DA-raadslid in Boerehaatherrie

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Spyker in Afrikanerdoodskis?

’n DA-raadslid van die Kaapse metro, Pat Hill, bevind hom midde-in ’n Boerehaatherrie rondom ’n sms wat Saterdag vanaf sy selfoon uitgestuur is waarin hy praat van Helen Zille se verkiesing as “die finale spyker in die Afrikanerdoodskis”.

Die presiese bewoording van die sms lui: “The final nail in the afrikaner cofin, w’ll get (rid) of them after the confrce. Vote right!”

Dis bekend dat spanninge tussen Afrikaners en liberale Engelse in die party hoog loop en dit ly geen twyfel dat Hill se “stem reg!” ’n stem vir Zille beteken nie.

Intussen word die sms nou in DA-geledere rondgestuur, met onsteltenis wat onder Afrikaanse partylede heers.

Volgens een Afrikanerlid van die party gaan Hill dissiplinêr binne die party vervolg word vanweë die gewraakte sms. Daar bestaan ’n beleidsreël in die DA wat die saai van onmin of verdeeldheid binne die party verbied.

PRAAG is tans besig om ’n verklaring oor die aangeleentheid voor te berei.

светильниковлобановский александр игоревич харьков

Zimbabwe Army’s deserters

They are the missing regiment: 1,500 men deserting from the Zimbabwean Defense Forces across the South African border, sometimes in groups of two or three, and sometimes in whole platoons.

The loss of a regiment, talked about in hushed tones at Army headquarters in the early part of this year, is no small matter in a country as poor as Zimbabwe. But for the regime of President Robert Mugabe, an anticolonial commander who has always found his staunchest supporters among the military, it could be fatal. If he can’t rely on his own security forces to maintain control, one year ahead of crucial presidential elections, how much control does he really have?

"This is the breakdown of Mugabe’s most trusted sector; he banked on the military and the security forces," says Sikhumbuzo Ndiweni, a retired Zimbabwe Defense Forces lieutenant colonel and now a commentator on Zimbabwean affairs. Mr. Ndiweni himself fled Zimbabwe in November 2003 because of what he called continual harassment by police.

"This spells doom and a painful end, [in the same vein as] Mengistu, Idi Amin, and Charles Taylor," he says, referring to the former dictators of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Liberia, respectively. One of them, Mengistu Haile Mariam, is living in exile in Zimbabwe.

The picture within the Zimbabwe Defense Forces, as told by officers like Ndiweni and a half-dozen deserters interviewed by the Monitor, is a desperate one. President Mugabe has taken strong measures to ensure that the military will remain at his side. As recently as February, the Army chief of staff, General Chedondo, told his soldiers that all future requests for leave would have to be approved by President Mugabe himself. Deserters would be hanged.

Even so, in February, scores of recently recruited officer cadets quit before finishing their courses at the elite Zimbabwe Military Academy in Gweru. In January, it was broadly reported that 10 commandos from a unit fled on the same night. Neither South Africa nor Zimbabwe has released statistics confirming the desertion and arrival of Zimbabwean soldiers, but the anecdotal evidence suggests that the trickle is turning into a flood.

To fill the gaps, Mugabe has been recruiting people whose loyalty can be trusted, replacing his own Presidential Guard with members of his secret police and filling Army ranks with his party’s youth militia and aging veterans of the liberation struggle from the 1970s. Meanwhile, top generals are constructing their own survival strategies, making alliances along tribal and ethnic lines in order to take power – or at least survive – once Mugabe is gone.

"We’re moving toward a collapsed state," says Chris Maroleng, a top Zimbabwe expert at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria (now known as Tshwane). Mugabe’s crackdown on the Army "shows that the president is preparing for compromise, for mediation. He is tired, frankly."

To ensure loyalty, Mugabe gives priority to the military at the expense of other ministries, Mr. Maroleng says. "Last week, the Central Intelligence Organization’s personnel got a 200-percent pay increase. In a security state, anything is acceptable."

But for a professional soldier like Sgt. Patrick Dube, a platoon sergeant and crew commander with five years of combat experience who fled a couple of months ago, there are some things that are unacceptable.

"We were ordered to vote for the ZANU-PF (Mugabe’s party), and there were officers who were monitoring our voting; if you complained about salaries, they said ‘You are subverting other soldiers’ morale,’ " says Sergeant Dube, who fought for nearly five years in a controversial Zimbabwean intervention in the But the final straw, says Dube, was when his unit was called to beat up hospital employees striking for higher pay last February.

"The national Army is collapsing, every day the soldiers are running away," he says. "I will never go back. Either I’m going to go to jail [as a result of arrest by South African immigration authorities], or I’ll starve to death here."

Peter Shava, a commando from the elite 5th Brigade of the 52nd Battalion who also left a couple of months ago, says his unit was ordered in 2000 to "force white settlers to move off their land. We were armed. The war veterans" to whom the white farmers’ land was promised "were not armed. We hit people like hell. They had no choice but to leave."

Corporal Shava found this work distasteful, but "you obey orders. We work under command. You have to do it."

Zimbabwean deserters have been arriving in such numbers that they are beginning to overwhelm the local labor market. On street corners where South Africans and poor refugees of other nationalities used to hawk their services for contractors and gardening services, Zimbabwean soldiers cluster by the dozen. Many are homeless, sleeping in the shrinking spaces between high-priced estates surrounded by 10-ft. walls and electric fencing.

Sgt. Dennis Chingoma (a pseudonym, given because of his concern of getting arrested by South African police), recently took this reporter into one of these squatter camps in a posh neighborhood. Men wash themselves in a rancid gully and sleep among the boulders and elephant grass. When it rains, they rush to garbage cans to grab newspapers to serve as umbrellas. For food, they dive into dumpsters behind grocery stores, occasionally fighting with refugees of other ethnic groups over postdated loaves of bread.

As dusk falls on this evening, a group of 20 dusty, Shona-speaking Zimbabweans clusters around a reporter to tell their stories. None will admit to being soldiers, but a half dozen of them quarrel among themselves in Shona over whether to tell this outsider about their military careers.

"Are you crazy?" says one former Zimbabwean soldier, in Shona. "Whatever you say here will be read in Harare." A schoolteacher, who seems to be the camp leader, suggests that "next time, you should take them aside privately, and they will feel more comfortable talking with you." The schoolteacher then asks if he can wash this reporter’s car.

"They are afraid to talk, but they are desperate," says Sergeant Chingoma, later, who works as a porter at a local bus station and sends home money to his wife through the bus driver. He fled first to Mozambique, then crossed into South Africa in January through the Kruger National Park. It is a treacherous journey. Many Mozambicans have been devoured by the park’s lions.

"We are desperate," says Chingoma, who says that most soldiers are leaving because of the economic crisis, not politics. "In Zimbabwe, we are not getting paid. We are just getting promises."

"I was born to be a soldier; I don’t want to do anything else," Chingoma says with a sigh. "But … I have a family to feed. So I do what I have to do: leave my country, take any job I can find on the street, and send money home to my family."

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Mali stem langtand

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Amadou Tour?

Maliese kiesers het op 29 April stembus toe gegaan om ’n nuwe president aan te wys. Vyftien jaar van ’n veelpartybedeling het hulle egter nie entoesiasties gestem nie, aangesien slegs 36% die moeite gedoen het om te gaan stem. In vorige verkiesings was die gemiddelde stempersentasie maar 21%. Sowat 1 000 waarnemers het die verkiesing in hierdie arm land (posisie 175 uit 177 op die Verenigde Nasies se lys van ontwikkelde lande) bygewoon.

Volgens prof Mamadou Samake van die Universiteit van Bamako is Maliërs nie juis geïnteresseerd in politieke aangeleenthede nie. Sowat 80% van die bevolking van dertien miljoen mense sukkel om ekonomies te oorleef. Die gemiddelde vrou bring 6,7 kinders in die lewe. Politiek is dus in hierdie konteks nie ’n prioriteit nie. Baie mense is ook onbewus van die feit dat hulle stemgeregtigd is. “Baie van hulle weet nie eens dat hulle geregistreerd is nie,” het hy gesê.

Die persepsie dat die huidige president, Amadou Toumani Touré egter beslis aan bewind sou bly, het ook meegebring dat mense nie lus was om te gaan stem nie.

Die stemlys is egter nie baie betroubaar nie: oorledenes se name word nie verwyder nie en duplikasie vind dikwels plaas. Stembusse is verder in baie gevalle kilometers ver van afgeleë nedersettings.

Samake glo dat dit beter sal werk as mense in die toekoms vrywilliglik gaan registreer as kiesers, eerder as om outomaties op ’n lys te verskyn. Sulke mense sal beslis moeite doen om te gaan stem. “Maliërs besef nie dat die stembus ’n wapen is om dinge te verander nie,” het hy voorts gesê.

