The Left’s globalist narrative is more complicated and goes something like this: Humans are members of the same species; the racial differences between them are superficial, cultures should not be viewed in ‘essentialist’ terms, but as constructs in a state of continuous change. To be a true liberal, one must allow individuals to express themselves without being tied to pre-given identities, be they cultural, national, or sexual identities. With the ‘freeing’ of humans from identities ‘constructed’ by ‘White males’ and the emergence of new gender and racial identities, humans will learn to become global citizens, identifying themselves as members of an ‘international community’ devoid of hierarchies of dominance and the divisions generated by ‘exclusive’ national identities” (6012). “These new humans will be morally sensitive to the suffering of ‘strangers,’ quick in their responses to violations in the human rights of everyone, assist those threatened by famines in Africa, tsunamis in Asia, floods and earthquakes, while celebrating trans-sexuality en pan-sexuality in an orgiastic state of happiness. With the spread of transnational corporations, IGOs [International Governmental Organizations] and INGOs [International Non-Governmental Organizations], the European Union and other supranational organizations and trade blocks, power has become ‘deterritorialized’ and so there is a need for global governance and the breakdown of nationalism. As members of this increasingly transnational world, Europeans must think of their cosmopolitan responsibility rather than their national interests” (6021).

“The right [neoconservatives] may not be as keen with leftist demands for ‘global social justice,’ but corporate globalists have come to realize that the seemingly humanitarian concerns of the left serve as an excellent moral umbrella for the spread of global capitalism. Corporations love the way leftist causes adorned the narcissistic consumerist culture they promote with humanitarian concerns about transsexual rights, ‘discriminated minorities’ and ‘suffering refugees.’ The left and the right have actually reached a new consensus on the supposed economic benefits of mass immigration. The dominant pro-immigration argument today is really a combination of right and left economic concerns about how the populations of Western countries are set to decline dramatically in the next decades due to continuing below-replacement fertility rates, which is resulting in a shrinking labour force, at the same time as the population is aging, which will bring a decline, so they argue, in both economic growth and in the possibility of financing socialist programs. A decline in population, both sides say, will bring a ‘massive’ crisis which, left to its own, without mass immigration, will result in widespread labour shortages, lower tax receipts, declining welfare supports and lower consumption levels” (6030).

Die samevattende gevolgtrekking waartoe Duchesne kom, is: “Forget left and right – the new divide in politics is between nationalists and globalists” (6036). “The Left and the Right are two sides of the same coin promoting globalism and identifying nationalists as the enemy. In the language of Carl Schmitt [1888-1985], both sides believe that the friend-enemy distinction can be abolished in a world in which there is consensus on basic human rights and economic interdependency. The one obstacle standing in the way of this abolition, they hold, is the tribalism of nationalism and White identity. Mass immigration will result in the mixing of races inside White created countries, and this will result in eternal happiness and endless prosperity” (6286).

Duchesne haal soos volg aan uit ‘n berig in die New York Times (4.03.2017): “Being mixed makes it harder to fall back on the tribal identities that have guided so much of human history, and that are now resurgent. Your background pushes you to construct a worldview that transcends the tribal … President Trump has answered this challenge by reaching backward – vowing to wall off America and invoking a whiter, more homogeneous country … The point is that diversity – of one’s own makeup, one’s experience, of groups of people solving problems, of cities and nations – is linked to economic prosperity, greater scientific prowess and a fairer judicial process” (6286).

Duchesne lewer die volgende kommentaar op hierdie berig: “This article … suffers from a sequence of monumental contradictions. First, it argues against the racist ‘homogeneity’ of whiter America, while insisting that race-mixed individuals are superior in intelligence and overall ability to create better nations. Secondly, it says that increasing racial diversification in the United States has been behind its prosperity, while informing us that ‘multiracials’ today make up only ‘an estimated 7 percent of Americans.’ What about the making of the United States into the wealthiest and most innovative nation in the world by the 1950s when the nation was whiter, and when non-whites were not partaking in the nation’s creative genius? Thirdly, the studies it cites about the superiority of mixed individuals amount to nothing more than ‘demonstrating’ that race mixed individuals tend to be stronger believers in ‘diversity’ and since diversity is good, and thus they are better for the nation’s wellbeing. This is the trashy reasoning they teach at American Ivy Leagues [universities]” (8915).

Duchesne skryf verder: “What the globalists fail to realize is that only Europeans are relinquishing the political, their tribal identity, whereas non-European nations and ethnic groups inside the West are globalizing and playing up to cosmopolitan values while maintaining their ethno-national identities. In the end, non-Europeans, if current trends continue, will win since the political ultimately exists in the context of a national community, and can never become universal. The US versus Them distinction cannot be abolished, for it is part of human nature, human creativity, the very energy that makes life meaningful, gives it colour and real diversity” (6294).

