Leon Lemmer: Die stryd om die behoud van Westerse beskawing

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In Brittanje en veral Amerika het dit by skool- en universitêre onderrig mode geword om die eie kultuur af te kraak, die eie geskiedenis te verwaarloos en hulle met multikulturaliteit en wêreldgeskiedenis te vervang. Donald Trump gooi wal hierteen en tref maatreëls om die instroming te keer van vreemdelinge wat kultureel radikaal van tradisionele Amerikaners verskil. Soos Trump stel Boris Johnson Britse belange eerste en wakker hy nasionalisme aan, hoewel hy nie sterk standpunt teen immigrasie inneem nie.

Volgens die Handwoordeboek van die Afrikaanse Taal (HAT, 2015) is kultuur “die manier van leef, gewoontes, geloof, ens, van ‘n bepaalde groep mense of gemeenskap; geesteslewe.” Beskawing is “geestelike ontwikkeling; verfyning.” In die Collins World Encyclopedia (2003) word culture beskryf as “the way of life of a particular society or group of people, including patterns of thought, beliefs, behaviour, customs, traditions, rituals, dress, and language, as well as art, music, and literature.” Civilization is ‘n “highly developed human society.” Kultuur verwys dus na mense se leefwyse, hulle manier van dink en gevolglik van doen, terwyl beskawing verfynde of ontwikkelde kultuur is. Alle mense beskik dus oor kultuur maar net sommige mense het hulle denke en gedrag dermate verbeter dat daardie verhoogde vlak as beskawing gekarakteriseer word.

Veralgemenend kan groepe mense, bv gemeenskappe, samelewings en nasies, as beskaaf beskou word terwyl dit nie van ander groepe, hetsy histories of hedendaags, gesê behoort te word nie. Die verskil tussen beskaafde en onbeskaafde kultuur is dus hiërargies. Sodanige hiërargieë kan oor tyd verander. Die skeidslyn tussen beskaaf en onbeskaaf kan nie altyd duidelik getrek word nie omdat daar ‘n verskil kan wees in die waardes wat tydens beoordeling gebruik word. In die praktyk is dit egter dikwels moontlik om tussen onbetwisbaar beskaafde en onmiskenbaar onbeskaafde gedrag te onderskei. Tydens kolonialisme was dit (meesal/dikwels) die geval dat die koloniste van die veronderstelling uitgegaan het dat hulle, in vergelyking met die inheemse bevolking, beskaaf was. Die koloniste was gevolglik geneig om op die kultuur van die gekoloniseerdes neer te sien.

Aan die Kaap was die vroegste blanke inwoners nie uit die Europese elite afkomstig nie, hoewel gesofistikeerde kultuur plaaslik ‘n hupstoot met die koms van die Hugenote teen die einde van die 17de eeu (1688-1700) gekry het. In vergelyking met die inheemse bevolking, die Khoi-San, was hierdie vroeë blankes meer beskaaf. Hulle kon bv huise bou en akkerbou bedryf; nie net veeteelt nie. Toe die Britte hier aankom (1795, 1806), het hulle hulleself as meerderwaardig, as meer beskaaf, as die plaaslike Hollanders beskou. Tydens kolonialisme was die algemeen aanvaarde standpunt dat die Europese koloniale moondhede beskawing na die kolonies gebring het. Dit is ‘n geldige siening maar een wat weens politieke byderwetsheid deesdae selde geopper word.

In Amerika is daar die National Association of Scholars (NAS), met as missie “to sustain the tradition of reasoned scholarship and civil debate in American colleges and universities” (Stanley Kurtz, bron hier onder, Kindle 11), wat insluit ‘n verbintenis met “academic freedom and excellence” (25). Die polities linkse Wikipedia beskryf die NAS as “an American non-profit politically conservative advocacy group, with a particular interest in education. It opposes a perceived [!] political correctness on college campuses and supports a return to mid-20th century curricular and scholarship norms, and an increase in conservative representation in faculty.” Die NAS gooi wal teen die buitensporig linkse aard van Amerikaanse tersiêre onderrig, wat voortspruit uit die radikaal linkse politiek van die oorgrote meerderheid dosente, veral in die humaniora en sosiale wetenskappe.

