Ek het voorheen geskryf oor pogings om staatkundige eenheid in Europa te bewerkstellig, bv met die Europese Unie (EU). Dit is in ooreenstemming met die versugting na globalisering: “The Enlightenment, in which the idea of the European Union is intellectually rooted, demands universal citizenship,” volgens Gaspar Miklos Tamas (Ivan Krastev, bron hier onder, Kindle 381). Ek het ook oor die inkommerprobleem geskryf: die buitensporige mate waarin ekonomiese vlugtelinge en asielsoekers op Europa toesak. Dit vind aanklank by politieke byderwetsheid, humanitêre simpatieë en liberalisties-linkse politiek. Daarvolgens is die inkommers bv op welsynstoelaes geregtig, al het hulle niks tot die staatskas of die heil van die betrokke land bygedra nie. Dat hulle in baie gevalle onwettig die land binnegekom het en dus misdadigers is, word nie teen hulle gereken nie. ‘n Teenreaksie het gelukkig spoedig ingetree. Pleks van eendersverklarende kosmopolitiese begeertes word die belangrikheid van eiesoortige kultuur binne nasionale state beklemtoon. ‘n Nuwe waardering het nie net vir die handhawing van beveiligde landsgrense ontwikkel nie, maar ook groter bewustheid van die ons/hulle-onderskeid. “He is among us, but he is not of us” (234).
In groot mate het die Europeërs deesdae vir die eerste keer op eie bodem te make met mense (bv Moslems en swart Afrikane) wat kultureel grondig van hulle verskil. Waaraan ek al dikwels gedink het, is: Gestel die Europeërs het vroeër hierdie eerstehandse ervaring opgedoen. Myns insiens kon hulle dan groot simpatie met die blanke bewind in Suid-Afrika gehad het. Hulle sou die blankes/Afrikaners moreel en materieel ondersteun het, omdat hulle begrip vir die sterk onderlinge kulturele bande sou gehad het; ook begrip vir die groot kulturele kloof tussen ons en “die ander” want die onderskeid word nie op grond van velkleur gemaak nie maar omdat “die ander” ‘n ander denk- en leefwyse het. Ek het al dikwels die ooreenkomste tussen die lot van die blankes in Algerië en Suid-Afrika uitgewys. In albei gevalle het ‘n miljoen blankes gevlug toe enersyds Arabiese en Berberse Moslems en andersyds terroristies-kommunistiese swartes beheer van die regering oorgeneem het. Krastev skryf: “In many respects, people who vote today for the Far Right in Europe share the sentiments of French pied noirs [Algerian whites] who where forced to leave Algeria at the time of the War of Independence [1954-1962]” (356). Wanneer ek as ontheemde in die nuwe Suid-Afrika nostalgies na foto’s uit my verlede kyk, is dit soos “a postcard from a lost world, a place where [I] felt at home” (761).
Omdat ek reeds dikwels oor hierdie onderwerp gelees en geskryf het, het ek aanvanklik nie Ivan Krastev se boek, After Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017, 125p; Amazon Kindle $11,49), gelees nie. Toe daar vanjaar ‘n bygewerkte weergawe teen dieselfde prys beskikbaar gestel is, het ek besluit om dit te koop. Ek is nie spyt daaroor nie, want dit is ‘n briljant geargumenteerde uiteensetting. Vir my as leser het dit voorgekom asof elke stelling en selfs woord deeglik deur die outeur oorweeg is en dat hy uitstekend oor die onderwerp ingelig is. Die bywerking van 11 bladsye is tot die laaste afdeling beperk. Dit het my in mindere mate beïndruk omdat die outeur daarin in ‘n mate afbreek wat hy in die oorspronklike uitgawe staangemaak het.