Slegs ‘n enkele aspek van Duchesne se jongste boek is hier bo bespreek. Ek het by ‘n vorige geleentheid oor ‘n ander boek van Duchesne geskryf: “Die kreatiewe, dinamiese ondermeningsgees van Europeërs” (Praag 24.02.2018). Daarin redeneer hy onder meer dat die blanke bevolking in Kanada eerder Europees as Amerikaans is. Die boek van Southern wat hier bo bespreek is sowel as dié van Duchesne toon egter in hoe ‘n groot mate die Kanadese en Amerikaanse werklikheid verstrengel is.

Leon Lemmer: Die kreatiewe, dinamiese ondernemingsgees van Europeërs

In die literatuur van die 20ste eeu word daar dikwels na die groot blanke bevolkings in Europa, insluitende Brittanje, en Amerika verwys. Dan word daar ook melding gemaak van kleiner blanke bevolkings elders en die standaardlys was vier statebondslande: Kanada, Australië, Nieu-Seeland en Suid-Afrika. Klaarblyklik is aan hoofsaaklik Engelstalige lande gedink, want Argentinië, Chili, Uruguay en Brasilië het ook substansiële blanke bevolkings, al is blankes besig om ‘n minderheid in Brasilië te word en is daar in Suid-Amerika geen duidelike onderskeid tussen wit en nie-wit mense nie. Mario Vargas Llosa skryf goedkeurend van ‘n “mestizo continent” (Duchesne, bron hier onder, Kindle 1815). Die groot blanke bevolking van Rusland is gewoonlik onvermeld gelaat omdat daardie land destyds as nie-Westers en as kommunisties en agter die ystergordyn beskou is. Rusland is “homeland to the most numerous European group in Europe” (1779), vandaar “Guillaume Faye’s vision of a Euro-Siberia federation” (1793).

Wat in die literatuur opval, is dat Suid-Afrika sedert die grondwetlike ramp van 1990/94 nie meer as ‘n blanke enklave genoem of gereken word nie. In globale perspektief het Suid-Afrika se blankes ‘n vergete minderheidsgroep geword. “Australia’s Asian population is soaring as immigrants from across the region – particularly China and India – enter the country” (1847). Minder bekend is dat blankes in Kanada, soos in Amerika, vinnig besig is om ‘n minderheid te word. In Amerika is die situasie nie heeltemal so benard as wat dikwels voorgestel word nie omdat baie van die Hispaniste, wat met die oog op “regstellende” bevoordeling amptelik as nie-wit gereken word, in werklikheid eerder blank is (G Cristina Mora, Making Hispanics: How activists, bureaucrats, and media constructed a new American, University of Chicago Press, 2014, 252p; Amazon Kindle $18,81). Soos die bruin bevolkingsgroep in Suid-Afrika is Amerika se Hispaniste ‘n politieke konstruk. (Volgens die HAT is die woord kleurling rassisties.)

In Kanada is Hispaniste nie so ‘n beduidende faktor soos in Amerika nie. Oor die situasie in Kanada het Ricardo Duchesne in Augustus 2017 die volgende boek gepubliseer: Canada in decay: Mass immigration, diversity, and the ethnocide of Euro-Canadians (Black House Publishing, 2017, 374p).* Vóór dit het die volgende boek van Duchesne verskyn: The uniqueness of Western civilization (Brill, 2011, 527p). Albei hierdie boeke is nog nie as e-boeke beskikbaar nie maar is op my leeslys.

[* “As late as 1971, when official multiculturalism was introduced, Eurocanadians still made up over 96% of the population. Projections by Statistics Canada (2010) now estimates that one-third of Canada’s population will be a visible minority by 2031, ‘whites will become the minority in Toronto and Vancouver over the course of the next three decades'” (1847; ook 919). “As of 2011, non-Whites or ‘visible minorities’ constitute the majority in Vancouver, 51.8%, whereas Eurocanadians have been drastically reduced to 46.2% of the population, with projections showing that they will constitute only two out of five residents by 2031” (463). “The non-European immigrants arriving into Canada were interested in assimilating only to those aspects of Canadian culture that allowed them to keep their ethnic identity and advance their own ethnic interests” (476).]