Van ‘n senior NAS-genoot, Stanley Kurtz, is die volgende boek gepubliseer: The lost history of Western civilization (New York: NAS, 2020, 176p; Amazon Kindle $6,89). Die onderwerp van die boek is die kultuuroorlog wat by uitstek op Amerikaanse universiteitskampusse woed. Hierdie oorlog het in 1987, die jaar waarin die NAS gestig is, by Stanford University begin (36). Stanford, Jonathan Jansen se alma mater, ding met die University of California, Berkekey, mee om die ekstreem linkste Amerikaanse universiteit te wees. Waartoe Stanford gesink het, blyk uit die volgende: “Close to forty percent of Stanford’s undergraduate student body consisted of minority students” (1863). Minderheidstatus, pleks van akademiese prestasie, dikteer studente-toelating. “Most minorities on campus are there primarily because of preferences” (2317). “The more victim classes you belong to, the higher you rank” (1640). “If black students perform poorly, it is merely because they’ve been forced to imitate white culture and conform to its standards” (2445). Plaaslik is selfs al beweer dat standaarde en meriete verwerplike Westerse uitvindings is.

Die kultuuroorlog is ‘n stryd tussen “the new multicultural way and the traditional American conceptions of history and citizenship” (40). Kurtz redeneer: “The Western tradition is the source of America’s founding principles and constitutional system” (51). Wat die vyande van tradisionele Amerikaanse waardes doen, is om die Amerikaanse geskiedenis te dekonstueer en te herskryf, “a version of history that aims to debunk and overthrow the foundational narratives of America and the wider West” (142). Die ANC-regime is besig om met die hartlike samewerking van sommige historici ons geskiedenis volgens die wense van die ANC te herskryf. Die doel is om die aansien van die blankes, veral die Afrikaners, te ondermyn. “A civilization attains the ability to judge and guide itself by means of its history” (148). Daarom vind die ANC-regime dit noodsaaklik om Afrikanergeskiedenis te verwring tot iets wat verguis moet word.

Die aanleiding tot die 1987-gebeure was die historikus, Gilbert Allardyce, se valse bewering in 1982 “that the very idea of Western civilization is a modern invention devised during World War I as a way of hoodwinking young American soldiers into fighting and dying in the trenches of Europe” (56). In werklikheid “American colleges and universities have been teaching Western Civilization since before the Revolution” (War of American Independence, 1775-1783). Harvard, gestig in 1636, is die oudste Amerikaanse universiteit. “Required study of Western Civilization extends back to the colonial period, antedating the invention of the word ‘civilization'” (1105).

“In the decades since the Stanford dustup, the Allardyce thesis has been invoked to justify the replacement of college [undergraduate university] and K-12 [primary and secondary school] Western Civilization courses with World History, or with heavily globalized versions of European and American history” (62). Stanford se verpligte kursus in Western Culture is as gevolg van Allardyce se bewering in 1988 afgeskaf (67, 1006). Onlangs is pogings aanwend om die plek wat ‘n kursus in Westerse beskawing eens ingeneem het met ‘n verpligte kursus in “civic education and global citizenship” te vervang (83). “Civic education is the anodyne camouflage behind which modern universities often introduce coursework in progressive political activism” (94).

Aan Stellenbosch University (SU) is Wim de Villiers, met sy Amerikaanse akademiese agtergrond maar beperkte ideologiese insig, ‘n voorstander van Afrika- en wêreldburgerskap. Hy is myns insiens nie gebore in staat om die volgende vraag sinvol-beredeneerd te beantwoord nie: “Can there be a transnational national culture?” (1578). Kurtz se antwoord is: “A transnational national culture means the end of nation and culture as we know them and the start of a clash based on race instead” (2698). “The global level is simply a back-door way of undermining national narratives” (1722). De Villiers se uitgesproke diversiteitsmanie is pro-multikulturaliteit, dus “whatever works to the benefit of its advocates” (1608).

Die hoogste goed, die grootste prestasie, waartoe SU tans in staat is, is die brutale vernietiging van ‘n eens akademies voortreflike Afrikaans- en Afrikaneruniversiteit. Die Universiteit Stellenbosch het twee rektore gehad wat al die ander in die skadu stel. Die De Villiers-SU kon dit nie verduur dat die name van hierdie twee voortreflike Afrikaners op die kampus voortleef nie. Die HB Thom-teater is reeds na Adam Small hernoem. Tans word voorstelle ingewag vir die verandering van die naam van die RW Wilcocks-gebou. Die vernoeming van ‘n universiteitskoshuis na Russel Botman, ‘n ANC-aktivis, is egter in orde. Onder De Villiers se leiding het SU die era betree waarin (ten minste vergelykenderwys) eerder mikro- en nanogeeste verheerlik word. Verdere onverkwiklike nuus is dat Johannesburg University, voorheen die Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit, ná vanjaar selfs nie meer ‘n Afrikaansdepartement gaan hê nie.