‘n Boek wat min of meer oor dieselfde onderwerp handel, is ‘n bundel opstelle geredigeer deur Heinrich Geiselberger, The great regression (2017, 220p; Amazon Kindle $11,49). Twee ander boeke deur Krastev is In mistrust be trust: Can democracy survive when we can’t trust our leaders? (2013, 71p; Amazon Kindle $3,44) en Democracy disrupted: The politics of global protest (2014, 89p; Amazon Kindle $11,49). Met Stephen Holmes as mede-outeur het daar ook die volgende boek van Krastev verskyn: The light that failed: A reckoning (2019, 240p; Amazon Kindle $23,20). Dit is die lig van liberalisme wat al hoe dowwer skyn. Dit hang saam met Krastev se voorbehoude oor demokrasie en globalisme. Laasgenoemde boek het dieselfde hooftitel as een van Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) se romans (1891), wat oor ‘n mislukte liefdesverhouding handel. Kipling het ook die gedig, “The white man’s burden” (1899), geskryf, waarin hy as geswore imperialis die Amerikaners aanmoedig om die Fillipyne te annekseer. Van 1898 tot 1908 het Kipling dikwels tyd in Kaapstad deurgebring. Hy was ‘n sterk ondersteuner van die Britte in die Anglo-Boereoorlog.
‘n Groot voordeel van Krastev se 2017-teks is dat dit ‘n Oos-Europese siening van die ondewerp is terwyl hieroor (ten minste in Engels) meesal uit ‘n tradisioneel Westerse perspektief geskryf word. Krastev is verbonde aan die Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgarye. Dit is bekend dat lande in Oos-Europa minder welvarend as dié in Wes-Europa is. Om hierdie rede het Oos-Europa nie so ‘n groot probleem met inkommers wat wil parasiteer nie. Die sterk verset teen inkommers is daarom vir my des te meer interessant. Maar dit moet ook in gedagte gehou word dat hierdie lande onder kommunistiese bewind (oorwegend) blank gebly het. Dit gaan vir Oos-Europeërs nie soseer om die behoud van materiële dinge nie, maar om die bewaring en voortsetting van hulle geestelike erfenis.
Dit is bekend dat staatsryke kom en gaan. In Oos-Europa is dit bv die skielike ineenstorting van die Habsburgse Hongaars-Oostenrykse Ryk in 1914 ná die sluipmoord op aartshertog Franz Ferdinand wat ingrypende gevolge gehad het. Maar so ook die verbrokkeling van die Sowjetunie ná die val van die Berlynse muur op 9 November 1989. Daar was ‘n wydverspreide maar foutiewe aanname dat albei hierdie ryke gekom het om te bly, net soos die Britte gedink het die son sou nooit oor die Britse Ryk sak nie. Krastev verwys afwisselend na Sentraal- of Oos-Europa. Met albei bedoel hy eintlik eens kommunistiese Europa. Namate die Sowjetunie verkrummel het, het Europa as ‘t ware al hoe meer ooswaarts uitgebrei. Dieselfde gebeur met die Europese Unie.
Wat vir my nog steeds ‘n skokkende misdaad teen Europese beskawing bly, is dat die 1989-gebeure plaaslik op so ‘n vergesogte manier vertolk is dat dit tot die ondergang van blanke politieke beheer in Suid-Afrika gelei het. “When man-made worlds of political and cultural artifice disappear, they do so quickly” (38). Die vraag wat Krastev homself afvra, is: “Are we experiencing a similar ‘disintegration moment’ in Europe today?” (38). Blank Suid-Afrika se disintegrasie het op ‘n spesifieke dag begin: FW de Klerk se toespraak in die parlement op 2 Februarie 1990. Die NP-onderhandelaars het daarna telkens voor die voortgesette geweldpleging van ANC-terroriste en -kommuniste geswig. Daardie geweld is onder die leiding van die latere vredesikoon en versoener, Nelson Mandela, gepleeg.