Sedert Maart 2017 is die volgende boek van Duchesne maklik bekombaar: Faustian man in a multicultural age (London: Arktos, 2017, 262p; Amazon Kindle $11,39). Die outeur is ‘n dosent in sosiologie aan die University of New Brunswick in Saint John, die oudste Engelstalige universiteit in Kanada; maar dit lyk asof Duchesne veral as historikus bedrywig is. Faust is die legendariese towenaar wat sy siel aan die duiwel verkoop het en die skepping van talle literêre en klassieke musiekwerke geïnspireer het. Vir die doeleindes van hierdie rubriek is die volgende definisie voldoende: “’Faust’ and the adjective ‘Faustian’ imply a situation in which an ambitious person surrenders moral integrity in order to achieve power and success for a delimited term” (Wikipedia).

Dit is algemeen bekend dat Europese beskawing hoogs suksesvol was en wêreldwyd groot mag uitgeoefen het, maar dat daardie aansien en mag skynbaar aan die kwyn is en dat die tradisionele moraliteit van hierdie kultuur deesdae ingevolge kulturele marxisme* bevraagteken word. Duchesne ontleen sy gebruik van die begrip “Faustian” aan veral Oswald Spengler (1880-1936): “the irrational Faustian spirit of Western creativity” (114). Ek het voorheen oor Spengler geskryf (Praag 12 November 2016).

[* “The standard definition of cultural Marxism is that, unlike classical Marxism, it is an ideology preoccupied with the transformation of Western culture generally rather than the replacement of Capitalism with Communism. Cultural Marxists are dedicated to gender equality through the abolition of male and female traditional roles in society; to sexual equality through the downgrading of heterosexuality and the celebration of polymorphous sexual relations; to the replacement of Christian morals with politically correct morals; and finally to the abolition of ‘white supremacy'” (536). “We can talk about ‘racialised’ minorities or non-whites, and about black pride and Asian identity, and … about different medical diagnoses for different races, but never about white pride and white identity” (557).]

Aavanklik was ek ietwat skepties oor Duchesne se oriëntasie vanweë daardie goedkeurende verwysing na die irrasionele. Aan die ander kant toon die temas van sy boeke dat sy hart ongetwyfeld reg klop. Duchesne is “a subject of controversy with numerous complaints filed against me to the president of the university where I was working” (919). Hy skryf: “race is a factor that must be taken … seriously” maar “I am not a race determinist” (121), wat redelik klink omdat ras nie alles-bepalend is nie. Na aanleiding van James Burnham se boek, Suicide of the West (Praag 1.10.2016) skryf Duchesne: “There was something wrong about the nature of contemporary liberalism and rationalism” (114). Maar hy skryf ook: “I don’t view liberalism itself, as some in the Alt Right do, in negative terms as a form of ‘rationalism’” (129). “Liberalism is inherent to Western identity” (136). Liberalisme doen hom in talle gedaantes voor, waarvan sommige myns insiens afgewys behoort te word, al is seker alle mense positief ingestel teenoor sommige soorte vryheid.

Om rasionalisme af te wys, is egter problematies, maar Duchesne verheerlik irrasionalisme slegs in soverre hy dit assosieer met bv die impulsiewe kreatiewe en weetgierige gees van Europeërs. Byvoorbeeld, die destydse ontdekkingsreise van bv die Portugese en Spanjaarde vanaf die 15de eeu bevat ongetwyfeld ‘n beduidende skeut irrasionaliteit, maar dit is hierdie soort ondernemingsgees wat Europeërs/blankes wêreldwyd op die kaart geplaas en hulle prestasiegewys duidelik bo ander rasse laat uitstyg het. “Almost all the explorers in history were European” (3689).

In Charles Murray se boek, Human accomplishment: The pursuit of excellence in the arts and sciences, 800 BC to 1950 (New York: HarperCollins, 2003, 688p; Amazon Kindle $10,53), word aangetoon “97% of accomplisment in the scientific inventories occurred in Europe and North America” (4007). Murray “notes that the sheer number of ‘significant figures’ in the arts is higher in the West in comparison to the combined number of the other civilisations” (4015). Die prestasies wat Murray in ag neem “come only in the form of ‘great books’ and ‘great ideas'” (4023), terwyl daar ook baie ander prestasies was, bv in “warfare, voyages of discovery, and heroic leadership” (4015). Vir die positiewe dinge wat diesulkes vermag het, word hulle nasate deesdae kwalik geneem.

“The West had in fact been far more creative than all the other civilisations combined, and … it was the aristocratic heroic culture of the ill-reputed ‘Aryans’* which had initiated the West’s creative dynamic” (265). “Non-Western countries needed to Westernise in order to modernise” (302) maar “modernisation was not identical to Westernisation” (309). “What made the West unique was its rise to modernity before other civilisations” (342). [* Aryan: “The hypothetical parent language of an ancient people believed to have lived between Central Asia and Eastern Europe and to have reached Persia and India in one direction and Europe in another, some time in the 2nd century BC, diversifying into the various Indo-European language speakers of later times” (Collins World Encyclopedia, 2003, p 55).]