President Touré het 70.89% van die stemme in die pas afgelope verkiesing op hom verenig, alhoewel die oppposie bewerings van bedrog gemaak het. Hy gaan dus voort met sy tweede mandaat as president van Mali.

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Rhodesian convert advises Blair

Tony Blair decided to wage war on Iraq after coming under the influence of a "sinister" group of Jews and Freemasons, a Muslim barrister who advises the Prime Minister has claimed.

Ahmad Thomson, from the Association of Muslim Lawyers, said Mr Blair was the latest in a long line of politicians to have been influenced by the group which saw the attack on Saddam Hussein as a way to control the Middle East.

A Government spokesman confirmed last night that ministers and officials consulted Mr Thomson on issues concerning Muslims but refused to be drawn on his views. "We talk to a lot of people, including many whose views we do not necessarily agree with," she said.

Mr Thomson said: "Pressure was put on Tony Blair before the invasion. The way it works is that pressure is put on people to arrive at certain decisions. It is part of the Zionist plan and it is shaping events."

Mr Thomson wrote a book in 1994 in which he said Freemasons and Jews controlled the governments of Europe and America and described the claim that six million Jews died in the Holocaust as a "big lie". In The Next World Order, Mr Thomson, a Muslim convert who was born Martin Thomson in Rhodesia, wrote: "When the majority of people in a predominantly Christian society cease to worship God, the result is fascism.

"When the people in a predominantly Jewish society cease to worship God, the result is either communism or capitalism. A predominantly Christian society is concerned primarily with establishing a political ideology, whilst a predominantly Jewish society is concerned primarily with establishing an economic system."

This, he suggested, led to the rise of Adolf Hitler. Mr Thomson, who was called to the bar in 1979, wrote: "The fascism of Hitler was the Christian element in the increasingly "Jewish" environment in which he and his followers found themselves."

He also wrote that the Jews have no right to live in "the Holy Land" because they are not a pure race and therefore not the true biblical Israelites and that Saddam was used as an excuse for US troops – "including thousands of Jews" – to occupy Saudi Arabia.

A Government source said: "It is by talking to people with varying views that we find out what the range of opinions is. It doesn’t mean we agree with what they are saying."

 

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Battle over Zimbabwe?s Future

Amid heightened tension, an all pervading crisis is afflicting Zimbabwe. The economy is close to collapse, the standard of living has plummeted, and the political scene is marred by recent violence. To hear Western leaders tell it, it is Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe who has brought this state of affairs upon his nation through economic mismanagement and repression, and what would have been an otherwise prosperous country is instead on the edge of ruin. The U.S. and Great Britain trade barbs with Zimbabwe, and relations are perhaps at their lowest point, with pressure mounting in the U.S. and Great Britain for harsher measures.

 
There are many in the West who have joined the chorus denouncing the Mugabe government and call for its replacement with a “democratic government.” The hostile reaction against Zimbabwe is not surprising when one considers that the flood of news reports is notable for its uniformity and lack of context. A single message is repeated in the media. The ruling party, the Zimbabwean African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), rules through undemocratic means, we are told, while the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) enjoys wide support and is kept from power through repression. Western leaders seek only to promote democracy and prosperity in the region. This is the popular image in the Western press, and few question its veracity. How information is formulated, including what does not get reported, demonstrates some of the ways perception is managed and support for policy objectives is generated.

The beating of several MDC members while in police custody following their arrest triggered the latest upsurge of condemnation of the Zimbabwean government. MDC supporters were arrested merely for holding an innocuous prayer meeting, we were told, and the government’s resort to violence was unprovoked.

 The “prayer meeting” was in fact a demonstration that was part of the MDC-led Save Zimbabwe Campaign’s month-long “defiance” campaign. By calling the demonstration a “prayer meeting,” organizers hoped to get around the government’s four-month ban on demonstrations that had been instituted after a rally the month before resulted in running battles between the police and crowds of MDC supporters. The “prayer meeting” tag was also useful for managing Western perception. (1)

Troubles began on the morning of March 11 when a handful of demonstrators were arrested as they headed to the rally site. At around noon, a group of MDC supporters attacked three unarmed police officers. One officer managed to escape, but the other two were beaten and suffered serious head injuries.

During the next hour several more demonstrators were arrested as they attempted to enter the rally site, including Arthur Mutambara, leader of one faction of the MDC. A while later, MDC gangs at a shopping center hurled rocks at a bus, smashing its windows, and then attempted set an army vehicle afire. (2)

Despite a determined effort by the police, more than a thousand demonstrators did make it to the rally. When Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of a second MDC faction, arrived with his arms raised in the air, the crowd responded noisily. According to an MDC supporter, “the situation was getting heated” after police attempted to keep Tsvangirai apart from the crowd. “Tsvangirai and the police were arguing, and we were carrying on singing and shouting, louder and louder. In all there were only about thirty police and there were more than one thousand – we were too many for them. They could not control what was happening.” Police lobbed tear gas canisters to disperse the crowd and Tsvangirai and other MDC officials were hustled into two police cars and driven away. (3)

Demonstrators responded by throwing rocks and tear gas canisters at the police, while some in the crowd used slingshots to fire metal bolts. The crowd advanced, as the police fired 19 warning volleys in the air without effect. At this point, one officer aimed his rifle at a demonstrator and shot him dead. “Then everything became worse,” recalled an MDC supporter. “We went on the rampage and we did not even fear for our lives. There was a lot of action” as demonstrators “threw punches.” Chased by the crowd, the police ran to their pickup trucks, but not all of the officers were lucky enough to escape. “About six or eight of them were left with us,” said the MDC supporter. “As they ran some of them dropped their batons so we picked up their discarded sticks and used them to beat” them. “The police were badly beaten,” after which the crowd “left the police on the side of the road and ran away.” (4)

Meanwhile, MDC supporters elsewhere in Harare overturned a commuter omnibus and later stopped a kombi (commuter van). After looting the luggage, they doused the vehicle with gasoline and set it afire. A number of cars were stoned and one was overturned. (5)

Demonstrators who had been taken into custody and were brought to police stations in Avondale and Harare Central were treated with respect. A different fate awaited those taken to the Machipisa station, where detainees were ordered to lay down in the courtyard, whereupon they were kicked and beaten with clubs for about an hour. It is not entirely clear who administered the beatings, and at least one report suggests that it was not police but either a commando group or a pro-government militia that was responsible. (6)

Western governments and media wasted no time in condemning the government of Zimbabwe. The beatings were severe, and several individuals suffered broken bones. Western critics ignored MDC violence and singled out the government for sole blame, making the most of the incident’s propaganda value.

Faced with a barrage of criticism by its Western detractors, Zimbabwe badly mishandled the situation. That no attempt was made to investigate the beatings only fueled the anti-Zimbabwe campaign and handed the opposition a catalyzing issue. The government’s inaction contrasted with the period of the run up to the March 2005 parliamentary election, when President Mugabe declared a policy of “zero tolerance” for political violence, during which members of both parties were arrested for such acts.

It was clear by its behavior that the government of Zimbabwe felt threatened, as it had reason to. Years of sanctions and Western meddling, coupled with an increasingly truculent opposition, had indeed menaced ZANU-PF’s ability to govern the nation. Western intervention followed well-established patterns. Soften the target nation with sanctions and cripple the economy. Blame the resulting economic disaster on government “economic mismanagement,” in order to build support for the opposition. Fund the opposition party and press, as well as anti-government NGO’s, to tilt the democratic process in a direction favorable to Western interests. If the opposition lacks sufficient support to come to power through democratic means, then encourage and sponsor “regime change” through mass action, as in Yugoslavia, Georgia and the Ukraine.