Die dwaasheid van 1990/94 in Suid-Afrika én die aanvanklike verwelkoming van inkommers in Europa herinner aan wat George Orwell gesê het: “To see what is in front of one’s nose needs a constant struggle” (73). De Klerk & kie het gewone, goeie, redelike mense pleks van klipharde, immorele terroriste en kommuniste voor hulle oë aan die onderhandelingstafel gesien. “Societies sometimes do commit suicide, and they do it with a certain élan as well” (73). Soos uit my vorige rubriek blyk, verkeer iemand soos Leon Wessels steeds in die waan dat hy uitsonderlik gepresteer het deur in groter mate as enige ander NP-onderhandelaar ten prooi van die wense/eise van die bose ANC/SAKP te val. Sedert 2015 ly Europa weens inkommers onder terreuraanvalle soortgelyk aan dié destyds in Suid-Afrika. In Suid-Afrika se geval is die 1990/94-terreur, ongelooflik soos dit mag klink, onder meer gepleeg deur terroriste wat toegelaat is om na Suid-Afrika terug te keer, of sulke inkommers wat terroriste in Suid-Afrika opgelei het. Dit is moontlik gemaak deur De Klerk se verslapping van die sekuriteitsmaatreëls. In daardie sin was dit selfmoord.
“The [European] Union looks more than ever like a community of fate” (62), wat die inwoners kan noop om saam te staan om die kulturele en terreurbedreigings die hoof te bied. Maar dit gebeur nie noodwendig nie. Angela Merkel, die Duitse staatshoof, het dermate aan skuldgevoelens oor hulle Nazi-verlede gely dat sy aanvanklik nie net inkommers onbeperk toegelaat het nie, maar hulle selfs aangemoedig het om in groot getalle na Duitsland te kom. Linkses poog om hierdie optrede soos volg te regverdig: dat ‘n verouderde Duitse bevolking jong mense as werkers nodig het. In bv Japan is daar wat veroudering betref ‘n situasie soortgelyk aan dié in Duitsland. Maar in Japan word geredeneer dat outomatisering, bv robotisering, die arbeidsmag in afdoende mate sal aanvul. Pleks van ekonomiese oorwegings te prioritiseer, soos in Duitsland, verkies die Japannese wyslik om eerder die behoud van hulle kultuur voorop te stel. In Europa “the fear of a barbarian invasion coexists with a fear of a robot-driven transformation … How society will function when work is a privilege and not a right or duty is not a theoretical question” (570).
In Duitsland en elders in Europa kom daar in elk geval dikwels min van toegewyde werk deur inkommers tereg. Hulle verkies om eerder op die welsynsvoordele te parasiteer, wat van staatskant al hoe meer ontaard in “borrowing from future generations in the form of deficit spending” (111). Terselfdertyd is werkloosheid in Europa, soos in Suid-Afrika, ‘n teelaarde vir misdaad. Krastev se gevolgtrekking is: “Immigration is unlikely to provide Europe with a solution for its demographic weakness” (99), maw ‘n mens kan nie die blanke bevolking sinvol of bevredigend met sulke inkommers aanvul nie. Uiteraard kan die tradisionele bevolking nog minder wyslik met die inkommers vervang word. Maar daardie nuwes kan die inheemses uiteindelik verswelg.
“The geopolitical rationale for European unity vanished with the Soviet Union’s collapse” (87). Dit kan wees dat ‘n veranderingsoomblik vir Europa aangebreek het of naby is. “A passing glance at China, India, and Russia, not to speak of the vast reaches of the Muslim world, makes clear that both ethnic nationalism and religion remain major driving forces in global politics. Europe’s postmodernism, postnationalism, and secularism make it different from the rest of the world, not a harbinger of what necessarily awaits it. What is also visible in the context of the refugee crisis is that national loyalties, once considered dead and buried, are back – with a vengeance – in contemporary Europe” (122).
Krastev verduidelik die boektitel soos volg:
“It is this new reality that first inspired me to think in terms of after Europe. After Europe signifies that the old continent has both lost its centrality in global politics and the confidence of Europeans themselves – the confidence that its political choices can shape the future of the world. After Europe means that the European project has lost its teleological appeal and that the idea of a ‘United States of Europe’ is less inspiring than at perhaps any other moment in the last fifty years. After Europe means that Europe is suffering from an identity crisis in which its Christian and Enlightenment legacies are no longer secure. After Europe does not necessarily mean that the European Union is at an end so much as it signals that we need to leave behind our naïve hopes and expectations about the future shape of Europe and the world” (134).