Dwarsdeur sy boek kwalifiseer Duchesne sommige van die standpunte wat hy in sy 2011-boek ingeneem het. Dit kan die leser se vertroue in die outeur ondermyn omdat dit kan lyk asof hy nog nie weet wat om te dink nie. Sedert ek hierdie boek klaar gelees het, is dit egter vir my duidelik dat hy gesoek en al hoe meer gevind het; dat hy ongetwyfeld op die regte pad is. Dit gaan vir hom nie soseer om Westerse mense nie as om “the Europeans whom I identify in this book as a sub-race of the White race” (129). Duchesne en Spengler gebruik egter afwisselend (maar ongelukkig inkonsekwent) sowel die enger begrip Europees as die breër begrip Westers.

Die kern van Duchesne se boodskap is: “What is really troubling today about the relative decline of the West is mass immigration, race-mixing, and the permanent marginalisation of Europeans as a race in the world, and for this we should blame cultural Marxism rather than liberalism” (136). “The ‘ultimate’ factors in Western decline were not cultural, economic or even evironmental, but the complete control of Western nations by elites dedicated to mass immigration and the dissolution of the racial interests of Europeans” (904). Oor rasionalisme bring Duchesne homself spoedig ook in die reine: “Ethnocentrism is a rational and healthy human attribute explainable in Darwinian terms. Europeans are uniquely rational, and this disposition is itself a component of their Faustian psychology” (143).

Oor massa-immigrasie skryf Duchesne: “Could Europe really be identified as ‘Western’ once ‘a fifth of Europeans’ were designated as Muslim ‘by 2050’?” (387). Guillaume Faye stel dit soos volg: “Islam corresponds to nothing in the European soul and temperament. Its massive introduction into Europe would disfigure a European culture already damaged by Americanization. An assertive dogmatism, an absence of the Faustian spirit, a fundamental denial of humanism (understood as the autonomy of the human will) in favor of an absolute submission to God, an extreme rigidity of social obligations and prohibitions, a theocratic confusion of civil society, religion and the political State, an absolute monotheism, a profound ambivalence towards artistic freedom and scientific inquiry – all these traits are incompatible with traditional European patterns of thought” (395).

Oor rasvermenging die historikus Niall Ferguson “surmises that race mixing represented the fulfilment of Western egalitarianism; that the emergence of a ‘homogenised humanity’ through the ‘democratic’ blending of races, religions and cultures, is the ultimate end of history” (364). Ferguson het sy deel bygedra deur van sy blanke vrou (met drie kinders) te skei en met ‘n Somaliër te trou (712). “Race mixing is being promoted by the media, universities, textbooks, and politicians” (1854) – ook in Suid-Afrika. Edmund Burke (1729-1797), daarenteen, beklemtoon “the particular customs and folkways of different cultures” (372). “The core of Burke’s conservatism is fear of rootlessness, and revolutionary agendas that disregard ancestry and hierarchy, loyalty and duty, inherited habits and prejudices” (378) – dalk eerder voorkeure as vooroordele.

“Mass immigration by non-Europeans involves ethnic displacement by people with different genetic interests. The greater the genetic distance between the native Europeans and the immigrants, the greater the genetic loss to the nation” (881). Volgens Frank Salter “the ultimate interest is not happiness, nor liberty, nor individual life itself, but genetic survival” (896). “It is the preservation of the racial distinctiveness of Europeans and other races in the world. Salter calls for a ‘universal nationalism’ in which all ethnics have a right to self-determination and all ethnics learn to co-exist peacefully … Globalisation is consistent with ethnic national self-determination” (896). Maar Michael Polignano skryf: “I fear that Salter’s universal nationalism, like all forms of unreconstructed liberalism, will only prove a disadvantage to Whites. Moralistic abstractions about fairness and rights will not secure our survival if a ruthless, predatory, and amoral race gains the power to make ultimate decisions about the destiny of life on this planet” (936). Dink aan wat in die nuwe Suid-Afrika as mikro-kosmos gebeur.

“Western nations, as Salter observes, are ruled by both corporate and liberal-minded elites who have little identification with their own people, live cosmopolitan lifestyles, intermarry across ethnic lines, and are committed to open borders, cheap labour, and diversification. The problem is not immigrants per se, since they are simply coming to lands welcoming them as cultural enrichers where they are encouraged to affirm their ethnic and religious identities” (912). Duchesne skryf: “The West was declining by being colonised demographically” (927). Byvoorbeeld: “In ‘n stadium het ongeveer 20 000 Britse burgers in Zimbabwe gewoon, terwyl minstens 112 000 Zimbabwiërs in Brittanje gewoon het” (Die Burger, 17.02.2018, p 10).