The West began to apply significant pressure on Zimbabwe late in 2001. In September of that year, the IMF declared Zimbabwe ineligible to use its general resources, and three months later President George W. Bush signed into law the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001. The law directed the U.S. Treasury Department to instruct U.S. members of international financial institutions to oppose and vote against any extension of any loan, credit or guarantee to Zimbabwe. The law also authorized President Bush to directly fund opposition media as well as “democracy and governance programs,” a euphemism for organizations opposed to the government. (7)

Western financial restrictions made it nearly impossible for Zimbabwe to engage in normal international trade. External balance of payments support was eliminated and nearly all external lines of credit were obstructed. “The current wave of declared and undeclared sanctions is negatively affecting the image of the country, thereby distorting how financial markets assess the risk profile of Zimbabwe,” pointed out Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono. “As a result, Zimbabwean companies are finding it extremely difficult to access offshore lines of credit because of the perceived country risk.” Zimbabwean companies are therefore compelled to deal “with their international suppliers strictly on a cash up front basis, with very minimal credit terms.” If companies are fortunate enough to secure external financing, it is generally only at very high interest rates. “A vicious circle has thus evolved since the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe. The resultant decline in economic activity emanating from the sanctions has given rise to rising external payment arrears, and high country risk, which in turn, has adverse effects on economic activity.” (8)

It was not only the U.S that was using its influence to hamper Zimbabwe’s economy. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw revealed that he was “building coalitions” against Zimbabwe, and he stated that Great Britain would “oppose any access by Zimbabwe to international financial institutions.” (9) British officials threatened to eliminate financial assistance to southern African nations unless they imposed sanctions on their neighbor. President Benjamin Mkapa complained that African Commonwealth members had “endured a bombardment for an alliance against Mugabe.” (10)

The World Bank and IMF played an important role in the economic sabotage of Zimbabwe’s economy, and sought to dissuade others from extending financial credit to Zimbabwe. According to one source in Zimbabwe, “Our contacts in various countries have indicated that these institutions are using all sorts of tactics to cow all those who are keen to assist Zimbabwe.” (11)

For a nation that had to import 100 percent of its oil, 40 percent of its electricity and most of its spare parts, Zimbabwe was highly vulnerable to being cut off from access to foreign exchange. Any modern economy must rely on international financial institutions in order to transact normal trade. But Western nations had largely disrupted Zimbabwe’s ability to do so, and the result was immediate and dire. The supply of oil fell sharply, and periodically ran out entirely. It became increasingly difficult to muster the foreign currency to maintain an adequate level of imported electricity, and the nation was frequently beset by black outs. The shortage of oil and electricity in turn severely hobbled industrial production, as did the inability to import raw materials and spare parts. Business after business closed down and the unemployment rate soared above 70 percent. Inflation raged, driving incomes in real terms to a point so low that people struggled just to survive. (12)

U.S., British and Western European governments sought to exploit the resulting discontent by bankrolling the opposition MDC, supplying it with tens of millions of dollars. But passage of a law in Zimbabwe making it illegal for political parties to receive funding from abroad forced both the MDC and its Western backers to be more circumspect about their relationship. The West had reason to feel that it was not getting its money’s worth, as the MDC’s electoral performance was generally disappointing. Although the party could count on substantial support in urban areas, the more populous rural areas stood solidly behind the ZANU-PF government. There was little appeal for the rural population in the MDC’s program, which called for near total privatization of state owned firms and government services and a return to neoliberal economic policy. The ZANU-PF government, on the other hand, had done away with the land ownership pattern inherited from apartheid Rhodesia, with its extreme concentration of land and wealth in the hands of a relatively few white commercial farmers. The MDC’s adherence to neoliberal principles, on the other hand, posed the potential risk of a reversal of the land reform process, in whole or in part.

Left to its own merits, the MDC would have little prospect of coming to power through electoral means in the foreseeable future. The option of bringing down the government through non-democratic means therefore has considerable appeal for the opposition and Western governments. As early as 2000, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai told a rally, “What we would like to tell Mugabe is please go peacefully. If you don’t want to go peacefully, we will remove you violently.” (13) The MDC has since that time periodically organized mass actions against the government, including one that Tsvangirai dubbed “the final push.”

Tsvangirai had at one point even contacted a Montreal-based public relations firm led by a former Israeli intelligence official, believing that the company would have contacts with the CIA. Disturbed by Tsvangirai’s requests, the firm taped their final two meetings. The first tape, in which Tsvangirai was more explicit, proved to be inaudible due to nearby construction work, but the public relations firm did warn the Zimbabwean government and the second tape was sent as evidence. Tsvangirai was more careful with his words at the second of the recorded meetings, and it was therefore not entirely clear whether he was seeking the assassination of President Mugabe, as the public relations firm claimed, or a coup d’etat. Tsvangirai talked of the “elimination” of President Mugabe, and worried that the army would take over instead of him in the ensuing “chaos.” Tsvangirai went to trial on charges of treason over the case, but was found not guilty. The tapes were fairly incriminating but not specific enough, and the charge of treason carried the prospect of the death penalty. Furthermore the prosecution’s case was not particularly well prepared. Despite all that, the most charitable view of the content of the tape was that at a minimum Tsvangirai planned to come to power through extra-legal means. (14)

The opposition eventually split over the issue of whether or not to even participate in the electoral process. The MDC was trounced in the last election, partly due to the Tsvangirai faction’s decision to boycott the process and partly due to lukewarm public support for the party. Tsvangirai met with Western officials following the election, after which he announced that the way forward for the opposition would be “an era of democratic mass confrontation with the dictatorship – an era of non-violent mass resistance.” (15) Power was to be seized through “mass confrontation,” which in reality would be neither democratic nor non-violent. Washington and London dreamed of another “color revolution,” such as the one that had overthrown the government in the Ukraine, and the installation in power of a compliant leader eager to take orders.

On January 9 of this year, both factions of the MDC met with U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell, who urged them to unite. Soon thereafter, the MDC launched its “defiance campaign,” marked by a series of demonstrations and sporadic acts of violence, including the knifing of a police officer. By the time of the March 11 “prayer meeting,” the political atmosphere had become highly charged. (16) By relentlessly roiling the political waters, the U.S. and Great Britain had created an intensely contested political culture in Zimbabwe, and it was no secret that the aim was to topple the government. In such circumstances, political passions had reached the point where patience with the MDC and its efforts to bring down the government had worn thin.

Encouraged by the unreserved backing it was receiving in the West since the beatings at Machipisa station, the MDC stepped up its efforts. Arthur Mutambara announced that the MDC was “in the final stages of the final push,” and planned to continue with the defiance campaign. “We are talking about rebellion, war.” (17) This was followed by a flurry of violent acts. A police station in Harare was fire bombed, causing serious facial injuries to two policewomen. The demonstration at the funeral of the slain MDC demonstrator turned violent, and MDC supporters battled with police for several hours. A passenger train passing through a Harare suburb was fire bombed, causing five injuries, and the next day another police station, this time in Mutare, was the target of a gasoline bomb. By the end of a three-week period, the tenth target was bombed, a business owned by a former ZANU-PF member of Parliament. (18) The West’s high dudgeon over the issue of violence was nowhere to be seen and the incidents went without comment. After two gasoline tankers were bombed, a sweep by police nabbed 35 MDC suspects along with more than 50 explosives and two dozen detonators. It was said that the explosives were of the same type as those used against the passenger train. (19) Western media, silent on the wave of bombings, castigated the government of Zimbabwe for the arrests, and falsely asserted that Tsvangirai had been arrested in the sweep.

The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) called for a general strike to be held on April 3-4, and the MDC and its Western backers held high hopes that the strike would degenerate into such chaos that the nation would become ungovernable. Relations between the MDC and ZCTU are closely intertwined, and indeed it was the ZCTU that launched the MDC. Tsvangirai was at one time the leader of the trade union organization and in its early years, the MDC used the ZCTU’s offices and facilities. So cozy is the relationship that it is probable that the strike was in fact an MDC initiative. The opposition regarded the strike as part of its larger strategic plan. “You are going to see more of these actions coming,” warned MDC spokesman Nelson Chamisa. (20) Expectations, however, were to be disappointed when the strike fizzled as businesses continued to operate as normal.  

Internal pressure on the government of Zimbabwe was combined with external threats. The U.S. and Great Britain were once again urging African nations to pressure Zimbabwe. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said that African nations should impose sanctions. Western leaders arrogantly lectured African leaders in a demeaning manner, trying to dictate to them how to act, and treated them as if they were mere servants to do the West’s bidding. When the Southern African Development Community (SADC) met to discuss regional matters, the subject of Zimbabwe was high on the agenda. Western political leaders and media did not hide their expectation that Zimbabwe’s neighbors would choose the occasion to join the Western campaign.

Instead, the SADC issued a firm rebuff to the West. The statement issued by the organization pointed out that “free and fair democratic presidential elections were held in 2002 in Zimbabwe,” and the SADC “reaffirmed its solidarity with the government and people of Zimbabwe.” South African President Thabo Mbeki would work to facilitate dialogue between the government and the opposition. In a clear message to the Western powers, the SADC appealed to Great Britain to “honor its compensation obligations with regard to land reform,” and called for “the lifting of all forms of sanctions against Zimbabwe.” (21) Zimbabwe’s neighbors knew that Western sanctions had inflicted severe harm on the economy and had in large part turned the political environment into a fight to the death that only encouraged violence. If what was wanted was a reduction in violence and political passions, then that could best be achieved by removing sanctions and allowing the economy to recover.