“The only way to deal with the risk of disintegration [of Europe] is to recognise clearheadedly that the refugee crisis has dramatically changed the nature of democratic politics on the national level and that what we are witnessing in Europe is not simply a populist riot against the establishment but a voters’ rebellion against the meritocratic elites (best symbolized by hard-working, competent officials in Brussels who are nonetheless out of touch with the societies they are supposed to represent and serve). How the refugee crisis has changed European societies and why citizens resent the meritocratic elites are the two issues this book will try to address. (What the refugee crises has clarified is that Europeans no longer dream of some distant utopia. There really is no imagined perfect land where they want to live. The new dream is for what one might call Nativia – a distant island to which unwanted foreigners can be sent without the slightest pang of guilt) (196).
Die optimistiese idee van ‘n nuwe wêreldorde het volgens Kenneth Jowitt plek gemaak vir “the new world disorder” (294). “In [Francis] Fukuyama’s imagination, Europe was the model for the coming global liberal order. For Jowitt, on the other hand, the old continent was the epicenter of the new world disorder” (307). “There is depression: ‘We are lost; Europe is turning into Europastan!’” (434).
Dwarsdeur die boek het Krastev dit teen die “meritocratic elite”. In Europa is die elite seker intellektueel die meerdere van die populistiese massa, maar nie noodwendig kultureel nie. Ek dink Krastev se eintlike beswaar is teen burokratiese politici wat min kennis van en nog minder begrip vir die massa se belange het. In Suid-Afrika, waar daar bitter min sprake van intellektualiteit by die ANC-regime is, is die gaping tussen die politici en die gepeupel se leefwêrelde (die een buitensporig luuks, die ander brandarm) so groot dat ek ‘n revolusie voorsien. Krastev verwys na Europa se “demographic dystopia”: “In order to ensure their prosperity, Europeans need to open their borders; yet such openness threatens to annihilate their cultural distinctiveness” (570). Maar as Europeërs nou reeds hulle utopiese drome afgesweer het, hoe diep is die put nie vir die blankes in Suid-Afrika wat daagliks in ‘n distopie met rommelstatus moet lewe terwyl daar geen vooruitsig op verbetering is nie? ‘n Manier waarop verligting verkry kan word, is ‘n nieu-Robbeneiland, ‘n lekker groot een, waarheen alle misdadigers gestuur word, bv almal wat skole en winkels plunder, paaie versper, boere vermoor, vee en kragkabels steel, ens, asook alle onwettige inkommers.
“The refugee crisis turned out to be Europe’s 9/11” (245). “[It] now looks increasingly like the second coming of decolonization” (344). “In the twenty-first century, migration is the new revolution – not a twentieth-century of the masses, but an exit-driven revolution of individuals and families. It is inspired not by ideologically inscribed paintings of radiant futures but by Google Maps photos of life on the other side (of the border). In order to succeed, this new revolution doesn’t require ideology, political movements, or political leaders. For so many of the wretched of the earth, crossing the European Union’s border is a matter of human necessity and hardly a question of a utopian future” (208).
Wat dikwels misgekyk word, is dat hierdie migrante doelbewus ‘n nieblanke regime vir ‘n blanke regering verruil omdat laasgenoemde beter (bv meer doeltreffende) regeerders is. Maar dan word daar van die Suid-Afrikaanse blankes verwag om entoesiasties oor die “onderhandelde revolusie” van 1994 te wees.