Pierre L van den Berghe, ‘n sosioloog en volkekundige wat voorheen aan die Universiteit Natal verbonde was, beweer: “Preference for individuals of the same ethnicity (Irish, German, Chinese, Mexican), or of the same race (White, Black, Asian) is part of our human nature. Ethnocentrism is simply a ‘propensity’ to favour kin, and this propensity, as actualised in politics, is a form of nepotism” (491); eerder groeps- of volksgebondenheid as nepotisme – dit klink beter.

Dalk kom nepotisme eerder by nie-wittes as by blankes voor. “Europeans tend to be more individualistic, less collective in their ethnic awareness, for complex historical reasons, combined with the reality that non-Europeans are more collective and racially aware. These non-Europeans practice ethnic nepotism and engage in the highly threatening practice of free-riding ethnic behaviour by utilising welfare services, schools and national infrastructure created and sustained by Europeans, whilst at the same time being cheered on by a cultural Marxist establishment that prohibits whites any racial awareness” (888).

Sowel rasvermenging as multikulturalisme word deur kulturele marxiste gepropageer ten einde blanke, Westerse of Europese kultuur te verdun en uiteindelik te vernietig. “Multiculturalism was an asymmetrical system in which Europeans, and only Europeans, were expected to celebrate other cultures, feel guilty about their own ethnic identity, and behave as universal altruists; while at the same time non-Europeans inside the European homelands were being encouraged to practice their in-group ethnic interests. It became obvious that multiculturalism was not simply about ‘understanding’ different cultures but about accepting mass immigration into European lands” (844).

In hoofstuk 1 redeneer Duchesne dat “the cycles of civilisational rise and decline have been a natural phenomenon in the history of cultures but never has a decline come along through the existence of a hostile elite breaking up the racial identity of a people, which would mean permanent decline and extinction” (151). Hy verwys hier na kulturele marxisme. “Spengler believed that in his time the West had reached old age and had already actualised its unique Faustian soul” (196). Maar: “In his later writings, Spengler saw new forms of Faustian expression in modern industry and science … He remained however a pessimist in anticipating the eventual exhaustion of the West’s energies” (205).

Duchesne is meer optimisties as Spengler: “The historical record shows that a civilisation need not disappear completely, nor suffer permanent death. According to the theory of cycles, what civilisations experience are temporary downturns followed by renewals, unless they are conquered outright by stronger ones, absorbed within larger and more dynamic civilisations, or utterly destroyed” (205).

Om die “geographical boundaries and histories of the West” vas te stel, moet die geldigheid van die begrip ras, volgens Duchesne, noodwendig erken word (233). Voorheen kon die grense van die Weste makliker as tans vasgestel word. Weens massa-immigrasie word die Weste op die oomblik gekenmerk deur “a thoroughly mongrelised geography” (1862). Volgens Ted Sallis is ‘n ras wesenlik “a genetically distinct subpopulation that is characterised by a suite of heritable (genetic) phenotypic* traits distinguished from other such groups” (866). “The West was a civilisation developed by ethnic Europeans and … immigration posed a threat to this ethnic identity” (240). Aan Amerikaanse universiteite word die studente anders wysgemaak: “Every student is taught right from the start that race is not just a construct but that discussions of white identity violate the very liberalism we have come to identify with the West” (248). [* Phenotype: “In genetics, visible traits, those actually displayed by an organism … The phenotype is … modified by the effects of the environment” (Collins World Encyclopedia, 2003, p 721).]

“The current official policy of the American Anthropological Association is that ‘any attempt to establish lines of division among biological populations [is] both arbitrary and subjective.’ This is also the policy of the American Sociological Association: ‘race is a social construct'” (255); “the term ‘race’ should be used as a way of identifying and measuring ‘racial inequalities’ in society … the American Anthropological Association released a ‘statement on race’ (May 7, 1998) forbidding academic anthropologists from any notion that there are biological differences between population groups categorised as races” (625). Maar sedert 2003 is dit gekwalifiseer met “allowing academics to use data categorising Americans in different racial groups as long as the intention was to show certain groups were being discriminated and racialised” (625).

“What concerned me above all was challenging the leftist idea that the historic West was a social construct without any cultural boundaries. I rejected the view that a proper liberal attitude required an egalitarian view of world history” (272). Wat Europeërs histories gemeen het is “Greco-Roman humanism, Christianity, Indo-European languages, and the European high culture” (295).