U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe Christopher Dell spurned the appeal a few days later by saying that the U.S. would not lift sanctions against Zimbabwe. “It’s simply not going to happen.” (22) The U.S. and Great Britain liked to point to the targeted sanctions against selected officials in Zimbabwe, which consisted of restrictions on travel and financial transactions abroad, claiming that such sanctions could not affect the economy of the entire nation. That claim was disingenuous, leaving out as it did the substantial efforts to block Zimbabwe’s access to foreign currency and international trade. “They use the term targeted sanctions,” observed Zimbabwean information minister Sikhanyiso Ndlovu, “yet any company that deals with Zimbabwe – they have been threatened; ordered not to deal with Zimbabwe. External financial institutions and banks have been told not to deal with Zimbabwe…so that the country does not have foreign currency. These targeted sanctions are a smoke screen.” (23)

Further measures are in the works. In addition to current sanctions, U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said, “it’s really a matter of looking at what else we might do with the international community, and part of that effort is to work with states in the region to get them to increase the pressure” on Zimbabwe. (24) This was confirmed by U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey when he said, “There’s always other tools in the toolbox, though, and I certainly expect we’ll look at those.” (25)

The Western destabilization campaign coupled interference in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe with sanctions. In addition to aid and advice to the MDC, funding is provided to media and NGO’s in support of the opposition. Due to the illegality under Zimbabwean law of many of their actions, the U.S. and Great Britain have generally avoided spelling out too many specifics. But the aim is clear, as indicated by the U.S. State Department: the strategy is “to maintain pressure on the Mugabe regime” and “to strengthen democratic forces,” that is, the MDC. The campaign against Zimbabwe is international in scope, and “the United States emphasized international cooperation and coordination. U.S. officials engaged multilaterally and bilaterally to expand international support of sanctions against government and ruling officials.” The U.S. also sponsors “public events” inside Zimbabwe, which are intended to “discredit” the government’s claim that sanctions are harming the economy, and to shift blame for economic decline onto the government. The U.S. provides what it vaguely refers to as “support” to the political opposition, and which in fact is quite extensive. (26)

Training has been provided to some opposition members of Parliament, as well as to “selected democratically oriented organizations.” The United States also directly funds “a number of civil society organizations” (NGO’s) and provides them “with training and technical assistance to help them advocate to the parliament on issues of national significance.” In other words, so-called civil society organizations are being paid and trained to influence legislation in an amenable manner for Western interests. Opposition media are generously funded in order to “fortify” their efforts to swing public support to the opposition. Nearly a third of a million dollars was given to the U.S. Solidarity Center to establish a program “to assist trade unions in Zimbabwe to become more accountable and responsive to their members.” (27) It would be more accurate to say that the intent was to encourage trade unions to become “more accountable and responsive” to Western interests. Affiliated with the AFL-CIO, Solidarity Center receives funding from the National Endowment for Democracy, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. State Department, and it often acts as an extension of U.S. foreign policy. (28) Among the myriad organizations involved in Zimbabwe on behalf of U.S. interests are Freedom House, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the National Republican Institute, and a host of others.  

The interventionist liberal-left in the West has jumped on the bandwagon of support for Bush and Blair’s campaign to topple the government of Zimbabwe. But critics who call for a Western-imposed “transition process” in Zimbabwe forget that the nation already has a transition process — an election which is scheduled for next year. No amount of imperial posturing can change the fact that it is only the people of Zimbabwe that have the right to choose their government — not the U.S. and Great Britain. The Zimbabwean people made their choice in the last presidential and parliamentary elections, both of which were deemed free and fair by African observers on the ground. Predictably, the U.S. and Great Britain, having no election observers, condemned the elections from afar as fraudulent even before they took place in a blatant attempt to discredit election outcomes that every poll had foretold. Western condemnation was prompted by the uncomfortable realization that a different outcome could not be imposed, no matter how many tens of millions of dollars were pumped into the coffers of the opposition.

If the Western-funded MDC has been incapable of coming up with a program that would appeal to a majority of voters, it is because the party has preferred to focus its attention on policies that would benefit Western corporate interests. For the Western liberal-left to call for the U.S. to “mediate” in a transition process is nothing less than a demand for U.S. meddling to initiate a coup to remove the legally elected government of Zimbabwe. There is something unseemly in the attitude that the U.S. and Great Britain have the right to dictate the fate of other nations and to determine who shall hold power, and that it is the duty of activists to support imperial domination.

If the police in Zimbabwe have acted harshly at times, it is because Western interference has created a life or death struggle for survival in Zimbabwe. That the U.S. and Great Britain are using every means possible to effect regime change and to encourage the opposition to bring down the government through mass action can only have resulted in a deeply polarized society. The government of Zimbabwe is cognizant of previous Western-backed campaigns that successfully removed the governments of Yugoslavia, Georgia and the Ukraine and installed compliant puppets in their place. Zimbabwe is vigilant against Western attempts to incite opposition supporters to bring about a violent change of government.

It is dismaying that so many would call for U.S. and British intervention in the affairs of a sovereign nation. It was British colonialism that stole the land from the African people and introduced the horrors of the apartheid system in Rhodesia. Over the decades of colonial rule, the British government expropriated untold billions of dollars from the land, labor and resources while depopulating the rich farmland regions and herding those expelled from their homes into the most barren areas. Is it not ironic that the U.S. and Great Britain condemn government violence in Zimbabwe when they have done so much to create the circumstances that almost guarantee such an outcome? Is it not relevant that the West has fostered myriad acts of violence by the opposition? And what could be stranger than for the U.S. and Great Britain to act as self-appointed moral authorities on the subject of violence and democracy as they crush Iraq and Afghanistan under the boot of occupation? Whatever acts of violence may have taken place in Zimbabwe pale in comparison to the vast numbers of victims of Western firepower in Iraq. If the U.S. and Great Britain are as committed to peace, democracy and the rule of law as they claim to be, then let them leave Iraq now, without delay.

Western liberal-left critics demand more meddling by the U.S. and Great Britain in the affairs of Zimbabwe, under the delusion that Western-imposed regime change would be a “democratic”act. It is only corporate and elite interests that would be served, for Zimbabwe’s crime in the eyes of Washington is that it jettisoned the ruinous structural adjustment program several years ago, rejected the neoliberal economic model and redistributed land on a more equitable basis. It is not lack of democracy in Zimbabwe that worries Western elites; it is the fact that democracy has produced a government that those in the halls of power in Washington and London wish to remove. What the West wants is to overturn democracy in Zimbabwe and impose a government of its choosing. Zimbabwe, to its credit, has refused to bend to intense pressure and remains committed to the course it has charted, in which the economy is geared to the interests of its own people, not that of Western corporate interests.

“Zimbabwe is a strategic country for the United States because events in Zimbabwe have a significant impact on the entire region,” points out USAID. (29) Indeed, President Mugabe says that the struggle Zimbabwe has embarked upon is nothing less than Africa’s second liberation. The continent, having freed itself from direct colonial rule, has yet to free itself of economic domination. In Namibia and South Africa, the formal end of apartheid rule has done nothing to undo the concentration of land in the hands of the wealthy white few, while millions of black peasants remain without land. Throughout Africa, the neoliberal economic model has crippled prospects for development. Zimbabwe’s example, were it allowed to flourish unhindered, might threaten to set an example that would make an indelible continent-wide impression. Conversely, the U.S. and Great Britain hope that a defeated Zimbabwe would send a signal that resistance to Western economic domination is futile. There is much that rides on the outcome of Zimbabwe’s struggle against its imperial enemies — perhaps the fate of Africa itself.

Gregory Elich is the author of Strange Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem, and the Pursuit of Profit