“The problem with the migration revolution – as in any revolution, really – is that it contains within itself the capacity to inspire counterrevolution. In this case, the revolution has inspired the rise of threatened majorities as a major force in European politics. These anxious majorities fear that foreigners are taking over their countries and jeopardizing their way of life” (208). In Suid-Afrika is die situasie heeltemal anders. ‘n Kultureel andersoortige meerderheid is mandaadloos in beheer van die land geplaas en probeer om die eens polities magtige blanke minderheid ten minste kultureel te vernietig. ‘n Verdere revolusie is moontlik, selfs waarskynlik, maar dit sal uit die swart meerderheid ontspruit en na verwagting, ten minste aanvanklik, die gepeupel in groter mate as die 1994-revolusie bevoordeel. Van verligting van die blankes se lot is daar nie sprake nie. Die blankes se saak is in 1990/94 verbrou. Daar sal myns insiens geen tweede kans wees nie.
“Many Europeans unconditionally accept the flow of immigrants as a sign of democracy’s failure” (282). Hoewel ‘n demokraties verkose regering veronderstel is om uitdrukking aan die wense van die meerderheid kiesers te gee, was sulke regerings dikwels geneig om die weerstand wat by die meerderheid kiesers teen inkommers bestaan, te ignoreer. “For many, ‘democracy’ in the EU quickly became code for the political impotence of citizens. Rather than Brussels symbolizing the glory of a common European home, the EU’s capital came to represent the unrestricted power of the markets and the destructive power of globalization” (886). In hierdie sin “democracy can be a trigger for destabilization” (508). ‘n Diktator soos Muammar Gadafi van Libië het Europa redelik doeltreffend teen inkommers beskerm. Nadat hy weens die Westerse, veral Amerikaanse, sug na demokrasie uit sy pos verwyder is, het die migrantevloed Europa getref. Dit is waarom daar in Europa toenemende simpatie met regeringsvorme is wat meer outoritêr as demokrasie is.
Die strategie van baie van die demokrasië in Europa het spoedig verander. “In the age of migration, democracy has begun to operate as an instrument of exclusion, not inclusion” (208). In Amerika is Donald Trump die toonbeeld hiervan. Hy wil Amerikaanse verblyfreg en burgerskap so moeilik moontlik vir merietelose migrante maak. In Europa is daar die opkoms van regse politieke partye wat alles moontlik doen om migrante buite hulle lande te hou. Selfs regerings wat nie naastenby regs is nie, het dit nodig gevind om versperrings op hulle grense aan te bring sodat migrante nie so maklik kan inkom nie. “Open borders are no longer a sign of freedom but are now a symbol of insecurity” (496). “In the 1990s, globalization meant the opening of borders for ideas, goods and capital” (508). Globalisme het in ‘n nagmerrie ontaard toe ook mense op groot skaal en dikwels onwettig oor landsgrense begin beweeg het.
“Liberal notions of tolerance, cheaply reduced to a caricatured notion of ‘political correctness,’ have come to be seen as the enemy of the people” (282). Daar is “the inability and unwillingness of liberal elites to discuss migration and contend with its consequences … [The] revolt against the hypocrisy of liberal elites is fundamentally reshaping Europe’s political landscape” (332). “Tolerance and civility were long the defining characteristics of the European Union. Today they are often perceived as the EU’s core vulnerabilities” (520). “The idea of ‘creative destruction’ was at the very heart of our experience with globalization. But if a decade ago we preferred to focus on the ‘creative,’ now the focus is, regretably, on the ‘destruction’” (520).
Dit herinner aan Suid-Afrika se onlangse geskiedenis. Veral in die jare tagtig het die ANC/UDF alles moontlik probeer doen om af te breek wat onder die leiding van die blankes tot stand gebring is. Dit het geskied in die waan dat daar later onder ‘n ANC-regime iets beters tot stand gebing sou word. Vandaar die ANC se heropbou en ontwikkelingsprogram ná die 1994-ramp, sonder om openlik te erken dat wat heropgebou moet word, is wat die ANC/UDF doelbewus en eiehandig afgebreek het. In werklikheid het al hoe groter verval ná 1994 ingetree, soos gesimboliseer deur die verwerwing van ekonomies-finansiële rommelstatus. Dit is vir onkundiges en onbekwames veel makliker om af te breek as om op te bou.