“Chapter 2 looks at the evolution of a European ‘sub-race’ (within the Caucasian race)* … and how this sub-race evolved” (151). “European peoples constitute a distinctive subrace within the Caucasoid race that is unique to the continent of Europe. This subrace evolved in this continent, and is the one directly responsible for the development of Western civilization” (998). Volgens Carleton Coon is daar “three main sub-species of races (Caucasoid, Mongoloid en Congoloid)” (1020), dus die wit, geel en swart ras. Michael Hart definieer ras as “a large group of individuals – all of them members of the same species – who have formed a partially or completely isolated breeding population for a significant period of time, and who consequently differ statistically from the rest of the species in various heritable traits by which they can be recognized” (1036). [* Koukasies: “Van, betreffende die blanke tipe mens” (HAT).]

“It was not until about 5800 years ago that light-skin genes, as well as other genes for blue eyes and blonde hair, started to show up at a high frequency among the inhabitants of Europe” (1097). “The Aryans … started coming to Europe 4800 years ago after they had evolved white traits” (1278). “The aristocratic culture of Indo-Europeans constituted the original foundation of the West’s far more creative and dynamic path … [It could be that] this lifestyle left an imprint on the genetics of Indo-Europeans, producing personality traits, such as a greater willingness to take risks and to be aware of oneself as an individual rather than being completely submerged within one’s group” (1346). “Europeans have remained a very cohesive subrace through their entire history, apart from some Caucasoid input from the Near East” (1421), bv “the Etruscans [8th to 2nd centuries BC] were the only non-Indo-European people in the Italian peninsula” (1636).

“Chapter 3 examines how the teaching of Western civilisation has been replaced by multicultural histories aimed at downplaying Western achievements, demonising Western actions, elevating the achievements of non-Western peoples” (157). Westerse beskawing as vak is by feitlik al die Amerikaanse universiteite met wêreldgeskiedenis vervang (2094). Die unieke historiese dinamiek van blankes word deesdae in die akademie algemeen ontken (2101). “Students are being indoctrinated to believe that Europeans were unique mostly in the ‘windfall’ profits they obtained from the Americas, the ‘lucky’ presence of coal in England, and the blood-stained manner they went about creating a new form of international slavery combined with ‘scientific’ racism” (2115). Daarteenoor verwys Duchesne na Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) “who observed that ‘so fundamental is the difference between these two races of man [ie Black and White] …as great in regard to mental capacities as in color'” (2796).

Die oogmerke is “to downplay Western uniqueness, equalise the achievements of all races in world history, blame Europeans for the backwardness of other civilisations, while emphasising the connections of the West with the rest of the world in order to make non-European immigrants feel that they have contributed as much to the making of the West as Europeans. In this way, they wish to create a historical account that is suitable to a heterogeneous race-mixed Western culture consistent with the protocols of diversity enrichment” (2101). Wat gepropageer word, is “the imagined merits of a multiracial society inside European-created cultures” (2146). “The scholarship promoted by our current elites demands a view in which Europeans don’t exist except as hybrids, borrowers, and imitators” (2889). Soos Tim Whitmarsh dit stel: “In this story of interconnectedness and hybridity … there lie enormous intellectual and humanist opportunities” (2938).

Met groot finansiële ondersteuning lei Patrick O’Brien aan die London School of Economics ‘n navorsingsprojek, “Useful and reliable knowledge in global histories of material progress in the East and the West.” Dit kom onder meer neer op “rewriting the history of Europeans in accordance with the principles of cultural egalitarianism and racial inclusiveness” (2203), asook, na bewering, “transcending ‘the myopias imposed by the frontiers and chronologies of continental, national or local histories'” (2217). Dit is ‘n poging “to dissolve Europe’s identity and sense of accomplishment” (2226). Dit gaan om “useful knowledge” toegespits op materiële oorwegings, waarmee Europa se onoortroffe kulturele prestasies geïgnoreer word (2233).

O’Brien se Global Economic History Network (GEHN) “promotes England to the world and to potential international students as an ideal cosmopolitan place for the mixing of cultures and races against the ‘parochial’ identity of the British past” (2468). “The central premise of multiculturalism – that all cultures are equal in achievements and merit – is accepted ab initio. GEHN takes it for granted that Engeland’s (and Europe’s) intensified globalisation ought to come with multiculturalism (and mass immigration), without making it a subject of research. Nor is there any interest in asking whether Asian nations, too, should be experiencing globalisation while undermining their own national identities and inviting their countries to be flooded by immigrants” (2490).

“Chapter 4 makes a case for the importance of Spengler’s concept of a Faustian soul for the understanding of Western creativity, with the intent of showing that the Indo-Europeans were the original Faustian men of the West, in a way that set them apart from all other peoples, Huns, Mongols, Turks, and other groups, from the Steppes” (157) – “the Pontic-Caspian steppe, which is in present day Ukraine” (1772; ook 3442). “Spengler’s idea that the West was driven by a creative and expansive psyche is indispensable to the understanding of European history. The word ‘Faustian’ captures the multifaceted character of Western creativity in all the spheres of life better than such commonly used terms as ‘individualism,’ ‘liberty,’ ‘rationalism,’ ‘separation of church and state’ or ‘representative democracy’… the Indo-Europeans were the original Faustian men and the most historically significant nomads of the steppes” (3257).