NOTES

   1.
      “More Arrests, Tension Rises,” UN Integrated Regional Information Network, March 12, 2007.
   2.
      Cesar Zvayi, “It’s the MDC: See, Hear, Say No Evil,” The Herald (Harare), March 15, 2007. “Man Shot Dead as MDC Thugs Attack Police,” The Herald (Harare), March 12, 2007.
   3.
      “Eyewitness: Harare’s Brutal Clash,” BBC News, March 13, 2007.
   4.
      David Samuriwo, “Deal Decisively with Security Threat,” The Herald (Harare), March 16, 2007. “Eyewitness: Harare’s Brutal Clash,” BBC News, March 13, 2007.
   5.
      David Samuriwo, “Deal Decisively with Security Threat,” The Herald (Harare), March 16, 2007.
   6.
      Sarah Huddleston and Dumisani Muleya, “Mugabe’s Henchmen Unleash Torture Fury,” Business Day (Johannesburg), March 15, 2007.
   7.
      “IMF Declares Zimbabwe Ineligible to Use IMF Resources, IMF Press Release, September 25, 2001. “Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001,” Public Law 107-99 – Dec. 21, 2001.
   8.
      Gideon Gono, “An Analysis of the Socio-Economic Impact of Sanctions Against Zimbabwe: Supplement 7 of the Fourth Quarter 2005 Monetary Policy Review Statement, January 24, 2006.
   9.
      “Stop Talking and Start Acting Against Mugabe, Say Tories,” Daily Telegraph (London), March 15, 2002. “Zimbabwe Steering Towards Sanctions,” Afrol News, November 30, 2001.
  10.
      Peter O’Connor, “Zimbabwe Decision Reveals Deep Rift,” Associated Press, March 5, 2002.
  11.
      “Standoff Against Zimbabwe Taken to Extreme Levels,” The Herald (Harare), December 12, 2002.
  12.
      For a detailed account of Western sanctions and the effect on the economy of Zimbabwe, see: Gregory Elich, Strange Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem, and the Pursuit of Profit, Llumina Press, Ft. Lauderdale, 2006.
  13.
      Grant Ferrett, “Opposition Warning to Mugabe,” BBC News, September 30, 2000.
  14.
      For a detailed account of the case, see: Gregory Elich, Strange Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem, and the Pursuit of Profit, Llumina Press, Ft. Lauderdale, 2006.
  15.
      Tony Hawkins, “Mugabe’s Real Election Victory: An Opposition Split Down the Middle,” Financial Times (London), November 30, 2005.
  16.
      Caesar Zvayi, “It’s the MDC: See, Hear, Say No Evil,” The Herald (Harare), March 15, 2007.
  17.
      Jam Raath, “Mugabe Arms Police as Opposition Prepares ‘Final Push’ to Oust Him,” The Times (London), March 17, 2007.
  18.
      “Harare Base Fire-Bombed, Two Cops Suffer Serious Facial Injuries,” Real Time Traders, March 15, 2007. “Slain Activist Buried Away from Public View,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting (London), March 21, 2007. “Sakubva Police Station Bombed,” The Herald (Harare), March 24, 2007. “Zim Train Petrol-Bombed,” News24 (Johannesburg), March 24, 2007. “Wholesaler Bombed,” The Herald (Harare), April 2, 2007.
  19.
      “Police Nab 35 MDC Activists, Confiscate Arms, Explosives,” The Herald (Harare), March 29, 2007. “Petrol Bomber Arrested,” The Herald (Harare), March 28, 2007. “Seven Petrol Bombers in Court,” The Herald (Harare), March 30, 2007.
  20.
      Craig Timberg, “Few Honor Strike in Zimbabwe,” Washington Post, April 4, 2007.
  21.
      “Communique from the 2007 Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government Held in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania 28th to 29th March 2007,” SADC.
  22.
      Ndimyake Mwakalyelye, “US Ambassador Rebuffs Southern African Call to Lift Zimbabwe Sanctions,” Voice of America, April 4, 2007.
  23.
      Tendai Maphosa, “Sanctions May be Key to Political Reform in Zimbabwe,” Voice of America, April 5, 2007.
  24.
      Daily Press Briefing, Sean McCormack, Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, March 30, 2007.
  25.
      Stephen Kaufman, “Additional Sanctions Possible, State Department Says,” U.S. Department of State, March 14, 2007.
  26.
      “Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: the U.S. Record 2006,” U.S. Department of State, April 5, 2007.
  27.
      “Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: the U.S. Record 2003-2004,” U.S. Department of State, May 17, 2004.
  28.
      Alexandra Silver, “Soft Power: Democracy-Promotion and U.S. NGOs,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 17, 2006.
  29.
      “USAID/Zimbabwe Annual Report, FY 2005,” U.S. Agency for International Development, July 16, 2005.

 

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Is Besigheid teen Misdaad nog relevant?

Besigheid teen misdaad is die naam van ‘n organisasie (Business Against Crime- www.bac.org.za) wat in 1996 op versoek van oudpresident Mandela tot stand gekom het.


Hierdie organsasie het geld in trustvorm bestuur maar het eers in 2004 ‘n publiekevoordeelmaatskappy geword toe Artikel 18A-belastingstatus verkry is. Hierdie status stel skenkers in staat om hulle donasies van belasting te verhaal. Daar is meer as R20 miljoen per jaar beskikbaar en dit lei natuurlik tot die probleem van valse "entitlement," aangesien bestuurders nie die eienaars van die geld is nie, maar optree asof hulle wel is.

Volgens die BAC se jaarverslae van 2005 en 2006 het Mandela se versoek dat besigheid die staat se pogings teen misdaad moet ondersteun, tot die volgende doelwitte gelei:

1.Die vestiging van anti-misdaadvaardighede in regeringsgeledere
2.Die aanvoer van aksies teen misdaad en teen die oorsake van sulke misdaad
3.Die ontwikkeling van ondersteunende vennootskappe

Die organisasie het oor die laaste tien jaar die volgende vermag:

1.Die vestiging van vaardighede:
Nasionale misdaadvoorkomingstrategie
Kringtelevisie in die middestad van Johannesburg en Kaapstad
Vestiging van “beste besigheidspraktyke“ in die polisie (die werk van kommissaris Meyer Kahn)
Handelsmisdaadhowe in Port Elizabeth, Durban, Johannesburg en Kaapstad
Bestuur van trustfondse
Mentorskappe van swart regslui (danksy ’n USAID-donasie)
Voorstel van die wet op tweedehandse goedere

2. Die aanvoer van aksies teen misdaad en oorsake van sulke misdaad:
Prioritisering van belangrike misdade wat die volgende insluit:

Diefstal met verswarende faktore, sindikaatdiefstal, handelsmisdaad en korrupsie,
Kapings,
Voertuigmisdaadprojek (onwettige registrasies),
Afvalmetaaldiefstal (koperdraad),
Selfoondiefstal (swartlys)

3. Die ontwikkeling van ondersteunende vennootskappe :
"Justice security and prosperity partnership” (donasie van Global Alliance ter waarde van R500 000),
Ondersteuning van slagoffers by polisiestasies,
Bestuursprogram vir polisiestasies,
Tiisa Thuto-onderwysprojek,
Geïntegreerde justisieprogram,
Samewerking van sakekamers, Kamer van Mynwese, die veiligheidsbedryf, die Suid-Afrikaanse poskantoor, die Johannesburgse aandelebeurs en die motorbedryf,
Rehabilitasie van misdadigers,
Anti-korrupsieforum,
Bekamping van sindikate

Wanneer mens bogenoemde aksies se doeltreffendheid beoordeel, word die volgende duidelik:

 

 

Gevolgtrekking 1:
Die belangrikste voordeel van hierdie organisasie is dat landsburgers wel stappe doen om die Suid-Afrikaanse polisiediens by te staan in die bekamping van misdaad. Maar Mbeki se pleidooi dat hy nie alles alleen kan doen nie en dat ons ook iets moet bydra, wys dat hy waarskynlik nie bewus is van die rol wat BAC speel nie en dat die organisasie dus in hulle belangrikste opdrag gefaal het – naamlik om die regering te help. (Hier moet genoem word dat die regering se bydrae tot die BAC drasties verminder het waaruit mens seker kan aflei dat hulle nie meer "betrokke" is nie en dat misdaad volgens die owerheid onder beheer is).

Die vraag kan dan gevra word of die BAC nie eerder moet ontbind nie?

 
Gevolgtrekking 2 :
Die BAC is ‘n dinamiese organisasie met uitvoerende direkteure, werknemers, rekenaars en natuurlik heelwat konsultante wat betaal moet word, nes enige firma. Wanneer mens egter kyk na hulle misdaadprioritisering, stem dit nie ooreen met die misdaadstatistiek nie. Volgens die Suid-Afrikaanse polisiediensverslae groei misdaad met 30% in sekere van die kategorieë. Mens moet hier in ag neem dat misdaad vinniger moet groei as die bevolking, ten einde gesien te word as "stygend". Hierdie stygende misdaadkategorieë is soos volg:

Verkragting
Diefstal met verswarende faktore
Onwelvoeglike aanrandings
Ontvoerings
Wanopvoeding van kinders
Moorde
Openbare geweld
Gewapende diefstal by besighede
Gewapende diefstal van kontant
Bestuur onder die invloed van drank

Net een van hierdie misdade, naamlik diefstal met verswarende faktore (wat deur die BAC ge-prioritiseer is), is van toepassing. Die BAC gee dus aandag aan kategorieë wat oor die algemeen nie ‘n groeiende probleem is nie.

Die polisie, die regering en ook die BAC se verslae, skep die indruk dat misdaad onder beheer is, maar enige persoon wat tendense verstaan, sal beaam dat  ‘n  situasie waarop ‘n 30% negatiewe invloed inwerk, reeds buite beheer is.

Die gevolgtrekking is dus dat die BAC nie die nodige "kundigheid" oordra aan ons regering sodat hulle hierdie tendense kan prioritiseer en verstaan nie.

Gevolgtrekking 3 :
Die BAC het ‘n groot poging aangewend om aandag te gee aan die Departement van Justisie asook aan ‘n geïntegreerde interdepartementele regspoging om die regstelsel te verbeter. Volgens polisieverslae word daar jaarliks tussen 200 000 en 300 000 sake aangemeld te midde van ‘n groeiende gewaarwording dat mense heelwat oortredings nie aanmeld nie.