By ‘n vorige geleentheid het ek geskryf oor David Goodhart se onderskeid tussen “Anywhere people” en “Somewhere people” (Praag, 8.12.2018). Heel gepas verwys Krastev ook daarna: “The conflicts between Anywheres and Somewheres, between globalists and nativists, and between open societies and closed societies have become more important in shaping voters’ political identities than previous class-based identities” (460). Krastev verskaf dan hierdie interessante inligting oor Amerika: “Among the many electoral maps published after the last US elections, one captures this [the Somewheres and Anywheres phenomenon] particularly well, showing that although Trump-land covers around 85 percent of the land mass of the United States, those living in Clinton-land make up roughly 54 percent of the population. If we imagine these regions as two countries, we notice immediately that Clinton-land, composed of coastal regions and urban islands, suggests nineteenth-century Britain, while Trump-land more resembles the landmasses of Eurasia governed by Russia and Germany. The political struggle between Clinton and Trump was one between sea power and land power, between people who think in terms of space and people who think in terms of place” (460).
Die volgende waarneming is ook van aktuele belang: “[The] Harvard historian and legal scholar Samuel Moyn convincingly argues [that] the birth date of the human rights movement is relatively recent, sometime in the 1970s. Further, in order to understand properly the popularity of the human rights paradigm, we should recognize that it is a substitute for both nation-centered utopias and other internationalist utopias like socialism” (484). Menseregte-aktiviste veronderstel sowel die gelykheid as wesenlike eendersheid van mense en is dus geneig om beswaard oor nasiestate en landsgrense te wees. Maar ek dink nie menseregte lê (noodwendig) sosialisme aan bande nie. Byvoorbeeld, die ANC-regime is gaande oor menseregte (vir swartes) en terselfdertyd geswore aanhangers van sosialisme, wat sonder beswaar maar tot kommunisme oordryf kan word, bv in hulle “Tweede Demokratiese Revolusie”. “The insistence of political theorists such as Stephen Holmes that rights have costs, and that divorcing the capacity of the state from the ability of the regime to make rights real, has been ignored” (484). Dink maar net aan wat die agt menseregtekommissarisse en hulle administratiewe onderbou Suid-Afrika jaarliks kos en in hoeverre hulle daarin slaag om menseregte vir blankes te verseker.
In die Europese Unie is daar “a clash of solidarities: national, ethnic, and religious … Western Europeans as a rule trust their national governments … In the East … the majority of people there are more likely to trust Brussels than their national governments. They had pinned their hopes on technocrats in Brussels proving more competent and less corrupt than their national leaders” (582). Ná 1989 was die situasie in Oos-Europa dus aanvanklik soortgelyk aan dié in Suid-Afrika: Die kiesers het nog nie afdoende aangepas by die nuwe demokratiese opset nie. Die regerings gee dus nie werklik uitdrukking aan die wense van die meerderheid kiesers nie en is boonop ondoeltreffend en korrup. In Europa het massa-migrasie hierdie situasie teen 2015 radikaal verander. “The migration crisis upended this dynamic. Germans and Swedes are now less convinced that their governments are capable of shaping the EU’s common policies, while eastern Europeans, still skeptical about the competence and honesty of their national governments, now place more faith in them than in Brussels. They see them ready to defend what lies squarely in the national interest. In short, migration has brought a renationalization of politics and a concomitant resurrection of the East-West divide, if indeed it ever really disappeared” (582).
Waarop dit myns insiens neerkom, is dat die Wes-Europese lande, ten spyte van toenemende teenkanting in eie geledere, amptelik voortgaan om die Europese Unie se liberale migrasiebeleid te steun. Die Oos-Europese lande, daarenteen, het om ekonomiese redes aansluiting by die welvarender Wes-Europese land gesoek en daarom lid van die Europese Unie geword. Maar die migrantekrisis noop hulle om ter behoud van hulle kulturele identiteit hulle van die EU se migrasiebeleid te distansieer. Dít terwyl Oos-Europa ‘n groot uitvloei van inwoners na veral Wes-Europa ervaar en dus eintlik ekonomies-aktiewe migrante nodig het (630). Hulle teenstand spruit uit hulle bewustheid van “the darker sides of so-called multiculturalism” (641). “What this may intimate is that the unification of Europe has always been far more a dream than a reality. And it is the return of the East-West divide, more than any other political development, that fuels fears of a wholesale or even partial disintegration of the EU” (594).