“‘Faustian’ is the word Spengler used to designate the ‘soul’ of the West. He believed that Western civilisation was driven by an unusually dynamic and expansive psyche” (3271). “Each culture contains a unique spirit of its own” (3357). In Europa en die Weste was kreatiwiteit die dinamo vir dinamiese handelinge. “My view … is that the Indo-Europeans were a highly special people” (3538). “Starting from their homelands in present-day Ukraine, the Indo-Europeans successfully colonised the entire European continent” (3617). “The West can reassert itself, unless the cultural Marxists are successful in their efforts to destroy this Faustian spirit permanently through mass immigration and miscegenation” (3809). Kan die plaaslike blankes, veral die Afrikaners, ten spyte van kulturele marxisme, weer opstaan en hulleself laat geld? ‘n Deurslaggewende vereiste vir ‘n suksesvolle nuwe Suid-Afrika is ‘n herwaardering van blankes.

“Chapter 5 uses the Faustian idea as part of an effort to show that almost all the explorers in history were European and that the driving motivation for European exploration was Faustian rather than economic” (164). Kulturele marxiste probeer egter om al die prestasies van Europeërs, Westerlinge en blankes te verkleineer. Desnieteenstaande “universities cannot ignore altogether the cultural achievements of Europeans, otherwise they would have little to teach – all the disciplines, after all, were created by Europeans – the emphasis tends to be on the evolution of ‘progressive’ ideas, framed as if they were universal ideals by and for humanity. Egalitarians particularly enjoy teaching how these ideas have been improved upon, and continued to be, through the ‘critical thinking’ of teachers and activists. They envision themselves as activists fighting for the welfare of non-whites and females. This has entailed not just an emphasis on non-European experiences, but an outright depreciation and steamrolling of European greatness” (4036).

Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) se dekonstruksiebegrip “has taught thousands of students to suspect anything that was held in high esteem or deemed to be great and noble in the past, as nothing more than ‘Eurocentric’ prejudice that needs to be brought down. This, in order to open the way for the ‘full expression’ of human talents leading to the democratic validation of all peoples” (4054). “Ernst Breisach writes, that deconstruction, in principle, calls for each culture to be challenged and eroded from within, since each culture engages in exclusions and hierarchical judgments; yet, as he adds, ‘so far, Derrida and other post modernists have focused exclusively on the deconstruction of the West’s understanding of the world and history” (4740).

Die herskrywing van die geskiedenis is ‘n belangrike deel van kulturele marxiste se agenda. “‘History from Below’* directed attention to the important roles the masses had played politically, in bringing about major revolutions. It argued that history was not an affair of the upper classes only, using the French Revolution as an example of how even its ‘bourgeois’ phase was driven by the action of peasants and artisans, and how the proletariat was destined to be the main agent of history in ushering Communism. This approach, advanced by Marxist historians, would be extended by feminists and cultural Marxists generally into a call for a new history that would include the ‘indispensable’ roles and achievements of a whole host of ‘minorities’ neglected by traditional academics (ie gays, transsexuals, lesbians, blacks, etc), all of which contained a corresponding assault, and inevitable devaluation of the one agent that stood out as unoppressed, as ultimate oppressor: white hetero males, the very beings responsible for almost all the greatest works in Art and Science” (4077). [* ‘n Voorbeeld van voetsoolvlak-geskiedenis is die karaterisering van Afrikaans as ‘n kombuistaal en die verheerliking van die slawe en Khoi-San se bydrae tot die ontstaan van Afrikaans.]

“The argument by World Systems Theory* is that the ‘core’ countries of the West had achieved their status as advanced cultures by exploitation and holding down the ‘periphery’ and that a true historical narrative entailed an appreciation of the morally superior ways of Third World peoples struggling to liberate themselves from a world system controlled by white owned multinationals. This too has had an immensely negative impact on students, leading them to believe that the West only managed to modernise by extracting resources from the Third World and enslaving Africans and Natives. This highly influential school has missed the far more important role of modern science and liberal institutions in the industrialisation of Western European nations” (4084).