Die voorbeeld wat Stanford gestel het, word by talle ander universiteite nagevolg. Dit is deel van die kultuuroorlog wat woed. “American politics today has become Stanford’s culture war writ large” (1387). “Through the 1950s, Western Civ was the most popular course at Stanford. By 1963-66 … Stanford’s senior faculty had lost faith in the very idea of general education” (1392), bv verpligte kernleerplanne. Vryheid van vakkeuse is sedertdien aan die orde van die dag (1398). In die plek van Westerse beskawing is kursusse in multikulturalisme ingestel. Multikulturalisme se jongste inkarnasie word “intersectionality” genoem (72). “The intersectional alliance … downplay[s] culture and accentuate race. Race becomes the sign of shared oppression and essentially replaces culture at the core of modern intersectional identity” (2273).

Maar dit gaan om meer as net ras. Interseksionaliteit omvat al die polities byderwetse idees oor ras, klas, geslag, seksuele oriëntasie, ens, terwyl tradisionele opvattings hieroor as diskriminasie en bevoorregting veroordeel word. Die grondslag hiervan is onmiskenbaar nieu-marxisties. Die nuwe marxisme verskil van die klassieke marxisme van bv Karel Marx en Friedrich Engels deurdat dit nie meer gaan om die politieke of staatkundige verowering van die hele wêreld nie, maar die ondermyning van veral Westerse kultuur en beskawing. Soms vind hierdie motiewe skuiling onder “the secular political religion of modernity” (108) of “post-modernity” – skynbaar voorbeeldige maar vae terme vir verskynsels wat misbruik word om (alles) wat tradisioneel en behoudend is, af te breek.

“Multiculturalism has ushered in a radically new sort of culture in which perpetually expanding accusations of racism, bigotry and genocide stand as quasi-religious ends in themselves … The American experiment cannot survive without checking or reversing these trends” (83). Onderliggend aan multikulturalisme is daar die sug na globalisme (119). Hier moet ‘n belangrike onderskeid gemaak word. Globalisering is ‘n (positiewe) hedendaagse verskynsel, bv die gemak waarmee wêreldwyd gereis, handel gedryf en inligting uitgeruil word. Globalisme, daarenteen, is ‘n ideologie waarmee gepoog word om ras- en kultuurverskille op te hef, nasionalisme en nasiestate te vernietig en alle mense (sover moontlik) identiteitloos eenderse wêreldburgers te maak. Kurtz verwys na “the allure for academics of ideas like ‘invented traditions’ and ‘imagined communities’, conceptual tools designed to subvert and dissolve the apparent reality of nations, cultures and civilizations” (125).

Die destydse Stanford-kursus in Westerse beskawing het die bestudering van grootse Westerse literêre werke ingesluit (119); daardie klassieke boeke wat deesdae in byderwetse politiek as die werk van dooie, blanke mans afgemaak word. “Advocates for dropping the requirement argued that the very idea of Western culture – and perhaps by implication Western Civilization itself – was largely an illusion” (137). Dit geld glo ook vir kultureel eiesoortige nasies (142). Sedert 1994 word op ‘n soortgelyke manier plaaslik dikwels voorgegee dat die Afrikanerdom en selfs Afrikaans – as ‘n eiesoortige taal wat duidelik van Engels onderskeibaar is – nie bestaan of behoort te bestaan nie. Afrikanernasionalisme word sonder meer as ongewens verdoem terwyl dit in werklikheid verseker het dat Afrikaners en Afrikaans voortreflike hoogtes kon bereik.

“To reclaim the lost history of America’s Western Civilization courses is to recover an understanding of who we are and what we have become” (148). Kursusse in Westerse en Amerikaanse geskiedenis het die nuttige doel gedien om die blanke immigrante wat voor die Tweede Wêreldoorlog hulle opwagting gemaak het, te assimileer (1423). Sedertdien het dit in die era van massa-immigrasie van nie-Westerse elemente ontaard, wat nie (maklik) geassimileer kan of wil word nie en wat weerstand bied teen onderrig in ‘n kultuur en beskawing wat vir hulle vreemd is (1441). Aan Stanford was daar “growing attacks on the requirement by black, female, Hispanic and Asian students” (1434).