Oor die tienjaarperiode van BAC se bestaan kyk ons na ‘n totaal van ongeveer 2 500 000 misdade. Van hierdie misdade word minder as 10% suksesvol vervolg, wat ‘n aanduiding is van hoe onsuksesvol die regering werklik is in terme van die bekamping van misdaad. Verder is dit duidelik dat die BAC se pogings geen impak gemaak het op hierdie probleem nie. Die BAC het die probleem van "2.25 miljoen misdadigers op straat" byvoorbeeld nie eers geïdentifiseer as ‘n probleemkwessie nie.

Wat wel gebeur het, is dat addisionele handelsmisdaadhowe geopen is, wat minder as 1000 sake per jaar hanteer. Ekstra howe vir moordenaars en gewapende rowers word egter nie eers genoem nie.
 
Na aanleiding van voorgaande gevolgtrekkings kan die volgende opsomming gemaak word:

a. Die organisasie is wel nuttig, maar dan moet aandag aan die BAC se gebreke gegee word en die regering moet ook deelneem.

b. Landbou- en kulturele organisasies is nie betrokke by die BAC nie en hulle behoort by die bekamping van misdaad betrek te word.

c. Mens kan die argument voorhou dat die belastingbetaler nie nog geld behoort by te dra nie, alhoewel die punt gemaak is dat hierdie ekstra betalings nie vir regstellende aksie gebruik word nie, maar wel vir herstellende aksie, omdat die regering so onbekwaam is. Donasies vanaf die Skandinawiese, Engelssprekende en ou Oosbloklande sal egter van meer nut wees as om geld uit plaaslike besighede te wurg.

d. Die bogenoemde oorsig ondersteun ‘n swart filosofiese gedagte dat heelwat tyd en geld aan die Christelike en strafregtelike bewusmaking van benadeelde (2.25 miljoen volwasse) individue bestee moet word om misdaad uiteindelik te kan bekamp.

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Lindela-repatriasiesentrum

Immigrante wat desperaat is om aan oorlog en ekonomiese ellende in die res van Afrika te ontsnap, steek ons grense die afgelope paar jaar in hulle miljoene oor.

Niemand is seker presies hoeveel onwettige immigrante hulle tans in Suid-Afrika bevind  nie. Volgens die Human Rights Watch, wat in New York gebaseer is, is daar tans sowat 140 000 amptelike asielsoekers – net van Zimbabwe, die Ivoorkus, Rwanda en omstreke – hier teenwoordig. By die Lindela-vlugtelingsentrum buite Johannesburg word sowat 1000 Zimbabwiërs weekliks gedeporteer. Die Zimbabwiese reserwebank het verlede jaar die aantal Zimbabwiese immigrante in Suid-Afrika op ten minste drie miljoen geskat. Met ’n inflasiekoers van 2 200% gaan die stroom van vlugtelinge uit Mugabe se chaotiese land beslis net vermeerder.

Grense tussen Suid-Afrika en sy buurlande word lankal nie meer behoorlik gepatrolleer nie en die laksheid van beamptes maak dit onmoontlik om te weet hoeveel immigrante daar werklik in die land is. In die Limpopo-provinsie is Zimbabwiërs dikwels betrokke by plaasaanvalle en onwettige jag. Hulle dra by tot die sowat 300 moorde en gewelddadige aanvalle wat elke dag in die land plaasvind en wat van Suid-Afrika die tweede mees gewelddadige land op die planeet maak, net na Colombia. Boere in die noorde maak hierdie Zimbabwiërs van tyd tot bymekaar en oorhandig hulle aan die polisie, maar die meeste van hulle kom eenvoudig weer terug. Sommige navorsers meen dat ses of meer miljoen onwettige immigrante hulle in Suid-Afrika bevind.

In Hillbrow bly daar deesdae burgers van 34 verskillende lande. Die parallelle ekonomie in die buurt beloop volgens ’n navorser by die Instituut vir Sekerheidstudies miljoene rand. Dit is ’n bekende feit dat Nigeriërs meeste van die onwettige aktiwiteite vanuit vervalle hotelle in die buurt beheer. Onwettige handel in buitelandse valuta, dwelmhandel, prostitusie en die onwettige verkoop van vuurwapens is van die grootste probleme wat die polisie hier probeer bekamp.

Die regering se solidariteit met die res van die vasteland dra tot die probleem by. Kabinetsministers maak gereeld uitsprake oor hoe die gebrek aan kundiges in die land opgelos kan word deur meer immigrante uit Afrika te lok. Sulke verklarings laat al wat ’n sukkelaar is welkom voel.

Visumvereistes word ook nie meer drakonies toegepas nie. Sedert Suid-Afrika en Mosambiek byvoorbeeld in April 2005 visumvereistes verslap het, was daar ’n (amptelike) toename van 30% in die verkeer tussen die twee lande, gemeet aan verkeer by die hoofgrenspos. Besoekers kan nou vir 30 dae sonder visums tussen die twee lande reis.

Volgens Brenda Horne, hoof uitvoerende beampte van die Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative, het meer as 381 000 mense verlede maand deur die Ressano-Lebombo-grenspos gereis. Verlede jaar dieselfde tyd is 284 350 besoekers getel en in April 2005 slegs 165 957.

Die toename van 30% dui volgens haar daarop dat die verslapping van visumvereistes ‘n goeie idee was. “Dit is duidelik dat hierdie besluit ’n goeie stap was om streeksintegrasie te bevorder en om die beweging van ons mense oor die grens tussen die twee lande aan te moedig,“ het sy gesê.

Vreemdelingehaat onder die plaaslike swart bevolking strook egter nie met die vroom retoriek van die Suid-Afrikaanse owerhede nie. So byvoorbeeld is dosyne Somaliese vlugtelinge reeds die afgelope twee jaar in die Wes-Kaap afgemaai. Hierdie mense begin dikwels met winkeltjies in die swart woonbuurte, maar word gou as kompetisie deur plaaslike swartmense gesien omdat hulle produkte teen laer pryse verkoop. Die meeste Somaliërs in Suid-Afrika is onwettig hier, so dit is moeilik om presiese getalle te bepaal, maar daar word gereken dat daar tot 6 000 van hulle in die Wes-Kaap alleen kan wees. Die ironie is dat baie van hulle daar gaan woon omdat die Wes-Kaap as ‘n veiliger area as byvoorbeeld Gauteng beskou word. Somaliërs kla gereeld dat plaaslike swartes na hulle verwys as “vriende van honde“ of op hulle spoeg. Die pers skenk gewoonlik nie veel aandag aan hierdie gevalle nie. In Augustus 2006 was daar byvoorbeeld ’n georkestreerde aksie in Masiphumelele, net buite Kaapstad, toe plaaslike inwoners 27 Somaliese besighede geplunder het en ’n klompie winkels heeltemal afgebrand het. Die polisie moes 71 Somaliese inwoners inderhaas uit die woonbuurt verwyder. Soortgelyke insidente vind steeds plaas.

Michel Rocard, voormalige eerste minister van Frankryk, het tydens sy ampstermyn die volgende ten opsigte van immigrasie verklaar: ”Frankryk kan nie al die ellende van die wêreld hier verwelkom nie.“ Die tyd het aangebreek dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering dieselfde begin sê en van hierdie fortuinsoekers, wat tot die ellende, misdaad en werkloosheid in ons land bydra, ontslae begin raak.

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ImageDeesdae is daar baie kommentaar en selfs bekommerde uitsprake oor die gevolge van klimaatsverandering in die moderne wêreld.  Klimaatsverandering is sekerlik ’n baie belangrike onderwerp, maar daar is ’n olifant waaroor niemand, behalwe miskien ’n klompie geoloë en ander deskundiges, juis praat nie. Hoe groot is die olifant?  So groot dat dit die basiese aannames oor ons ekonomie, voedselverskaffing, en veral oor ons tegnologie, totaal kan vernietig.

Om die probleem te verstaan, help dit om die moderne wêreld van nader te beskou.  In 2007 is ons baie gewoond aan internasionale vlugte, aan plastiek en ander moderne stowwe, aan goedkoop kos wat plase en plantasies (selfs in die ontwikkelende wêreld) op ’n massiewe skaal produseer (deur kunsmis en gemeganiseerde implemente te gebruik).  Produkte wat ons koop (klere, rekenaars, motors, ensovoorts) is goedkoop en bevat groot hoeveelhede plastiek en kunsvesels.  Dit word ook êrens anders vervaardig vanuit komponente wat weereens vanaf elders kom.  Die wêreld het vandag ’n geïntegreerde ekonomie met meer as ses miljard mense waarvan ’n groot persentasie van aansteeklike siektes soos pokke bevry is.  Hierdie mense reis internasionaal op groot vliegtuie op reise wat eens maande of jare sou duur, maar wat nou net ’n paar uur neem.  In groot dele van die wêreld word huise in die winter verhit en in die somer verkoel, en inwoners reis kilometers ver in persoonlike voertuie tussen huis en werk. By die werk en by die huis is daar allerhande elektriese toestelle; rekenaars, mengers en stowe, warm water en sjampoe en grimering en wat ook al.