Dit is ook “central Europe’s deeply rooted mistrust toward a cosmopolitan mindset that divides East and West. Eastern Europe does not have a colonial history and thus lacks a sense of guilt, but it also lacks a shared fate that often accompanies colonial encounters” (737). Oos-Europeërs het nie ‘n kosmopolitiese verlede nie. In soverre hulle ‘n breër ervaring as hulle eie land het, is dit die onaangename herinnering aan kommunistiese oorheersing. Vir hulle is daar “the direct connection between communism and internationalism, that partially explains central Europe’s senstivities when it comes to the refugee crisis” (774). “The German drive for cosmopolitanism was also a way to escape the xenophobic legacy of Nazism, while it could be argued that central Europe’s anticosmopolitanism is partially rooted in an aversion to the communist-imposed internationalism” (774).
“Being a normal country was the dream of eastern European society. The West’s normality was embodied by its prosperity, civility, and economic success. Three decades later, postmodern Europe is viewed by many eastern Europeans as culturally abnormal” (749). Maar die inkommers het ook ‘n mate van herbesinning in Wes-Europa genoodsaak. “The demand for democracy in Europe has been transformed into a call to defend one’s own political community and thus a demand for exclusion rather than inclusion. It also creates a dynamic in which the European project is seen no longer as an expression of liberal universalism but as a sour expression of its defensive parochialism” (791). In Europa is daar ‘n herontdekking en herwaardering van eie kultuur. Plaaslik besef en verstaan iemand soos die armsalige Wim de Villiers dit nie. Hy weet nie dat sy passie om studente met wêreldburgerskap te indoktrineer en hulle ooreenkomstig op te lei in die Weste al hoe meer uit die mode raak nie. Maar solank hy die Afrikanergeskiedenis van die Universiteit Stellenbosch (US) met wortel en tak uitroei, insluitende Afrikaans so veel en so gou moontlik, bly die ANC-regime tevrede met die US se transformasieteikens.
“The public in Eastern Europe (aside from a relatively small number of die-hard liberals) remains largely unmoved by the plight of the refugees. That’s why leaders there have lambasted Brussels’s decision to redistribute refugees among EU member states. Prime Minister Robert Fico of Slovakia has asserted that his country would be prepared to accept only Christians … The leader of the governing Law and Justice Party in Poland, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, warned that accepting refugees would be a public health risk because of the allegedly dangerous diseases migrants carry with them. Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, contends that the European Union’s moral duty is not to help the refugees but to guarantee general security” (606). Die sterk teenkanting teen migrante in Pole is te begrype omdat die land eers ná 1989 daarin kon slaag om 98% etnies Pools te word (653).
“Citizenship means common descent and shared culture. It was precisely from nineteenth-century Germans that central Europeans borrowed the idea of the nation as cultural unity” (653). “Being more impoverished than western Europeans, they wonder how anyone can expect them to express spontaneous humanitarian solidarity” (665). “Gay marriages signify fewer kids and further demographic decline. For an eastern European nation haunted by low birth rates and migration, the endorsement of gay culture is like endorsing your own disappearance” (689). Is dit nie waarom Naspers/Media24-publikasies sowel rasgemengde as selfdegeslag-huwelike by iedere moontlike geleentheid met teks en foto’s aan lesers en kykers opdring nie? Die onderliggende motivering skyn te wees die vernietiging van die plaaslike blankedom, veral die Afrikanerdom met sy beweerde slegte apartheidsverlede.