Wat met multikulturalisme en globalisme beoog word, “is to undermine the public’s sense of national or civilizational identity” (153) terwyl daar terselfdertyd nie daarin geslaag kon word om groter belangstelling in die studie van die humaniora te wek nie (1447). “For deconstructionist historians, the only sound and fully legitimate identity is a global identity” (164). “We used to believe that individual liberty, religious freedom, liberal democracy, free markets, constitutionalism, scientific rationality, and the rule of law were significant enough to justify a focus on the traditions that created them” (170). “The very idea of American exceptionalism makes no sense without the complementary idea of Western civilization” (213). Amerikaanse eiesoortigheid sluit dus nie verwantskap met Europese beskawing uit nie. Inteendeel, dit is ‘n verlenging en verdere ontwikkeling daarvan. Verder: “How could modern Europe have recognized itself as a particular civilization in comparison to others had there not been something distinctive about it … – manners, customs, and institutions slowly shaped by the classical and Christian heritage of previous centuries?” (255).

“If anyone could be said to have ‘invented’ not Europe itself, but the emerging modern conception of European civilization, it was Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu [1689-1755], who did it 170 years before the First World War,” naamlik in 1748 (260). Hy het Europa met Asië gekontrasteer en bevind “Europe [is] a cultural and political entity with a history of its own” (267). Anders as ander kontinente vorm Europa en Asië ‘n aaneengeslote landmassa, maar die kulturele onderskeid tussen die twee gebiede word tot op hede algemeen erken. Dit geld bv vir vryheid. “While [Montesquieu] saw the West as far from immune to despotism, it was the locale in which liberty had made its foremost appearance” (284). Dit het bygedra tot die volgende latere standpunt: “The history of Europe is a history of liberty – the continent’s unique civilizational marker” (367).

Dit is vir my altyd interessant om veral in die Amerikaanse literatuur op te let hoe die woorde liberty en freedom gebruik word; liberty meesal in staatkundige verband. “Liberty” is vir die Amerikaners ‘n waardige, gekoesterde soort vryheid; nie die padversper-, klipgooi-tipe vryheid nie. “Liberty entails the responsible use of freedom under the rule of law without depriving anyone else of their freedom. Freedom is more broad in that it represents a total lack of restraint or the unrestrained ability to fulfil one’s desires” (Internet).

“England for Montesquieu played the ‘exceptional’ role that America (or the Anglo-American tradition) took on in later narratives of Western Civilization” (273). “Although Montesquieu was the first thinker to systematically characterize ‘Europe’, the word ‘civilization’ hadn’t yet been coined in 1748. ‘Spirit’ came close, since Montesquieu used it to summarize the totality of factors that shaped the laws of a given world-region. Montesquieu may be indirectly responsible for ‘civilization’, though; it was a French disciple of his [Victor de Riqueti, 1715-1789] who first coined the term in 1757, after which it swiftly became popular” (284). As vrugte van beskawing word “safety, abundance, liberty, and democracy” genoem (297). Naas vryheid word die christelike religie as die onderskeidende kenmerk van die Weste beskou (486). Gesamentlik het hulle bygedra tot die idee dat die Westerse beskawing meerderwaardig is (511). Daar word gemeen “that America had developed and perfected the career of liberty to an unprecedented degree” (630).

Adam Ferguson se 1767-boek, Essay on the history of civil society, is “the first known English-language publication to use the word ‘civilization'” (315). “Ferguson saw every human society passing through stages from ‘savage’ to ‘barbarous’ to ‘polished'” (321). Eersgenoemde twee beskik oor kultuur maar slegs laasgenoemde kan op beskaafdheid aanspraak maak. In 1769 het William Roberson ‘n biografie oor Karel V (1500-1558), die keiser van die Heilige Romeinse Ryk, gepubliseer. “It was Robertson’s lengthy introduction to that work that gained fame as the first great narrative account of the development of European civilization” (335). “Robertson persistently ranked the pursuit of liberty and the desire for justice as independent historical forces. For Robertson, the quest for ‘the unalienable rights of humanity’ was both an ethical choice and a driver of Europe’s story” (373). “The idea of civilization implies restraint in war, and lays down a standard of justice by which conflicts can be judged and condemned” (807). In bv die Anglo-Boereoorlog het die Britte hierdie beskawingstoets skouspelagtig gedruip.