Dus ’n komplekse en energieke wêreld wat op die verskaffing van hoëkwaliteitenergie in die vorm van elektrisiteit (eintlik net ’n draer van energie) beskikbaar is, asook oorweldigend: die kwaliteit energie wat in ru-olie beskikbaar is.

Maar daar bestaan ’n skaduwee waaroor niemand in die pers eintlik skryf nie.  En die skaduwee kan oor ons val nog voor klimaatsverandering enigsins ’n noemenswaardige impak gehad het.  Dit het selfs ’n naam: “Peak Oil”, en die gevolge kan genoeg wees om ons nywerheidswêreld se ekonomie ernstig te ontwrig en selfs te vernietig.  En om die gevolge van “Peak Oil” te vermy sal groot wetenskaplike en finansiële uitvindings verg, in ’n klimaat waar baie mense nog ontken dat dit ’n probleem kan word, of steeds totaal in die duister hieroor is.

Om “Peak Oil” te verstaan, help dit om na olie-produksie uit ’n tipiese ru-olieveld te kyk.  As ’n olieveld ontdek word, gee dit aanvanklik relatief maklik olie, en die produksie van die veld neem toe soos meer en meer gate geboor word om ru-olie te tap.  Op ’n stadium bereik die produksie ’n maksimum (dit gebeur miskien wanneer die helfte van die olie uitgepomp is) en dit begin moeliker word om die ru-olie te pomp.  Sommige boorgate droog op, en die produksie by ander neem af.  Om meer olie uit die veld te trek verg nou ander truuks.  ’n Algemene metode wat help is om seewater in die olieveld te pomp.  Dit verplaas die ru-olie (wat in rotse vasgevang en geabsorbeer mag wees) wat dan makliker uitgepomp kan word.  Die metodes verleng die lewe van die olieveld, maar word duurder en duurder, terwyl produksie aanhou afneem, totdat die olieveld nie meer winsgewend ontgin kan word nie.  Op dié stadium neem die totale produksie vinnig af. 

Die produksie van ’n olieveld kan voorgestel word deur ’n grafiek met ’n produksiekurwe.  Die produksie vanuit ’n olieveld is normaalweg ’n klok-kurwe:  Produksie begin laag en goedkoop, maar neem toe tot op ’n maksimum wat normaalweg gebeur as omtrent die helfte van die olie uitgepomp is.  Daarna neem die produksie af en word dit duurder om verder olie uit te veld te ontgin.  Uiteindelik is die veld uitgeput wanneer dit ekonomies nie meer sin maak om olie te ontgin nie.
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Die algemene vorm van die produksiekurwe maak dit moontlik om te voorspel hoe lank en hoe winsgewend ’n spesifieke olievonds sal wees.  Nog belangriker, dit is moontlik om taamlik akkuraat te voorspel hoe lank ’n olieveld gaan produseer en hoeveel olie daar uitgepomp kan word.  Die feite is uitgewerk deur M King Hubbert, wat in 1956 voorspel het dat olie-produksie van Amerikaanse olievelde in die 48 state sonder Alaska en Hawaii teen 1969 ’n maksimum gaan bereik.  Hy was met net een jaar uit.  Produksie het in 1970 ’n maksimum bereik en daarna afgeneem soos dit moeiliker en duurder geword het om verdere olie uit die velde te ontgin.

Hubbert se argumente is ook toepaslik op die wêreld se olieproduksie.  Die grafiek (sien hieronder) toon die wêreldproduksie in ru-olie aan (data tot en met 2007) en dan projeksies na die datum.  Die onstabiele produksie sedert 1973 is weens die olieboikot van Saoedi-Arabië.  Sulke onstabiliteite is normaal naby die maksimum van die Hubbert-kurwe; dit impliseer dat die produksie beïnvloed kan word deur net enkele produserende lande of velde.  Sedertdien is die olieprys taamlik kunsmatig beheer deur veral Saoedi-Arabië.  Om die olieprys te beheer, het Midde-Oosterse produsente sedert ongeveer 1980 ’n beleid gevolg van “krane oop” of “krane toe”.  As die prys te hoog word, is die Midde-Oosterse oliekraan oopgedraai, wat die mark met olie voorsien het, en wat dan die prys weer laat verlaag het.  Die gedrag is belangrik geag omdat olie so ’n belangrike eknomiese faktor in die Westerse ekonomieë is.  Die gedrag het aangehou tot en selfs na 2000 en het die prys van ru-olie taamlik oor die tydperk serdert 1973 bestendig.  Maar daar is nou aanduidinge dat olievelde in Saoedi-Arabië sodanig ontgin is dat hulle dalk hulle individuele Hubbert-maksima bereik het.  Dit gaan dus moeliker word om krane indien nodig oop te draai.  Die gevolg is ’n vraag na olie wat die prys opstoot, en die bruto prys van ru-olie het sedert ongeveer 2002 skerp in reële terme gestyg.
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Daar is nou meer en meer beweringe dat wêreldolieproduksie se Hubbert-maksimum in 2005 bereik is, of dat dit teen 2010 bereik sal word.  Die beweringe is konsekwent met voorspellings wat reeds so lank terug as 1972 gemaak is toe die maatskappy ESSO voorspel het dat olie teen 2000 duur sou word.  Daar word ook taamlik algemeen aanvaar dat ongeveer die helfte van die wêreld se olievoorraad (tussen 2000 en 2500 triljoen vate) reeds ontgin is.  Die probleem is nie dat olievoorraad sodanig uitgeput is nie, maar dat dit duur gaan word om dit te ontgin.  Om dit in perspektief te stel:  dit vat energie om olie te ontgin, en in ’n nuwe olieveld kry mens miskien 50 eenhede energie uit vir elke eenheid energie wat op die ontginning bestee word.  Na die Hubbert-piek kan die verhouding krimp tot 2 eenhede energie uit die ontginde olie, vir elke eenheid energie wat bestee is.

Die wêreld het dus waarskynlik die Hubbert-maksimum reeds bereik, en as daar nog skommelinge rondom die maksimum is, is die verwagte langtermynvooruitsig een van ’n afname in olieproduksie in ’n omgewing waar die vraag vinnig toeneem weens ekonomiese groei in die Verre Ooste en Indië.

Die resultaat?  Ten eerste ’n drastiese toename in die prys, en daarna mededinging tussen moondhede vir olie.  Die uitwerking op die wêreldekonomie kan drasties wees, maar duurder energie beteken duurder voedsel, duurder verbruikersprodukte, en veral, omdat dit olie is, drastiese verhogings in petrolpryse en in die pryse van vliegtuigkaartjies op internasionale vlugte.

Maar, sou u wil weet, kan dit nie alles verhoed word met ander energiebronne nie?  Die antwoord is nie eenvoudig nie, maar in ’n neutedop:  Die presiese rede waarom die wêreldekonomie so vinnig oor die laaste eeu gegroei het, is omdat olie so goedkoop ontgin kon word:  ’n hoëkwaliteitenergiebron wat maklik verwerkbaar en verbruikbaar was.

Deesdae word waterstof as ’n alternatief voorgehou.  Dit maak sin, maar dit ontwyk ook die grondliggende probleem:  Waterstof is ’n draer van energie, en die energie moet steeds êrens opgewek word, en die opwekking impliseer verliese in energie.  Die opwekking van energie (deur wind, die getye, hidro-elektriese opwekking, die produksie van etanol vanuit landbouafval of graan, ensovoorts) het almal een of ander probleem:  wind, die getye en hidro-elektriese opwekking kan nie die gehalte van energie in ru-olie produseer nie.  Etanol verg energie om geproduseer te word – ’n vergelyking met ru-olie toon aan dat dit baie duurder is en dat dit nooit in die hoeveelhede geproduseer kan word om olie te vervang nie.  Laastens is daar kernenergie, wat as mens veiligheid verontagsaam, aangewend word om elektriese energie op te wek, maar wat ook afval produseer wat vir tienduisende jare gevaarlik gaan wees, asook steenkool, wat ’n vuil en besoedelende laekwaliteitenergiebron is vergeleke met ru-olie, en wat reeds duurder en moeiliker word om te ontgin.