“It is loyalty – namely, the unconditional loyalty to ethnic, religious, or social groups – that is at the heart of the appeal of Europe’s new populism” (1212). “The emerging illiberal political consensus is not limited to right-wing radicalism; it encompasses the transformation of the European mainstream itself. It is not what extremists say that threatens Europe; the real threat is what the mainstream leaders no longer say – principally, that diversity is good for Europe” (1070). Dit word die “illiberal turn” genoem (945). “The rise of the populist sentiments signals a return to political polarization and a more confrontational style of politics … The Left-Right divide is being replaced by a conflict between internationalists and nativists … Populism’s key feature is a hostility not to elitism but to pluralism … Populists do not claim to stand for all Poles, French, or Hungarians, but they insist that they stand for all ‘true Poles,’ ‘true French,’ and ‘true Hungarians’” (958), soortgelyk aan die onderskeid wat tussen enersyds egte of ware Afrikaners en andersyds hanskakies, oorverligtes of verloopte Afrikaners gemaak word.
Aan die einde van sy 2017-boek het Krastev tot die volgende slotsom gekom: “The disintegration of the union is one of the most likely outcomes” (1442). Maar die teks is so kort ná twee onvoorsiene en hoogs onverwagte politieke verwikkelinge voltooi dat die gevolge daarvan toe nog nie in hulle volle omvang verwerklik was nie. Ek verwys na die pro-Brexit-uitslag van die referendum op 25 Junie 2016 in Brittanje en die verkiesing van Donald Trump as Amerikaanse president op 8 November 2016. In sy 2020-bywerking skryf Krastev oor sy 2017-boek: “It guessed (correctly) that the refugee crisis of 2015 would profoundly transform European politics. It predicted (wrongly) that Europeans’ newly born love for referenda could bring the end of the union. The book was read as pessimistic and gloomy, and in a way it is. But it is also a book of hope. ‘Hope is definitely not the same thing as optimism,’ wrote Václav Havel [1936-2011]” (1499), die president van die Tsjeggiese Republiek (1993-2003). In die nuwe Suid-Afrika behoort Afrikaners dalk ook hierdie onderskeid te maak sodat hulle nie op moedverloor se vlakte beland nie.
Krastev het sy deuntjie verander. Die vraag is of sy gewysigde siening korrek is. “The European populist revolution that started with the promise to destroy the EU has ended up reconciling itself to the idea that disintegration of the union would be a tragedy for Europeans. Nostalgia for the nation state is still present in the rhetoric of the populist right, but it’s begun to take the decline of the nation state for granted” (1536). Dalk probeer Krastev om te gou ‘n nuwe tendens te bespeur. “For many European societies, particularly in the East, the fear of emigration (your compatriots leaving your country for another) outweighs the fear of migration (foreigners trying to join your country) and better explain the support for populist parties” (1536). Maar is die leemte wat gelaat word deur mense wat landuit vlug (noodwendig) erger as die mate waarin inkommers met ‘n wildvreemde kultuur ‘n land, hetsy op kort- of langtermyn, kan opdonder?
“If there is one single factor that is most responsible for Europe making its peace with the idea of maintaining the union in some form, it is Brexit. Since 2016, Great Britain has been transformed in almost unimaginable ways. It has become provincial, disoriented, and unimportant. [?] What once was the greatest empire in the history of the world has started to resemble a rebellious colony” (1548). Maar Ian Smith (1919-2007) van Rhodesië-faam (eerste minister 1964-1979) het die Britte lank gelede al daaraan herinner dat Great Britain tot Britain gekrimp het. Die teenstanders van Brexit het groot rampspoed vir die land voorspel, maar te oordeel aan die wisselkoers gaan dit veel beter met die Britse ekonomie as dié van baie ander lande, noodwendig insluitende Suid-Afrika. Brittanje het ‘n onontbeerlike bondgenoot in Trump se Amerika. Die vraag is of skeptisisme oor Trump as persoon nie dalk Krastev se ongunstige evaluering van Brexit oormatig beïnvloed nie, asook sy bewering van ‘n afname in die entoesiasme vir nasionalisme en nasionale state in (Oos-)Europa.