“For Robertson, the moral choice most essential to the survival of a free and civilized Europe was the decision to foreswear the pursuit of universal empire. Robertson’s History of the reign of the emperor Charles V taught the dangers of the quest for continental hegemony” (379). “The essence of civilized Europe, for Robertson, was its balance of power” (385). “Europe had become a kind of informal confederacy of nations – a civilization bound by a shared system of manners … Only the pursuit of total continental (and world) domination could disrupt the system” (391).

“The [American] colonists absorbed these histories on the understanding that America was the last great outpost of British freedom and virtue at a time when the mother country itself was beset by luxury and corruption. America came to see themselves as torchbearers of British liberty, perhaps even capable of inspiring a renewal of freedom and virtue in Britain itself. Once again, American exceptionalism took shape against the background of a shared European civilization story” (348). “Robertson, Montesquieu, and Ferguson, the key early accounts of Western Civilization, all held an important place in Harvard’s late-18th century curriculum” (397).

Oor ‘n invloedryke Harvard-dosent, Charles Eliot Norton (1827-1908), is (oordrewe – 772) beweer: “[He] effectively ‘invented’ the idea of Western civilization in the 1890s” (767). Hy het egter bloot op ‘n voorbeeldige manier historiese oorsigte van Westerse kunsgeskiedenis, insluitende die bestudering van die “Great Books” (767), in leerplanne neerslag laat vind (772). Die oorsprong van die tradisionele en soms luidrugtige Amerikaanse teenkanting teen kolonialisme kan, afgesien van sy eie onafhanklikheidsoorlog (1775-1783), sekerlik ook na Robertson se boek teruggevoer word. Maar daar is heelwat valsheid en skynheiligheid in die agtereenvolgende hedendaagse Amerikaanse regerings se bewerings dat hulle anti-kolonialisties is. Verwys bv na die uitstekende boek van Daniel Immerwahr, How to hide an empire: A history of the greater United States (2019, Kindle $14,94).

Aansluitend by Allardyce is verwys na “the dangers of a resurgent barbarism in Europe of which the savagery of the First World War was taken as a prime example” (948). “[But] World War I may indeed have helped stimulate renewed interest in the survival of Western civilization. And that broader preoccupation with the fate of the West between the two world wars may have helped promote the idea of a required general education course in Western history” (954). “Broadly speaking, whether we call it ‘Western civilization’, ‘European civilization’, or even, as often in the 18th and 19th centuries, merely ‘civilization’ (under the assumption that European society was at the leading edge of general human progess), the basic cultural and historical referent for purposes of college teaching and otherwise was essentially the same” (972).

“The new globalist history has degenerated into a one-sided game whose implicit goal is to debunk the notion that Western culture exists at all. Every European borrowing of a new foodstuff, each trans-Atlantic disease transmission, or any artistic inspiration drawn from another continent is taken as proof of a culturally borderless world” (1052). Westerse kultuur en beskawing word ingevolge nieu-marxistiese gelyk- en eendersverklaring dood- en weggewens, des te meer omdat geen kultuur of beskawing glo beter (bv meer gevorderd, meer welvarend) as ‘n ander mag wees of as sodanig voorgestel word nie. Dit is nie-presteerders wat ‘n afkeer van hiërargieë het. Die voorstanders van Westerse beskawing, daarenteen, “rightly believed that they were describing a continuous tradition to which they and their students were deeply indebted” (1487).

Michel Foucault (1926-1984) het geredeneer dat kennis en subjektiwiteit deur sosiale instellings en gebruike beïnvloed word en met verloop van tyd verander. Hy het gepoog om konvensionele opvattings sover moontlik te ondermyn. In die konteks van Kurtz se onderwerp is Foucault se idees op ‘n bepaalde manier vertolk. “There is only talk about ‘civilization’ that serves as a tool for suppressing the purportedly less civilized. From this perspective, history itself is the continuous invention of ‘knowledge’ in the service of dominant groups” (1470). “Everything is bent toward resisting the current ‘regime of truth’ on behalf of groups disadvantaged by the dominant powers” (1476). In die Weste gaan dit dus om die diskreditering en ondergrawing van blanke heerskappy. “If it’s ancient or admirable, it must be a myth; if it challenges hallowed traditions, it must be true” (1550).