En vir sekere doeleindes is daar nie ’n ander energiebron nie.  Lugvaart is byvoorbeeld net moontlik met brandstof vir die stralerenjin, en as dit duurder word, word vliegkaartjies duurder.  Oor die algemeen is die probleem van alternatiewe energiebronne reeds ondersoek, die Hirsch-verslag (http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/others/pdf/Oil_Peaking_NETL.pdf) noem byvoorbeeld dat dit baie dekades se investering en tegnologiese ontwikkeling sal verg om alternatiewe bronne ekonomies vatbaar te maak.

Wat sou die gevolge van die Hubbert-maksimum in olie wees?  Dit wissel, afhangende van wie gevra word: van voorspellings van absolute anargie en oorloë aan die pessimistiese kant, tot minder pessimistiese ontledings wat verwys na aanpassings in ’n wêreld waar vervoer baie duur gaan word (95% van die energie in vervoerwese kom vanaf ru-olie), en waar voedsel nie meer so maklik bekombaar sal wees nie (in intensiewe landbou word tot 10 eenhede energie (in die vorm van brandstof) gebruik vir elke eenheid energie in die voedsel wat geproduseer word).  Verder is die moderne finansiële stelsel van olie afhanklik.  Finansiële instellings en banke het op aannames van volgehoue ekonomiese groei geld uitgeleen.  As ekonomiese groei drasties genoeg ingekort word deur energietekorte, kan dit die aannames ondergrawe, met die gevolg van ’n destabilisering van die ekonomie en ’n uiteindelike ressessie of depressie. 

Daar word dikwels ook bespiegel dat groot moondhede in ’n wêreld met duur olie die bron vir hulleself sal toe-eien, met ander lande (meestal in die derde wêreld) wat op die kantlyn gerangeer gaan word, met gevolglike voedseltekorte en katastrofiese inkrimping van hulle ekonomieë.  Dus, burgerloorloë, hongersnood en ander manifestasies van ellende.

Daar is vandag ’n beter waardering van die volgende vergelyking:

Energie = geld

Dit is nie met een opslag sinvol nie, maar die rykdom wat ons vandag op aarde het (of nie het nie), is een honderd persent die resultaat van ons vermoë om energiebronne te ontgin.  Hoe meer energie ontgin word, hoe meer rykdom het ons.  En die mees belangrike bronne?  Ru-olie en gas, wat waarskynlik in 2005 en in 2017 deur hulle Hubbert-maksima gaan, waarna die afname in produksie ’n merkwaardige invloed op ons samelewings en op ons ekonomieë gaan uitoefen.  Hier is dit opgesom in 2005 deur die London Times (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article575370.ece)

  • Oil is running out; the climate is changing at a potentially catastrophic rate; wars over scarce resources are brewing; finally, most shocking of all, we don’t seem to be having enough ideas about how to fix any of these things.
  • Almost daily, new evidence is emerging that progress can no longer be taken for granted, that a new Dark Age is lying in wait for ourselves and our children . . . growth may be coming to an end. Since our entire financial order — interest rates, pension funds, insurance, stock markets — is predicated on growth, the social and economic consequences may be cataclysmic.

Olie is natuurlik nie die enigste energiebron vir ’n moderne beskawing nie, maar dit is by verre die maklikste bron, en ook een met die hoogste kwaliteit.  Dit vervoer maklik, was taamlik volop, en is redelik veilig en stoor baie energie in klein hoeveelhede.  Dit is ook die grondstof vir menige van die mees belangrike produkte in die moderne wêreld.  Ons voedsel is goedkoop en volop, omdat kunsmis en gemeganiseerde landbou, wat beide deur goedkoop olie moontlik gemaak word, dit maklik maak om groot hoeveeldhede daarvan te produseer.  Dit is maklik om te vergeet dat die wêreldbevolking van een miljard tot ses miljard toegeneem het sedert olie op die toneel verskyn het.  Die meeste deskundiges dink dat dit nie toevallig was nie.  Die olie-ekonomie het energie verskaf wat die merkwaardige bevolkingsgroei en gepaardgaande groei in die ekonomieë van die wêreld veroorsaak het.  Sou dit steeds moontlik wees as olie nie meer goedkoop is nie om ’n beraamde bevolking (teen 2050) van by die 9 miljard mense van kos te voorsien?  U kan self die somme maak.

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Not out of Africa

It has been widely assumed that modern humans—Homo sapiens—first traveled out of Africa and settled in central and Western Europe before heading to Eastern Europe. That may not be the case. Recent finds from a site in Russia about 250 miles south of Moscow suggest that the first humans in Europe were Eastern European.The discoveries include bone and carved ivory artifacts.

Researchers calculated the date they were made by determining that the ash surrounding the artifacts came from an eruption that occurred 40,000 years ago in southern Italy. “Some of the artifacts found right under the ash were almost certainly made by modern humans,” says a University of Colorado archaeologist working at the site. Among them is an ivory piece that appears to be the head of a partially complete human figurine. Radiocarbon and other dating methods also helped establish that the artifacts—stone blade fragments, scrapers, shell ornaments, a bone awl, and various digging and carving tools—are an astonishing 42,000 to 45,000 years old.

The artifacts are most likely remnants from H. sapiens, not Neanderthals. “The shells came from the Mediterranean basin, a minimum of 300 miles away,” Hoffecker says. “One of the things you see when modern humans show up is a big leap in the distances over which materials move.” The carved piece of mammoth ivory is further proof of modern humans at work. “Carving ivory is confined to modern humans,” Hoffecker says. “So whether it’s a human figurine or not doesn’t matter. A modern human carved it, and that human is older by a considerable amount than any previously found in Eastern Europe.”

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Lyding van Swartes en Indiane

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Elizabeth II

Koningin Elizabeth II het Donderdag in Richmond, Virginia, gesê dat sy die lyding wat swartes en Indiane deurgemaak het met die totstandkoming van die Britse nedersetting in Jamestown 400 jaar gelede erken. Sy is op ‘n weeklange besoek aan die VSA en sy het die Parlement van Virginia toegespreek. Vyftig jaar gelede, tydens die 350-jarige vieringe, was die klem gelê op die aard van die 104 wit Europese setlaars. Só onthou Elizabeth die verrigtinge van 1957 waar sy ook teenwoordig was.

Die inheemse bevolking van die VSA is deur koloniste uitgeroei en minder as 2 miljoen leef vandag in reservate waar hulle tot onlangs meesal in armoede en alkholisme verval het. Dobbellisensies wat aan stamme toegeken word, is vandag feitlik die enigste inkomste waarop hulle kan staatmaak. Desnieteenstaande het die wanbestuur van inheemse trustfondse deur die Federale regering die Bush-administrasie onlangs daartoe genoop om $7 biljoen in ‘n skikking aan te bied.

"Ons het in hierdie gebeurtenis (…) die oprigting van ‘n groot nasie gadegeslaan, geskoei op die ewige waardes van demokrasie en gelykheid, ‘n regstaat en die uitbou van vryheid," het sy aan die gehoor gesê.

"Na 50 jaar word ons nou die geleentheid gebied om die nalatenskap van Jamestown van nader sonder skroom te beskou. Die vooruitgang van die mens geskied dikwels teen ‘n prys," het sy bygevoeg met verwysing na die grootskaalse uitwissing van inheemse volke en slawerny gedurende die totstandkoming van die Nuwe Wêreld.

"Die eerste jare in Jamestown, toe drie groot beskawings mekaar ontmoet het vir die eerste maal – Europeërs, inboorlinge en Afrikane – was gekenmerk deur ‘n reeks gebeurtenisse wat tot vandag toe nog ‘n diepgaande sosiale impak nie alleen op die VSA nie, maar ook Brittanje en Europa het."

Die groepie wat aan wal gestap het in Jamestown op 14 Mei 1607 het ‘n moerasagtige landskap oortrek met muskiete teëgekom. Hulle was opsoek na goud, maar hongersnood, droogte en vyandige inboorlinge was hul vonds. Vir sekere stamme was "die jaar 1607 die begin van die verlies" van hul grond. Die eerste slawe uit Afrika het daarna in Amerika aangekom in 1619.

In 1607 was daar ongeveer 15 000 Indiane in die gebied en ‘n honderd jaar later was daar maar 1500 oor. Siektes en botsings met koloniste het hulle dermate uitgedun.

Die Koningin het in haar rede ook verwys na die 32 ongevalle by Virginia Tech op 16 April, die gevolg van ‘n Suid-Koreaanse student, Cho Song-Hui se uitbarsting. "Virginia is nog steeds in ‘n toestand van skok" het die vors gesê nadat sy ‘n aantal oorlewendes van die voorval ontmoet het. Daarna sal sy ‘n perdewedren bywoon in Kentucky.

Dit is haar vierde besoek aan die VSA. Sy sal deur Bush onthaal word in die Withuis, NASA se Goddard Space Flight Center besoek en by ‘n gedenkteken vir die Tweede Wêreldoorlog aandoen.

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