[* World Systems Theory, soos GEHN, is marxisties van oorsprong en sterk op ekonomiese oorwegings ingestel. Wêreldstelsels eerder as individuele lande word beklemtoon. Volgens die wêreldkaart wat daaroor by die Wikipedia-artikel gepubliseer is, was die stabiele lande in die tydperk 1975 tot 2002 Amerika, Kanada, Wes-Europa, Japan, Australië en Nieu-Seeland. Op die rand van ekonomiese stabiliteit was Mexiko, Brasilië, Uruguay, Chili, Argentinië, Tunisië, Suid-Afrika, Turkye, Israel, Iran, Maleisië, Singapoer en Suid-Korea. Hiervolgens was dit oorwegend blanke lande wat ekonomiese voorspoed beleef het.]

“Michel Foucault [1926-1984] and the postmodernist currents swept the academic world in the 1970s and 80s with the claim that truth was a matter of which discourse held power rather than a question of ‘objectivity’. This has been used to bring down any ‘metanarrative’ that prioritises the role of Europeans in history, in the name of discourses expressing multiple voices. This discursive assault has led students to believe that there is no way to ascertain the achievements of cultures, since reality is a construct of the discourses within which said reality is evaluated … the rise of the West was no more than a preoccupation with the deeds of ‘dead white males'” (4091).

“Meanwhile, ‘ethnomethodology’ afforded a method by which to bring out the voices of the marginalised in society, the ones who had been silenced by the official discourses of ‘Western social scientists’. Students were obligated to hear their folk-ways, their forms of expression, ‘the silences or absences’ of marginalised criminals, drug addicts, black lesbians, the mentally impaired, on the grounds that there was as much to be learned from their ‘voices’ than from the now sterile and biased works of the Western Canon.* Of course, the ones in charge of hearing these voices have generally been well-off academic whites, and non-whites looking to profit from white-created countries” (4099). [* Byvoorbeeld, Harold Bloom, The Western Canon: The books and school of the ages (London: Papermac, 1995, 578p). “We are destroying all intelletual and aesthetic standards in the humanities and social sciences, in the name of social justice” (p 35).]

Felipe Fernández Armesto se boek, Pathfinders: A global history of exploration (2006), word voorgehou as “an excellent example of how someone committed to egalitarian cultural achievements in history reacts in the face of persistent European greatness in exploration” (4139). Ruimte ontbreek om in besonderhede te vertel van die briljante manier waarop Duchesne sy mede-historikus Armesto aan die kaak stel. “Armesto’s mindset is paradigmatic of what is going on in academia today in the face of the great achievements of European males” (4626). “The most glaring expression of Armesto’s contempt for European achievement is his cynical and cowardly account of Robert Falcon Scott’s tragic expedition to the South Pole in 1911-1912” (4635). “Armesto’s book is a complete travesty and a direct testimony of the deceitfulness of academics determined to spit on the greatness of European history, solely for the sake of enforcing a make-believe world of equality and racial mixing in the West. The history of the West has been virtually banned in academia, and nowhere is the history of exploration being taught other than as a history of imperialism and ‘othering'” (4693).

Die ontaarding van die werklikheid, gelei deur blanke Westerse elite, soos hierbo geskets, is in baie opsigte goed aan ons bekend. Hierdie werklikheid is wesenlik ‘n weerspieëling van die destruktiewe gevolge van kulturele marxisme, met die nuwe Suid-Afrika, soos ons hom daagliks ervaar, as ‘n sprekende voorbeeld. Byvoorbeeld, die herskrywing van die geskiedenis om die politieke bewindhebbers te pas, is nie tot buitelandse historici, soos Armesto, beperk nie. Hermann Giliomee skryf dat “die mees wydgelese algemene geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika” is Rodney Davenport en Christopher Saunders se South Africa: A modern history. In die 5de uitgawe (2000, p 674) word “geargumenteer dat sowel die Eisenlen-verslag [1951] as die wet [op Bantoe-onderwys, 1953] gegrond was ‘op die veronderstelling van die Afrika-verstand se minderwaardige potensiaal’ en dat die wet ‘uitdruklik ontwerp is om die swart mense vir ‘n minderwaardige plek in die samelewing voor te berei.’ In die vorige uitgawe (1987) is daar geen verwysing na sulke veronderstellings of idees nie [p 375]. Die 2000-uitgawe maak ‘n kniebuiging na die feit dat ‘n nuwe regering, behep met rassisme, aan bewind gekom het. Apartheid is nie meer as ‘n onreg of misleide beleid beskou nie, maar as die boosheid self” (Die laaste Afrikanerleiers, Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 2012, p 69-70).

Terug by die opskrif van hierdie rubriek. Ons moet onsself eerlik afvra: Wat het geword van die kreatiewe, dinamiese ondernemingsgees wat so kenmerkend van die Afrikanervolk was? Apatie gaan ons nie uit die gat bekend as die nuwe Suid-Afrika kry nie.