Die bestudering van die grootse literêre werke wat die Westerse beskawing opgelewer het, “the Great Books,” het tradisioneel ‘n belangrike rol in Amerikaanse tersiêre onderrig gespeel. “To introduce these students collectively to the great books of the West is a way of making them powerful: of allowing them to know who they are, so that they may more effectively choose who to be” (1509), “[ie] permitting them to recognize their kinship with, and indebtedness to, predecessors who made them what they are” (1514). Maar aan Stanford was daar bv iemand soos Herbert Lindenberger wat daarop uit was “to desacralize the course [in Western Civilization]” (1531). “We should think of history as ‘the process by which we “construct” whatever pasts we deem serviceable'” (1537) – soos die ANC-regime tans met sy herskrywing van die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis doen.

In die laaste afdeling in sy boek vestig Kurtz die aandag op die buitensporige uiterstes waartoe die teenstanders van Westerse beskawing en ‘n eie Amerikaanse kultuur hulle wend. “The very act of naming and defining a common American culture is racist, insofar as it tramples on ‘multis’ who resist assimilation and demand identities of their own. Lauding an allegedly common American culture as ‘great’ compounds the offense, especially in light of slavery and other abuses of the past” (1836). “Almost anything is potential fodder for a racism claim” (2014). “The upshot appears to be that the West is evil; and besides, it doesn’t exist” (1847). Plaaslik is ons situasie soortgelyk: Die blankes, veral die Afrikanerdom, word sonder meer as boos getakseer. By bevoordeling handel die ANC-regime asof blankes nie bestaan nie. Die bestaan van blankes kom slegs in die prentjie as ‘n sondebok vir die ANC-regime se onbekwaamheid gesoek word en as besittings vir hertoedeling aan swartes gevind moet word.

Plaaslik is amptelike sensuur en in Amerika en Suid-Afrika selfsensuur aan die orde van die dag. “Pointing to problems in other people’s cultures (or subcultures) is impermissible. Now the corollary was drawn: it is forbidden even to laud one’s own culture, lest that imply derogation of others” (1918). ‘n Oorverligte dosent aan die Universiteit Kaapstad mag nie die resultate van ‘n eerlike ondersoek publiseer oor waarom swart studente nie vir biologiestudie registreer nie. Een van die redes is dat daar ander beroepe is wat meer lonend is. In die geval van swartes mag dit nie gesê word nie, want dit reflekteer minder gunstig op hulle; dit impliseer dat swartes materialisties is. Moet daar eerder uitgaan word van die veronderstelling dat swartes oorloop van ubuntu, van mededeelsaamheid, en dat dit duidelik blyk uit die feit dat Suid-Afrika sedert 1994 dié toonbeeld van ‘n korrupsievrye samelewing geword het?

“[The] reasoning [above] short-circuits America’s ability to recognize, affirm, and transmit its core values. Culture itself becomes impossible. The very idea of a commonly held tradition is stigmatized as ‘racist'” (1924). “It can fairly be said that generating charges of systematic, unconscious, and implicit racism (and associated other isms and phobias) is today a central preoccupation of America’s universities and increasingly a cultural dividing line in society at large” (1976). “Accusations of racism are becoming the new American culture” (2687). “Mere talk of different cultures – and certainly, of ‘civilizations’ – is in itself evidence of guilty ‘Othering'” (1987). “Charging non-minorities with complicity in that historical oppression is the new key to power. In a sense, it is the basis of a new kind of American culture” (2009).

Dink aan die Protea-krieketspelers en -beamptes wat onlangs gekniel en met die Mandela-saluut vuis in die lug hulle ondersteuning aan Black Lives Matter (BLM) betuig het. Dit was in reaksie op die dood van ‘n swart misdadiger en die gevolglike verdere aftakeling van wet en orde in Amerika. Hou in gedagte dat hierdie Suid-Afrikaners eerder iets van krieket as van ideologie, propaganda en politiek verstaan. Die blanke krieketspelers en -beamptes het hulle sodanig gedra om hulle solidariteit met hulle swart kollegas te betuig omdat die swartes, daarenteen, nie van hulle BLM-dogmatisme sou afsien nie. Dit is soortgelyk aan die druk waaraan die blanke politici in 1990/94 tydens die grondwetlike onderhandelinge toegegee het. Daar word geredeneer: Gee liewer toe anders is daar tot in die oneindige ‘n chaotiese gemors. Maar iedere toegewing aan blanke kant lei tot hernude eise en in elk geval tot voortgesette chaos.

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